J. OF INDIAN
phil

G. K. V.

1 160

Vol. 12 - 1984

12P.

RT 1036

[illegible]
Karachi [illegible] Road
JAWALAPUR

110160

VOLUME 12 No. 1 MARCH 1984

69
B9
110160

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

181.4

EDITOR: BIMAL K. MATILAL

30/12

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
DORDRECHT : HOLLAND / BOSTON : U.S.A.

ISSN 0022-17
CODEN JIPHDI 12(1) 1-104 (19

1.

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Editor:

B. K. MATILAL, *All Souls College, Oxford University, Oxford, England*

Board of Consulting Editors:

GOPIKAMOHAN BHATTACHARYA, *Kuruksetra, India*
KALIDAS BHATTACHARYA, *Visva-Bharati, India*
KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA, *Paris, France*
†JOHN BROUGH, *Cambridge, England*
GEORGE CARDONA, *Philadelphia, Penn., U.S.A.*
MASAAKI HATTORI, *Kyoto, Japan*
HANS HERZBERGER, *Toronto, Canada*
DANIEL H. H. INGALLS, *Harvard, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.*
DALSUKH MALVANIA, *Ahmedabad, India*
J. N. MOHANTY, *Norman, Okla., U.S.A.*
T. R. V. MURTI, *Varanasi, India*
M. NAGATOMI, *Harvard, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.*
KARL H. POTTER, *Seattle, Wash., U.S.A.*
D. SEYFORT RUEGG, *Seattle, Wash., U.S.A.*
J. F. STAAL, *Berkeley, Calif., U.S.A.*

Associate Editor:

J. MOUSSAIEFF MASSON, *University of California, Berkeley, Calif., U.S.A.*

Publication programme, 1984: Volume 12 (4 issues).
Subscription prices, per volume: Dfl. 195,-/$ 78.00 including postage.
Private individuals (no institutions, libraries, etc.) may subscribe at the reduced rate of Dfl. 65,-/$ 26.00 per volume. They must declare that the subscription is for their own private use, it will not replace any existing institutional subscription, and it will not be put at the disposal of any library.
Subscriptions should be sent to **D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland,** or to any subscription agent.
Private subscriptions should be sent direct to the publisher, as above or at **190 Old Derby Street, Hingham, MA 02043, U.S.A.**
For advertisement rates, prices of back volumes, and other information, please apply to Dordrecht.

D. Reidel Publishing Company is a member of the Kluwer Group.

Photocopying. This journal is registered at the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 21 Congress Street, Salem, MA 01970, U.S.A.
Authorisation to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by D. Reidel Publishing Company for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) Transactional Reporting Service, provided that the fee of $0.10 per copy per page is paid directly to CCC. 0022-1791/84$0.10.
This authorisation does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as that for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale.

The permission to publish in this journal entails the author's irrevocable and exclusive authorisation of the publisher to collect any sums or considerations for copying or reproduction payable by third parties (as mentioned in article 17, paragraph 2, of the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912 and in the Royal Decree of June 20, 1974 (S. 351) pursuant to article 16b of the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912) and/or to act in or out of court in connection herewith.

© 1984 by D. Reidel Publishing Company. Printed in the Netherlands.

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Volume 12 – 1984

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
DORDRECHT : HOLLAND/BOSTON : U.S.A.

EDITOR

BIMAL K. MATILAL, All Souls College, Oxford University, Oxford, England

BOARD OF CONSULTING EDITORS:

GOPIKAMOHAN BHATTACHARYA, Kuruksetra, India
KALIDAS BHATTACHARYA, Visva-Bharati, India
KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA, Paris, France
† JOHN BROUGH, Cambridge, England
GEORGE CARDONA, Philadelphia, Penn., U.S.A.
MASAAKI HATTORI, Kyoto, Japan
HANS HERZBERGER, Toronto, Canada
DANIEL H. H. INGALLS, Harvard, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
DALSUKH MALVANIA, Ahmedabad, India
J. N. MOHANTY, Norman, Okla., U.S.A.
T. R. V. MURTI, Varanasi, India
M. NAGATOMI, Harvard, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
KARL H. POTTER, Seattle, Wash., U.S.A.
D. SEYFORT RUEGG, Seattle, Wash., U.S.A.
J. F. STAAL, Berkeley, Calif., U.S.A.

ASSOCIATE EDITOR:

J. MOUSAIEFF MASSON, University of California, Berkeley, Calif., U.S.A.

ISSN 0022-1791

All Rights Reserved
© 1984 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner

Printed in The Netherlands

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARTICLES

BROIDO, MICHAEL M. / Abhiprāya and Implication in Tibetan Linguistics 1
CHAKRABARTI, KISOR KUMAR / Some Remarks on Indian Theories of Truth 339
CRITTENDEN, CHARLES / Serenity 201
FENNER, PETER / A Study of the Relationship between Analysis (*vicāra*) and Insight (*prajñā*) Base on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* 139
FORT, ANDREW O. / The Concept of Sākṣin in Advaita Vedanta 277
FRANCO, ELI / Studies in the Tattvopaplavasiṃha. II. The Theory of Error 105
FRANCO, ELI / On the Interpretation of Prāmāṇasamuccaya (vrtti) I, 3d 389
GRANOFF, PHYLLIS / Holy Warriors: A Preliminary Study of some Biographies of Saints and Kings in the Classical Indian Tradition 291
HADGOPOULOS, DEMETRIUS JOHN / A Note on Inferring and Perceiving: (Anumiti and Saṁśayottara-Pratyakṣa 67
HOORNAERT, PAUL / The Bipolar Buddha 51
KATSURA, SHORYU / Dharmakīrti's Theory of Truth 215
MOHANTY, J. N. / Prāmāṇya and Workability - Response to Potter 329
PERRETT, ROY W. / Self-Refutation in Indian Philosophy 237
PERSZYK, KENNETH J. / Negative Entities and Negative Facts in Navya-Nyāya 265
POTTER, K. H. / Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief? 307
PRASAD, HARI SHANKAR / Time and Change in Sāṁkhya-Yoga 35
TILLEMANS, TOM J. F. / Two Tibetan Texts on the "Neither One nor Many" Argument for *Śūnyatā* 357

BOOK REVIEWS

Crawford, S. Cromwell, *The Evolution of Hindu Ethical Ideas* (JOSEPH T. O'CONNELL) 199
Matilal, Bimal Krishna, *Logical and Ethical Issues of Religious Belief* (J. LIPNER) 401

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Ruegg, David Seyfort, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy of India* (JACQUES MAY) 305

REVIEW ARTICLE

Lindtner, Chr., *Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna* (PAUL WILLIAMS) 73

MICHAEL M. BROIDO

ABHIPRĀYA AND IMPLICATION IN TIBETAN LINGUISTICS

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The words *abhisandhi* and *abhiprāya* are often translated by such words as "intention"; "*ābhiprāyika* by "intentional". This seems not exactly wrong, but somehow puzzling; it seems to represent a problem, rather than the solution of a problem.

The sense of puzzlement dissolves somewhat if we reflect that "intention" is indeed one of the normal meanings of *abhiprāya* in Sanskrit, but that *ābhiprāyika* does not correspond to this, but means something more like Edgerton's "specially intended". Of course there is no second sense of "intentional" in English corresponding to this use of "*ābhiprāyika*", and so Edgerton's "special" is not redundant. He does not distinguish a Buddhist Sanskrit use of *abhiprāya* corresponding to *ābhiprāyika* and to such words as *saṃdhā*, but in Tibet such a use was recognized and resulted in a clear ambiguity in the word *dgongs-pa*[1].

1.2. Speakers sometimes say what they mean, or mean what they say, and sometimes not; and the attempt to make clear what is involved in this kind of distinction leads to a cluster of problems in linguistics and in the philosophy of language. Clarity about these problems is important for any theory of the interpretation of texts. This paper is about some Tibetan attempts to articulate and apply the distinction between *ābhiprāyika* utterances and others. The applications discussed here will be mainly to interpretation of the tantras.

1.3. The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra[2] presents and discusses four varieties each of abhisandhi and abhiprāya. The Sanskrit and Tibetan for the verses on these are presented and the terms listed in Appendix A. Similar lists are found in the Mahāyāna-saṅgraha[3] and in the Abhidharmasamuccaya[4]. All these texts and/or their commentaries present rather similar illustrative examples.

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 1–33. 0022–1791/84/0121–0001 $03.30.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

1.4. The older and shorter Indian commentaries present a similarly puzzling picture. Neither the Sanskrit commentary on MSL nor the commentaries on MS quoted by Lamotte[6] nor the Sanskrit commentary on AS[7] clarify the terms at all.

1.5. The very bulky vṛtti-bhāṣya on MSL by Sthiramati[8], available only in Tibetan, is some advance on these shorter works, but is not wholly satisfactory, especially as the Tibetan for our main terms is different from that in all other Tibetan texts, translations and indigenous (see Appendix A). Really this text presents a separate puzzle of its own for the interpretation of *abhisandhi* and *abhiprāya*. Nevertheless, Sthiramati's examples are clearer than the similar ones in the shorter texts and his detailed discussion presents interesting new material; I shall use both of these.

1.6. When writing their own works, the Tibetans seem to have noticed these difficulties and to have developed their own approach. For us, however, this approach presents problems of its own since the Tibetans used technical terms which are not found in their translations of Indian texts and which themselves require interpretation. The term *dgongs-gzhi* will be important for us. Here I rely mainly on rGyal-sras Thogs-med[9], some of whose examples are discussed below and quoted in Appendix B.

1.7. Padma dKar-po, one of Tibet's most important writers on the tantras, has explained the difficult and controversial terms of the *mtha-drug*, which form an important part of the explanatory apparatus used in exegesis of the tantras, in terms of the notions of abhisandhi and abhiprāya and related Tibetan terms. He seems to have been the first person to use the MSL literature to explain the *mtha-drug*. He also seems to have been the person who replaced the term *dgongs-bshad* which is found in the Tibetan translations of *bshad-thabs* texts by the simpler and clearer term *dgongs-pa-can* (ābhiprāyika).[11] Some of his definitions and other specimen sentences using all these technical terms are given in Appendix C.

1.8. The *mtha-drug* (ṣaṭkoṭi) terms were normally defined in India and Tibet following the Pradīpoddyotana, the well-known commentary on the Guhyasamājatantra by the tantric Candrakīrti[12]. Padma dKar-po's definitions are better than the older ones both in their clarity and in their power to explain the numerous traditional examples in the literature. The centrepiece of this paper is the discussion of Padma dKar-po's definitions and comparison with the definitions used by Bu-ston and bTsong-kha-pa. Padma dKar-po also used new definitions for the *tshul-bzhi* terms; these definitions are given in Appendix C and briefly reviewed.

1.9. In the Hevajra-tantra and elsewhere we find a kind of 'code' or 'secret language' (gsang-skad). The Sanskrit word for this is sandhābhāṣa, often translated also by *dgongs-skad*. The lexical similarity between *dgongs-skad* and *dgongs-bshad* has led some scholars into a confused belief that these terms are closely related in meaning. Tibetan texts lend no support to this view. I will not review the matter here, since I have recently written about it at length elsewhere[13].

1.10. There is also of course a lexical similarity between the Sanskrit terms *sandhābhāṣa* and *abhisandhi*. Some Sanskritists have used this similarity in an attempt to work out the meaning of "sandhābhāṣa" as thus used in the Hevajra-tantra. The present paper throws no light on such proposals. (However the proposal to translate *sandhābhāṣa* by "intentional language" is wrong for the kind of reasons sketched in para. 1.1: *all* communicative use of language is intentional.)

1.11. The Sanskrit for *dgongs-bshad* is not known with certainty, but is no doubt some compound of sandh- and bhāṣ-. Suppose that it is sandhyābhāṣita, as Wayman proposes. Once the point made in 1.9 is taken on board, we can ask: is there any conclusion to be drawn from the lexical similarity of *sandhyābhāṣita* and *abhisandhi*? This question is *quite different* from the one posed in 1.10 and has, I think, not previously been posed in the Western scholarly literature. But a similar idea has been used by Padma dKar-po: "dgongs-pa-can" is related to "abhiprāya", and abhiprāya is a form of abhisandhi. This is the idea behind his treatment mentioned in para. 1.7.

1.12. When writing this paper I had not originally intended to deal with the separate, though closely related, problem of the use of phrases such as *dgongs-pas bshad-pa* and *dgongs-pas gsungs-pa* in the sūtra (i.e. non-tantra) literature, since Thogs-med and Padma dKar-po do not seem to treat it. However, after the completion of the paper Prof. David Seyfort Ruegg drew my attention to the discussion in Bu-ston's *bde-gshegs snying-po's mdzes-rgyan*. Some points raised in this work are briefly reviewed in the Postscript.

2. SOME TIBETAN LINGUISTIC TERMS

2.1. *ldem-po* is a fairly common attribute of sayings, and means roughly that they are not to be taken literally. At H, 16b2, Padma dKar-po glosses this word with *'khyog-pa*, literally "crooked" or "indirect".

2.2. *dgongs-pa* is both noun and verb. It is very often used for Skt. sandh- (though is our context it is the translation of *abhiprāya*). The verb can mean "to intend" or "to refer to". *dgongs-nas* can means "intending" or "in reference to". As noun, *dgongs-pa* can certainly mean "intention". But in our context the word carries the sense of a saying whose content is not conveyed directly but only by implication[14]. So in this context I shall interpret the verb *dgongs-pa* normally by "to *imply", the noun by "implication$_A$" (see 2.3 for the suffix), and the adjective by "implicative".

2.3. Nouns such as "saying" and "implication" have an act-object ambiguity: there is an *act* of saying, but "saying" may also mean *what is said*, the fact stated, the question asked, in short the content of the (act of) saying. Similarly for "assertion", "implication" etc. Our Tibetan authors seem to have signalled this distinction by the use of the word *gzhi* for the object, the act not being signalled. We seem to have the following correspondence:

brjod-pa	to say; act of saying
brjod-gzhi	content of a saying
dgongs-pa	to imply; act of implying
dgongs-gzhi	content of an implication.

In the second pair of cases, in order to signal the distinction while giving reasonably uncluttered interpretations, I shall use suffices, thus:

dgongs-pa (noun)	implication$_A$
dgongz-gzhi	implication$_C$

Among these words and their interpretations, the greatest difficulties concern the word *dgongs-gzhi*. My "content of an implication" and its abbreviation "implication$_C$" refer to the fact or state of affairs or proposition implied by an implicative utterance, as against the topic or subject-matter or what the utterance is about. In the examples reviewed in this paper, the *dgongs-gzhi* seems to be the content in this sense, and not say the topic implied, etc. (Borderline cases are possible, such as *śūnyatā*: is this – in its technical, madhyamaka use – a fact or a thing?)

2.4. Padma dKar-po frequently uses the term *brjod-don* (see Appendix C). This literally means "saying-intention" and does seem to be closely related to our *utterer's intention*.

2.5. The passages in Appendix C contain the phrase *dngos-bstan* eight times. On the basis of the appearance of this phrase in other texts, I conjecture that it is similar to *dngos-gzhi*. If this is right, then its relation to the phrases in which it is embedded in the passages of Appendix C is such that its function is little else than that of an emphatic particle (rather like "real" as in "real meaning"). So I will ignore it.

2.6. The word *dgos-pa* is both noun and verb. As a noun it frequently means "purpose". Where utterances and speech-acts are discussed in Tibetan, it often means a specific kind of purpose associated with an utterance, more remote than the perlocutionary intention[15] but more specific than the very general word *don*. When *dgos-pa* is used in this specific way I shall interpret with "*purpose". Of course *don* may easily mean the sense or meaning of words or utterances, as well as the point or the purpose of speech-acts or other actions.

As a verb, *dgos-pa* often means *to be required*, but here this sense can be quite inappropriate and, having regard to the sense of the noun *dgos-pa* I will often interpret the verb by *to intend*. Something like this is clearly essential in sentences e, f, g of appendix C.

2.7. Generally speaking, my idea in this paper is to focus as sharply as possible on the restricted context of the very narrow range of Tibetan texts discussed here. I am not claiming that these interpretations hold elsewhere than in the passages under discussion or that they are wholly satisfactory even there. They are to be regarded as *hypotheses*, to be tested by their explanatory value. For the moment I will be satisfied if they give us intelligible descriptions of the passages discussed in this article, especially the puzzling passages of Padma dKar-po quoted in Appendix C. Needless to say, I shall be happy if they turn out to apply more widely; but I think it much more likely that as our knowledge improves, they will be replaced by other interpretations which do apply more widely and which are perhaps also more accurate as regards these passages.

3. THOGS-MED ON ABHISANDHI AND ABHIPRĀYA

Together with 2.3, the standard equivalences

abhisandhi = ldem-por dgongs-pa
abhiprāya = dgongs-pa

would yield the interpretations

abhisandhi : indirect implication$_A$
abhiprāya : implication$_A$

As one would expect, however, this mechanical sticking-together of expressions gives only a very approximate fit, and on the whole I will leave these words in Sanskrit. Concerning the difference between abhisandhi and abhiprāya, Thogs-med says[16]:

> The four abhiprāyas are part of pratipakṣa-abhisandhi. Why then is there the distinction between abhiprāya and abhisandhi? Abhiprāya is concerned mainly to convey the implication$_C$, abhisandhi to convey the *purpose.

This seems vaguely reasonable but not particularly interesting. But we will see later that it is quite natural to include the particular four abhiprāyas given in pratipakṣa-abhisandhi. So we may feel that the hypotheses are worth testing on Thogs-med's examples, some of which are given in appendix B. We may also note that what we have so far fits in well with the standard translations into Tibetan of *abhiprāya* and *abhisandhi* but is difficult to reconcile with the translations used for the Sthiramati commentary. So let us go through Thogs-med's examples.

gzhug-pa-la ldem-por dgongs-pa (*avatāraṇa-abhisandhi*). In order to bring the Śrāvakas into the Mahāyāna, (the Buddha) said that forms and other outer objects exist. Here the implication$_C$ is that the subjective component in perception is mere appearance, since they take things literally[17] in accordance with their minds. The *purpose is to bring them into the Mahāyāna.

This example suggests that avatāraṇa-abhisandhi is an implication for the benefit of beginners. Little would be added by "indirect"; but it may be deceptive. The suggestion is consistent with the examples given in Indian texts, but more precise than the definitions there.

mtshan-nyid-la ldem-por dgongs-pa (*lakṣaṇa-abhisandhi*). It is the teaching that all things are lacking in svabhāva, etc. The implication$_C$ is that at the parikalpita level there is lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā; at the paratantra level there is utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā; and at the pariniṣpanna level there is paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā. The *purpose is to reverse the hankering after *satya*[19].

If I have correctly understood Thogs-med's use of "dgongs-gzhi", this example is slightly wrong. The idea is very clear in Sthiramati: we say (zhes, bshad, gsungs) that things are non-existent in reference (dgongs-nas) to their parikalpitasvabhāva, that things are unborn in reference to their paratantra-svabhāva, &c. In Thogs-med's terms: in *saying* that there are the svabhāvas we imply the lack of a (real) svabhāva, &c.

Then the phrase *lakṣaṇa-abhisandhi* just means "an indirect implication$_A$ as regards lakṣaṇa".

gnyen-po-la ldem-por dgongs-pa (*pratipakṣa-abhisandhi*) This means indirect implication$_A$ to counteract faults. The MSL and all related texts deal with this fully later on, under XII. 19–23; but this section has no special linguistic interest.

bsgyur-ba-la ldem-por dgongs-pa (*pariṇāmana-abhisandhi*) This example is very complex in all texts. The general idea is that one flatly says something quite improbable, here that the heart of the dharma is a wavering mind. The *purpose is to get people to renounce the disparagement of the Buddhadharma suggested by the thought that it is something easy. (I cannot follow Thogs-med's implication$_C$.) This is the case most similar to the dgongs-pa-can utterances of the tantras, as Thogs-med half-acknowledges by quoting the line (not found in the other texts)

/brjod-pa dgongs-pa zab-mo-can/

As we will see later, it is only in this case that the intention is held not to depend at all on the words and letters.

mnyam-pa-nyid-la dgongs-pa (*samatā-abhiprāya*) Śākyamuni, having praised the buddha Vipaśyin, then said "I myself at that time became Vipaśyin". The implication$_{C}$ is that the dharmakāya is the same for both. The *purpose is to bring people to renounce disparagement of Śakyamuni.

Samatā-abhiprāya, then, seems to be a saying that two things are the same in order to imply the sameness of some feature of them. (In other texts this seems less clear. This example is also interesting because the *purpose so obviously belongs to the interpreter, not to Śākyamuni.)

don gzhan-la dgongs-pa (*arthāntarābhiprāya*). Here Thogs-med says that the svabhāvatraya example given under lakṣaṇa-abhisandhi serves also here. Vasubandhu and Sthiramati use the word ayathāruta (non-literal, not according to convention). So arthāntara-abhiprāya means roughly: implication$_{A}$ that there is a referent different from the literal one.

dus gzhan-la dgongs-pa (*kālāntara-abhiprāya*). Thogs-med: as for instance when it says that anybody who prays to be reborn in Sukhāvatī, will be. The implication$_{C}$ is that this will indeed happen after a long time. The *purpose is as an antidote to laziness. (Sthiramati's example, though it also concerns a rebirth prayer, is not directly comparable.) Apparently *kālāntarābhiprāya* means something like: implication$_{A}$ that something will happen at a time different from the one expected according to a literal rendering.

ganz-zag-gi bsam-pa-la dgongs-pa (*pudgalāśaya-abhiprāya*). Thogs-med: as when one sometimes praises charity (dāna) and sometimes denigrates it. The implication$_{C}$ is that from the point of view of the non-practice of virtue, charity is an excellent thing, but from the point of view of the other pāramitās it is inferior. The *purpose is to introduce some people to the practice of charity while getting others who are over-satisfied with it to combine it with other things. So *pudgalāśaya-abhiprāya* seems to mean: implication$_{A}$ relating to the state of mind of the pupil.

It now seems obvious how all four abhiprāyas come under pratipakṣa-abhisandhi. Thogs-med concludes thus (cf. Appendix B):

> Abhisandhi and abhiprāya are not solely concerned with neyārtha, for the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha says that people become convinced of the entire buddha-word through the four abhisandhi's and the four abhiprāya's, and that pratipakṣābhisandhi includes any

action to counteract any of the 84,000 activities.[20] But (an objector replies) in the Samuccaya it says that abhisandhi expresses a purpose other than that of the letters, words and syllables of the text – the purpose is completely different. Surely this cannot be neyārtha? – But it applies only to pariṇāmana-abhisandhi.

The last remark is interesting since it strengthens the connection between pariṇāmana-abhisandhi and *dgongs-pa-can* utterance. (We will see in the Postscript that the argument would not have been accepted by Bu-ston. However I do not know whether Thogs-med was working with the same notions of neyārtha and nītārtha.)

4. THE MTHA-DRUG TERMS AT THE TIME OF PADMA DKAR-PO

On the whole, Padma dKar-po wrote for people who were already familiar with his subject-matter. Few of his works are "elementary". So a further preliminary to his application of the notion of implication to the tantras is needed: we must say something about how others viewed the relevant technical terms at the time he was writing (16C). The following summary of the mtha-drug (ṣaṭkoṭi) terms is based[21] on the works of Bu-ston[22] (1290–1364) and bTsong-kha-pa[23] (1357–1417).

4.1. *Drang-don* (neyārtha) and *nges-don* (nītārtha) describe two different explanations of one and the same passage.[24] These two explanations are said to differ mainly in the purpose (don) ascribed to the passage: underlying the remark is the convention that such purposes are those of the speaker (here, the buddha Vajradhara &c) though in fact it is the commentator who provides the two explanations and ascribes purposes associated with them. Of the two explanations, the one which is more advanced from the point of view of the path toward liberation is called *nges-don*, the other, less advanced, being *drang-don*.

4.2. A passage in which normal vocabulary is used according to normal linguistic conventions is called *sgra ji-bzhin* (yathāruta). Both authors agreed[25] that where words are used which are unknown in the world or in śāstras, so that the word and its use are connected *ad hoc*, adventitiously (glo-bur[26]) rather than by convention, the passage is to be called *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin* (nayathāruta). They claimed that the difference between these two modes of explanation is based on differences of *sgra* (śabda) and *don* (artha). See table.

4.3. *dgongs-pas bshad-pa* (short form *dgongs-bshad*) is a mode of explanation in which the discourse (tshig, ālāpa) of Vajradhara is held to be "opposed" (viruddha, 'gal-ba). The definition given in PPD omits to say what is opposed to what, and Tibetan authors filled the gap in different ways. Bu-ston thought that the passage had to be opposed to worldly usage[27]. bTsong-kha-pa, whose view is much clearer, thought that the literal sense (sgra) of the passage had to be opposed to its purpose (don)[28]. By contrast *dgongs-pa ma-yin-pas bshad-pa* (short: *dgongs-min*) is a mode of explanation in which (in either case) there is no such opposition. The two authors agreed that the difference between *dgongs-bshad* and *dgongs-min* explanation was to be seen by comparing two different passages having the same purpose (don[29]) and that the difference was then one of sense or of linguistic meaning (*sgra*) (see table).

4.4. It is obvious how our six terms fall into three pairs: drang-don/nges-don, sgra ji-bzhin/min, and dgongs-bshad/dgongs-min. Though Indian works such as PPD group them in this way, they have not stressed the specific principles of distinction between the members of each pair. Since Bu-ston perhaps did this first we may call this facet of the analysis *Bu-ston's principle.*[30] bTsong-kha-pa states the principle in the same form, but Padma dKar-po, while retaining its general shape, changed the details a good deal. These two views of Bu-ston's principle may be summed up thus:

BU-STON'S PRINCIPLE

	Bu-ston *bTsong-kha-pa*	*Padma dKar-po*
The distinction between:	is based on differences of:	
drang-don and nges-don	don (intention)	brjod-don (utterer's intention)
dgongs-bshad and dgongs-min	sgra (convention)	brjod-gzhi (content, i.e. whether implicative or not)
sgra ji-bzhin and sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin	sgra and don (convention and intention)	sgra (convention)

Elsewhere[31] it has been shown that the point of the middle column can be seen by taking *sgra* (śabda) to mean, roughly, words together with their sense or the linguistic meaning or linguistic conventions associated with them, and *don* (artha) to mean roughly the intention ascribed to the passage. (What appears in brackets in the table is a kind of slogan or mnemonic and should not be taken more seriously than that.) The claim is that the definitions and examples given by Bu-ston and bTsong-kha-pa become *intelligible* under these descriptions, even though we may, on reflection, consider them wrong or imprecise. That is, it should become *intelligible* that our authors believed that their definitions and examples are indeed definitions and examples of these terms. It is not claimed here that, under these interpretations of *sgra* and *don*, the definitions and examples in fact become accurate or appropriate. But at least they are not nonsense. It is most necessary to be clear that the interpretation of *sgra* by "word" or "words" and *don* by "meaning" can only turn our authors' observations into nonsense; I have dealt with this in detail elsewhere[32].

5. PADMA DKAR-PO ON THE MTHA-DRUG

It is convenient now to render most of the definitions in Appendix C in English. Though I stick fairly closely to the surface form of the Tibetan, nothing offered here is to be taken as a *translation*. The definitions (para. 5.1–2) are followed by some brief remarks on the place of the *mtha-drug* in the rest of Padma dKar-po's work, and then by detailed discussions of the six terms in the usual three pairs (5.4–6).

5.1. *Padma dKar-po on Bu-ston's principle*

(a) The difference between a *sgra ji-bzhin* (yathāruta) and a *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin* (ayathāruta) utterance is mainly one of convention.

(b) The difference between a *dgongs-pa-can* (ābhiprāyika) utterance and one which is not *dgongs-pa-can* is mainly one of how the content is conveyed, whether by implication (dgongs-pas) or explicitly.

(c) The difference between *drang-don* (neyārtha) and *nges-don* (nītārtha) interpretations is a matter of utterer's intention.

5.2. *Padma dKar-po's definitions of the mtha-drug*

(d) A *sgra ji-bzhin* (yathāruta) passage is one which can be understood without considering an utterer's intention different from that normally conveyed by the words.

(e) A *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin* (na yathāruta) passage is one which is intended to be understood mainly by considering an utterer's intention related to signs and letters (*brda* and *yi-ge*) and not to what is normally conveyed by the words.

(f) A *dgongs-pa-can* (ābhiprāyika) passage is one in which the utterer's intention can be understood only by considering implication$_C$ (*dgongs-gzhi*).

(g) *A dgongs-pa-can ma-yin* passage is one in which the utterer's intention can be understood without considering implication$_C$.

(h) *Drang-don* (neyārtha) and *nges-don* (nītārtha) are distinguished mainly by the utterer's intention ascribed by the commentator. Conventionally they convey respectively *saṃvṛti-satya* and *paramārtha-satya*[32a].

5.3. Padma dKar-po's general scholarly method was to base his views on Indian sources; his aim was to exhibit the exegetical tradition of his lineage (the 'Brug-pa) as deriving ultimately from India, as not being merely a Tibetan invention. In these respects he is rather similar to bTsong-kha-pa. However, Padma dKar-po rarely mentions other Tibetan writers or compares the 'Brug-pa tradition with other traditions, and as his works are rather cryptic and oblique they can be difficult to follow.

As a set, our six terms relate to the tantras, though they have been applied to the sūtras too (see postscript). Though Padma dKar-po is celebrated especially for his works on the tantras, he did also write significant works on the sūtras which are still studied today[33]. In sūtra contexts he frequently uses terms taken from the tantras, and so his sūtra and tantra writings are more or less compatible in their terminology. This unusual feature, which compensates for some of the difficult aspects of his work, has important consequences, some of which will have to be stated rather baldly during the discussion (though with references) if the bulk of this paper is not to become intolerable.

5.4. *Drang-don* (*neyārtha*) *and nges-don* (*nītārtha*).

In the sūtras, these two terms are *never*, to my knowledge, used by one author of one and the same sentence or text. In the tantras they are *normally* so used. Let us see how Padma dKar-po, apparently using an identical terminology for both sūtras and tantras, still manages to observe this rule.

For both sūtras and tantras, Padma dKar-po bases his discussion of the nītārtha/neyārtha distinction on the two *satyas*. We should take this point seriously, since it is found in G, which is a work on madhyamaka. The two satyas are the pivotal notions of G (and not, say, śūnyatā). Following Madhyamakāvatāra VI. 23, Padma dKar-po there takes the two satyas as epistemic modes, modes of cognition (and not as ontological modes, as strata of reality). For him, saṃvṛti-satya is a concept-mediated cognitive mode which, as far as it goes, is veridical[34]. Paramārtha-satya has two varieties. There is a "real" ultimate not mediated by concepts (avikalpajñāna[35]); this is what Bhāvaviveka and others call niṣparyāya-paramārtha (rnam-grangs ma-yin-pa'i don-dam), but Padma dKar-po never uses this phrase. The second kind is what Bhāvaviveka calls paryāya-paramārtha and what Padma dKar-po sometimes calls rnam-grangs-pa'i don-dam; however he is very insistent that it is really only a purified form of saṃvṛti[36]. However Padma dKar-po usually calls them both just *don-dam bden-pa* and only the context allows us to tell which is which. I shall sometimes distinguish them by using the *Sanskrit* terms paryāya and nisparyāya just to indicate that Padma dKar-po was not making the distinction explicitly.

Sentence (h) tells us that neyārtha is associated with saṃvṛti and nītārtha with paramārtha. However the paryāya/niṣparyāya distinction gives rise to two different notions of the neyārtha/nītārtha distinction. For the sūtras, Padma dKar-po bases the neyārtha/nītārtha distinction on the contrast between saṃvṛti and niṣparyāya-paramārtha. In the sūtras, then, "drang-don" ascribes to a passage the intention to communicate saṃvṛti-satya. More accurately, since saṃvṛti-satya is not something expressed in propositions but a concept- or proposition-mediated cognition or awareness, a drang-don passage is one communicating concepts (&c) such that an awareness mediated by those concepts (&c) can be counted as saṃvṛti-satya and not saṃvṛti-mātra (*mere* saṃvṛti; the difference is very great[37]). On the other hand, since niṣparyaya-paramārtha is not to be conveyed by assertion, in Padma dKar-po's view *no passage of the sūtras counts as nges-don*. A whole section of the *nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* is devoted to this point[38], which will no doubt surprise those not familiar with bka-brgyud-pa thought. (Here one should recall their interest in the mother-tantras, where one operates with the notion of sarvākāravaropetaśūnyatā. In Padma dKar-po's view this counts only as saṃvṛti-satya.)

However, the *mtha-drug* are concerned not with the sūtras but with the tantras (at least in the first place). And in the tantras, Padma dKar-po is generally working with the notion of paryāya-paramārtha. Here, then, the drang-don interpretation of a passage ascribes to it the intention of communicating saṃvṛtisatya (other than paryāya-paramārtha), while the nges-don interpretation ascribes the intention of communicating paryāya-paramārtha[39]. One reaches this conclusion by taking passages (c) and (h) (see Appendix C) together with their contexts. Similar considerations also figure in passage (j), but I will take this complex passage in connection with *dgongs-pa-can*.

At the risk of tedium I repeat: *nowhere* does Padma dKar-po describe as *nges-don* (nītārtha) a passage intended to communicate niṣparyāya-paramārtha; on the contrary, he says firmly that there is no such passage. Now of course it is a commonplace that the tantras (as well as, say, the sayings of Zen masters) contain passages, sometimes quite bizarre, intended to shock the reader into a direct apprehension of niṣparyāya-paramārtha, usually by saying something which no Buddhist could take literally. The production of this perlocutionary effect might be thought to belong to the sphere of religious experience, rather than to philosophy or linguistics; but insofar as the *ascription* of such intentions is a linguistic matter concerned with the interpretation of texts, it comes under *dgongs-pa-can* and not under *nges-don*. Such, at any rate, is Padma dKar-po's view.

I do not want to claim that this represents a dramatic innovation. On the nītārtha/neyārtha distinction Padma dKar-po really only clarifies the traditional views (at least as far as the tantras are concerned). In practice all that happens is that we deal with more and less advanced levels of practice. And as far as this distinction is concerned, the *tshul-bzhi* provide a more refined instrument than the *mtha-drug*[40].

5.5. *sgra ji-bzhin* (*yathārutha*) *and sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin* (*ayathāruta*) *utterances*

In connection with Bu-ston's principle we pointed out that, though *sgra* may literally mean "words", these, if they are not to be merely dead marks, have to be associated with conventions for their use, and it is the conventions which are there important. Indeed, if *sgra* meant just "convention", *sgra ji-bzhin* would mean literally "according to convention" and this is nearly right. The table indicates that, according to Padma dKar-po, the difference between yathārutha and ayathāruta utterance is one of convention, while the earlier authors thought it was a matter of both convention and intention. Now our authors were not attempting to make a contribution to Sanskrit philology (viz. that of yathāruta), but were rather engaged in a philosophical enterprise: that of disengaging and exhibiting the general principle behind the many *instances* of utterances distinguished as *sgra ji-bzhin* and *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin* in the texts. As we will see, Padma dKar-po's suggestion is in this respect a distinct improvement over the older one.

According to Padma dKar-po, in a *sgra ji-bzhin* interpretation the audience is invited to take the utterance as being governed by just those conventions which *normally* apply to the words and phrases uttered. (It is important to see that this *normally* is relative.) Now to interpret involves ascribing intentions to the speaker (e.g. *brjod-don*, see (d), (e), (g), (h), (j)), even if only as a matter of convention. Thus to interpret *sgra ji-bzhin* is to ascribe intentions consistent with the linguistic and other conventions associated with the normal use of the words uttered. To interpret *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin* will be to ascribe intentions not consistent with the usual conventions.

Now it simply is the case that, in the standard examples, what varies systematically between *sgra ji-bzhin* and *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin* utterances is the character of the conventions in use. Of course the intentions vary as well, but there is no *correlation*. The *difference* between the two classes does not correspond systematically to the differences in intention. We see here the superiority of Padma dKar-po's account over the earlier one.

Commonsense suggests that there are two ways in which an interpreter can ascribe attitudes and intentions, otherwise than just following the standard conventions governing the speaker's words and sentences. First, there may be conventions, but different from the normal ones: I shall speak of *non-standard* conventions. Second, there may simply be no conventions at all: intentions may be ascribed *ad hoc*, from occasion to occasion.

One type of *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa* in which non-standard conventions are applied is called by Padma dKar-po *brda*[41]. The most straightforward example of *brda* is a code. For instance a secret agreement between two people to refer to a mutual friend as "Brer Rabbit" is conventional (between them) but non-standard. This is a case of *brda*. In the Hevajra-tantra we find the famous code there called sandhyābhāṣa (sic) (Tibetan dgongs-skad or gsang-skad): "madana" stands for "madya", "bala" stands for "māṃsa", . . . This has been classified under *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin* by many Tibetan authors[42]. Padma dKar-po describes *brda* in terms which clearly refer to such a code[43]:

> *brda* passages are for instance those expressed in *brda'i skad* and *dgongs-skad* unknown to the world or to sāstras.

I said this passage was clear, but one has to be familiar with the context. The last remark is a gesture in the direction of the Pradīpoddyotana tradition. The terms *dgongs-skad* and *brda-skad* are both found in the Hevajra-tantra itself[44] and in the literature on it, including Padma dKar-po's own study of that tantra[45]. The word *brda* is found also in the verse of PPD which defines *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa*[46]. Of the latter term, the verse says that it is tathāgata-symbols (de-bzhin gshegs-pa-rnams-kyi brda) not known in the world or in śāstras, such as koṭakhya etc.

Now both Bu-ston and bTsong-kha-pa review the way in which these words are used in various tantras, and come to the conclusion that the connection between them and their meaning is adventitious (glo-bur), varying from one context to another in a way which is not specified but which does not seem (from their examples) to reflect a convention of any kind applying to all these works. Padma dKar-po's view seems rather to have been that these uses had *become* conventional, even though non-standard, through familiarity. The idea is well-known in Indian linguistics, and is there called *nirūḍha-lakṣanā* (faded metaphor): "paṅkaja" literally means "mud-born" but by now the meaning "lotus" is conventional, even though not standard, in the sense that the *standard* use of "pankaja" *is* "mud-born". However, if Bu-ston and bTsong-kha-pa are right on koṭakhya etc. these words seem to fall under what Padma dKar-po called *yi-ge* (in spite of the "brda" in the PPD verse).

This brings us to the second type of sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa noted by Padma dKar-po, viz. *yi-ge*, "letters". This does *seem* to lack convention. Texts G and H both list three types, but H is far more useful, since it gives examples of all three. They all concern the interpretation of Sanskrit words in Tibetan. The first type, called *yi-ge bsnan-pa*, "combining letters", seems to involve adding extra syllables to the Sanskrit word, producing something which can be "literally" interpreted in terms of that part of Sanskrit already dealt with. The second type is called *yi-ge phyes-pa*[47], "dividing letters". The third type is called "altering into something else" (gzhan-du bsgyur-ba) and involves altering some of the letters of the given phrase, again producing something which can be translated literally. Now it does *seem* that these are *ad hoc* devices simply ignoring the normal conventions of the Sanskrit language. The question is: are those normal conventions being replaced by others, or are the devices genuinely adventitious (glo-bur)? I hope it is clear that one cannot expect to answer this question on any very general grounds, because of the way an adventitious innovation may become conventional over the course of time, as with faded metaphors. The question can be answered only by looking at particular examples *as used on particular occasions*.

The Sa-skya school[48] had a similar category of interpretative devices for Sanskrit phrases which they called *yi-ge'i don*, and which they do seem to have regarded as a set of alternative *conventions*. In the absence of any other clear evidence, we may suppose that Padma dKar-po, using the word "yi-ge" too, also took this view. This unclarity is a fault in the treatment offered in G and H. (Bu-ston and bTsong-kha-pa clearly indicate their different view by the use of "glo-bur", and do not use "yi-ge".)

There remains the question of what Padma dKar-po intended to do with the pseudo-words *koṭakhya* etc. Unfortunately he does not tell us in G or H. In F[49] he gives us an explanation very similar to that of Bu-ston and bTsong-kha-pa. If he intended this explanation to apply in the system of G and H also and if the analogy with the Sa-skya use of "yi-ge" mentioned in the last paragraph is correct, then these words should be treated as a third type of *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa*, different from both *brda* and *yi-ge*.

We noted earlier that Vasubandhu and Sthiramati use "ayathārutha" of some of the examples they discuss under abhisandhi and abhiprāya. (The term is also found in the sūtras, e.g. in chap. VI of the Lankāvatāra where the Buddha says of the parable of the sands of the Ganges that it is ayathāruta and upamāmātra.) All it seems to mean here is that the utterance is not to be taken literally. The analysis of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati does not seem clear enough to incorporate the distinction between *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa* and *dgongs-pa-can* in a systematic way. In any case, Padma dKar-po, when he took over these examples, suppressed the references to *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa* and treated them all under *dgongs-pa-can*.

It seems possible that one should recognize in Padma dKar-po's writing a separate sūtra and tantra sense of *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa*, just as with *drang-don/nges-don*. We may perhaps attempt to find such a distinction by returning to the question whether the conventions under discussion are linguistic conventions or not. In all the tantra examples, it seems to be the linguistic conventions which are changed. In the case of the svabhāvatraya example it seems clearly a case of non-linguistic convention that one sometimes means the niḥsvabhāvatraya. The parable of the sands of the Ganges is perhaps a metaphor; now here it is a matter of dispute whether a change of linguistic convention is involved. For the sake of argument, let us follow Davidson[50] in supposing that metaphors involve no change of linguistic convention. Then it may be that Padma dKar-po's lack of interest in the older examples of *ayathāruta* stems from his concern with change of *linguistic* convention. I hope to deal with this rather specialized point at some later time, when more examples are to hand.

5.6. *dgongs-pa-can and dgongs-min*

This is the most difficult pair of terms in the *mtha-drug*, the one where Padma dKar-po made the most innovations, and where he made the most use of MSL and similar sources.

In discussing *dgongs-pa-can* utterances, he has twice given a brief but complete summary of the varieties of abhisandhi and abhiprāya. His examples are too similar to those of earlier authors to be worth giving in detail, but it is worth bringing out some of the general features they reveal.

In common with Thogs-med (but against the Indian works) he discusses both abhisandhi and abhiprāya *under the heading* "dgongs-pa-can"[51] . His treatment is far briefer than that of Thogs-med, and indeed is scarcely comprehensible unless seen as a summary of a longer version. It also differs in two specific ways. First, whereas Thogs-med treats abhisandhi and abhiprāya separately and only indicates at the end that abhiprāya is to be seen as a kind of pratipakṣa-abhisandhi, Padma dKar-po's treatment is explicitly organized round this relationship. Secondly, in the examples Padma dKar-po does not use the term *dgongs-gzhi*. Instead he uses a verbal form, e.g. "dgongs-nas", e.g.[52]

> mtshan-nyid gsum-la *dgongs-nas* chos thams-cad ngo-bo-nyid med-do zhes gsungs-pa lta-bu mtshan-nyid-la ldem-por dgongs-pa dang/ Lakṣaṇa-abhisandhi: as when, *implying* the three lakṣaṇas, one says that all things are without svabhāva.

These are the reasons why I have found it necessary to include a discussion of Thogs-med's contribution in this paper. Without Thogs-med (or something similar) it would have been impossible to work out what is meant by "dgongs-gzhi", since Padma dKar-po's few uses of this phrase are not referring. Admittedly the phrase is intensional; but it is far easier to interpret it if one knows something about its extension.

With this in mind we can turn to what Padma dKar-po takes from the Pradīpoddyotana tradition. First, we have Bu-ston's principle; and in Padma dKar-po's version (cf. Table) it tells us that the difference between *dgongs-pa-can* and *dgongs-min* is one of *brjod-gzhi* (content of a saying). More explicitly, sentence (j) tells us that this *brjod-gzhi* either is, or is not, *dgongs-pa-can* (implicative); and the actual definitions, (f) and (g), tell us that the utterer's intention is, or is not, conveyed by an implication_C (dgongs-gzhi).

The point is sharpened if we compare Bu-ston's principle in this case with what we found in the case of *sgra ji-bzhin/min*. There, the difference rested on differences of *convention*; here, it rests on whether the point of the utterance is conveyed by *implication* or by understanding the words literally or naturally.[53]

Previously I pointed out that in some ways, pariṇāmanābhisandhi is the case most obviously related to the well-known examples of *dgongs-pa-can* utterances from the tantras. In this particular case, the distinction between literal and implicative use of language appears already in a rather vague form in MS, as Lamotte points out[54]:

> /bsgyur-ba-la ldem-por dgongs-pa ni gang-du sgras don-gzhan-du brjod-la/ don-nyid gzhan-du ston-pa-ste/

which he translates by

> arrière-pensée d'interprétation, quand il veut dire autre chose que ce qu'il dit.

But Padma dKar-po's treatment is more general and more precise.

Now we can ask how the classical examples of *dgongs-bshad* are related to Padma dKar-po's explanation. This is easy enough; for as JVS already points out[55], these mostly have the same purpose, viz. *mthar-thug-don*, to get the audience to experience paramārtha-satya; and this is not at all what one would expect from the words used, *regardless of the conventions in use* (and so they have nothing to do with sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa). Indeed, these are just the facts which lie behind the explanatory power of bTsong-kha-pa's definition of *dgongs-bshad*. But that definition rests explicitly upon an opposition ('gal-ba, viruddha) between linguistic meaning and intention. In many cases, this is enough, but occasionally it fails. The classical example of samatā-abhiprāya is "I have become the Buddha"[56] and in Vajrayāna the *purpose is to bring this about, but that *purpose has very little to do with the conventions governing the remark (which in any case are not opposed to it); it is the *truth* of the remark which is normally opposed to the *purpose. Padma dKar-po's definition of *dgongs-bshad* is also more general than that of Bu-ston. Both authors agree that saying "The self exists" to newly-converted hindus[57] in order to boost their confidence in buddhism is a case of avatāraṇa-abhisandhi. Using Padma dKar-po's definition of *dgongs-bshad*, it falls under the latter; however Bu-ston's definition of *dgongs-bshad* (in the tantras!) excludes it, since the remark is exactly what *is* believed by worldly people (in this context). (Again there happens to be opposition between the truth of the remark and the intention; but such opposition is absent in other cases, e.g. the Sukhāvatī prayer.)

Another inadequacy of the old form of the Bu-ston principle may be seen more clearly if we look at the definition of *dgongs-bshad* given in the Pradīpoddyotana. There, such passages are said to be addressed to those desiring the highest; and bTsong-kha-pa glosses this as meaning the highest siddhi, an interpretation with which few would disagree. But the old form of the Bu-ston principle claims that this is to be accounted for in terms of convention (sgra). Convention, however, is accessible to everybody, and so no explanation in these terms can account for the fact that *dgongs-bshad* passages (in the tantras) work only for particular kinds of people.

The reader familiar with the way "drang-don" and "nges-don" are used in Tibetan vajrayāna texts may feel that this use has something in common with the notions just spelt out for *dgongs-pa-can*. The thought may be spelt out thus: is there nothing *else* to the notion of *drang-don* than that it is the less advanced of the two interpretations? When one says that *nges-don* is hidden, does this not point to an implication beyond what is made explicit in a *drang-don* interpretation? And does this not introduce an element of *dgongs-bshad* into the *nges-don* interpretation? Padma dKar-po seems to have taken this line of thought seriously, for he says[58]:

> If the path and its fruit are distinguished as to purity and non-purity, we have outsiders and insiders[59]. If insiders are distinguished by having a low or a lofty conception[60], we have the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna[61]. In the Mahāyāna we distinguish the sūtra and mantra paths by *spyi-don* and *sbas-don*[62]. In the mantras, there are the shallow and profound teachings of the outer and inner tantra divisions. In the anuttarayogatantras there are two different methods of classification. Either they are divided into father and mother tantra according to whether (the subject-matter is) mainly upāya or prajñā, or we class them all as non-dual tantras. They are also divided according to whether they are common or uncommon[63] into utpatti- and sampanna-(krama). The sampannakrama is

further divided according to whether marks[64] are present or not, into niṣprapañca and highly niṣprapañca[65].

From the point of view of the second member of each pair, the first member is explained as having an utterer's intention which is *drang-don* and a content[66] which is implicative; while from the point of view of the first member of each pair, the second member is explained as having an utter's intention which is *nges-don* and a content which is non-implicative[67].

The general idea seems to be this. A person who is say at the level of the Mahāyāna may explain it to a beginner (avatāraṇa-abhisandhi) in terms of pudgala-nairātmya alone, without dharma-nairātmya. Taken literally, such an explanation belongs to the Hīnayāna. To interpret a particular passage in this way may be *drang-don* (in relation, say, to an interpretation including dharma-nairātmya). Nothing need be said here about the *words* of the passage under discussion since they are irrelevant to the *drang-don/nges-don* distinction (remember that this distinction depends only on the intention attributed). But now in relation to the first interpretation, there is the further hidden (sbas-te) intention, viz. the *nges-don*, which is here *inexplicit* (dgongs-pa-can[68]). The reverse case would be that of a person at the Hīnayāna level, for whom the Mahāyāna-dharma is simply a (provisional) ultimate[69] to be taken literally[70], without any further intention being involved. (Obviously these remarks, like those of Padma dKar-po on which they are based, are only a very brief, schematic indication.)

6. ABHIPRĀYA AND THE HEVAJRA-TANTRA

We have seen that in his treatment of the *mtha-drug*, Padma dKar-po combined ideas from the Pradīpoddyotana literature with ideas from the treatment of abhisandhi and abhiprāya by Vasubandhu, Sthiramati and their successors. Now these latter authors are not known to have written on the tantras, and I am not sure where Padma dKar-po got the idea of applying their methods to the tantras (if he did not invent it himself)[71]. However there seems to be some possibility that this treatment of abhisandhi and abhiprāya was used in the tantras already in India.

When in the Hevajra-tantra[72] Vajragarbha first asks the Buddha what is meant by sandhyābhāṣa, the Buddha's reply tells us only the referents of this word and not its sense. Kāṇha[73] attempts to fill the gap by saying

> sandhir abhiprāyaḥ : abhiprāya-pradhānaṃ bhāṣaṇaṃ :
> nākṣara-pradhānam ity arthaḥ / (*)

110160

and we may ask whether this is a reference to the system discussed here. Now, given the code-like character of the sandhābhāṣa in the Hevajra-tantra (of which so much is made by the Tibetan commentators[74]), it seems natural, among the four kinds of abhiprāya, to put it under arthāntarābhiprāya. We may compare this with the way the example of the three svabhāvas is taken under arthāntarābhiprāya (that this example appears also under lakṣaṇābhisandhi is irrelevant: there is no parallel here). Just as in the svabhāva example each svabhāva is taken to imply the corresponding niḥsvabhāvatā, so in the sandhābhāṣa example, "madana" is taken to refer to wine, "bala" to meat, etc. And just as Vasubandhu and Sthiramati call that way of talking about the three niḥsvabhāvatā-s ayathāruta, so the Tibetan commentators[75] call sandhābhāṣa *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin pa* (ayathāruta); and their reasons are exactly parallel.

Padma dKar-po wanted of course to contrast *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin* with abhiprāya, and no doubt this was why he did not say that arthāntarābhiprāya is *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin*; but we may suppose (in order to pursue this line of thought) that Kāṇha, like Vasubandhu and Sthiramati before him, did not want to make such a sharp distinction between different kinds of abhiprāya. Akṣarārtha (see (*)) is the Sanskrit for *yi-ge'i don*, one of the *tshul-bzhi*; but again there seems no reason to believe that Kāṇha was using the full *tshul-bzhi* system in his commentary. The point made in (*) seems to be simply that sandhābhāṣa is a non-literal use of language. *Within* this category of non-literal uses of language, the sharp distinction between the uses relying on non-standard conventions and the implicative uses perhaps came later.

Commenting on II.iii.1, Kāṇha says:

abhisambodhi-bhāṣaṇaṃ sandhyābhāṣaṃ :: (**)

It is interesting that Tibetan authors working with the *mtha-drug/tshul bzhi* system never say anything like this of sandhābhāṣa, as the latter term is used in the Hevajra-tantra[76]. So what are we to make of (**)? We might be tempted to say that the first word indicates *reference* to abhisambodhi (i.e. another case of ayathāruta). But to anybody who knows the subject-matter this seems unlikely. It is much more likely that the remark is about the *purpose of *showing* or even *bringing about* abhisambodhi. (This would be consistent with passage (n), for instance.) Now *this* interpretation of Kāṇha is inconsistent with *mtha-drug/tshul bzhi*; for there abhisambodhi goes with *dgongs-bshad*, and the latter is incompatible with sandhābhāṣa (dgongs-skad), as we now know. But Kāṇha nowhere suggests that he uses the *mtha-drug/ tshul bzhi* system. We could combine his two remarks by saying that in (*) he was concerned with illocutionary force, while in (**) he is concerned with intention (strictly, with *purpose); as far as I know nothing in *his* methods of interpretation prevents him doing this. Later authors do not seem to have accepted (**); but that is another matter.

Obviously these brief indications are very far from establishing that Kāṇha, in using "abhiprāya", was referring back to its use in the MSL literature. However, his use is consistent with that possibility; and there are other indications that he was familiar with the writings of Yogācāras.

In the Introduction (1.10) I said that the present paper throws no light on proposals to use "abhisandhi" to explain "sandhābhāṣa" as used in the Hevajra-tantra. However in this section we saw Kāṇha using "abhiprāya" to explain this same sandhābhāṣa. If in addition we assume that Kāṇha, in this use of "abhiprāya", *was* following MSL, then we have the outline of an explanation of "sandhābhāṣa" somewhat related to that mentioned in 1.10.

I think it is clear that this line of argument, as here presented, is far too conjectural to lend substantial support to any such view as that of 1.10. But we might find more, and clearer, evidence in Sanskrit texts for a connection between abhiprāya and sandhābhāṣa. Such a situation would be interesting: a conclusion about Buddhist thought in India, founded on Sanskrit texts and contradicting a view generally held in Tibet. Such a conclusion would be a valuable reminder that the Tibetans did not merely reproduce what they inherited from India.

APPENDIX A: TEXTS AND VOCABULARY FROM THE MAHĀYĀNASŪTRĀLAṄKĀRA

A1: *Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of the verses on abhisandhi and abhiprāya* (ch. XII)

avatāraṇasandhiś ca sandhir lakṣaṇato'paraḥ
pratipakṣābhisandhiś ca sandhiḥ pariṇātav api //16//
śrāvakeṣu svabhāveṣu doṣāṇāṃ vinaye tathā
abhidhānasya gāmbhīrye sandhir eṣa caturvidhaḥ //17//
samatā'rthāntare jñeyas tathā kālāntare punaḥ
pudgalasyāśaye caiva abhiprāyaś caturvidhaḥ //18//

gzhug-pa ldem-por dgongs-pa dang//mtshan-nyid ldem-por dgongs-pa dang/
/gnyen-po ldem-por dgongs-pa dang//bsgyur-ba ldem-por dgongs-pa ste/
/nyan-thos dang ni ngo-bo-nyid//de-bzhin nyes-pa 'dul-ba dang/
/brjod-pa zab-mo-nyid-la ni//ldem-por dgongs-pa 'di rnam-bzhi/
/mnyam-pa-nyid dang don-gzhan dang//de-bzhin-du ni dus-gzhan dang/
/gang-zag-gi ni bsam-pa-la//dgongs-pa rnam-pa-bzhir shes-bya/

A2: *The Normal Forms of the Technical Terms, and the Tibetan in Sthiramati*

Vasubandhu	*Standard Tibetan*	*Sthiramati*
abhisandhi	ldem-por dgongs-pa	dgongs-pa
avatāraṇa-	gzhug-pa-la-	rjes-su 'jug-pa-la-
lakṣaṇa-	mtshan-nyid-la-	mtshan-nyid-la-
pratipakṣa-	gnyen-po-la-	gnyen-po-la-
pariṇāmana-	bsgyur-ba-la-	bsngo-ba-la-
abhiprāya	dgongs-pa	ldem-po'i ngag
samatā-	mnyam-pa-nyid-la	mnyam-pa-nyid-kyi-
arthāntara-	don gzhan-la-	don gzhan-gyi
kālāntara-	dus gzhan-la-	dus gzhan-gyi-
pudgala-āśaya-	gang-zag-gi bsam-pa-la-	gang-zag-gi bsam-pa-la

Note: One may wonder whether Sthiramati's translator has really more or less reversed the usual Tibetan terms for *abhisandhi* and *abhiprāya*. But the almost exact correspondence of the eight sub-headings, to say nothing of the examples given under these, should be enough. Reading Sthiramati as putting abhiprāya before abhisandhi would throw the text into chaos.

APPENDIX B: THOGS-MED ON ABHISANDHI AND ABHIPRĀYA (EXTRACTS)

Avatāraṇābhisandhi (264.5)
gzhug-pa-la ldem-por dgongs-pa ni nyan-thos-la-sogs-pa theg-chen-la gzhug-pa'i phyir gzugs-sogs phyi-rol-gyi don yod-par gsungs-pa ste/ dgongs-gzhi gzung-char snang-ba-tsam-la dgongs-la/ sgra ji-bzhin-par go yang de-dag-gi blo dang mthun-pa'i sgo-nas/ rim-gyis theg-chen-la 'jug-pa'i dgos-pa yod-do/

Lakṣaṇābhisandhi (265.1)
mtshan-nyid-la ldem-por dgongs-pa ni chos thams-cad ngo-bo-nyid med-pa-la-sogs-par bstan-pa'o/ /dgongs-gzhi ni kun-brtags-la mtshan-nyid-kyi ngo-bo-nyid med-pa dang/ gzhan-dbang-la skye-ba'i ngo-bo-nyid med-pa dang/ yongs-grub-la don-dam-pa ngo-bo-nyid med-pa'o/ /dgos-pa bden zhen ldog-pa'o/

Samatābhiprāya (265.6)
mnyam-pa-nyid-la dgongs-pa ni thub-pas sangs-rgyas rnam-par-gzigs-kyi bsngags-pa brjod-nas, nga-nyid de'i tshe rnam-par-gzigs-su gyur-to zhes-gsungs-pa lta-bu ste/ dgongs-gzhi ni chos-kyi sku mnyam-pa'o/ /dgos-pa ni thub-pa-la brnyas-pa spong-bar 'gyur-ba'o/

Kālāntarābhiprāya (266.1)
dus gzhan-la dgongs-pa ni gang-dag bde-ba-can-du smon-lam 'debs-pa de-dag der skye-bar 'gyur-ro zhes-gsungs-pa lta-bu'o/ /dgongs-gzhi dus ring-po-na de-ltar 'gyur-ba'o/ /dgos-pa le-lo'i gnyen-por 'gyur-ba'o/

The connection between abhisandhi and abhiprāya, etc. (266.4)
dgongs-pa dang ldem-dgongs-kyi khyad-par ni dgongs-pa bzhi ni gnyen-po-la ldem-por dgongs-par 'dus-so/ /o-na ci'i phyir dgongs-pa dang/ ldem-dgongs-su bzhag ce-na/ dgongs-gzhi dang dgos-pa gtso-bor bstan-pas-so/ /kha-cig dgongs-pa dang ldem-dgongs thams-cad drang-don kho-nar bzhed mod-kyi/ de-lta ma-yin-te, theg-bsdus-las/ yang dgongs-pa bzhi dang ldem-por dgongs-pa bzhis sangs-rgyas-kyi gsung thams-cad khong-du chud-par bya'o zhes-pa dang/ gnyen-po-la ldem-por dgongs-pa ni gang-du spyod-pa brgyad-khri-bzhi-stong-gi gnyen-po bstan-pa'o, zhes gsungs-pas-so/

/o-na kun-las-btus-las/ ldem-por dgongs-pa rnam-par-nges-pa gang zhe-na/ ming-gi tshogs dang tshig-gi tshogs dang yi-ge'i tshogs-rnams-kyi don gzhan-du brjod-pa don gzhan-du yongs-su bsgyur-ba ste zhes drang-don-du bshad-pa dang 'gal-lo, zhe-na/ de ni bsgyur-ba-la ldem-por dgongs-pa kho-na'i dbang-du mdzad-pa yin-no/

APPENDIX C: PADMA DKAR-PO'S DEFINITIONS OF THE MTHA-DRUG ETC.

mtha-drug
(a) rjod-byed gtso-bor gyur-pa sgra ji-bzhin dang sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa gnyis
(b) brjod-gzhi gtso-ba dgongs-pa-can dang dgongs-pa-can ma-yin-pa gnyis/

(c) brjod-don gtso-ba drang-don nges-don gnyis rnams-so/

(d) rjod-byed-kyi dngos-bstan-las/ brjod-don gzhan-la bltos-med-du go nus-pa'i gsung-rab/ sgra ji-bzhin-pa'i mdo'i mtshan-nyid/

(e) rjod-byed-kyi dngos-bstan-las brjod-don brda yi-ge gtso-ba-la bltas-te go dgos-pa'i gsung-rabs/ sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa'i mdo'i dang/

(f) dngos-bstan-gyi brjod-don dgongs-gzhi-la bltos-nas go dgos-pa'i gsung-rab dgongs-pa-can-gyi mdo'i mtshan-nyid/

(g) (dgongs-pa-can ma-yin) ni/ dngos-bstan-gyi brjod-don dgongs-gzhi-la bltos-med-du go dgos-pa ste/

(h) drang-don nges-don ni/ brjod-don gtso-che-ba'i dbang-las/ kun-rdzob bden-pa dang don-dam bden-pa gtso-bor bton-pa-la rim-pa bzhin-du bya-ba spyir grangs-pa yin-la/

(j) phyi-ma-phyi-ma-la bltos-nas snga-ma-snga-ma brjod-don drang-don dang brjod-gzhi dgongs-pa-can dang/ snga-ma-snga-ma-la bltos-nas phyi-ma-phyi-ma brjod-don nges-don dang brjod-gzhi dgongs-pa-can ma-yin-par bzhag-pa-rnams-so/

Sources: (a)–(c), H15b3 (cf. G10b6); (d)–(f), G11a2 (cf. H15b4, 16a2); (g), (h): H16b3 (cf. G11b5); (j), H17a2 (not in G).

tshul-bzhi

(k) (yi-ge'i don) ni/ dngos-bstan-gyi brjod-don sgra-don-la zhugs-nas bshad-pa ste/

(l) (spyi-don) ni/ dngos-bstan-gyi brjod-don rigs-pas gtan-la phab-pas bshad-pa ste/

(m) (sbas-don) ni/ dngos-bstan-gyi brjod-don gzhan dang gzhan-du lung-gis gtan-la phab-pas bshad-pa ste/

(n) (mthar-thug-don) ni/ dngos-bstan-gyi brjod-don gnas-tshul yin-lugs gtan-la phab-nas bshad-pa ste/

Source: H17ab (not in G).

Notes: Spelling variations have been left uncorrected. The phrases in brackets are supplied from earlier headings referred to here merely by numbers (dang-po ni, etc.). The form *gtso-ba* (for *gtso-bo*) occurs regularly as an alternative (b, c, e). Similarly *gsung-rabs* for *gsung-rab* (e).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Paul Williams drew my attention to the importance of the terms *paryāya* and

nisparyāya. Edward Henning criticised some of my early attempts to interpret the sentences in Appendix C. My thanks are offered to both.

POSTSCRIPT

After this paper had been completed, it was read by Prof. David Seyfort Ruegg who, with his customary thoroughness, drew my attention to many unclarities and inaccuracies. (Needless to say he is not responsible for those which remain.) Now in his book *Le Traité du Tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub* (Paris 1973), Seyfort Ruegg has given us a French translation of Bu-ston's *bde-gshegs snying-po mdzes-rgyan* (C). Bu-ston's work contains interesting information on the use in the sūtras (as distinct from the tantras) of the terms *drang-don/nges-don, dgongs-pas gsungs-pa, sgra ji-bzhin*, etc., as he saw them. He quotes with approval Ratnākaraśanti's view (11b2) that *nges-don* passages are those whose literal (sgra ji-bzhin) meaning is the correct one, while where the passage is implicative (dgongs-pas gsungs-pa), the literal meaning is said to be *drang-don*. This view is of course quite different from the bTsong-kha-pa/Padma dKar-po view of what happens in the sūtras (roughly, that drang-don/ nges-don correspond to saṃvṛti/paramārtha). It is also very different from the views of all three authors on the use of these terms in the tantras (reviewed in the present paper.)

Bu-ston also gives (8b4 ff.) an account of the four abhisandhis and abhiprāyas which is broadly parallel with that of Thogs-med, especially in what for our purposes is the central feature, viz. the use of the term *dgongs-gzhi*. Bu-ston's use of this word seems consistent with the view that it stands for the fact, state of affairs etc. implied, and not the *thing* which is the subject or topic of the implication. But he is no more explicit on this than Thogs-med. We feel that we know what he is talking about because he gives us examples (e.g. 8b6, 10b6, 12a1, 15a5).

As is his wont, Seyfort Ruegg provides us with a careful and competent lexical translation. He translates *dgongs-gzhi* consistently by "fondation intentionelle". Because Bu-ston provides examples and because the matter is somewhat peripheral for the *mdzes-rgyan*, one feels that the translation is perfectly reasonable, in spite of the qualms expressed in my Introduction.

Still, one is left with the feeling of wanting to know *what Bu-ston was saying about the examples*, and the phrase "fondation intentionelle" does not tell us this. The matter becomes much more important when one considers

Padma dKar-po since he offers us definitions of other terms (Appendix C) which are materially changed if one changes the notion of *dgongs-gzhi*. Now my hypothesis "implication$_C$" rules in favour of the content (facts, states of affairs etc.) and against say "implied object" (e.g. a topic or a thing implicitly referred to). "Implied object" is impossible because of the examples. But might it not be better to have an *ambiguous* phrase? For instance *śūnyatā* and *niḥsvabhāvatā* might be either facts or things, and we have no means of knowing whether our Tibetan authors wished to distinguish sharply. Well, it might be better; and if examples of *dgongs-gzhi* plainly referring to *things* turn up, we will need an ambiguous phrase. Meanwhile, however, all the examples discussed in this paper (and Bu-ston's examples to which reference has been made) can be accomodated without too much discomfort under "implication$_C$".

I think there is another, methodological reason for keeping "implication$_C$" rather than using an ambiguous phrase. *Because* it is sharper, this hypothesis has more empirical content: there are more potential facts which might refute it. The sharper hypothesis presents the reader with a clearer picture with which to compare any examples he may himself know about. It points more clearly towards the possibility of improved interpretations, based on better knowledge and understanding. On these grounds I prefer it to a vaguer hypothesis. Obviously, when we know more, we may have to retreat to a *more general* (no longer vaguer) hypothesis, if that is what the facts demand.

*University of Oxford, England**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AS: Abhidharmasamuccaya, Skt. text (ed. Pradhan)
ASBh: Bhāṣya on AS (ed. Tatia)
HT: Hevajra-tantra (Skt. & Tib. texts ed. Snellgrove)
JVS: Jñānavajrasamuccaya (Tib. text, Peking)
MMV: Madhyamakāvatāra (Tib. text, sDe-dge)
MS: Mahāyānasaṅgraha (Tib. text ed. and trans. Lamotte)
MSL: Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, attr. Asaṅga
MSLS: Skt. text of MSL, with the bhāṣya attr. Vasubandhu, (ed. Bagchi)
MSLT: Tib. text of MSL (sDe-dge)
PPD: Pradīpoddyotana (sDe-dge)

---

*Address for correspondence: Magdalen College, Oxford.

S: Sūtrālaṅkāra-vṛtti-bhāṣya by Sthiramati (Tib. text. sDe-dge: theg-pa chen-po mdo-sde'i rgyan-gyi rgya-cher bshad-pa; references are to the first *glegs-bam*)
YRM: Yogaratnamālā by Kāṇha (Skt. text printed in HT)

A: rGyal-sras Thogs-med (1295–1369): Theg-pa chen-po mdo-sde'i rgyan-gyi 'grel-pa rin-po-che'i phreng-ba, Gangtok n.d. (267 foll.)
B: Bu-ston (1290–1364): dpal gsang-ba 'dus-pa'i tīkka sgron-ma rab-tu gsal-ba (lHa-sa gsung-'bum, vol. ta)
C: Bu-ston: bde-gshegs snying-po'i mdzes-rgyan (ibid. vol. wa)
D: bTsong-kha-pa (1357–1419): dpal gsang-ba 'dus-pa'i bshad-rgyud ye-shes-rdo-rje kun-las btus-pa'i rgya-cher bshad-pa, rgyud bshad-thabs-kyi man-ngag gsal-bar bstan-pa (bKa-'bum vol. ta)
E: sGam-po-pa bKra-shis rNam-rgyal (1512–87): dpal kye'i rdo-rje'i rgyud-kyi rgyal-po'i 'grel-pa legs-bshad nyi-ma'i od-zer
F: Padma dKar-po (1527–92): gsang-ba 'dus-pa'i rgyan zhes-by-ba Mar-lugs thun-mong ma-yin-pa'i bshad-pa (gsung-'bum vol. 16)
G: Padma dKar-po, dbu-ma gzhung-lugs-gsum gsal-bar byed-pa nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta (gsung-'bum vol. 9)
H: Padma dKar-po, brjod-byed tshig-gi rgyud bshad-pa mkhas-pa'i kha-rgyan (gsung-'bum vol. 1)
K: Padma dKar-po, dpal Kye'i rdo-rje'i spyi-don grub-pa'i yid-'phrog (gsung-'bum vol. 15)
J: Kong-sprul Blo-gros mTha-yas (1813–99): dgyes-pa rdo-rje'i rgyud-kyi rgyal-po brtag-pa gnyis-pa'i tshig-don rnam-par 'grel-pa gzhom-med rdo-rje'i gsang-ba 'byed-pa (Rum-btegs blockprint)

NOTES

[1] Commenting on Abhidharmakośa VI. 3, Vasubandhu says that the sūtra passage

> pañca bījajātānīti sopādānasya vijñānasyaitad adhivacanam /
> pṛthivīdhātur iti catasṛṇām vijñānasthitīnām etad adhivacanam

is *ābhiprāyika*, by contrast with the *lākṣaṇika* definition of the skandhas given in the abhidharma. Yaśomitra's explanation of "ābhiprāyika" in this passage seems to relate it to a "special" sense of "abhiprāya". For all this see the *Abhidharmakośa and bhāṣya of Vasubandhu with the Sphuṭārtha commentary of Yaśomitra*, ed. Shastri vol. 3, p. 887; Poussin, *Abhidharmakośa* vol. IV, p. 137. Poussin is inconsistent in his translation of *ābhiprāyika*, once even using "implicitement" (Prasannapadā p. 545 fn. 6). As regards Buddhist sanskrit texts of the sūtra (i.e. non-tantra) class the remainder of the problem is well summarized by Edgerton in the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v. ābhiprāyika, saṃdha, saṃdhāya.

[2] MSL, XII. 16–18.

[3] MS Chapter 11 Section 31.

[4] AS, satyapariccheda.

[5] Following the Tibetan tradition I shall attribute this commentary to Vasubandhu (nothing depends on it).

[6] MSG pp. 130–2. Lamotte translates "abhiprāya" by "intention" and "abhisandhi" by "arrière-pensée". Again I think these translations are not wrong but represent a problem rather than the solution of a problem.

[7] ASBh pp. 114–5.

[8] S 239b4 ff. If this work is a subcommentary on Vasubandhu, the latter work must once have been in a rather different state from now. S does not comment directly upon or quote the verses of MSL.

[9] A 264.5.

[10] G, 11a4 H 36a1.

[11] The Sanskrit original of *dgongs-bshad* is not certain, perhaps *sandhā-bhāṣita*.

[12] The Tibetan tradition of *bshad-thabs* (particularly the part based on PPD) is reviewed in my *bshad-thabs: Some Tibetan methods of explaining the tantras* (Proc. of the 1981 Csoma de Körös Symposium, Wien 1983). For the Indian tradition, see also E. Steinkellner, *Tantristic Hermeneutics* (Proc. of the 1978 Csoma de Körös Symposium, Budapest 1981).

[13] Michael Broido, *Does Tibetan hermeneutics throw any light on sandhābhāṣa*? (J. Tib. Soc. 1982 pp. 000).

[14] See R.C.S. Walker, *Conversational Implicatures* (in S. Blackburn (ed.): *Meaning, Reference and Necessity*, Cambridge 1975, pp. 133–181).

[15] For examples of the use of *dgos-pa* and some of its compounds in linguistic contexts see Michael Broido, *A note on dgos-'brel* (to appear in J. Tib. Soc.).

[16] A 266.4. See Appendix B.

[17] sgra ji-bzhin-par (yathāruta): see below.

[18] S example revolves about calming the fears of the Śrāvakas. The general effect is the same.

[19] bden-pa (i.e. the veridical).

[20] Note that the first argument applies only in the sūtras, since there a text is either neyārtha or nītārtha, not both as in the tantras. The second argument is very weak.

[21] bKra-shis rNam-rgyal (1512–87), writing during the life of Padma dKar-po, gives at E, 9b5 ff. a summary of the mtha-drug consisting mainly of paraphrases of Bu-ston and bTsong-kha-pa. bKra-shis rNam-rgyal was a bKa-brgyud-pa scholar whom Padma dKar-po held in high esteem, but who was an encyclopaedist rather than a thinker. Thus his views are a valuable check on what was considered orthodox for a bKa-brgyud-pa contemporary of Padma dKar-po. However my summary in 4.1–4.4 makes no use of him, but relies directly on Bu-ston and bTsong-kha-pa. Padma dKar-po himself summarizes the *mtha-drug* according to the Pradīpoddyotana tradition at F, 35b3. This summary is based almost entirely on Bu-ston, but is very brief and lacks examples. (It is very clear, though.) I take it that the versions in G and H represent Padma dKar-po's own view; but there is no indication whether the version in F was regarded by Padma dKar-po as Bu-ston's view (if this were known it would simplify the exposition). F is compatible with all the observations under 4.1–4.4 except bTsong-kha-pa's view of dgongs-bshad, on which Padma dKar-po here follows Bu-ston (while incidentally bKra-shis rNam-rgyal follows bTsong-kha-pa).

[22] B, 24a4 ff.

[23] Points relevant to bTsong-kha-pa's views on *mtha-drug* are scattered rather promiscuously through the later part of work D. See especially 207b5 ff. (definition), 209b6 ff. (examples drawn from JVS; they do not always fit the definitions), 207b2 (Bu-ston's principle) and 218a2 (explanation of Bu-ston's principle).

[24] gzhung gcig-la 'jug-pas, D 218a5. Bu-ston does not seem to say this explicitly but his work B is full of examples of it. It is necessary to draw attention to this important point explicitly because Western works persist in taking *drang-don* and *nges-don* in the tantras

as referring to different passages. The mistake even occurs in works which quote B and D. For instance Steinkellner (note 11: p. 452 and his note 25), who does quote them, teeters on the edge of the mistake by saying "I think that within tantristic exegesis . . . these two terms . . . refer to different kinds of speech . . . it is nonetheless the choice of different words which serves as a basis for the different meanings". This is quite incompatible with bTsong-kha-pa's remark quoted at the beginning of this note, and with many examples given by both Bu-ston and bTsong-kha-pa.

[25] B, 25a2; D, 218a4.

[26] B, 25a7; D, 209b2 and 218a6.

[27] B, 24b6: 'jig-rten-dang-'gal-ba; similarly Padma dKar-po at F, 36a2; 'jig-rten-las 'gal-ba.

[28] D, 218a3.

[29] It would be quite wrong here to translate "don" by "reference". What are here held to be the same are the purposes with which sentences are uttered. We might be tempted to try "perlocutionary intention" but plain 'don' will not bear the weight of the distinction. (Padma dKar-po is more precise, with *brjod-don*.)

[30] Bu-ston: B, 24b1; bTsong-kha-pa, D, 207b3; he also explains it rather carefully at 218a2. Padma dKar-po's modification is found at G, 8b5 and H, 15b4 (the latter version is given in passages (a)–(c) of Appendix C). The first Western mention seems to have been by Wayman in his article in the Louis Renou memorial volume. He translates bTsong-kha-pa's version from D, 207b3 but does not seem to have grasped the point of it (perhaps he missed the explanation at 218a2). The original form of the principle is discussed at length in my article mentioned in note 12. Padma dKar-po's modification is discussed for the first time in the present article.

[31] See Section 4.3 of my article in note 12.

[32] In the article in note 13. This article also contains a careful discussion, with references, of the notion of interpretation briefly alluded to in the two paragraphs following the table.

[32a] See postscript.

[33] For instance G, which is Padma dKar-po's main work on madhyamaka, is still studied today, especially by bKa-brgyud-pas, as a short but fairly advanced text on the subject. It contains also some interesting prefatory material on various subjects, including an extremely brief *grub-mtha*.

[34] satya (bden-pa). See MMV VI. 24, etc. (quoted at G, 38a4, with discussion).

[35] G, 42b3 and 68ab.

[36] G, 42b4.

[37] Cf. MMV VI. 28, quoted with discussion at G, 36b6. For bTsong-kha-pa's view of the important distinction between *kun-rdzob bden-pa* and *kun-rdzob tsam* see Paul Williams' "Tsong-kha-pa on kun-rdzob bden-pa", in *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson* (ed. Aris and Kyi: Aris & Phillips 1980).

[38] G contains an entire section called "*nges-pa'i don ci yang ma-bstan-pa'i tshul*": 12b3 ff. See also 12a2.

[39] Hence the phrase: drang-don-gyi nges-don, G 12a1.

[40] Orthodox explanations of the *tshul-bzhi* may be found at B, 25b3 and F, 37a1. Padma dKar-po's explanations in passages (k)–(n) are unorthodox. Tables relating the *tshul-bzhi* with different stages of practice are found in the papers of note 12. Steinkellner's table is based on Indian sources, mine on Bu-ston (and they reveal interesting differences). For comparisons between the *mtha-drug* and the *tshul-bzhi* see B, 26b3; D, 206b2; F, 37b3; H, 17b2.

[41] The Sanskrit for *brda* as used in such contexts is probably not *saṅketa* but some such word as chomā (HT I. vii, passim). See note 13.

[42] E.g. bKra-shis rNam-rgyal, E 10a6 etc.; Padma dKar-po, K 63b5; Kong-sprul, J 39b1. Full details and references are given in the paper in note 13.

[43] H. 15b5; cf. also G, 11a3.

[44] HT II. iii.

[45] K on HT I. vii and II. iii and passim.

[46] Quoted for instance by Bu-ston, 25a4:

> koṭakhya-la-sogs-pa'i sgra//'jig-rten bstan-bcos-las gzhan byas/
> /de-bzhin-gshegs-pa-rnams-kyi brda//de ni de-bzhin min-par bsgrags/

[47] H 16a1. The spelling *phyis-pa* is found twice (G, 11a4 and H, 15a6) but does not make sense; it is probably a tracing error.

[48] A, 64b1. Their use of "yi-ge'i don" is not the same as that in the *tshul-bzhi*. See the discussion in my paper, note 12.

[49] F, 36b2.

[50] Donald Davidson, "What metaphors mean", *Critical Inquiry* **5** 31 (1978).

[51] Thogs-med's headings are quite interesting. The main one is /khyad-par-du dgongs-pa-can-gyi mdo'i don bshad-pa, with three divisions ldem-dgongs, dgongs-pa, and de-dag-gi dgos-pa. But Thogs-med does not use the term dgongs-pa-can again, whereas Padma dKar-po is of course *committed* to explaining it.

[52] H, 16a4.

[53] This is why it is not enough to consider the notion of a *non-literal utterance* (see, e.g. Brian Loar, "Two Theories of Meaning", in Evans and Macdowell (eds.), *Truth and Meaning* (Oxford 1976), p. 138). In any case, Loar's principal criterion (p. 156) is that the hearer will take the utterance literally unless there is some reason to take it otherwise. Many of Padma dKar-po's examples depend on a certain indirect (ldem-po) intent on the part of the speaker. But no doubt the analysis could be extended.

[54] MSG Chapter 11, 32.

[55] JVS 298b8.

[56] MSL 80.26; S 484.1, G, 11b2, H, 16a5. The Vajrayāna case may be compared with such epigrams as HT II. ii. 39 (/'chad-pa-po nga chos kyang nga/, etc.) which Padma dKar-po says is *mthar-thug-don* (H, 17b2). The voluminous literature on this verse raises complex issues which cannot be dealt with here.

[57] G, 11b1; H, 16a4, etc.

[58] H, 16b5.

[59] phyi-rol-pa dang nang-pa (really: Hindus and Buddhists).

[60] bsam-sbyor dman-mchog.

[61] theg-pa chen-po dang chung-ngu (I have reversed them to fit Padma dKar-po's analysis).

[62] These are dealt with under tshul-bzhi.

[63] thun-mong dang mchog; the distinction does not necessarily refer to siddhi.

[64] mtshan-ma.

[65] shin-tu spros-bral.

[66] brjod-gzhi.

[67] dgongs-pa-can ma-yin-pa.

[68] snga-ma-snga-ma . . . . brjod-gzhi dgongs-pa-can (see (j)).

[69] paryāya-paramārtha.

[70] See note 67.

[71] It does not seem to have come from Thogs-med. I cannot make anything out of the single occurrence of "dgongs-pa-can" in his account.

[72] II. iii. 53.

[73] YRM on HT II. iii. 53.

[74] The word for "code" is *brda-skad*, and the individual words used for the code are called *brda-skad-rnams*. See my paper, note 13.

[75] The description of sandhābhāṣa in the Hevajra-tantra as *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin* by bKra-shis rNam-rgyal, Padma dKar-po and Kong-sprul is discussed at length in the paper of note 13.

[76] In the *mtha-drug/tshul-bzhi* system, abhisambodhi is connected with *mthar-thug-don* (cf. passage (n)), and with *dgongs-bshad*. The latter connection is canonical (e.g. JVS 292b8).

HARI SHANKAR PRASAD

TIME AND CHANGE IN SĀṀKHYA-YOGA[1]

Sāṁkhya and Yoga are two aspects of one and the same system. Yoga accepts the Sāṁkhya theories with slight variations. But regarding the problem of time, there are clear-cut divergent interpretations. In Sāṁkhya the time-concept is not given much weight. Here we find only scattered references, and in order to gather a clear idea of the concept of time, we have to draw inferences at many places from its expositions of other metaphysical categories. On the contrary, in Yoga we encounter an elaborate and explicit discussion on time.

The whole development of the Sāṁkhya conception of time may be broadly divided into two groups – preclassical and classical. The dividing line between the two is the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (350–400 A.D.), which is the first systematic text of the classical Sāṁkhya. The beginning of the preclassical "Sāṁkhya speculation cannot be precisely dated, as scattered elements of the doctrine may be traced back to the oldest parts of the *Veda* itself".[2] Various aspects of it can be found in the *Vedas, Brahmaṇas*, earliest *Upaniṣads, Mahābhārata, Bhagavad-Gītā, Buddhacarita*, etc.,[3] but during this period Sāṁkhya never emerged as a systematic philosophical system. On the other hand, the classical Sāṁkhya period embodies the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and its commentaries – the *Yuktidīpikā* (600 A.D., author unknown), *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* (700 A.D.), and *Tattva-kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra (980 A.D.). For our study of the concept of time we shall confine ourselves only to the classical Sāṁkhya literature and its later developments, comprising the *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtra* of Kapila (1400 A.D.) and the commentaries of Aniruddha (1500 A.D.) and Vijñānabhikṣu (1600 A.D.) thereon.

For the Yoga conception of time we shall be discussing with the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali (300–400 A.D.) and its commentarial literature, such as the *Yoga-bhāṣya* of Vyāsa (500–600 A.D.), *Tattva-vaiśāradī* of Vācaspati Miśra (980 A.D.) and *Yoga-vārttika* of Vijñānabhikṣu (1600 A.D.).

Sāṁkhya-Yoga assumes two fundamental and independent realities – *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* is self, pure spirit and consciousness, all-pervading

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 35–49. 0022–1791/84/0121–0035 $01.50.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

but passive. *Prakṛti* is the root cause of matter. This is the fundamental substance out of which the whole world evolves. Unlike puruṣa, it is purely matter, but it is active in character. It is a string of three strands. The three *guṇas* – *sattva* (tendencies to manifestation),[4] rajas (activity) and tamas (tendencies to non-manifestation and non-activity)[5] – are the constituent parts of *prakṛti*. When *prakṛti* comes under the influence of *puruṣa*, evolution starts. The twenty-three constitutive elements (tattva) are derived from *prakṛti*, and these are effects. Only *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are infinite; the other twenty-three evolutes are of limited magnitude. The following chart will show the gradual development of the whole process[6] according to the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*:


(1) Puruṣa
(2) Prakṛti
(3) Mahat or buddhi (intellect)
(4) Ahaṁkāra (ego)
(5) Manas (mind)
(6–10) sense-organs
(11–15) motor organs
(16–20) tanmātras [of sound, touch, smell, form and colour]
(21–25) mahābhūtas [five gross elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth]

From the preceding table it is clear that *mahat, ahaṁkāra* and the five *tanmātras* are both causes and effects, while the mind, five sense-organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin), five motor-organ (larynx, hand, foot, anus and genitals) and the five *mahābhūtas* are only effects, and not causes.[7] Of these, mahat (literally 'Great') or *buddhi* (intellect) is the first evolute of prakṛti. It is the basis of the intelligence of the individual. While the term 'mahat' brings out the cosmic aspect, *buddhi* refers to the psychological aspect pertaining to each individual. In Sāṁkhya, stress is laid on the psychological aspect of the *mahat.*[8] According to the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā,*[9] *mahat, ahaṁkāra* and *manas* are called internal organs (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and the ten sense and motor organs are termed external organs (*bāhyendriya*). *Buddhi* is the faculty of all the mental processes, reasoning, ascertainment, imagination, etc. In Sāṁkhya-Yoga, it is this buddhi which plays an important role in conceptualising the reality of time.

SĀṀKHYA

In Sāṁkhya, there are two groups – one who believes in God and the another who denies his existence.[10] Here Sāṁkhya is taken as the combined system of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. In the same vein, it is said that Kapila represents the latter group and Patañjali that of former.[11]

(i) *Time Not Different from Change*

We must keep in our mind that throughout the evolutionary process of prakṛti there is no such element as time. Regarding the existence of real time, the Sāṁkhya answer is an emphatic 'No'. It explicitly proclaims the unreality of time[12] in direct opposition to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika postulation of substantive and eternal time. The author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, the oldest commentary on the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, boldly declares that there is no substance as time.[13] It makes no sense to say that time is the creator of the world.[14] As to the question of what is time, the Sāṁkhya reply is that in our daily life we are aware of events succeeding each other. We experience the passage of time by way of events and change of states. Out of the observations of these events man must have developed the concept of time. If there is no change, there is no time. Sāṁkhya maintains the reality of change and identifies time with it. Time actually is nothing apart from change, events or actions.[15] The latter themselves are time.[16] However, time is not an entity which brings about change. It is only an abstract relation binding the events arising from the evolution of prakṛti, and hence it is unreal.[17] This means that time is neither a material nor an efficient cause. Thus, there is no metaphysical reality called Time, but our ordinary notion of time is explained away in forms of causation and change.

Gauḍapāda (700 A.D.), the author of the *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* on the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, rejects the notion of time as a cause of the universe. There are, he enunciates, only three categories in Sāṁkhya – the manifest (*vyakta*), the unmanifest (*avyakta*, or *prakṛti*) and pure-consciousness (*puruṣa*), and time comes under one of these, i.e. the manifest. Since prakṛti is the cause of everything, it must also be the cause of time.[18]

(ii) *The Three Time-epochs in Sāṁkhya*

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, time occupies an independent status as a substance, and the past, present and future are considered as its imposed properties (kālopādhi) based on objects or events of finite durations (or our watches). But Sāṁkhya regards time "as past, present and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things in its different manifesting stages of evolution".[19]

Both Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra take a critical stand against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the reality of time while commenting on the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, 33. They speak of the three time-epochs, but not of time as such. Gauḍapāda says that the three internal organs, *buddhi, ahaṁkāra* and *manas*, function in all the three time-epochs, past, present and future. The buddhi apprehends and forms an idea not only of a present object, such as a pitcher (ghaṭa), but also of the past (which is quiescent or sublatent) and future ones (which is potential, or yet to be manifested). Likewise, the *ahaṁkāra* supplies consciousness of the objects, past, present and future; and the manas makes determination (saṁkalpa) in respect of all the three times.[20] Thus, the internal organs can have knowledge of all the three time-epochs. For example, if a river is swollen, the internal organs will infer that there has been rain (referring to the past); if there is smoke in a mountain, they will deduce from it on the basis of their past experiences that there is fire in the mountain (referring to the present); and lastly, there is an ancient belief in India that if in the hot weather the ants carry their eggs from one place to another, this indicates that there will be rain (referring to the future).[21] But the external organs function only in the present (*vartamāna*); for instance, the eye only sees present forms, not past and future ones.[22] In addition, Vācaspati maintains that the present also includes in itself the immediately preceding (*atīta*) and succeeding (*anāgata*) moments.[23] The reason behind this may be that an instantaneous present cannot be apprehended. Here he seems to have been influenced by the great Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini.[24] This means that the present comprises at least three moments, though it may take more than three. But the problem is this: if we continue this process to its logical extreme, we arrive at the absolute and infinite mode of present which is external and all-pervasive time of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. However, we may not take Vācaspati's statement to have such implication. For he explicitly criticises the Vaiśeṣika notion of unique time which does not possess any divisions in itself, such as the past, present and future. The latter are, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, actually the imposed properties of real time (*kālopādhi*),[25] based on the different sorts of conditions. Vācaspati suggests that origination (*ārambha*), duration (*sthiti*) and cessation (*nirodha*) of an action themselves can be taken as the ground of the notion of the past, present and future. Therefore, it is needless and superfluous to postulate time as a real and absolute substance apart from the twenty-five principles (*tattva*) of Sāṁkhya; instead, he says, these *upādhis* alone can serve our purpose. Dasgupta remarks:

> "The Sāṁkhya did not admit the existence of any real time; to them unit of kāla is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms and their movements. The appearance of kāla as a separate entity is a creation of our buddhi (*buddhinirmāṇa*) as it represents the order or mode in which the buddhi records its perception."[27]

(iii) *Diverse Interpretations Within the System*

There is, however, a lack of unanimity regarding the exact import and characteristics of time in the later development of Sāṁkhya, particularly among the commentators. This diversity is found in the interpretation of the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* (II.12).[28] Here both time and space (*kāla* and *dik*) have been said to be the products of 'ether' (*ākāśa*), though we do not encounter any such view in the rest of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga literature. The literal rendering of the aphorism is: "Space and time (arise) from ether, etc." Aniruddha in his commentary on the sūtra explains that ether itself, by different upādhis or external conditions, is called space and time. They are, therefore, included in the 'ether'.[29] Vedāntin Mahādeva[30] (end of 17th century) follows Aniruddha. But they do not furnish any further details. From this exposition it is not clear why space and time are included under 'ether' and what their characteristics are. Aniruddha states that the word 'etc.' (*ādi*) in the sūtra is used by accident (*saṁpāta*). It follows that both these scholars fail to give any significant interpretation of the sūtra.

It is Vijñānabhikṣu who, in his *Sāṁkhya-pravacanabhāṣya*, adds a quite different meaning to this sūtra, which definitely does not fit in with the traditional Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrines. His distinction between eternal and limited space and time is certainly new within the classical Sāṁkhya system. This obviously implies that there is an independent and eternal time. Space and time, he asserts, which are eternal, are of the nature of *ākāśa*, and are like the particular *guṇas* or modifications of *prakṛti*. Therefore, space and time are proved to be all-pervasive (*vibhu*) in character.[31] Further, space and time, which are limited or finite (*khaṇḍadikkāla*), are said to be produced from *ākāśa*, because of its conjunction with various *upādhis* or external conditions.[32] Vijñānabhikṣu also explains the word 'ādi' used in the sūtra. By this, he says, we mean upādhis. Finite space and finite time are not the product of *ākāśa* in the real sense, but rather they are *ākāśa* itself particularised by various upādhis.[33] Radhakrishnan writes:

> "We have no perception of infinite time or infinite space, and so they are said to be constructed by the understanding. From the limited objects of perception which stand to one another in the relation of antecedence and sequence, we construct an infinite time order to represent the course of evolution."[34]

But when we look into the classical Sāṁkhya system, we fail to find any consistency in Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation of the sūtra. There is hardly anything in the sūtra which sustains this distinction between eternal and limited space-time.[35] Every student of Sāṁkhya-Yoga knows that it assumes only two fundamental independent realities, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. So, how is it possible to grant an independent status to a third element, such as time? That's why A. B. Keith is confronted with difficulty in maintaining any such distinction, keeping the Sāṁkhya doctrines in view. He says: "In the empiric world both [space and time] appear as limited, and are explained in a quite inconsistent way by origination from the ether through its conditioning by the masses of corporeal nature, on the one hand, in the case of space, and by the movement of the heavenly bodies in the case of time".[36] Sen thinks, "In any case, time, if it be not absolutely unreal, must also be in the ultimate analysis a particular product . . . of three guṇas (elements or constituents). Perhaps this is the reason why Vijñānabhikṣu, besides identifying time with *Ākāśa* after the sūtra, also speaks of it as a particular *guṇa* or modification of *Prakṛti* (*prakṛter guṇaviśeṣaḥ*)."[37] Whatever may be the reason, Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation is evidently incompatible with the classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga tenets.

Moreover, there is another striking aphorism in the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* (I.12)[38] which admits eternal time: "(The bondage of the puruṣa can-) not (be continued) by connection with time, because (time which is) all-pervading and eternal is related to all (*puruṣas*, released and unreleased)."[39] Here

Aniruddha has taken the words 'eternal' (*nitya*) and 'all-pervading' (*vyāpin*) as qualifying the puruṣa, whereas Vijñānabhikṣu has applied them to time.[40] But it is really surprising "to note that Vijñānabhikṣu himself in his *Yogasāra-saṁgraha* admits that the Sāṁkhya does not accept a separate entity as infinite time (Mahākāla) as the one, all-pervading reality or the basis of temporal determinations of moments, etc. Moreover, Vijñānabhikṣu goes to a great length even to criticise the views of Sāṁkhya expressed in the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra*".[41]

There is one more reference where the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*[42] gives the analogy of eternal and infinite time (mahākāla), but here he certainly does not deny the existence of time, as he has done earlier.

To conclude the classical Sāṁkhya notion of time, we can say that except Vijñānabhikṣu in his *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, all the Sāṁkhya philosophers repudiate the existence of real time, though Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati maintain the three temporal determinations, past, present and future. In the following lines we shall try to explain why Sāṁkhya-Yoga admits these temporal determinations.

YOGA

The conception of time in Yoga cannot be fully dealt with unless *the theories of causality, conservation of energy, change, succession* and other allied topics are discussed. Sāṁkhya and Yoga are not two wholly different systems (they show only few variations in their philosophical postulate), yet we find more explicit and elaborate exposition of these problems in the Yoga literature than in Sāṁkhya.

(i) *Causality, Conservation of Energy, and Time*

In the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system, *Prakṛti* alone, not *Puruṣa*, is held to be the ground of all activities and evolution. It is constituted of the three guṇas – sattva, rajas and tamas. All activities belong to these guṇas. Causality is explained in the system as different modifications of guṇas. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of causality (known as *satkāryavāda*),[43] unlike that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist, means that cause and effect are not two different things. The effect is real and is always existent. It subsists in a latent form in the cause, even beforehand. It is not entirely a new creation. It is the manifestation of what was latent.[44] The underlying substance remains the same in both the states, cause and effect. In Yoga this substance is called *dharmin* and its different modifications are termed *dharma-s*. A substance (*dharmin*) is that which possesses characteristics or external aspects (*dharma*).[45] Further, the substance is said to be the same to its past (*śānta*), present (*udita*) and future (*avyapadeśya*) forms.[46] Of these, the past is that which has come to its quiescent state by finishing its functional activities.[47] The present is that which is in operation, i.e. in this form the substance is in its manifested or actualised form.[48] And the future is that which is not yet manifested (*avyapadeśya*); it is still latent in its material cause and has not yet commenced its functional activity.[49]

The past, as we have seen, is a quiescent state. Now one may ask whether this quiescent past exists or is annihilated for ever. What happens to it? The theory of *satkāryavāda* may also be called the theory of the conservation of energy, according to which nothing is destroyed but everything is transformed into different forms.[50] The same is the case with the past. When something finishes its activity, it is absorbed by its substance (dharmin) into a state of equilibrium. The future is not yet manifested. This means that both the past and future are in their unmanifested form. Only the present is manifested. A *yogin* is said to be vested with the power of recalling the past form of anything. He does not actually call it back, but rather brings about its exact duplicate.

(ii) *The Doctrine of Change and Time*

Yoga maintains that with regard to the five gross elements and all the organs, change (*pariṇāma*) is held to be threefold: (1) change of external aspect (*dharma-pariṇāma*), (2) change of time-variation (*lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma*), and (3) change of state (*avasthā-pariṇāma*).[51] Change is defined in the system as the emergence of another external aspect (*dharma*) in a substance, which is permanent, on the disappearance of previous aspect.[52] Vācaspati remarks that here change of external aspect refers to all the three kinds of changes, stated above.[53] Of these, change of external aspect in a substance is the disappearance and appearance of the external forms, such as evolution (*vyutthāna*) and absorption (*nirodha*, lit. restriction, suppression).[54] In this mutation the substance remains intact, just as the substance of a lump of gold, even if it is turned into different kinds of ornaments, such as a ring, chain, bracelet, is constant throughout its various modifications. Change of time-variation is that by which a time-determination (*kālabheda*), such as the past, present or future, is characterised.[55] This change is from potential (future) to actual (present), and from actual to quiescent (past). It marks the three stages of a substance: the pre-manifested which is still in the womb of future awaiting to be manifested; the manifested which is present; and the post-manifested, that after having finished its manifestation, is now conserved in its quiescent state[56] (past, or the state of equilibrium). Lastly, change of state, or change due to duration or lapse of time, is described by the mutation of external aspect of the substance. In this change, the external aspect (dharma), which is in the manifested or actual (present) state, constantly undergoes change every moment. In this state, the force of restriction (*nirodhasaṁskāra*) becomes more powerful, while the force of emergence (*vyutthānasaṁskāra*) becomes weaker.[57] To quote Dasgupta: "When the changes that a thing undergoes are of so remarkable a nature as to affect the constitution of the body materially, we call it new or old, or say that it has suffered growth or decay, and this aspect of the change is called *avasthā-pariṇāma*."[58] Thus, the mutation of substance from the point of view of the change of external aspect is called dharma-pariṇāma; from the point of view of temporal determinations – the past, present and future – it is called lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma; and from the point of view of the change in an external aspect in every succeeding moment in any of its particular stages in time it is called avasthā-pariṇāma.

(iii) *The Absolute Atomistic Theory of Time and the Succession of Moments*

Yoga, like Sāṁkhya, admits that time is not an independent reality. But whereas the latter identifies time with change or action, the former nowhere explicitly does so. Yoga admits time in the form of discrete moments, which are considered real. The *Yoga-sūtra*[59] of Patañjali and its commentaries contain a full analysis of moments and their succession (*krama*).

The moment (*ksaṇa*) is defined as the minimal duration of time, just as an atom[60] (*paramāṇu*) is the minimal part of matter (*dravya*). Alternatively, the moment is defined as the time taken by an atom in order to move from its previous point in the space to the next point.[61] It is identical with the unit of change in the phenomenon. The perpetual flow of such discrete moments, one after another, gives the idea of succession or a series of moments. This succession of moments is devoid of reality, and the idea of the divisions of time, such as day and night, is merely a conceptual combination (*buddhisamāhāra*) of moments. Time does not exist as an objective reality. Any attempt to ascribe reality to time is a work of understanding (buddhi), mere words. Only to common people, who do not have critical mind, it appears as objectively real.[62] Two or more moments cannot co-exist in order to form real time. Though the change from A to B and that from B to C are each real time as moments, but we cannot construct a series of A–B–C as real time.[63] We can also say that in Yoga, time is included under *vikalpa*, i.e. cognition produced by a word which is supposed to have no corresponding object.[64]

Further, the moment in Yoga falls under the category of reality and is considered to be the basis of succession, and the succession in turn has its essence in the series of moments, which (series) is called time by the proponents of time. Again, two co-existing moments can neither co-exist nor form a succession to constitute absolute time, because it would be impossible. Succession is defined as the flow of moments in which one moment follows another. It follows that the present consists of only one moment. The preceding (past) moment and the succeeding (future) moment do not exist. Therefore, we cannot maintain their combination to constitute the *real* time.[65] The past and future moments can be understood in relation to change,[66] as we have explained above.

Department of Philosophy,
University of Delhi,
Delhi, India

NOTES

[1] *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, kārikā 33, and *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya, Tattvakaumudī* and *Māṭharavṛtti* thereon; *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* also on kārikā 61; *Yuktidīpikā*, pp. 64.5ff, 73.30–74.7, 131.8–132.18; G. S. Musalagaonkar (1971), pp. 206–210; *Sāṁkhya-sūtra*, I.12, II.12, and the commentaries of Aniruddha, Vedāntin Mahādeva and Vijñānabhikṣu thereon; *Yoga-sūtra*, III.13, 52, and *Yoga-bhāṣya, Tattva-vaiśāradī* and *Yoga-vārtika* thereon; *Kālasiddhānta-darśinī*, pp. 1–9; Garbe (1892), pp. 10, 96; Pulinbihari Chakravarti (1975), pp. 45, 94–99, 120, 200–208, 239–240, 254–264; B. M. P. Sinha (1976); I. H. Jhaveri (1955), pp. 417–419; Sen (1968), pp. 406–426; Mandal (1968), pp. 116–125; B. N. Seal (1915), pp. 18–21; Keith (1949), pp. 121–122; Satyavrat Sastri (1963), pp. 190–194; Schayer (1938), pp. 13–14; S. N. Dasgupta (1974a), pp. 107, 109, 115ff, 214ff, 234–235, (1974b), pp. 43–47, (1975), p. 311.

[2] Hulin (1978), p. 127

[3] See *ibid.*, pp. 127ff, 159.

[4] Radhakrishnan (1962), p. 266.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] S. S. S. Sastri (1930, pp. xxxii–xxxv) gives four kinds of such tables according to (i) *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, (ii) *Śaiva-siddhānta*, (iii) Paramārtha's version of the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, and (iv) *Pratyayasarga*. Also see *Yuktidīpikā*, Appendix-2 and G. S. Musalagaonkar (1971), pp. 392–397.

[7] Here it is to be noted that each evolute is finer than its succeeding one and grosser than its preceding one.

[8] Radhakrishnan (1962), pp. 266–267.

[9] Kārikā 33:

> antaḥkaraṇaṃ trividhaṃ daśadhā bāhyaṃ trayasya viṣayākhyam /
> sāmpratakālaṃ bāhyaṃ trikālam ābhyantaraṃ karaṇam //

[10] *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 320.7: dvividhaṃ ca Sāṁkhyam – nirīśvaraṃ seśvaraṃ ca. Also see Johannes Bronkhorst (1981), pp. 309–320.

[11] Cf. *Kālasiddhānta-darśinī*, p. 5: tatra Kapilaṃ mataṃ nirīśvaram. Pātañjalaṃ mataṃ seśvaram.

[12] Cf. *Ratnaprabhā* on *Śārīrakabhāṣya* of Śaṁkara (2.2.1): Sāṁkhyaiḥ kālasyānaṅgikārāt (see Satyavrat Sastri, 1963, p. 191).

[13] Cf. *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 132.6: na kālo nāma kaścit padārtho 'sti. Also cf. *ibid.*, p. 73.31: na hi naḥ kālo nāma kaścid asti.

[14] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 73.30: yad apy uktaṃ kālāj jagad utpattir bhaviṣyatīti tad anupapannam.

[15] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 73.31–32: kriyamāṇakriyāṇām evādityagatigodohaghaṭāstanitādīnāṃ viśiṣṭāvadhisarūpapratyayanimittatvam.

[16] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 132.6: kriyāsu kālasaṁjñā.

[17] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 74.6: kālas tu sambandhamātropakārī na vikriyāhetuḥ. tasmād asad etat.

[18] Cf. *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* on kārikā 61: vyaktāvyaktapuruṣāḥ trayaḥ padārthāḥ, tena kālo 'ntarbhūto 'sti. sa hi vyaktaḥ. sarvakartṛtvāt kālasyāpi pradhānam eva kāraṇam.

Also see *Parāśara-smṛti* of Mādhavācārya, pp. 94.7–95.2: pradhānavāde pañcaviṁśati-tattvebhyo bahir bhūtasya kālatattvasyābhāvāt pradhānam eva kālaśabdena vyavahṛiyatām.

[19] Dasgupta (1975), Vol. I, p. 311. For a similar observation, see Guenther (1976), p. 218, fn. 32.

[20] Cf. *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* on kārikā 33: trikālam ābhyantaraṃ karaṇam. buddhyahaṁkāramanāṁsi trikālaviṣayāṇi buddhir vartamānaṃ ghaṭaṃ budhyate atītam anāgataṃ ceti. ahaṁkāro vartamāne 'bhimānaṃ karoti atīte 'nāgate ca. tathā mano vartamāne saṁkalpaṃ kurute atīte 'anāgate ca. evaṃ trikālam ābhyantaraṃ karaṇam iti.

Also see *Māṭharavṛtti* on the same kārikā.

[21] Cf. *Tattvakaumudī* on kārikā 33: tadyathā – nadīpūrabhedād abhūd vṛṣṭiḥ; asti dhūmād agnir iha naganikuñje, asaty upaghātake pipīlikāṇḍasañcaraṇād bhaviṣyati vṛṣṭir iti, tadanurūpāś ca saṁkalpābhimānādhyavasāya bhavanti.

[22] Cf. *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* on kārikā 33: sāmpratakālam. śrotaṃ vartamānam eva śabdaṃ śṛṇoti nātītaṃ na ca bhaviṣyantam, cakṣur api vartamānaṃ rūpaṃ paśyati nātītaṃ nā 'nāgatam, tvag vartamānaṃ sparśam, jihvā vartamānaṃ rasam, nāsikā vartamānaṃ gandhaṃ nātītānāgataṃ ceti evaṃ karmendriyāṇi, vāg vartamānaṃ śabdam uccārayati nātītam nā' nāgataṃ ca, pāṇi vartamānaṃ ghaṭam ādadate nātītam anāgataṃ ca, pādau

vartamānaṃ panthānaṃ viharato nātītam nāpy anāgatam, pāyūpasthau ca vartamānāv utsargānandau kuruto nātītau nā 'nāgatau. evaṃ bāhyaṃ karaṇaṃ sāmpratakālam uktam.

Also see *Māṭharavṛtti* on the same kārikā.

[23] Cf. *Tattvakaumudī* on kārikā 33: vartamānasamīpam anāgatam atītam api vartamānam.

[24] Cf. *Laghusiddhānta-kaumudī*, sūtra 767: vartamānasāmīpye vartamānavad vā / 3.3.131/

[25] Cf. *Tattvakaumudī* on kārikā 33: kālaś ca Vaiśeṣikābhimata eko na anāgatādivyavahārabhedaṃ pravartayitum arhati. tasmād ayam yair upādhibhedair anāgatādibhedaṃ pratipadyate.

Also cf. Musalagaonkar (1971), p. 209.10: svasya svabhedajanakatvābhāvāt.

[26] Cf. *Tattvakaumudī, ibid.*: santu ta evopādhayaḥ, ye 'nāgatādivyavahārahetavaḥ, kṛtam atrāntargaḍunā kāleneti Sāṁkhyācāryāḥ, tasmān na kālarūpatattvāntarābhyupagama iti.

[27] Dasgupta (1975), vol. I, p. 311. Also cf. *Siddhāntabindu*: dikkālau tu aprāmāṇikatvād noktau, ākāśasyaiva digvyavahārajanakatvasambhavāt, diśaḥ śrotam iti śruteś ca. kālas tu avidyā eva, tasyā eva sarvādhāratvāt. (quoted by Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, 1977, p. 105, fn. 1).

[28] Dikkālāv ākāśādibhyaḥ.

[29] tattadupādhibhedād ākāśam eva dikkālaśabdavācyam. tasmād ākāśe 'ntarbhūtau.

[30] See Garbe (1892), p. 96; Satyavrat Sastri (1963), p. 193.

[31] Cf. *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya* on kārikā II.12: nityau yau dikkālau tāv ākāśaprakṛtibhūtau prakṛter guṇaviśeṣāv eva. ato dikkālayor vibhutvopapattiḥ.

[32] Cf. *ibid.*: yau tu khaṇḍadikkālau tau tu tattadupādhisaṁyogād ākāśād utpadyete ity arthaḥ.

[33] Cf. *ibid.*: ādiśabdenopādhigrahaṇād iti. yady api tattadupādhiviśiṣṭākāśam eva khaṇḍadikkālau tathāpi viśiṣṭasyātiriktābhyupagamavādena.

[34] Radhakrishnan (1962), p. 277.

[35] Sen (1968), p. 414.

[36] Keith (1949), pp. 121–122.

[37] Sen (1968), p. 415.

[38] na kālayogato vyāpino nityasya sarvasambandhāt.

In spite of Vācaspati's above protest "against the hypostatizing of a real Time, the Sāṁkhya, as a matter of fact, does not go beyond the problems and constructions of the 'Substantialists', Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsakas, etc. The distinction of eternal and created Time is retained in the form that the former becomes an attribute (guṇaviśeṣa) of the prakṛti, while the latter is reduced to ākāśa as the motion of the Sun and of the planets. The Sāṁkhyas also do not dismiss the conception of Time as the general cause." – Schayer (1938), p. 13. "It is not denied", Schayer continues, "that Time (just as Space, karma, etc.) possesses paraṃ kāraṇatvaṃ sāmānyarūpeṇa; what is denied is only that it is a special cause, an asādhāraṇakāraṇa". – *Ibid.*, fn. 2. Further, he disagrees with Garbe (*Die Sāṁkhya Philosophie*, 1917, p. 168) and says: "A true estimate would rather be just the opposite, i.e. that the Classical Sāṁkhya manifested strikingly little interest in the Time-problem and that, apart from the negation of Time as a separate substance, it confined itself to copying the views of the rejected kālavāda." – *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[39] Translation by Nandalal Sinha (1974), p. 31.

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] B. M. P. Sinha (1976), p. 86, fn. 2.

[42] p. 96.21–22: sa ca mūrtipratyayābhyāṃ mahataḥ sthūlataraḥ. kasmāt? avibhāgāt, vibhāganiṣpatteḥ kālādivat.

Aslo cp. *ibid.*, p. 91.19: sa tu deśamahatvāt kālamahatvāc ca mahān.

[43] Cf. *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, 9:

> asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt /
> śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt, kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam //

[44] Cf. *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 27.5: sūkṣmāṇāṃ mūrtilābhaḥ kāryam. Also cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya, Tattvavaiśāradī* and *Yogavārtika* on *Yoga-sūtra*, 3.13.

[45] Cf. *Ibid.* on *Yoga-sūtra*, 3.14.

[46] Cf. *Yoga-sūtra*, 3.14: śāntoditāvyapadeśyadharmānupātī dharmī.

[47] Cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 305.16: śāntā ye kṛtvā vyāpārānuparatāḥ.

[48] Cf. *ibid.*: savyāpārā uditāḥ.

[49] Cf. *Tattvavaiśāradī*, p. 293.5ff; *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 305.15ff.

[50] Cp. *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya* on the sūtra, I.91: satkāryavādināṃ hy atītādikam api svarūpato 'stīti. Also cp. *Yoga-sūtra*, 4.12, and its commentaries thereon.

[51] Cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 290.23–24: bhūtendriyeṣu dharmapariṇāmo lakṣaṇapariṇāmo 'vasthāpariṇāmaś coktaḥ.

[52] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 292.26–27: avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmanivṛttau dharmāntarotpattiḥ pariṇāmaḥ.

[53] Cf. *Tattvavaiśāradī*, p. 297.7–8: dharmaśabdasya āśritatvena dharmalakṣaṇāvasthāvācakaḥ.

[54] Cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 290.25: vyutthānanirodhayor dharmayor abhibhavaprādurbhāvau dharmiṇi dharmapariṇāmaḥ. Also Cp. *Yoga-sūtra*, 3.9a.

In nirodha the change is not experienced, but it does not mean that there is no change. Since the guṇas are always active, the absence of change even for a moment is impossible.

[55] Cf. *Tattvavaiśāradī*, p. 293.5: lakṣyate 'neneti lakṣaṇaṃ kālabhedaḥ.

[56] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 293.5ff; *Yoga-sūtra*, 4.12, and its commentaries thereon.

[57] Cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 291.6–7: nirodhasaṁskārā balavanto bhavanti durbalā vyutthānasaṁskārā iti. eṣa dharmāṇām avasthāpariṇāmaḥ.

[58] Dasgupta (1974a), p. 117.

[59] 3.52: kṣaṇatatkramayoḥ saṁyamād vivekajaṃ jñānam.

[60] For a comparative study of atom according to Vyāsa, Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu, see Dasgupta (1974b), p. 43.

[61] Cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 383.11–13: yathākarṣaparyantaṃ dravyaṃ paramāṇur evaṃ paramākarṣaparyantaḥ kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ. yāvatā vā samayena calitaḥ paramāṇuḥ pūrvadeśaṃ jahyād uttaradeśam upasampadyeta sa kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ.

[62] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 383.13–16: tatpravāhāvicchedas tu kramaḥ. kṣaṇatatkramayor nāsti vastusamāhāra iti buddhisamāhāro muhūrtāhorātrādayaḥ. sa khalv ayaṃ kālo vastuśūnyo buddhinirmāṇaḥ śabdajñānānupātī laukikānām vyutthitadarśanānām vastusvarūpa ivāvabhāsate.

[63] See K. C. Bhattacharya (1956), vol. I, p. 170.

[64] Cf. *Yoga-sūtra*, 1.9: śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ.

[65] Cf. *Yoga-bhāṣya*, p. 383.17–21: kṣaṇas tu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambī. kramaś ca kṣaṇānantaryātmā. taṃ kālavidaḥ kāla ity ācakṣate yoginaḥ. na ca dvau kṣaṇau saha bhavataḥ. kramaś ca na dvayoḥ sahabhuvoḥ, asambhavāt, pūrvasmād uttarasya bhāvino yadānantaryaṃ kṣaṇasya sa kramaḥ. tasmād vartamāna evaikaḥ kṣaṇo na pūrvottarakṣaṇāḥ santīti. tasmān nāsti tatsamāhāraḥ.

[66] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 383.21–22: ye tu bhūtabhāvinaḥ kṣaṇās te pariṇāmānvitā vyākhyeyāḥ.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bhattacharya, K. C. (1956). *Studies in Philosophy*, Calcutta, Progressive Publishers, 2 Vols.

Bhattacharya, Ram Shankar (ed.) (1977). *Sāṁkhya-sūtra with Vijñānabhikṣu's Commentary*. Varanasi, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.

Bronkhorst, Johannes (1981). 'Yoga and Seśvara Sāṁkhya', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9, pp. 309–320.

Chakravarti, Pulinbihari (1975), *Origin and Development of the Sāṁkhya System of Thought*, Reprint, New Delhi, Oriental Books Reprint Corporation.

Dasgupta, S. N. (1974a), *Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought*, Reprint, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass.

Dasgupta, S. N. (1974b), *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*, Reprint, New York, Krishna Press.

Dasgupta, S. N. (1975), *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Reprint, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 5 Vols.

Garbe, Richard (tr.) (1892), *Aniruddha's Commentary and the Original Parts of Vedāntin Manadeva's Commentary on the Sāṁkhya Sūtras*, Calcutta, Bibliotheca Indica 131.

Gauḍapādabhāṣya, see *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Guenther, H. V. (1976), *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice*, Boulder, Sambhala.

Hulin, Michel (1978), 'Sāṁkhya Literature', in *A History of Indian Literature*, vol. Vi, Fasc. 3, ed. by J. Gonda, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz.

Jhaveri, I. H. (1955), "Concepts of Kāla and Ākāśa in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga System", *Journal of Oriental Institute* (*Baroda*) 5, pp. 417–419.

Kālasiddhānta-darśinī: A Treatise on the Indian Philosophical Views on Time, ed. by H. C. Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1941.

Keith, A. B. (1949), *The Sāṁkhya System*, Reprint, Calcutta.

Mandal, K. K. (1968), *A Comparative Study of the Concepts of Space and Time in Indian Thought*, Varanasi, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.

Māṭharavṛtti, see Vangiya (1970).

Mishra, Shree Narain (ed.) (1971), *Pātañjala-Yogadarśana with Yoga-bhāṣya of Veda Vyāsa, Tattvavaiśāradī of Vācaspati and Yoga-vārttika of Vijñānabhikṣu*, Varanasi, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.

Musalagaonkar, G. (ed.) (1971), *Sāṁkhyatattva-kaumudī of Vācaspati*, Varanasi, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.

Parāśarasmṛti of Mādhavācārya, ed. by Chandrakanta Tarkalamkara, Reprint, Calcutta, the Asiatic Society, 1974.

Radhakrishnan, S. (1962), *Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2, Reprint, London, George Allen & Unwin.

Sāṁkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the Commentary of Gauḍapāda, ed, and tr. by T. G. Mainkar, second rev. and enlarged ed., Poona, Oriental Book Agency, 1972.

Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, see Ram Shankar Bhattacharya (1977).

Sāṁkhya-sūtra, see Ram Shankar Bhattacharya (1977).

Śāstradīpikā of Pārthasārathi Miśra, ed. by L. S. Dravid, Benares, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1916.

Sastri, Satyavrat (1963), *Essays on Indology*, Delhi, Meharchand Lachhmandass.

Sastri, S. S. S. (ed. and tr.) (1973), *The Sāṁkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa*, Reprint, Madras, University of Madras.

Schayer, Stanislaw (1938), *Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian Philosophy*, Cracòw, Polska Akademia Umiejetnósci Prace Komisji Orientalistycznej.

Seal, B. N. (1915), *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, London.

Sen, S. K. (1968), 'Time in Sāṁkhya-Yoga', *International Philosophical Quarterly* 8, No. 3, pp. 406–426.

Sinha, B. M. P. (1976), *Problem of Time and Temporality in Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Ābhidharma Buddhism*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Hamilton, McMaster University.

Sinha, Nandlal (tr.) (1974), *The Sāṁkhya Philosophy Containing (1) Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtra, with the Vṛtti of Aniruddha, and the bhāṣya of Vijñānabhikṣu and extracts from the Vṛtti-sāra of Mahādeva Vedāntin*; (*2*) *Tattvasamāsa*; (*3*) *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*; *and* (*4*) *Pañcaśikhā-sūtram*, Reprint, New York, AMS Press.

Tattvakaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra, ed, and tr. by G. N. Jha, third edition, Poona, Oriental Book Agency, 1965.

Tattvavaiśāradī, see Shree Narain Mishra (1971).

Vangiya, S. (ed.) (1970), *Sāṁkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Māṭharavṛtti of Mādhavācārya,* Varanasi, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.

Yoga-bhāṣya, see Shree Narain Mishra (1971).

Yoga-sūtra, see Shree Narain Mishra (1971).

Yoga-vārttika, see Shree Narain Mishra (1971).

Yuktidīpikā, An Ancient Commentary on the Sāṁkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, ed. by R. C. Pandey, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1967.

PAUL HOORNAERT

THE BIPOLAR BUDDHA

This paper is an attempt to write a part of Buddhist philosophy which as a whole “remains still to be written”.[1] Its object is to expose the inner coherence of the basic patterns of Yogācāra philosophy as exemplified in its ‘bipolar’ buddhology.

The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* (T. 1585)[2] and the *Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra* (T. 1530), exponents of Dharmapāla’s doctrine advocated at Nālandā, elaborate and systematize the buddhology contained in earlier writings such as the *Buddhabhūmisūtra* (T. 680), *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra* (MSA esp. IX. 56–76) and *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (MS exp. VIII–X). They expound a ‘bipolar’ Buddha embodied in:

(1) an unconditioned (*asaṁskṛta*) pole.
(2) a conditioned (*saṁskṛta*) pole comprising:
    (i) a pure (*anāsrava*) mental continuum or substratum (*upadhi, āśraya*) constituting the real conditioned Buddha-nature.
    (ii) a quasi-impure but unreal substratum, created and assumed as means (*upāya*) to lead non-buddhas towards buddhahood.

The preliminary part of this paper examines the soteriological and ontological claims on which the notion of bipolar buddhahood is based. I will argue that the ideal of bipolar buddhahood is equivalent to the ideal of abodeless *nirvāṇa* (*apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*) and that it is in virtue of his real conditioned substratum [(2) (i)] that the Buddha abides neither in a defiled substratum (*saṁsāra*) nor in a substratumless *nirvāṇa* (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) while, paradoxically enough, abiding in both.

I. BIPOLAR BUDDHAHOOD AS ABODELESS NIRVĀṆA

Buddhist ontology is an auxiliary of Buddhism as a message of salvation so much so that the divergent and often contradictory ontological claims of the Buddhist schools are reducible to diverse views on salvation. Statements that such and such exist or do not exist, obviously conceptualizations and verbalizations by

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 51–66. 0022–1791/84/0121–0051 $01.60.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

the Buddhist saint of insights into the real gained in the course of his path (*mārga*), have no other purport but to convey to others the soundness of the Buddhist soteriological claim that liberation is possible and the path leading towards it effective. Yogācāra ontology, condensed in the doctrine of the three dharmic modes of own-being (*trisvabhāva*), is no exception to the rule. A firm grasp of its fundamentals is indispensable for understanding bipolar buddhahood and abodeless *nirvāṇa.*[3]

1. The doctrine that an eternal self (*pudgala, ātman*) and elements (*dharma*) conceived as non-monemtary or substantial[4] entities do not exist, is an ancillary of soteriology. Two soteriological applications of the unsubstantiality of elements (*dharmanairātmya*) suffice to evidence this.

Defilements (*kleśa*) and defiled acts, the origins (*samudaya*) of misery (*duḥkha*), do not exist as substantial defilers. Painful (*duḥkha*) elements have no lasting or permanent painful nature. Since lasting beyond one moment (*kṣaṇa*) is equivalent to everlasting, elements either perish immediately upon birth or do not perish at all. But everlasting defilement and misery preclude the possibility of liberation.[5] Substantial own-being is therefore a merely imagined and nonexistent mode of own-being (*parikalpitasvabhāva*). Recognizing its existence would be tantamount to undermining the significance of any effort to gain liberation from misery.

The Small Vehicle, disgusted with the misery inherent in all conditioned existence, aims at a state of emancipation where every conditioned corporeal-mental substratum (*upadhi*) is annihilated. The substratumless *nirvāṇa* (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) of the disciples (*śrāvaka*) is absolute extinction "just like firewood completely consumed by fire"[6] and "the disciples, residing in a substratumless *nirvāṇa*, have completely annihilated body and knowledge just like the extinguished flame of a lamp."[7] This concept of a 'monopolar' *nirvāṇa*, annihilation of the conditioned and strictly speaking immersion in unconditioned suchness (*tathatā*), derives from the false discrimination of imagined own-being. Conditioned elements are imagined to be unpeaceful in nature (*ma źi baḥi raṅ bźin, aśāntasvabhāva*) and to exist apart from an intrinsically appeased (*źi bahi raṅ bźin, śāntasvabhāva*) unconditioned which is to be obtained from a state in which it is not yet obtained.[8] But if conditioned elements are intrinsically unpeaceful and not in some respect always already at peace, which effort will ever be able to appease their intrinsic defilement? The ontological presupposition of intrinsic and hence ineradicable defilement and of extrinsic and hence unappropriable liberation invalidates the Buddhist message of liberation.

2. The Buddhist promise of liberation therefore requires that elements be always already empty of a substantial self and of a substantial *dharma*-nature. This always-already-being-empty of substantial own-being is the always-already-accomplished mode (*parinispannasvabhāva*) of elements. It is their emptiness (*śūnyatā*), their invariably-being-thus (*tathatā*), their *dharma*hood (*dharmatā*).

It is in virtue of this unconditioned mode of own-being that defilements are void of a lasting nature of defilement. Defilers never get born as substantial defilers producing a substantial realm of misery. In their substantial mode they do not defile, must not be eradicated, are appeased from the outset (*ādiśānta*), intrinsically pure (*prakṛtiviśuddha*) and emancipated (*prakṛtinirvṛta*). *Nirvāṇa* is not (and cannot be) obtained by annihilation of a substantial *saṁsāra* because all *saṁsāra* elements are (and should be) always already annihilated as substances. The ignorance of the worldling (*pṛthagjana*) as void of the substantial mode of ignorance does not in the least differ from the wisdom of the Buddha as void of the substantial mode of wisdom. Substantial ignorance must not (and cannot) be eradicated, substantial wisdom must not (and cannot) be gained. The same emptiness, the same peace inhabits both ignorance and wisdom.[9]

3. The Yogācārins, experts in yoga and vividly aware of its purifying and liberating power, could not remain content with the simple assertion that all elements are always already intrinsically liberated. The meaningfulness and effectiveness of yoga require that elements, indistinguishable as to their intrinsically pure and liberated nature (*parinispannasvabhāva*), be in one or other way distinguishable as defilers (*vipakṣa*) and purifiers (*pratipakṣa).* The affirmation of complete identity between *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa* validates the possibility of liberation but at the expense of paralyzing all efforts to gain it. There must be a mode in which defiling elements really do get born, do defile, should be and can be eradicated. There must be a basis of distinction between the elements of an unenlightened worldling and those of an enlightened bodhisattva or Buddha. In short, defilement and its antidotes, the defiled mind and the pure mind etc. require an ontological status. Here lies the reason why the Yogācārins developed the doctrine of three dharmic modes of own-being and attributed a central role to the dependent mode (*paratantrasvabhāva*).

Defilers, nonexistent as substantial defilers, do exist as dependently originated (*paratantra*) elements. *Abhūtaparikalpo 'sti* (MVK I. 1a), Maitreya's opening statement in the *Madhyāntavibhāgakārikā*, is a pregnant proclamation that the mind in its dependent mode necessarily exists as locus of defilement. A mental continuum of dependent elements (not a substance!) must exist as a substratum (*āśraya*) of continuous defilement and purification: this is the gist of the later developed rational arguments for the existence of an uninterrupted seventh (*manas*) and eighth (*ālayavijñāna*) consciousness. The continuous defilement and purification are possible if and only if defilers and purifiers exists as an uninterrupted flow of dependent or momentary entitites. A substantial defiler cannot defile and no substantial purifier can eradicate substantial defilement. Only what is empty of substantial own-being can act efficiently as a defiler or purifier. It is important to notice, however, that the efficiency of a moment (*kṣaṇa*) can per definition include no other act except the 'act' of momentary existence or of spontaneous and immediate perishing. A moment acts efficiently upon a next moment only in the sense that it exists immediately before the next moment and, so to speak, makes room for it by perishing immediately.[10]

The mental continuum is impure (*saṁkliṣṭa, sāsrava*) as long as its moments are infected – either potentially (the eighth consciousness as store of defilement seeds) or in act (the actual sixth and seventh consciousnesses[11]) – with objectification (*vikalpa, parikalpa*) of and attachment (*grāha*) to substantiality. Defilement is misplaced imputation of a substantial-independent nature on momentary-dependent elements. It is not realizing that dependent elements never exist in the imagined substantial mode, that they are always already merely dependent and that their mode of being-merely-dependent is itself not a dependent mode but their truly independent or unconditioned (*pariniṣpanna*) mode. In other words, attachment to the substantial mode is equivalent to not realizing emptiness and not realizing emptiness is equivalent to not realizing the dependent as (merely) dependent. For instance, the clinging to a substantial self (*ātmagrāha*), proper to the defiled *manas*, is ignorance of the unsubstantiality or emptiness of the self. But in the final analysis it is ignorance of the dependent nature of the eighth consciousness. The eighth consciousness, uninterrupted flow of radically different moments, hides its dependent nature and 'deceives' by developing as a quasi-identical subject of indistinct (*aparicchinna*) awareness of 'world' (*bhājanaloka* and *sattvaloka*). *Manas* does not realize *ālayavijñāna*'s dependent character and falsely imagines it to be an eternal self-identical knower.[12]

The bodhisattva purifies his mental continuum by gradually suppressing the obstacles of defilement (*kleśāvaraṇa* = *ātmagrāha*) and knowledge (*jñevāvaraṇa* = *dharmagrāha*). Purification is cultivation of great insight (*mahābodhi*), ever deepening realization of the nonexistence of the imagined mode (equivalent to realization of the *pariniṣpanna* mode) and realization of the dependent mode as dependent. It is cultivation of nondiscriminative knowledge (*nirvikalpajñāna*) and of its follow-up discriminative knowledge (*pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna*). After the diamond-concentration (*vajropamasamādhi*) all obstacle-remnants are eliminated. The mental substratum (*āśraya*) is 'revolutionized' and turns into (*parāvṛtti*) a perfectly pure (*anāsrava*) Buddha-substratum.

4. The revolutionized Buddha-substratum is a continuum of pure dependent mental elements. It is perfection of non-objectification (*nirvikalpa*) and of its follow-up objectification (*vikalpa*).[13]

Perfect non-objectificatory knowledge does not de-limit, de-fine or de-termine. Emptied of notions and distinctions (which do de-limit and de-fine), it alone can be adequate knowledge of emptiness. In fact, emptiness is the notionless (*animitta*), un-de-finable or limit-less (*bhūtakoṭi*) and inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*) reality. The nondiscriminative mind is pure receptivity and acceptance (*kṣānti*) of always already given emptiness. It is the 'amen' which lets emptiness be what it is without adding anything to it or deducting anything from it. It is seeing of highest truth (*paramārthasatya*) because it is full dis-closure, dis-coveredness, un-concealment (*a-letheia*) of the highest reality (*paramārtha*). It dis-covers and re-leases emptiness from the categories under which a grasping (*grāhaka*) and appropriating mind covers it up. It is, to say it in Kantian terms, pure seeing (*Anschauung*) free of concepts (*Begriffe*). The nondiscriminative mind, absorbed in the notionless unconditioned, neither conceives nor speaks notions such as *śūnyatā, saṁsāra, nirvāṇa, parikalpita, duḥkha, samudaya* etc. It dwells in complete silence.

But self-contained silence is deficient. "*Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind*" (Kant). Asaṅga compares nondiscriminative knowledge to the knowledge of someone who knows the real but whose eyes are closed. It is similar to the knowledge of the fool, the deaf and the mute who know truth but are unable to conceive it and relate it to others.[14]

Nondiscriminative knowledge therefore requires a complement which attempts to conceive the inconceivable and speak the unspeakable.[15] This is the function of the other aspect of great insight (*mahābodhi*), a discriminative knowledge immediately following upon (*pṛṣṭhalabdha*) nondiscrimination. The blind sees, the fool understands, the mute speaks and the deaf hears. There is re-descent from the transwordly (*lokottara*) realm of silence into the wordly (*laukika*) and public realm of concepts, names and phrases.

In its very attempt to define the undefinable and express the inexpressible, notional knowledge violates its own purpose. It clothes and veils (*saṁvṛ*). It is truth (and necessary truth) but truth which reveals or unveils in the mode of veiling (*saṁvṛtisatya*). Nevertheless, and this is very important, it is veilment after having dis-covered. Perfect discrimination following upon perfect non-discrimination retains the latter's dis-covery and returns to it again and again. In this way it remains vividly aware of its own veiling act, of its necessity and of the impossibility to manifest the highest truth adequately.

Buddha's discrimination is perfect knowledge of the nonexistence of the substantial mode. The Buddha knows that all elements are always already void of substantial own-being and are in that respect unborn, unperished, intrinsically pure, appeased and liberated. He knows that there is not the slightest difference between *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa* because *saṁsāra* as empty of substantiality is *nirvāṇa* and *nirvāṇa* is nothing else but the emptiness of *saṁsāra.*[16] Knowing that there is no need to eradicate an ineradicable *saṁsāra* he is at peace and 'rejoyces' in the possibility of liberation.

Further, because he knows that in their dependent mode defilement and misery are real and because he knows the defiling and purifying nature of each single element, he can be the great friendship (*mahāmaitrī*), the great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) who does not rest as long as defilement and misery exist. But because he knows the dependent *as* dependent,[17] he knows that dependent elements, although real, have only a momentary and fleeting existence like a dream, a mirage, magic. . . and are easily eradicable. He knows that a purifying element eradicating a defiler is like magic fighting magic.[18]

We are now in a position to draw some first conclusions:

1. The defiled mental continuum of non-buddhas is the basis and locus of attachment to the imagined mode of own-being. It conceals emptiness and consequently does not know the dependent as dependent. The pure Buddha continuum is the locus of fully discovered emptiness and of knowing the dependent as dependent.

2. This pure continuum is the 'pivot' of the bipolar Buddha. Because of it the Buddha abides in abodeless *nirvāṇa*:

(a). The pure Buddha continuum is in itself neither *saṁsāra* nor *nirvāṇa*.
As a pure (*anāsrava*) substratum it is not part of the realm of misery and its origins (*duḥkha* + *samudaya* = *saṁsāra*). As dependently originated substratum it is not substratumless annihilation (*nirodha* = *nirvāṇa*). That is why it is said to be included in the *mārgasatya* only.[19]

(b) As perfection of *nir-vikalpa and follow-up vikalpa* it is the basis of residence in both a defiled substratum (*saṃsāra*) and substratumless *nirvāṇa*.

First, in virtue of his perfect insight, the Buddha realizes that the unconditioned is always the unconditioned in and of the conditioned (the *pariniṣpanna* in and of *paratantra*) and that there is no other way to let others dis-cover emptiness except by taking recourse to veiling (*saṁvṛti*) means in order to unveil emptiness for others. He also does not fear *saṁsāra* nor despairs about it because he knows that being momentary it is easily eradicable.
He is therefore the great companion and compassionate who never forsakes *saṁsāra*. He is ever active assuming various quasi-defiled substrata (*duḥkha-samudaya* or *saṁsāra*-substrata) in order to be-with and to 'suffer' with non-buddhas and guide them towards buddhahood.

Second, in virtue of his perfect nondiscriminative knowledge, the Buddha uninterruptedly abides in substratumless emptiness. This is his unconditioned pole, his substratumless *nirvāṇa.* It is his perfect peace (*śānti*), his true *nirodha.*

In the following parts I will make use of these preliminary findings to specify the character of each Buddha pole.

II. THE UNCONDITIONED POLE

The basic affirmation of Yogācāra philosophy as an ancillary of soteriology is that there is an unconditioned reality (*śūnyatā, tathatā, pariniṣpannasvabhāva* etc.) and that it is not apart from the conditioned (*paratantra*) but constitutes the intrinsic nature in virtue of which the conditioned is always already pure and liberated. Intrinsic liberation, however, is not *de facto* liberation lest effort towards liberation be needless. As long as the conditioned is defiled it acts as an extrinsic or adventitious obstacle (*āgantukāvaraṇa*) obscuring the unconditioned and covering (*āvṛ*) it with 'dust' (*mala*). *De facto* liberation is full dis-covery of the unconditioned obtained through complete eradication of the defiled conditioned.

In the Buddha or Tathāgata all obstacles are removed. In him the unconditioned is fully dis-covered, completely purified of 'dust' (*ekāntanirmalatathatā*).[20] Removal of *mala* is never an intrinsic or original (*prakṛti*) purification. It is a re-purification of intrinsic purity, a re-discovery from adventitious hiddenness. The reversal of the unconditioned (*tathatā-āśrayaparāvṛtti*) is only a re-turn to an original purity which always already was.[21]

Because he is the locus of fully dis-closed emptiness, the Buddha is said to 'embody' emptiness. Emptiness is his body (*kāya*), his great self (*mahātman, paramātman*).[22] It is his intrinsic body (*svābhāvika-kāya*)[23] because it is not produced (*svābhāvika = akṛtrima = prakṛti = asaṁskṛta*) but only revealed or unveiled. It is the substratumless realm (neither real *cittacaitta* nor real *rūpa*) of all Tathāgatas, their common support (*āśraya*) and abode (*kṣetra*). It neither arises nor perishes and does not act. It is absolute peace.

Because the unconditioned Buddha pole is embodiment of emptiness, it is present in all conditioned elements. All elements are Embryo of the Tathāgata (*tathāgatagarbha*).[24] This is likely to be misunderstood. It only means that unconditioned buddhahood is present in all beings and not that all beings will *de facto* become Buddha by perfecting the conditioned Buddha continuum. Only beings who possess the inborn *mahābodhi* seeds (beings born in the Tathāgata family) and eventually those who are not fixed (*aniyata*) in any family (*gotra*) can perfect the conditioned Buddha continuum. The familyless (*agotraka*) and beings fixed in the Small Vehicle family can never obtain a perfectly pure Buddha substratum. Unconditioned buddhahood is present in them too but it remains hidden.[25]

III. THE CONDITIONED POLE

1. *The Real Substratum*

The real conditioned Buddha pole, outcome of ongoing purification over many aeons, is a pure (*anāsrava*) mental continuum obtained at the instant[26] of mental revolution (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*). Unlike the unconditioned pole it is not obtained through revealing but is a product of dependent origination.[27]

It is a chain of momentary mental events, uninterrupted (*asraṁsana*)[28] actualization of all Buddha perfections (*mahābodhi, mahākaruṇā* etc.). 'Perfection' here means that Buddha qualities show neither increase nor decrease because they are born from perfect potentialities or seeds. For instance, Buddha's discriminative knowledge (*pratyavekṣaṇājñāna*) is perfect because it is at any moment omniscience, knowledge of all particular and universal characteristics of all elements. But what it knows (the content of omniscience) viz. all characteristics existing at each particular instant, varies from instant to instant.

The real conditioned Buddha pole is the Buddha of self-enjoyment (*svasaṁbhoga*).[29] In and for himself (*sva*) the Buddha actualizes and enjoys the perfection of buddhahood. As outcome of ongoing praxis during many aeons this enjoyment is peculiar (*sva*) to each Buddha. Yet in their perfection all Buddhas are one, enjoying in harmony and communion (*saṁbhuj*) the perfections proper (*sva*) to Buddhas only and inaccessible to non-buddhas.

The pure Buddha continuum is a nexus of eight kinds of mental activity invariably accompanied by twenty-one mental functions (*caitta*).[30] In the Buddha, just like in the wordling, the centre of mental activity is the eighth store-consciousness. At the Buddha level it has grown into a store of perfected potentiality from which the eight actual consciousnesses associated with perfect insight, wholesomeness (the eleven *kuśalacaitta*) and all Buddha perfections uninterruptedly get born.

The mental function of insight (*prajñā*) associated with the eight actual consciousnesses is the perfection of nondiscriminative knowledge (full and uninterrupted disclosure of the unconditioned) and of discriminative knowledge (omniscience knowing every conditioned as conditioned).

The insight accompanying the eighth actual consciousness is called 'vast mirror knowledge' (*mahādarśajñāna*).[31] As *nir-vikalpa* this knowledge is unshakable (*acala*) union with and uninterrupted discovery of the unconditioned. As follow-up discriminative knowledge it is similar to a vast untainted mirror in which all conditioned elements are clearly reflected moment after moment. At each instant it knows[32] the particular and universal characteristics of all elements. It knows the past as past (perfect *smṛti*) and has a vision of the future as future. It is also awareness of the perfect Buddha seeds and is in this sense vision and enjoyment of the full potentiality of wisdom and wholesomeness.

Just as the defiled eighth consciousness of the worlding is the basis of continuous residence in a defiled 'field' (*kṣetra, bhājanaloka*) and a defiled body (*sattvaloka*), just so is the pure eighth consciousness the basis of residence in a pure Buddha body and a pure Buddha field (*svasaṁbhogakāyakṣetra*). This self-enjoyment body and field are the only real conditioned Buddha body and field. They are made up of wonderful color and form (*rūpa*), sound (*śabda*) etc. perceptible by the Buddha eye, Buddha ear etc. only.

The Buddha mind is always accompanied by other mental functions such as e.g. decidedness and unshakable adherence (*adhimukti*) to the truth, illimited zeal and aspiration (*chanda*) for the good (*kuśala*) and unsatisfiable effort (*vīrya*) to realize the welfare of others. The Buddha is always the selfless companion in the struggle for happiness (*mahāmaitrī*) and the great com-passionate or co-sufferer in the eradication of misery (*mahākaruṇā*). By virtue of perfect nondiscrimination he realizes the fundamental sameness of all beings and is free of favoritism. By virtue of perfect discrimination he knows what can and should be done for the salvation of each being and he is skillful in creating and assuming various veiling substrata in order to instruct others, remove their doubts, display ideals adapted to the particular situation of each and 'lure' all beings towards buddhahood.

2. *The Unreal Substratum*

Because of his great companionship and compassion, perfections inherent in his real conditioned nature, the Buddha always joins non-buddhas in their struggle to obtain liberation from misery. Although he is free of defilement and misery, he never stops redescending to 'world' (the defiled *paratantra* realm or *saṁsāra*) assuming existences subject to defilement and misery and skillfully using various worldly means (*upāya*) in order to lure others towards buddhahood.

Disguised in a very subtle substratum (*parasaṁbhogakāya*)[33] he redescends to the realm of the spiritually advanced (bodhisattvas in the *bhūmi*) and joins them in a common enjoyment of the deep and vast Mahāyāna truth. He helps them remove the last vestiges of defilement and perfect their nondiscriminative and discriminative knowledges. He abides with the spiritually less advanced (bodhisattvas before the *bhūmi*, adepts of the Small Vehicle, worldlings) via the historical buddhas who are his 'creation bodies' (*nirmāṇakāya*).[34] In these bodies he enacts defilement and misery and shows a way out.

The created Buddha substrata do exist. As products of compassion they have a conditioned (*saṁskṛta*, *paratantra*) existence. But they are only creations of the real *svasaṁbhoga* Buddha and are not the real (実, *bhūta*?)[35] conditioned Buddha himself. The *nirmāṇakāyāḥ*, outcome of compassion and not of defilements (*klesa*) and defiled acts (*karman*), are quasi-defiled (viz. they enact defilement) but not really defiled. Notice, however, that the quality of always-being-with all defilement and misery is a real Buddha quality inherent in the real Buddha continuum.

To reveal the highest truth (*paramārthasatya*) and express the inexpressible, the Buddha creates substrata adapted to the thinking and talking of the world. As we pointed out before, this revealing (unveiling) or lightening activity eventually veils (*saṁvṛ*) and obscures (*āvṛ*). All the same, it remains a necessary activity because it is the only means to guide others towards buddhahood. Moreover, the important point is that the Buddha, although with world (*mahāmaitrī, mahākaruṇā*) as long as world exists, is never really of world. This is because, remaining fully conscious of the veiling character of his own veiling activity, he knows world as world and in that sense always transcends it. Non-buddhas, on the contrary, do not know the disguise as disguise (the veil as veil) and are likely to falsely conveive the manifested buddha as the real Buddha.

When manifesting the ideal of wisdom and wholesomeness (*kuśalatva*), the Buddha is never direct cause (*hetupratyaya*) of the realization of wisdom and wholesomeness by others. Direct causes are the potentialities or seeds of wisdom and wholesomeness proper to each living being. These seeds, subject to the law of cause and effect (or, for that matter, to the 'law' of emptiness), are susceptible of growth and decay. Buddha is not an omnipotent cause (*īśvara*) who interferes with that law. His revealing of the ideal is only a supporting condition (*adhipatipratyaya*). His power is skillful disguise and lure, not coercive but persuasive. And yet the power of persuasion is a necessary supporting condition. Without it wholesomeness cannot grow just as a sprout cannot grow from a seed in the absence of supporting conditions such as earth, water etc.[36]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. The pure Buddha substratum is the locus of absolute peace and restless activity for others. It is the basis of uninterrupted union with substratumless emptiness and of continuous revelation of buddhahood in the defiled world. It is the centre of the bipolar Buddha.

2. The real conditioned Buddha pole is free of defilement and misery. It is *mārgasatya* only. Although always beyond the suffering of the world, the Buddha is the great companion who is always with all the suffering of the world. This is his real quality of com-passion. It is a soteriological demand

that if world (*saṁsāra*) is beginningless, buddhahood or liberation from world and manifestation of buddhahood in world be beginningless too and that the Buddha continue revealing himself as long as world exists. The Buddhist canon is one of the main products of this ongoing revealing-veiling activity.

3. In this paper I have not paid special attention to the consciousness only (*vijñaptimātra*) doctrine. This is because the fundamental ontology of the Yogācāra school is the doctrine of the three dharmic modes of own-being (*trisvabhāva*). The mind-only doctrine is only one of its specifications: it restricts the dependent mode to mind-only. All Yogācārins are trisvabhāvavādins but not all are vijñaptimātravādins. No *vijñaptimātra* without *trisvabhāva* but *trisvabhāva* is not necessarily *vijñaptimātra*!

4. The ultimate goal of Buddhist scholarship is to devise a well-defined conceptual framework in order to explicate the inner coherence of Buddhist thought. This requires philological expertise which neither violates the text nor yields to textual slavery or to pedantic analysis of irrelevant details. It also calls for meditative insight into the significant issues and for philosophical inventiveness which frames and connects concepts in such a way that the text releases its full implications. I suggest that the search for coherence be guided by one principle: all Buddhist thought (ontology, epistemology, psychology, buddhology etc.) coheres in the fact that it is a logos of salvation, a validation of the message that liberation from misery is possible and that the path leading towards liberation is both necessary and efficient.

Department of Indian Philosophy and Buddhist Studies
Tōhoku University, Sendai (Japan).

ABBREVIATIONS

MS	Lamotte, E. *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga (Mahāyāna-saṁgraha)*. Tome II. Louvain: Bibliothèque du Muséon 7, 1938.
MSA	Lévi, S. (ed.). *Asaṅga. Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṁkāra. Exposé de la doctrine du Grand Véhicule selon le système Yogācāra*. Tome I – Texte. Paris: Sciences Historiques et Philologiques Fasc. 159, 1907.
MSAbh	*Mdo sde rgyan gyi hgrel bsad* (*Sūtrālaṁkāravṛttibhāṣya* by Sthiramati). Sde Dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka Bstan Hgyur vol. 3 (Mi $1b^1$–$283a^7$) and vol. 4 (Tsi b^1–$266a^7$). Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kankō Kyōkai, 1980.

MVK	*Madhyāntavibhāgakārikā* (included in MVT).
MVT	Yamaguchi, S. (ed.). *Sthiramati. Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā. Exposition Systématique du Yogācāravijñaptivāda*. Tome I – Texte. Nagoya. 1934.
T.	Takakusu, J. and K. Watanabe (ed.). *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*. Tokyo, 1924–1935.
T. 680	*Fo ti king* (*Buddhabhūmisūtra*). T. Vol. 16, 720b–723b.
T 1530	*Fo ti king louen* (*Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra*) by Bandhuprabha *et al.* T. Vol. 26, 291b–328a.
T. 1585	*Tch'eng wei che louen* (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra*) by Dharmapāla *et al.* T. Vol. 31, 1a–59a.
T 1594	*Chö ta cheng louen pen* (*Mahāyānasaṁgraha*) by Asaṅga. T. vol. 31, 132c–152a.
T 1595	*Chö ta cheng louen che* (*Mahāyānasaṁgrahabhāṣya*) by Vasubandhu, translated by Paramārtha. T. Vol. 31, 152a–270b.
T 1597	*Id.*, translated by Hiuan tsang. T. Vol. 31, 321a–380a.
T. 1598	*Chö ta cheng louen che* (*Mahāyānasaṁgrahopanibandhana*) by Asvabhāva. T. Vol. 31, 380a–449b.
TR	Lévi, S. (ed.). *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Deux traités de Vasubandhu. Viṁśatikā (la Vingtaine) accompagnée d'une explication en prose et Triṁśikā (la Trentaine) avec le commentaire de Sthiramati*. lère Partie- Texte. Paris, 1925: 13–45.
TS	Krishnamacharya, E. (ed.). *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita together with Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā*. Baroda: Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30–31, 1926.

NOTES

[1] Guenther, H. V. *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974 (2nd rev. ed.), p. 240 fn. 2.

[2] Cf. ABBREVIATIONS.

[3] The following is a general exposition of Yogācāra philosophy not restricted to Dharmapāla's teaching. For a slightly different approach and complementary references see my paper 'The Ontological Foundation of Religious Praxis in Yogācāra-Buddhism: The Ontological Significance of *Madhyāntavibhāgakārikā* I. 1', *Transactions of the International Conference of Orientalists in Japan* 26 (1981): 38–50.

[4] In this paper the terms 'substance, substantial, substantiality' refer to a non-momentary entity retaining an identical nature either beyond one moment or permanently. They denote the imagined mode of own-being (*parikalpitasvabhāva*).

[5] This is one aspect of the soteriological relevance of the doctrine of momentariness (cf. MSA XVIII. 82–91).

[6] T. 1598, 433c14.

[7] T. 1598, 434a14–15.

[8] Cf. MSAbh Tsi 211b1–213a4 ad MSA XIX. 52.

[9] Cf. MVT 239, 10–21; MSA XIII. 11–13.

[10] These ideas, fully developed in TS, explicate the Yogācāra notion of dependent own-being (*paratantrasvabhāva*). Chapter 8 of TS (*Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā*, Kār. 350–475 pp. 131–166) formulates an ontological principle: only what is efficient or has the capacity to bring about an effect (*arthakriyāsāmarthyaṁ*) is existent (*sat, vastu*) (TS p. 150, 5–6: *idam eva hi vastulakṣaṇaṁ yad arthakriyāsāmarthyaṁ*; TS p. 142, 1: *yat sarvasāmarthyaśūnyaṁ tad avastu, yathā vandhyāputraḥ*). Because nonmomentary entities (*sthirābhāvāḥ*) lack efficiency and are therefore nonexistent, 'exist' is predicable of momentary entities only (TS p. 143, 23: *yat sat tat sarvaṁ kṣaṇikam*). Only what is empty of substantiality can be efficient and therefore exists. The non-empty is the non-efficient, the non-existent. TS defines existence and nonexistence in function of the principle (or reality) of emptiness. Emptiness, the reality in function of which things are efficient and existent, is itself neither efficient (viz. existent) nor nonefficient (viz. nonexistent).

Chapter 9 (*Karmaphalasaṁbandhaparīkṣā*. Kār. 476–546, pp. 166–185) explains how a moment can be efficient. Since a moment is intrinsically free of change, its existence can never be a process of transition from potentiality to act. A moment is complete (*niṣpanna*) as soon as it exists. Its existence is mere presence, mere 'act'. Its efficiency or act (*kriyā, vyāpāra*) can therefore be nothing beyond its mere existence or immediate destruction (TS Kār. 520: *sattā eva vyāpṛtiḥ*; TS p. 180, 4: *ye kṣaṇikās te janmātiriktavyāpāraśūnyāḥ*). The efficiency of a momentary cause 'producing' an effect is nothing but the fact that a certain moment (called 'cause') exists immediately before a next moment (called 'effect') and perishes as soon as it exists so that the effect-moment can exist after it.

The meaning of 'change' (in terms of defilement and purification of the mental continuum) can now be specified. For the Buddhist change does not exist. Moments are intrinsically void of change and 'mental continuum', being but an arbitrary name for the uninterrupted run of radically different moments, does not 'change'. We conventionally say that the continuum 'changes' when, at favored moments, the quasi-identity of the series breaks up and a 'change' is noticed. The revolution of the continuum (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*, cf. infra) is an instantaneous happening. It is the instant at which the last defiled moment perishes and the first completely pure moment gets born.

[11] Cf. T. 1594, 139b12–16; T. 1585, 45c21–46a10; T. 1530, 323b9–324a5.

[12] The defiled *manas* has the *darśanabhāga* of *ālayavijñāna* as object and conceives it as an eternal knower (cf. T. 1585, 22a2–10).

[13] On *nirvikalpa-* and *pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna* see esp. MS VIII. In 'Amalavijñānam und Ālayavijñānam' (*Alt-und Neu- Indische Studien 7*, Hamburg 1951, 148–159), certainly not one of his better articles, E. Frauwallner misreads both Maitreya and Asaṅga. It is not true that Maitreya locates the process of defilement and purification in the unconditioned (*dharmadhātu, śūnyatā*) and that Asaṅga radically deviates from his teacher by relocating the same process in the *paratantra*-realm (cf. esp. pp. 155–158). For Maitreya too, real defilement inheres in the *paratantra* mind (*abhūtaparikalpa*) and liberation consists in its eradication (MVK I. 4d). Maitreya does not elaborate the

paratantra-process of defilement and liberation because he is preoccupied with showing in which sense this process (*dharma, paratantra*) affects the unconditioned (*dharmatā*, *pariniṣpanna*). His main concern is to safeguard the unconditioned from unwarranted attribution of change. He stresses again and again that the process of defilement and liberation affects the unconditioned only extrinsically (*āgantuka*) and never intrinsically (*prakṛti*). Far from Maitreya to see the unconditioned as 'wirksam' (p. 155) or as 'der Träger alles psychischen Geschehens' (p. 158)! Asaṅga complements Maitreya's teaching by elaborating the *paratantra* process of defilement (theory of 8 *vijñānas, bīja* etc.) and purification (e.g. MS VIII). He does not disagree with Maitreya on the extrinsic defilement and purification of the unconditioned (e.g. T. 1594, 140b4–16).

[14] Cf. T. 1594, 148a5–16 (MS p. 243–245).

[15] This presupposes, of course, that there exists a *paratantra* realm where speaking the unspeakable and listening to that speech are both necessary and efficient.

[16] Cf. note 8.

[17] *na adṛṣṭe 'smin* [*pariniṣpannasvabhāve*] *sa* [*paratantrasvabhāva*] *dṛśyate* (TR Kār. 22d).

[18] Cf. MSA XI. 27–29.

[19] Cf. T. 1585, 57a17–22; T. 1530, 304b10–13.

[20] MVT 125, 19.

[21] Cf. T. 1585, 51a9–16.

[22] MSA IX. 23.

[23] On *svābhāvikakāya* cf. MSA IX. 59–60, 62, 66; T. 1585, 57c21 ff.; T. 1530, 325c5 ff. According to T. 1585, *dharmakāya* is a comprehensive term standing for the three Buddha bodies (*svābhāvika, saṁbhoga* and *nirmāṇa*). The *svābhāvikakāya* may also be called *dharmakāya* because as support of all conditioned and unconditioned Buddha elements (*dharma*) it is *dharmakāya par excellence* (cf. T. 1585, 57c17–24; T. 1530, 325c6–7).

[24] Cf. MSA IX. 37; T. 1595, 191c20–24 and T. 1598, 406b25–28 ad T. 1594, 140b5–6; T. 1530, 305c4–8.

[25] Cf. MSA IX. 15–16; T. 1594, 150c3–4; T. 1585, 9a21–b7 and esp. T. 1530, 305c4–19.

[26] Cf. note 10.

[27] T. 1585, 56a7. As proper to each particular Buddha the pure mental continuum and its perfections (*mahābodhi, mahākaruṇā* etc.) have a beginning. A very interesting soteriological question is whether perfect *bodhi, mahākaruṇā* etc. as such have a beginning or not. MSA IX. 77 (also T. 1594, 149b19–20) suggests that the assumption of a first pure continuum precludes ongoing salvation. Perfect purity cannot grow from impurity unless an always already existent pure continuum (conditioned buddhahood) guides and 'lures' towards perfection. There is no first uncovering of emptiness, no first perfection of *bodhi*, no *ādibuddha*. Do *mahābodhi* etc. require an unconditioned (*asaṁskṛta*) status on a same level with *śūnyatā, tathatā* etc.?(see e.g. MVT 85, 6–12: to obtain *sthiti* in always already existing *bodhi*). Paramārtha taught an unconditioned pure mind (*amalavijñāna*). Asaṅga struggled with the problem (*śrutavāsanā*). Dharmapāla refuses to elevate *mahābodhi* to an unconditioned intrinsic in all elements because this would contradict his *gotra* theory. He solves the problem by attributing to *mahābodhi* the status of a beginningless *saṁskṛta* (inborn *mahābodhi* seeds) to be perfected through perfuming (cf. T. 1585, 8a20–9b7; T. 1530, 304b3–10).

[28] Cf. MSA IX. 66; T. 1585, 57c27; T. 1530, 326b1–12.

[29] Cf. T. 1585, 57c24 ff.; T. 1530, 325c7 ff.

[30] Cf. T. 1585, 14a1–4 and 56a28–29; T. 1530, 303c29–304a8.

[31] Cf. MSA IX. 67–69; T. 1585, 56a12 ff.; T. 1530, 302a11 ff.

[32] It is *pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna* because it knows the conditioned. But it has no clear-cut (*paricchinna, saṁvidita*) knowledge and is therefore 'vision' or 'awareness' rather than discrimination. Clear-cut discrimination belongs to *pratyavekṣaṇājñāna*, the mental function of insight associated with the sixth consciousness.

[33] Cf. T. 1585, 57c28 ff.; T. 1530, 326c12 ff.

[34] Cf. T. 1585, 58a2 ff.; T. 1530, 325c8 ff.

[35] Cf. T. 1585, 58b19–21; T. 1530, 326b21 ff. and 327b20 ff.

[36] Cf. T. 1530, 309c13–27. Paramārtha says that the attainment of buddhahood depends on the Buddha as mediating cause and on personal effort as direct cause (cf. T. 1595, 269c26–29).

DEMETRIUS JOHN HADGOPOULOS

A NOTE ON INFERRING AND PERCEIVING:

(Anumiti and Saṁśayottara-Pratyakṣa*)

The purpose of this paper is to show that Professor G. Bhattacharya fails to defend Annaṁbhaṭṭa's claim that saṁśayottara-pratyakṣa is not anumiti. His mistake lies in the fact that he does not recognize that offering the definition of something in certain cases is different from ascertaining whether what is defined exists or not.

In order to make this point clear, I will elucidate it by the following example:

Suppose that on a hot summer day a forest is on fire without the intervention of human agency. Such a fire is a case of spontaneous combustion. In order for spontaneous combustion to come into being certain circumstances must obtain. If one of these circumstances is absent, spontaneous combustion cannot occur. Let us agree that four such circumstances are needed: (1) a certain range of air temperature, (2) absence of wetness, (3) oxygen and (4) combustible material. Since oxygen and combustible material are always present in the forest, I shall omit these circumstances and I shall concentrate on the other two. Let us agree, then, that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of spontaneous combustion in the forest are: (1) a certain range of temperature or, briefly, temperature and (2) the absence of wetness. So, spontaneous combustion comes into being just in case both circumstances obtain. Thus, we have:

> spontaneous combustion if and only if temperature and absence of wetness.

Now, spontaneous combustion is absent if and only if the absence of 'termperature and absence of wetness' obtain. Let us call 'absence of spontaneous combustion' 'aspaka'. Now, we have:

> aspaka if and only if absence of 'temperature and absence of wetness.'

I shall understand the right hand part of the above equivalence in DeMorgean fashion, i.e. as either absence of temperature or absence of absence of wetness. The either-or connective is the inclusive one. So, if absence of temperature

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 67–71. 0022–1791/84/0121–0067 $00.50.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

obtains or absence of absence of wetness (=wetness) obtains or both absence of temperature and absence of absence of wetness (=wetness) obtain then aspaka obtains. All that is needed for aspaka to obtain is that at least one of the disjuncts obtains. This does not mean that aspaka is *defined* or *described* as the presence of wetness if there is wetness in the forest and thus aspaka obtains. I shall argue in what follows that this point was not seen by Bhattacharya and consequently his defence of Annaṁbhaṭṭa is mistaken.

In the *Tarkasaṁgraha* (TS),[1] Annaṁbhaṭṭa defines anumiti as "the cognition resulting from parāmarśa", (p. 189). Then, in his commentary *Tarkasaṁgraha-Dīpīka* (TSD), we find that what he really intended to say by the above definition is the following: "anumiti is the cognition resulting from parāmarśa accompanied by pakṣatā," (p. 189). Pakṣatā is defined in the TSD as "the absence of 'certainty that is accompanied by the absence of the desire-to-infer' (p. 189). Annaṁbhaṭṭa offers the enriched definition of anumiti because he wants to meet the objection that the TS definition is too broad, for, according to the TS definition, saṁśayottara-pratyakṣa (the perception following a state of doubt) would be anumiti, which, according to him, is not. The example he gives of saṁśayottara-pratyakṣa is the following:

> Immediately after a doubt about (something being) a stump or a man, if there ensues a parāmarśa like 'the thing before me is with an arm etc. which is a uniform associate (vyāpya) of the features of a man' there emerges a perception like 'a man, to be sure'. It cannot, again, be claimed that in such a situation (tatra) there is nothing but 'anumiti'; for the claim is contrary to the subsequent (internal) perception (anuvyavasāya) like 'I am perceiving a man." (p. 189).

According to the TS definition, the perception 'a man, to be sure' following a state of doubt would be anumiti since it does result from parāmarśa. But since this kind of perception, according to the Nyāya school, is immediate or direct cognition, it cannot be anumiti. So, in order to avoid the charge that his definition of anumiti is too broad, Annaṁbhaṭṭa puts the further condition in the definiens "accompanied by pakṣatā." This new element plus the first one in the TSD definition of anumiti removes the charge of broadness against the TS definition. Saṁśayottara-pratyakṣa is due to parāmarśa only but anumiti is due to paramārśa plus pakṣatā.

Now, what is pakṣatā? Bhattacharya characterises pakṣatā as "the psychic condition or circumstance which qualifies something for being a pakṣa or subject of a correct inferential cognition." (p. 197). Bhattacharya's elucidation of Annaṁbhaṭṭa's definition of pakṣatā "the absence of 'certainty that is accompanied by the absence of the desire to infer" is as follows:

> It is evident that this absence is of a complex entity and not of a simple one. The complex here has two components: (i) certainty and (ii) the absence of the desire to infer. Now this absence of a complex is dependent on the absence of one or both of the components. In other words this absence would depend either (i) on the absence of 'certainty' or (ii) on the absence of 'the absence of the desire to infer' or lastly (iii) on both the absence of certainty and the absence of 'the absence of the desire to infer.' In any one of these three situations there would be 'absence of the complex' that would furnish a necessary condition for inference. This necessary condition is 'pakṣatā'. (p. 198).

It is evident from the above quotation that Bhattacharya applies DeMorgan's law on the definiens of Annaṁbhaṭṭa's definition of pakṣatā.

Let 'C' stand for 'certainty', 'D' for 'desire to infer', 'A' for 'absence of', '.' for 'and' and 'v' for 'either-or'. Then, we have:

> pakṣatā $=_{df}$ A (C . AD) or pakṣatā$\equiv$A (C . AD) but A (C . AD) $\equiv$(AC v AAD), so pakṣatā$\equiv$(AC v AAD) or pakṣatā$\equiv$(AC v D), where AAD$\equiv$D.

Bhattacharya interprets the connective 'either-or' as the inclusive one. So, we may say that pakṣatā obtains if and only if either AC obtains or D obtains or both AC and D obtain. Thus, if either AC obtains or D obtains or both AC and D obtain then pakṣatā obtains. The antecedent of this conditional is true if anyone of the disjuncts is true, and if this happens, the truth of the antecedent is a sufficient condition for the truth of the consequent.

Bhattacharya believes that, given his elucidation of the notion of pakṣatā, the TSD definition of anumiti excludes from its extension saṁśayottara-pratyakṣa. He writes the following:

> The perception in question is expressed in the form 'That is a man, to be sure' and, as has been shown above, it is admittedly due to parāmarśa. But though due to parāmarśa it is not due to parāmarśa accompanied by pakṣatā. The condition described as 'pakṣatā' would be satisfied only if the absence of 'certainty that is accompanied by the the absence of the desire to infer' were to precede the emergence of the perception following a state of doubt. But here though there is the precedent 'absence of certainty' (siddhyabhāva) about whether 'That is a man', the certainty is as a matter of fact accompanied by the presence of the desire for certainty. The situation cannot therefore be described as the absence of 'certainty that is accompanied by the absence of the desire for certainty.' And as it is just such absence alone that constitutes pakṣatā which is a necessary condition for inference, it is clear that for the emergence of the perception under reference, no

> such condition was operative and therefore the perception following a state of doubt cannot be regarded as a case of inference which according to Annaṁbhaṭṭa is always due to parāmarśa accompanied by pakṣatā. (p. 199).

I believe that Bhattacharya is confused here. The question is whether or not pakṣatā obtains in the case of the perception following a state of doubt. It is the same as the question whether or not aspaka or the absence of spontaneous combustion in the forest obtains. In the example that illustrates saṁśayottara-pratyakṣa the following elements are present: (i) absence of certainty and (ii) the presence of the desire for certainty. [2] Since Bhattacharya understands Annaṁbhaṭṭa's definition of pakṣatā as the absence of a complex, namely, the absence of '(i) certainty and (ii) the absence of the desire to infer,' and interprets this in DeMorgean fashion, then all he has to do in order to find out whether or not the condition described as pakṣatā is satisfied in the case of saṁśayottara-pratyakṣa is to use the conditional:

> If either AC obtains or D obtains or both AC and D obtain then pakṣatā obtains.

('D' is understood here as 'the desire for certainty'.) Since this conditional is part of a definitional equivalence and since the antecedent is true the consequent is also true. As a matter of fact, all the disjuncts of the antecedent of the above conditional are true. But that is not necessary. One would suffice. The absence of certainty is sufficient for the psychic condition or circumstance called 'pakṣatā' to obtain.

Now, the question arises: What bearing to the Nyāya position does Battacharya's failure to defend Annaṁbhaṭṭa's claim have? Was Annaṁbhaṭṭa wrong in presenting the Nyāya position? I will give Professor Matilal's answer to this question. He writes the following (due to correspondence) concerning this:

> Annaṁbhaṭṭa was not wrong in presenting the Nyāya position, although he did not make it sufficiently clear. Nīlakantha supplies one significant phrase "prayojanābhavena". He means that in our perception following a doubt only parāmarśa is the cause without any help (sahakāritva) from pakṣatā, for there is no need to imagine (prayojanābhāva) that pakṣatā, though it may be present, is causally operative.

He elucidates the above by applying it to my "forest-fire" example. He writes:

> When a man sets fire, then in spite of the presence of (1) and (2), i.e. right temperature, and absence of wetness, [one] could not imagine that they caused the fire rather than the man.

Then, he writes the following to make the Nyāya position more clear:

> With regard to the same object (fire), the totality of causal conditions (sāmagrī) leading to perception is stronger than that leading to inference. In this case, fire would be perceived if parāmarśa plus other factors for perception (ciz. connection between the eye and fire) obtain, in spite of the fact that conditions for inference also obtain. With this postulate, Nyāya solves the puzzle that perception following a doubt is only perception, not an inference.

University of Crete,
Rethymnon, Crete,
Greece.

NOTES

* This paper is the result of work done while attending an NEH Summer Seminar on "Indian Logic and Epistemology" under the directorship of Professor Jitenddra N. Mohanty.

[1] The quotations in this paper are found in: *Tarkasaṁgraha-Dīpīka on Tarkasaṁgraha by Annaṁbhaṭṭa,* translated and elucidated by Gopinath Bhattacharya. Progressive Publishers, 37 College Street, Calcutta (1976).

[2] It should be noted here that Bhattacharya writes 'desire for certainty' instead of 'desire to infer', but it seems that there is no problem for him here as seen from the above quotation.

** The editor wishes to note that his letter of Dr. Hadgopoulos was written with the idea of explaining the traditional Nyāya doctrine and the such texts as *Nīlakaṇṭha.* Hence the author's criticism of Prof. Bhattacharya's view does not in any way reflect the editor's own view. The editor has not yet been able to study carefully Professor Bhattacharya's book.

PAUL WILLIAMS

REVIEW ARTICLE

Chr. Lindtner (1982). *Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna,* Indiske Studier 4, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag.

Reviewing the third volume of Étienne Lamotte's *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna* J. W. de Jong commented that "the uncertainty regarding the authenticity of the works attributed to Nāgārjuna makes it difficult to form a reliable picture of his philosophical and religious ideas."[1] A large number of works are attributed to this great thinker, "the second Buddha", most of them extant only in Tibetan and/or Chinese translations. Of course, if we knew exactly what Nāgārjuna's teachings were then we would be well on the way towards establishing which texts are authentic. But unfortunately the scholar is caught in a vicious circle, since only when we know which texts are authentic can we establish Nāgārjuna's teachings. And, as David Seyfort Ruegg has recently pointed out, the use of stylistic and lexical criteria for establishing authenticity is severely hampered by the need to work from Tibetan and Chinese translations.[2] Perhaps it is these problems which have led many Indologists in the past to take Nāgārjuna as axiomatically the author of the *Madhyamakakārikā* (MK) and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (VV) (extant in Sanskrit and clearly belonging together) and to neglect the other works attributed to the Master, attributed sometimes, perhaps, with good reason.[3] Fortunately this situation has begun to change. Christian Lindtner's book follows the recent publication of Ruegg's *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, primarily a guide to the *dBu ma* section of the *bsTan 'gyur,* in which he sought to note and explain, albeit briefly, the whole range of Madhyamaka texts available particularly in Tibetan translation.[4] The present book by Lindtner, replete with lengthy footnotes in the best Continental style, is the first detailed attempt to separate those works which can be considered genuinely by Nāgārjuna from those which are certainly spurious, and to divide the rest, the doubtfuls, into those which are perhaps authentic and those which are probably not. To anticipate the results first. Lindtner concludes that in

Journal of Indian Philosophy **12** (1984) 73–104. 0022–1791/84/0121–0073 $03.20.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

addition to the *Madhyamakakārikā* another twelve works can definitely be considered genuine: the *Śūnyatāsaptati* (ŚS), *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (VV), *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* (VP), *Vyavahārasiddhi* (VS), *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (YṢ), *Catuḥstava* (CS), *Ratnāvalī* (RĀ), *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā* (PK), *Sūtrasamuccaya* (SS), *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* (BV), *Suhṛllekha* (SL) and *Bodhisaṃbhāra* (BS). It will be noticed that including MK the first six coincide with the six logic treatises (*rigs tshogs*) traditionally ascribed to Nāgārjuna by Tibetans. Lindtner reaches these conclusions regarding authenticity by taking MK as axiomatically by Nāgārjuna, obviously the starting point for any investigation of Nāgārjuna's works, and then examining the other candidates for agreement in style, scope and doctrine. In addition a text has also to be attributed to Nāgārjuna by such witnesses as Bhavya (Bhāvaviveka), Candrakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. After a short introduction on authenticity, and a summary of Nāgārjuna's system, the bulk of the book is taken up with editions of the Sanskrit, and, more often, Tibetan texts, a number of important translations, synopses and textcritical notes, as well as an interesting account of Nāgārjuna's philosophical and religious thought, based, of course, on the whole range of authentic texts, and, as an appendix, an excellently produced photographic reprint of the Nepalese manuscript of the *Catuḥstava*, together with the *Akāriṭīkā*.

Now, Lindtner's criteria for selection of Nāgārjuna's authentic works might seem to be a very convincing way of establishing which works are or are not by the author of MK. But while they provide a reasonable starting point it seems to me there are problems involved here, and Lindtner's book as a whole should not be taken as providing anything like the final word on authenticity. It should be noted immediately that Lindtner doesn't require that *all* the 'trustworthy witnesses' attribute a work to Nāgārjuna for it to be a strong candidate for authenticity. For example, the six verses he has traced and translated from the 'lost' VS, found in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, are attributed to Nāgārjuna's *Vyavahārasiddhi* only by Kamalaśīla in his *M. āl. Pañjikā* (Incidentally, although Kamalaśīla may generally be a trustworthy witness, there was some doubt in Tibet as to whether this *Pañjikā* was actually by Kamalaśīla. See here Ruegg, *Literature*, p. 93 n. 299). It should be noted also that the earliest of Lindtner's trustworthy witnesses, Bhāvaviveka, was still probably some 350 years later than Nāgārjuna, separated from him by a period of enormous social, political, intellectual and religious change in India. Moreover the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, attributed to

Bhāvaviveka and an important source for Lindtner, may well be considerably later still, since it mentions Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti.[5] Which should sound a note of caution as regards giving too much weight to attribution of texts to Nāgārjuna by even the earliest of our witnesses. In the last analysis the burden of proof of authenticity must lie in a detailed study of style, scope and doctrine. But to make a convincing argument for agreement in style requires detailed textual work made all the more difficult by the need to work with Tibetan and Chinese translations and of a type not to be found in the present book. And even if agreements in style could be shown the proof would be far from compelling. Styles in India, as elsewhere, were often copied. It isn't surprising that the style of a great Master could form a model for succeeding generations, particularly those historically close to his own lifetime. Moreover, similarity in style between texts is only to be expected when members of the same school or tradition approach the same topics. But when different topics are involved then even the same writer may change his style quite dramatically. Which means that the issue of style may not be as important as, and may be subservient to, the issues of scope and doctrine. Having said that, I confess that I am not totally clear what Lindtner means by 'scope'. It is one of the demerits of a highly meritorious book that the criteria applied for judging authenticity are simply stated and the conclusions given. They are not themselves subjected to critical scrutiny, explanation, debate or defence. If, as I assume he does, our author means by 'scope' 'covering the same topics', and 'doctrine' 'covering them in the same way', or 'saying the same things about these topics' then I am afraid many of these 'authentic' works would have to be rejected. It is one of Lindtner's main points (and one with which I totally agree) that the study by Indologists of MK in isolation from other works reasonably attributed to Nāgārjuna has led to emphasising Nāgārjuna as a philosopher, perhaps even a radical philosopher, to the neglect of his key theme, the religious concern with the practice of *bodhi* and the cultivation of *bodhicitta*, But if we start with the axiomatic authenticity of MK, and judge the scope and doctrines of other texts according to that, then obviously the only authentic texts will be those which remain within the area of critical philosophy, the concern of MK. If we are prepared to go outside the concerns of MK, by arguing, as Lindtner often does, that a work on topic *x* is attributed to Nāgārjuna by certain trustworthy witnesses and would be in place as filling a gap neglected by MK, then this requires that firstly we give pride of place to the witnesses, rather than MK. And secondly it looks as though we would have fallen into precisely the trap of circularity that lies in wait for all who venture into this extremely difficult and hazardous area. For clearly such an approach involves knowing in advance what Nāgārjuna's aims were in order to decide which texts are authentic or not. But as a matter of fact we can only know Nāgārjuna's aims by a careful study of authentic texts. Nāgārjuna could have been a radical philosopher, he could have written only the *Madhyamakakārikā*!

But it seems unlikely, and my caution is not damning. It is simply caution. As a matter of fact, in spite of his criteria, Lindtner's actual practice is to give primary weight to the trustworthy witnesses, combining this with arguments for the place of the text concerned in Nāgārjuna's overall project. He then tends simply to *assert* an agreement of style, scope and doctrine, an assertion of agreement which tends in fact to equal one of no disagreement. What Nāgārjuna's overall project was Lindtner shows to be precisely that of the Mahāyāna, particularly the Prajñāpāramitā – the bodhisattva path to full, perfect and complete Buddhahood for the benefit of all sentient beings. Indeed, one of the most important contributions of the book, and its importance is very great indeed, is the tracing of parallels to Nāgārjuna's statements, and quite probably direct influences, in *sūtra* material of both the Śrāvaka and the Mahāyānas.

Let us turn now to the interrelationships between Nāgārjuna's works taken as a whole. Lindtner divides the corpus of Nāgārjuna's works in two complementary ways. In his short introduction he makes a twofold division into the "six mainly dialectical works (MK, ŚS, VV, VP, VS and YṢ) and then the remaining chiefly didactic texts" (p. 23). In his longer explanation of Nāgārjuna's system Lindtner comments that "MK, ŚS and VV were intended to be studied by philosophically minded monks. VP was written as a challenge to Naiyāyikas. YṢ, VS and PK are contributions to Buddhist exegesis. CS is a document confessing its author's personal faith in the Buddha's *deśanā*, while SS, BV, BS, SL and RĀ on the whole addressed themselves to a wider Buddhist audience, monks as well as laymen" (p. 265). This way of dividing Nāgārjuna's thirteen works can be placed alongside attempts in Tibet to distinguish between Nāgārjuna's Pāramitāyāna and Vajrayāna texts, dividing the first, in the most well-known schema, into the dialectical treatises (*rigs tshogs*), the corpus of hymns (*bstod tshogs*), and the homiletic corpus (*gtam tshogs*).[6] Modern scholars distinguish at least two Nāgārjunas, the author of MK and the Tantric Nāgārjuna who probably lived in the seventh or eighth centuries. The Tibetans have tended to attribute a very long life to the same Nāgārjuna, but they also make a clear distinction between phases of this Methuselah's literary output, thus in fact making a similar distinction to that of modern scholars. I want to introduce here an interesting and neglected discussion of Nāgārjuna's works, their rationale and division, found in the commentary to the *Madhyamakakārikā* by the twelfth-century Tibetan scholar rMa bya pa brTson grus seng ge. Further investigation will show, I think, how important a figure rMa bya pa was in the transmission and understanding of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka in Tibet. He was apparently a pupil of the Kāśmīri pandit and translator Jayānanda, author of the *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, and his Tibetan collaborator, Khu mdo sde 'bar, and he flourished a good 200 years earlier than Bu ston Rin po che, whose comments on Nāgārjuna's works are occasionally referred to by Lindtner.[7] rMa bya pa's discussion shows that a number of Bu ston's comments on Nāgārjuna's works, particularly the VS and BS, were not original to him but simply represented 'received wisdom' from previous ages.

Generally, rMa bya pa comments, Nāgārjuna's texts can be divided into three categories. The first of these three categories can itself be divided into a further three sections. However, neither of these tripartite sets equals the threefold division *rigs tshogs* etc. familiar from later writings. rMa bya pa rather divides Nāgārjuna's corpus into those texts which deal with the cause, clarifying the Pāramitāyāna, those which deal with the effect, on the Vajrayāna, and lastly the text, for as we shall see there is only one, which shows that the preceding two have but a single purpose or goal. If we then subdivide the Pāramitāyāna corpus we have (i) the six logic or dialectical treatises of the Madhyamaka, which teach fundamentally the View; (ii) three texts concerned primarily with Practice, teaching in a graduated manner – extensively, in an intermediate way, and also in a condensed way – the *Bodhisaṃbhāra, Sūtrasamuccaya* and *Suhṛllekha*; (iii) the *Rājaparikathāratnāvalī*, which teaches equally View and Practice.[8] Noteworthy here, apart from the way rMa bya pa divides up the material, which has its echoes in Bu ston, is the inclusion of the *Bodhisaṃbhāra* and the complete exclusion of the Catuḥstava, which receives no mention either here or later in the list. Lindtner has noted Bu ston's reference to BS, a text which is quoted twice in the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* and once in the *Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana* but otherwise only known in Chinese translation. Either there may have been at one time a Tibetan translation, which may or may not have been known to Bu ston, or, Lindtner suggests, Bu ston may have based his generally accurate classification of BS in terms of its content on an Indian oral tradition. Now, it is clear from rMa bya pa that this accurate classing existed long before Bu ston, so that Bu ston only needed to follow an already existing classification. Could it be that rMa bya pa knew of the text from Jayānanda or, since Jayānanda and Khu mdo sde 'bar were translators, could it be that they actually translated the text? Or was the text, supposing it was ever available in Tibetan, already lost by the time of rMa bya pa? Did he base his classification on an even older tradition? Some slight clue may be provided by his reference to texts (?) "extensive, intermediate and condensed". If these are intended to apply sequentially to BS, SS and SL, and if these degrees of magnitude refer to size, then it would indicate that rMa bya pa had never actually seen BS, which is much shorter than SS. On the other hand the word 'extensive' could be taken to refer not to length but rather to range, or topics covered, and in that case it could be claimed that BS is more extensive than SS. Or, of course, the series "extensive, intermediate and condensed" may not have been intended to apply sequentially to BS, SS and SL at all. Why the *Catuḥstava* wasn't included in rMa bya pa's list is impossible to say, short of complete guesswork. The logical options are that he didn't know of the CS, knew of it but didn't attribute it to Nāgārjuna, or to mention it at this point wasn't relevant to his concerns. Surely the second is unlikely, but it really is difficult to tell at the present.

rMa bya pa continues by noting that all Nāgārjuna's dialectical treatises can be classified as either major works or supplements. This classification follows the opening section of Candrakīrti's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti.* MK and YṢ teach fully and extensively the two truths and emptiness, while the other four works, VV, ŚS, VP and VS, clarify certain points and remove misunderstandings.[9] Lindtner also mentions this division, but he fails to note the rather interesting evidence that Candrakīrti (followed by rMa bya pa) cites in favour of the theory. An opponent asks why it is that Nāgārjuna hasn't written a verse at the beginning of ŚS and VV praising the Buddha, whereas he has at the beginning of YṢ and, of course, MK? The answer is that ŚS and VV are supplements or appendixes, and so there is no need to offer praise at the beginning of what is, in effect, a continuation.[10] It is clear from rMa bya pa's discussion that VV supplements MK by pointing out that there is no self-contradiction, no fallacy in reasoning, in maintaining that all phenomena lack essence (*svabhāva*), including Nāgārjuna's own discourse, since absence of essence doesn't equal pragmatic uselessness. Likewise ŚS supplements MK by showing that Nāgārjuna hasn't contradicted the Buddha's statements about the rising and falling of phenomena (*dharmas*). Things do happen conventionally, to essenceless entities, as in a dream.[11] So as supplements VV and ŚS counter objections concerning reasoning and scripture respectively.

Now, this point of absence of *maṅgalaślokas* in these two works because they are supplements is an interesting one, since rMa bya pa, Bu ston, and the Tibetan tradition generally, consider ŚS, VV, VP and VS all to be supplements, and rMa bya pa continues to give the rationale for VP and VS in just the same way as he had for ŚS and VV. If both these texts are also supplements to MK then they too should lack *maṅgalaślokas*. And this is exactly what we find (so far as we can tell, since we only have six verses from VS). On the other hand if we look at the other works considered to be authentic by Lindtner we find that these verses are also missing from PK, SS and SL. Two problems, at least, seem to present themselves here. Firstly, given that PK, SS and SL aren't also to be considered supplements to MK, why is it that they lack *maṅgalaślokas*? And secondly, if, as the Tibetan tradition maintains, VP and VS *are* to be seen as supplements, then why is it that Candrakīrti only mentioned in this connection ŚS and VV? Well, the first problem is perhaps insoluble. It is by no means unusual for Mahāyāna texts to lack *maṅgalaślokas* (*Madhyāntavibhāga*, for example), although to say that it happens is neither to explain why it happens nor why it happened in these particular cases. Nāgārjuna was an enthusiastic follower of the Mahāyāna, and he refers in a number of his works to the characteristically Mahāyāna sevenfold practice, which begins with praising the Buddhas and bodhisattvas and ends with dedication of merit.[12] So we might expect him to apply this to his own compositions. Certainly the issue of the *maṅgalaśloka* was sufficiently serious by the time of Candrakīrti for the commentator to attempt some kind of explanation. Supposing for the moment that PK, SS and SL are all authentic works of Nāgārjuna, perhaps PK, which is a very short work, was not intended as a formal composition but rather as an *aide-mémoire*. Or perhaps it represents lecture notes taken by one of Nāgārjuna's students (cf., for example, rGyal tshab rje's notes on some of Tsong kha pa's lectures). Likewise, Nāgārjuna's compendium of excerpts from the *sūtras* may have been notes, a teaching aid or in some other way not a final, formal composition intended for public consumption.[13] In certain respects SL is easier to deal with here, since as a letter of instruction to a king it certainly wasn't intended as a formal piece. It is notable that rMa bya pa places SL in a different section of Nāgārjuna's works from RĀ, although this latter work was also ostensibly addressed to the same king. RĀ does have a *maṅgalaśloka,* and is quite clearly a finished discourse, a public document of some importance in a way in which SL is not.

If we turn now to the second problem, and ask why Candrakīrti only mentioned ŚS and VV as supplements, omitting to mention also VP and VS, then, I think, the problem becomes more serious. Of the four texts considered as supplements by the Tibetan tradition Candrakīrti only mentions in this capacity ŚS and VV, and elsewhere in his works Candrakīrti quotes from VV and writes a commentary on ŚS. But in all of his works there are no quotes from VP or VS, although there is a reference to what appears to be VP in the *Madhyamakaśāstrastuti,* attributed to Candrakīrti. So it seem as though Candrakīrti did not consider VP and VS to be either supplements to MK or independent works, and he saw no need to quote from these texts in spite of the fact that VS was written to show that there is no contradiction between emptiness and the conventional world, surely an important theme in Madhyamaka thought. Which provides a *prima-facie* case either for doubting that Candrakīrti knew of VP and VS, or for suggesting that Candrakīrti did not consider VP and VS to be by Nāgārjuna. Of course, the *M. śāstrastuti* does refer to a *'Vidalā'* and the list of works attributed to Nāgārjuna in the *Stuti*, like that in 'Bhavya's' *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa,* forms an important source for Lindtner. But even if it *is* by Candrakīrti the *Stuti* has to be used cautiously since Candrakīrti was many years later than Nāgārjuna and his reference to the legend of Nāgārjuna's donating his head shows that by the time the *Stuti* was written Nāgārjuna, and perhaps also therefore his works, had been relegated to the area of myth.[14] Nevertheless the important point here is whether the testimony of the *Stuti* is *in itself* sufficient to indicate the works attributed to Nāgārjuna by Candrakīrti, irrespective of arguments (even perhaps, weak ones) to the contrary. And the answer must surely be negative. Unless it can be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the *Stuti* is by Candrakīrti then its evidence will simply stand as one piece of evidence to be weighed along with others. Moreover, the extent to which the reasoning above is even slightly plausible, to that extent there is a slightly plausible case against the authenticity of the *Stuti*. At the moment all we know for certain is that some manuscripts of the *Prasannapadā* do contain the *Stuti,* and some don't. For its authenticity to be reasonable there must be reasons, and while a case can doubtless be made out the case is at the moment far from compelling.

The case of the missing *maṅgalaśloka*, on the other hand, casts an interesting light on another dispute in Tibet. Lindtner refers to mKhas grub rje and the dGe lugs pa scepticism regarding the authenticity of VS. mKhas grub rje comments that if Nāgārjuna's six dialectical works included VS then one of Nāgārjuna's disciples would have quoted it. Moreover all of the six dialectical treatises are referred to, according to mKhas grub rje, in the *Prasannapadā*, with the exception of VS. Thus bLa ma rje (apparently Red mda' ba, one of Tsong kha pa's Sa skya teachers) concluded that actually Nāgārjuna only wrote five dialectical works. Tsong kha pa, on the other hand, introduced RĀ as the sixth.[15] Lindtner is able to provide six verses from VS, quoted by Śantarakṣita in his *M. alaṃkāravṛtti,* although it is difficult to believe that Tsong kha pa, who lectured on the *M. alaṃkāra,* wasn't familiar with these verses and their attribution to Nāgārjuna's VS by 'Kamalaśīla'. Since the previously mentioned doubt as regards Kamalaśīla's authorship of the *M. āl. Pañjikā* stems from dGe lugs writers so perhaps this indicates that Tsong kha pa was prepared to ignore or see as insignificant the attribution of these verses to Nāgārjuna. Be that as it may, this Tibetan dispute over the number and composition of Nāgārjuna's dialectical treatises was much older than Red mda' ba and Tsong kha pa. rMa bya pa mentions that some earlier writers made the number up to six by adding RĀ, while others maintained that the number didn't have to be six anyway – there could quite happily be only five dialectical works.[16] Now, I am, alas, unable to pronounce on whether there should be five or six of these works attributed to the Master, and in Red mda' ba's commentary on the *Catuḥśataka,* the only work of his available to me, I have been unable to find any discussion of the topic and so I have no idea of why he settled for only five treatises, and why he was unable to accept RĀ as the sixth. However, if RĀ were included, as Tsong kha pa and others wished to do, then since this text has a *maṅgalaśloka* so, on Candrakīrti's own principles, it could scarcely replace VS as an appendix to MK. Rather RĀ would have to take a place alongside MK and YṢ as a major independent dialectical treatise. And this clearly has no grounds in Candrakīrti, fidelity to whom was vital to Tsong kha pa's whole philosophical project. rMa bya pa is surely correct when he places RĀ in quite a different subcategory of Nāgārjuna's works from the purely dialectical treatises, as a work devoted equally to View and Practice.

If we might expect Nāgārjuna's works to have *maṅgalaślokas* so we might also expect them to have verses at the end dedicating the merit obtained from their composition, in true Mahāyāna fashion and on the model of the sevenfold practice. Lindtner mentions in a footnote that MK, ŚS and VV, the purely dialectical works, do not contain such a dedication (p. 123n). But YṢ is also considered to be a dialectical work (*yukti*!), and yet this work certainly contains a dedication. VP, on the other hand, doesn't, while with only six verses available it is impossible to tell with VS. Of the non-dialectical treatises all four hymns which authentically make up CS offer the merit, RĀ has a number of verses towards the end which might be construed as dedicating the merit from the composition (vv. 469–487 in Hopkins' trans.), PK and SL have no dedication, perhaps for the same reasons that they have no *maṅgalaśokas,* while SS, on the other hand, has no obvious dedication but does end with a quote from a *sūtra* on the benefits of copying and worshipping the *sūtra* concerned, which may perform a similar function. BV dedicates the merit, but BS doesn't – something on which I really have no comment at present, except to repeat the note of caution as regards dealing with Chinese translations.

It seems that the main problem, then, is why Nāgārjuna, a fervent Mahāyānist, didn't dedicate the merit obtained from his composition at the end of MK, ŚS, VV and, perhaps, VP and VS? In particular, we might hope for a dedication at the end of MK, which is a major independent work, as is YṢ. Clearly, the problem here is similar to that of the *maṅgalaśloka*, except that a dedicatory verse comes at the end, rather than the beginning, and for some reason MK, while it has a *maṅgalaśloka* lacks a dedication of merit. Lindtner's comment on the absence of a dedicatory verse in Nāgārjuna's purely dialectical works suggests that he considers this absence to be connected with the content of MK, VV and ŚS – that is, a concern purely with argument and insight doesn't require the dedication of merit. The same reason would also cover VP, supposing it is by Nāgārjuna, and perhaps also VS, for all we can tell. But to state the fact doesn't explain why it should be the case. Unfortunately the absence of dedicatory verses seems not to have been a problem for Candrakīrti, since he appears to have no discussion of the topic on the model of his discussion of the *maṅgalaśoka.* Other Mahāyāna works similarly lack dedicatory stanzas. T'ai Situ Rin po che, speaking recently about the so-called 'Five Works of Maitreya' has commented that in actual fact all five works should be considered as one text, citing in support of this theory the presence of a *maṅgalaśloka* at the beginning of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, and the absence of *maṅgalaślokas* or dedicatory verses in all the other works until the dedicatory verse at the end of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. Now, I make no comment on this theory as regards the works attributed to Maitreya, except to note my extreme scepticism. It is not clear to me that the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* has a *maṅgalaśloka,* while if we go beyond the introductory verses the *Ratnagotravibhāga* arguably has a number of such *ślokas.* Moreover the five works do not seem to show the homogeneity which will allow one to attribute them all to the same author (even a divine one).[17] But, if I may be permitted wild speculation in the total lack of hard facts, the theory mentioned by Situ Rin po che may not sound so bizarre in the case of Nāgārjuna's MK and its supplementary texts. It is reasonable to attribute MK, VV and ŚS to one author, and we can take Candrakīrti's testimony that they belong together as a set. MK begins with a *maṅgalaśloka,* as does YṢ. YṢ ends with a dedicatory verse, but MK only has a verse of homage to the Buddha. VV has no *maṅgalaśloka,* but also ends with a verse in praise of the Buddha. ŚS lacks suitable verse at the beginning and end – indeed the text could be said to end rather suddenly. It may be, therefore, that Nāgārjuna saw MK, VV and ŚS as forming one work, so that a verse dedicating merit was originally appended to ŚS. Or, supposing one accepts the Tibetan theory that VP and VS should also be included as supplementary texts (although perhaps unknown to Candrakīrti), then one may expect to find the dedicatory verse for all six texts at the end of VS. This suggestion has the merit (or, from a Popperian point of view, demerit) that it is unlikely to be refuted, since VS appears to be lost. One could even speculate further, and suggest that ŚS lost its dedicatory verse, or the verse was moved, when, after the time of Candrakīrti (?), VP and VS were added to Nāgārjuna's supplementary texts. But, to repeat, this is all wild speculation, suitable more, perhaps, for dotage than youth! A simpler, although less neat, theory is that at the time of Nāgārjuna (and for some time after) it was not felt necessary to add dedicatory verses to all one's compositions.

Thus far rMa bya pa's discussion of Nāgārjuna's Pāramitāyāna corpus. The Vajrayāna corpus is straightforwardly asserted to be Nāgārjuna's *Pañcakrama* and so on, the works written presumably by the later Tantric Nāgārjuna.[18] More interesting is the third major category of the Master's works, containing just one text, the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa,* written to show that the Pāramitāyāna corpus and that of the Vajrayāna have a single meaning or goal, which it does through commenting on the discussion in the *Guhyasamājatantra* (GST) concerning the ultimate *bodhicitta.*[19] It follows from this that for rMa bya pa BV is not in itself a Tantric work, but is nevertheless written by an author who knows both the Pāramitāyāna corpus and the Tantric works attributed to Nāgārjuna. The matter is complicated, however, since there seem to be two different BVs extant in the *bsTan 'gyur.* Both begin with the same quote from Chapter Two of GST, but the version considered by Lindtner to be an authentic work by the author of MK makes little further direct mention of the verse from the Tantra, whereas the other version certainly shows signs of being a closer commentary, and is correspondingly considered by Lindtner to have been written probably by the Tantric Nāgārjuna. One cannot tell from rMa bya pa's comments which of the two versions he is referring to, so it is not obvious that he is disagreeing with Lindtner's remark that, as regards the 'Madhyamaka' BV, apart from the quote from GST, it has nothing Tantric about it (p. 183n). Having said this, however, it should be noted that when Tsong kha pa and mKhas grub rje both quote or refer to BV in a Tantric context, as a commentary on part of GST, it is nevertheless to the version of BV considered by Lindtner to be by the Madhyamaka Nāgārjuna that they refer.[20] Of course, Lindtner presupposes that for a text to be concerned with the Tantras, a commentary on the Tantras, that text must have certain 'Tantric' features. But rMa bya pa himself notes that BV (whichever version he is referring to) is not a Tantric work, but expands and comments on a philosophical verse in the Tantra precisely in order to show that as regards the goal, ultimate *bodhicitta,* there is no difference between the Tantras and the Sūtras. So the fact that there is nothing specifically Tantric about BV isn't really surprising, and doesn't in itself show that BV isn't a commentary on a section from the Tantras. Given that it actually quotes from GST, this can only be denied in the face of overwhelming evidence that BV is an authentic work of the Madhyamaka Nāgārjuna, and presupposing that the Madhyamaka Nāgārjuna didn't know the *Guhyasamājatantra*. Now, Lindtner simply dismisses the quote from GST ("How we are to account for the fact that a verse from a tantric text occurs in BV I am not to say." (p. 183n)), and he points out that anyway the verse isn't particularly Tantric. But as rMa bya pa, and, I might add, the dGe lugs pa maintain, Tantric *View* isn't itself particularly

Tantric. Terminology apart, there is, indeed, nothing particularly Tantric about Chapter Two of GST. Nevertheless the verse quoted by BV does bear a similarity to common Tantric verses concerning View, referring to the unborn and essentially empty nature of one's own mind (*svacittam ādyutpannaṃ śūnyatābhāvam*), and it would not be impossible to make out a case for the whole of even the 'Madhyamaka' BV as a commentary on Chapter Two of GST. Simply to dismiss the presence of a quote from GST in BV is scarcely adequate. The logical options seem to to be that either this verse is a later interpolation in BV, or there is a quote from Nāgārjuna (or a common earlier source) in GST, or Nāgārjuna knew the GST, or BV is not by Nāgārjuna. It seems to me that the first option is a possibility only if the other evidence that BV is by Nāgārjuna is, if not overwhelming, nevertheless very convincing. The second alternative is also possible, but perhaps unlikely, as BV is already embedded in a Tantric, or at least, Mantric, context since it follows the 'quoted' section with a reference to "a bodhisattva having practised a course by way of mantras."[24] Thus if the quote is from a common earlier source, and Nāgārjuna is commenting on that, nevertheless the BV still shows signs of an awareness of the use of mantras in Mahāyāna practice. Still, it remains a possibility for which there is no evidence. Whether it would be more drastic to maintain that the Madhyamaka Nāgārjuna knew of the GST, or that BV is not by Nāgārjuna, remains to be seen.

The *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* is undoubtedly an interesting text, indeed a profound one, and I agree with Lindtner that it has been 'regretably neglected'. But what precisely is the evidence – in order to rule out the quote from GST, the strong evidence – that this is a work by Nāgārjuna? Lindtner notes that BV is never mentioned or even cited by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti (p. 180), so there is no evidence to show that it was even known, let alone postulated as an authentic work, by the main Indian representatives of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. Not only that, but BV is also totally neglected by Bhāvaviveka. There is not a single quote from the work in those texts authentically attributed to Bhāvaviveka (Lindtner prefers the name 'Bhavya') – the *Tarkajvālā, Prajñāpradīpa* and *Karatalaratna.* However, and the point is important, BV does form a major source for the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (MRP), which Lindtner emphatically maintains to be a late and authentic work by Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya. I have no wish to add my voice to the dispute between Lindtner and Ruegg concerning the authenticity of this work. Suffice to say that at present I agree with Ruegg that although

MRP states that it was written by the author of the *Tarkajvālā*, nevertheless this fact is not sufficient to outweigh the problems involved in the references in MRP to Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti. The very fact that, on Lindtner's own testimony, MRP makes considerable use of BV, whereas the other texts attributed to Bhāvaviveka do not, itself tells against the authenticity of its attribution to the same author. There may have been one, or possibly two later Bhavyas who could have written the text. Ruegg suggests that we attribute MRP to a later, Tantric Bhavya, and points out that the text "bears the stamp of later developments including some inspired by the Vajrayāna." There was a Tantric Bhavyakīrti, who wrote a commentary on the *Pañcakrama* and the *Pradīpoddyotana*, and he could perhaps be identical with an eleventh century Bhavya who was a teacher of the Tibetan translator rNgog bLo ldan shes rab.[22] In any case it seems highly unlikely that MRP could be earlier than the time of Candrakīrti, which means that, with one possible exception mentioned below, there is no evidence at all even for the existence of BV, let alone its being an authentic work of Nāgārjuna, prior to the seventh century AD. Be that as it may, Lindtner suggests that in *later* Indian literature BV is one of the most frequently quoted of all works attributed to Nāgārjuna. Śāntarakṣita and Asvabhāva both quote verse 20, according to Lindtner, a verse referring to the different ways of seeing the female body adopted by an ascetic, a lover and a dog. One might expect this to be a stock Indian image, not necessarily traceable to BV. Unfortunately, although in his note on the verse Lindtner refers to Mimaki's book on Ratnakīrti for further references, neither Mimaki nor Lindtner give any actual page references for Śāntarakṣita, so it is impossible at this stage to know whether he cites BV and/or Nāgārjuna by name, although I presume not. Asvabhāva definitely quotes this verse in his *Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana*, although it is not clear who this Asvabhāva was, or when he lived. He could have flourished any time between the late fifth and ninth, or even eleventh centuries, and he may have been a Vijñānavādin or a Vijñapti-Mādhyamika.[23] But supposing Asvabhāva (the author of the *M. saṃgrahopanibandana*) could be dated to, say, 500 AD, therefore a Vijñānavādin, still there are no quotes from BV dating from this time in Madhyamaka texts, and Asvabhāva doesn't cite the verse as coming from BV or Nāgārjuna. Which would suggest that the image of verse 20 was a stock topic contained in a stock verse, particularly prevalent, it seems, in Vijñānavāda circles. If this is correct, then the quoting of verse 20 by Asvabhāva, and therefore by Śāntarakṣita, would not in itself show that they knew of BV, or, more significantly, attributed it to Nāgārjuna. But there is also an additional reason why it may be that Śāntarakṣita did not know of BV. Verses 22 onwards of this text give a perfect statement of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka, or perhaps the Vijñapti-Madhyamaka, viewpoint. Verse 22 states that there is no external object apart from consciousness. Verse 23 asserts that consciousness appears under the aspect of form. Verse 25 maintains that *bodhisattvas* should establish themselves in pure consiousness (*cittamātra* – Lindtner's trans.) But subsequent verses then explain that the teaching of *cittamātra* was merely a skilful device, and go on to dismiss any claim that consciousness might therefore be a fundamentally real entity. Thus BV clearly teaches an ascent by stages, adopting the *cittamātra* teaching as a step on the path to the final Madhyamaka position of complete emptiness.[24] There is a precedent for this view in *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 10:256–7. However, as is well known, Śāntarakṣita bases the Madhyamaka textual evidence for his similar approach on YṢ, verses 21 and 34. Moreover he appears to have had a different version of YṢ v. 21 or, alternatively, and perhaps more likely, to have deliberately misquoted the verse to suit his theory.[25] If Śāntarakṣita had known of BV, and considered it to be a genuine work by Nāgārjuna, then he would have had a text tailor-made for authoritatively supporting his Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka, and he would undoubtedly have supplied copious quotes from it. From which one can conclude that the evidence that Śāntarakṣita knew of BV is extremely slim, and the evidence that he was aware of BV as a work by Nāgārjuna is, as far as I can see, nil.

I want now to look at the verses of BV quoted, according to Lindtner, by later Indian writers and still available in Sanskrit (p. 180, note 173). Verses 12–13a are quoted in the *Prasannapadā*, and clearly come not from BV but from an *āgamic* source. I have already considered verse 20. Verses 25 and 27 are apparently quoted by Jñānaśrīmitra, a logician of the tenth or eleventh centuries. Verse 27 is also quoted in the *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha.*[26] Verses 45–6 are found in the *Pañjikā* to the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* – the first Prāsaṅgika reference so far, although Prajñākaramati (late tenth century) sometimes also quotes Śāntarakṣita with approval. Note also that the verses in the *Pañjikā* identified by Lindtner with verses in BV are nevertheless still not said to be from BV or by Nāgārjuna. Verse 52ab can be found in the *Caryāgīti* (eleventh/twelfth centuries), but it too looks like a stock phrase. Verse 57 is found in the *Advayavajrasaṃgraha*, a compendium of the works of Advayavajra an important tenth/eleventh-century yogin. Finally, verses 98–99 are quoted as coming from BV by name, although with no mention of Nāgārjuna, in the Hindu *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (fourteenth century). There is a commentary on BV by Smṛtijñānakīrti, who also translated his commentary into Tibetan. This Smṛtijñānakīrti is presumably identical with the teacher that died a little before the birth of Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po (1012–1088), who was considered to be his reincarnation, and can thus be placed in the tenth century.[27]

If we try to draw together the threads of the preceding discussion it seems that the majority of Lindtner's quotes, presupposing these quotes are directly from BV, are citations appearing in texts dating from the late tenth-century. Jñānaśrīmitra, Prajñākaramati and Advayavajra all flourished at this time, as did Smṛtijñānakīrti and his commentary. Since BV forms a major source for MRP it is also significant that Bhavya, the teacher of rNgog bLo ldan shes rab must have flourished in the eleventh-century, and it seems that the evidence points to a writer of this era as the author of MRP. I have suggested reasons for thinking that Śāntarakṣita, if he was familiar with BV, for which there is little evidence, still didn't identify it as a work of Nāgārjuna. BV may have been composed in the 'school' of Śāntarakṣita; it is certainly quoted in the main by writers interested in the Tantric teachings and/or the Mentalistic or Idealistic traditions of Buddhism. This text is a product of a period when these concerns were predominant. The fact that Tantric writers took an interest in BV shows that the quote at the beginning from GST was seen as forming an integral part of the text. Indeed, since rMa bya pa was writing in the twelfth-century, presumably his contention that BV was intended to show the common goal of Pāramitāyāna and Vajrayāna, as a commentary on GST, represents fairly accurately the views of Indian scholars for at least the previous century, and perhaps the preceding two centuries. If this is so then obviously the era when BV was most quoted was also an era which saw the GST section as integral to the text and its purpose. It is anyway clear that the evidence for BV being by the Madhyamaka Nāgārjuna is far from sufficient to overule the quote from GST at the beginning. It would not be impossible to attribute BV to the Tantric Nāgārjuna, although the only merit in doing this would be to explain why BV became associated with the name of Nāgārjuna. In particular, if it were shown that Śāntarakṣita knew of BV, or attributed it to a Nāgārjuna, then undoubtedly the Siddha Nāgārjuna would be the most reasonable candidate for authorship. Otherwise I suggest that on the balance of evidence at our disposal BV should be attributed to a writer of the eighth or ninth centuries. One thing is certain; the evidence that BV is by the Madhyamaka Nāgārjuna is so slim that one wonders when and why this attribution was made at all.

It is impossible in the present context to undertake a detailed study of the style and content of BV. Lindtner himself notes that "none of Nāgārjuna's other works exhibit such a well-balanced and coherent structure as BV" (p. 181), but whether this could be taken to illustrate at least one point where the style of BV differs from that of the other works attributed to the Master remains to be seen. As regards content, we might note here that BV refers by name to the *apratiṣṭhanirvāṇa* (verse 102), a concept found in Nāgārjuna's other works but an expression which is not apparently found in any of the works authentically attributed to Nāgārjuna, and which is historically associated with the Vijñānāvada.[28] But the most important doctrinal feature of BV is, as Lindtner notes, its critique of Vijñānavāda, particularly in its *Laṅkāvatāra* form. Now, to maintain *à priori* that Nāgārjuna didn't know of the Vijñānavāda and therefore cannot have written BV would obviously be to beg the question. But Lindtner doesn't seem to realise that when he maintains that Nāgārjuna had refuted the absolute existence of *citta* only incidentally in his other works, so that this text fills an important gap, so he must be maintaining that doctrinally BV does and says something new, even if this is simply to make explicit what was previously implicit. But in that case how can Lindtner justify the authenticity of BV by appealing to its agreement in content with MK, originally the main criterion for authenticity?

It is clearly important for our author to show that Nāgārjuna knew of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (LS), and he is not slow to indicate at a number of points parallels to Nāgārjuna's verses in the *sūtra*. In one sense the issue is quite simple, since Nāgārjuna quotes LS four times in SS, including a section on the *tathāgatagarbha,* so the issue of whether Nāgārjuna knew LS should settle on whether he was truly the author of SS. The text is mentioned as an authentic work in *M. śāstrastuti*, and also towards the end of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, so it is reasonable to maintain that Candrakīrti knew of SS and attributed it to Nāgārjuna. Śāntideva (Lindtner prefers 'Śāntadeva') also appears to refer to a SS by Nāgārjuna in *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 5:106, and the work is quoted and attributed to Nāgārjunapāda by Kamalaśīla. So the attribution, while not conclusive (Candrakīrti was many years later than Nāgārjuna) is reasonable. But if we maintain that Nāgārjuna knew *a* LS, it doesn't follow that he knew *the* LS. In particular, although one of our excerpts concerns the *tathāgatagarbha*, none of the four quotes contains any *cittamātra* teaching. There is a tendency to forget that LS is a large *sūtra*, perhaps really a family of texts, not necessarily mutually consistent, which were probably compiled over a long period. To show that Nāgārjuna knew LS, even by name, is not to show that he knew all of LS, particularly that he knew of the *cittamātra* doctrines. All we can argue is that there was probably a version of LS extant and known by Nāgārjuna.

Lindtner often mentions parallels to Nāgārjuna's verses in LS, and it is impossible in the present context to discuss all of these. But there are two particular texts attributed to Nāgārjuna by Lindtner where it might be thought that their authenticity depends on Nāgārjuna's knowing the Vijñānavāda. The first is the *Acintyastava,* which seems to contain references to the *trisvabhāva* theory. And the second is BV. In both cases Lindtner refers to the same verses of Nāgārjuna, and their parallels in LS, in order to show Nāgārjuna's familiarity with LS and *therefore* Vijñānavada:

(i) MK 18:7 – nivṛttam abhidhātavyam nivṛttaś cittagocaraḥ/
anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇam iva dharmatā//

LS 3:9 – astināstīty ubhāvantau yāvac cittasya gocaraḥ/
gocareṇa niruddhena samyak cittaṃ nirudhyate//

(ii) MK 21:11 – dṛśyate saṃbhavaś caiva vibhavaś caiva te bhavet/
dṛśyate saṃbhavaś caiva mohād vibhava eva ca//

LS 10:37 – saṃbhavaṃ vibhavaṃ caiva mohāt paśyanti bāliśāḥ/
na saṃbhavaṃ na vibhavaṃ prajñāyukto vipaśyati//

(iii) MK 17:33 – kleśāḥ karmāṇi dehāś ca kartāraś ca phalāni ca/
gandharvanagarākārā marīcisvapnasaṃnibhāḥ//

LS 10:279 – kleśāḥ karmapathā dehaḥ kartāraś ca phalaṃ ca vai/
marīcisvapnasaṃkāśā gandharvanagaropamā//

(iv) YS 3 (Lindtner's edition) – ji ltar byis pas rnam brtags bzhin//
dngos po gal te bden gyur na/
de dngos med pas rnam thar du//gang gis mi 'dod rgyu ci zhig/

LS 10:466 (=3:16) – na bhāvo vidyate satyaṃ yathā bālair vikalpyate/
abhāvena tu vai mokṣaṃ kathaṃ necchanti tārkikāḥ//

The final reference Lindtner gives is to one of the sections quoted in SS (implying also the other sections):

bya ba dang ni mtshan nyid dang/dngos por mya ngan (?) mi 'da'/
rnam rtog rnam par shes pa las/bzlog pas mya ngan (?) 'das so/ (The question marks indicates what appears to be '*nga*' in my edition of the Co ne *bsTan 'gyur.* Ki folio 191b.)

However, the verse Lindtner gives as an equivalent, LS 10:640, is rather different, carrying with it a possible *cittamātra* interpretation lacking in SS:

LS 10:640 – kriyākṣaravikalpānāṃ nivṛttiś cittadarśanāt/
adarśanāt svacittasya vikalpaḥ saṃpravartate//

In spite of the fact that Lindtner claims that these verses from Nāgārjuna are *references* to LS, in a number of cases the reference is far from obvious. The two verses in (i) both refer to the cessation of the *cittagocara*, and so both verses use the words '*citta*' and '*gocar*a'. But in LS there is no reference to the cessation of the verbal referent, while MK is concerned with the similarity of *dharmatā* to *nirvāṇa* and makes no reference to the cessation of *citta* as a result of the cessation of its referential sphere. We can say that both these verses express similar sentiments, but a concern with what happens when the mind transcends dualistic reference must have been present in all stages of Buddhism and there is no need to suppose that the similarities between these verses indicate that Nāgārjuna was referring to LS, any more than they suggest that LS is in fact taking its inspiration from Nāgārjuna. It is noticeable that Candrakīrti, who in his commentary on MK I8:7 quotes from a number of *sūtras*, nevertheless gives no quote here from LS. Again, I see no need to postulate a reference to LS I0:37 in MK 2I:II. Certainly both refer to production and destruction apprehended through delusion. But this point is central to the critique of the Abhidharma, and so one would expect a similar sentiment in many Mahāyāna works. The verse from LS contrasts fools with the one conjoined to wisdom; MK replies to an opponent who considers that production and destruction exist because they are perceived. One makes a poetic, the other a philosophical point, but the reference is more likely to be in both cases to a common intention or doctrinal background. The third set of verses, however, do seem to be close enough to indicate a more direct connection. Apart from anything else they have far more words in common than the previous pairs of verses. Nevertheless, there is no need to assume that the direct connection required is a reference by Nāgārjuna to LS. These verses articulate a stock Mahāyāna image, and even if one accepts the testimony of SS and grants that Nāgārjuna knew of a version of LS it doesn't follow that if there is a case of directly similar verses in a work by Nāgārjuna and the LS so the LS verse is earlier. It is not obvious that here, as in the other verses, LS couldn't have been inspired by Nāgārjuna. The same might be said of the fourth set of verses; indeed their polemical nature, made more explicit in LS by relating the fools to logicians (*tārkikāḥ*) might suggest that they originated from the pen of someone like Nāgārjuna.

To argue that the verses which are close to each other in Nāgārjuna's works and LS represent a reference by Nāgārjuna to LS is to beg the question, based on the fact, if it is a fact, that LS can be dated earlier than Nāgārjuna combined with the assumption that therefore *all* of LS is earlier. The final quote from SS, intended not as a reference but rather as a direct citation of LS, makes this point rather well. If, on Lindtner's testimony, this is a quote from LS 10:640 then there are rather striking differences in the two versions. In particular, although the references in 10:640 to *citta* don't necessarily carry Vijñānavāda connotations (as Suzuki presupposes in his translation), nevertheless it is noticeable that the SS quote refers in good Madhyamaka style to *nirvāṇa* through the reversing of discriminative awareness (*rnam rtog rnam par shes pa=vikalpavijñāna*) and makes no mention of seeing *citta* (*cittadarśana*) at all. Clearly, in Nāgārjuna's quote the contrast is between discriminative conceptions and their cessation. In the present text of LS the contrast is one of seeing or not seeing the *citta* as a cause of discriminative conceptions. Which indicates the most important point concerning Lindtner's parallels between Nagarjuna's works and LS. Even supposing that Nāgārjuna's verses are direct references to LS, and not the result of a common heritage, or LS gaining inspiration from Nāgārjuna, nevertheless none of these verses refers to the Vijñānavāda doctrines – not even the lengthy *tathāgatagarbha* quote in SS (=LS 2, section 28 in Suzuki's trans.) And the one case where the LS original could have *cittamātra* significance is found to be lacking in Nāgārjuna's quotation. It is noticeable that there appears to be no quotes from the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* in SS, the *sūtra* which, according to Tibetan tradition, is the most important one for teaching the Vijñānavāda doctrine. From all of which we can conclude that even if Nāgārjuna did know of *a* LS no reason has been supplied for thinking that Nāgārjuna was familiar with the Vijñānavāda teachings of *cittamātratā*.

We return to the *Acinytastava* and BV. Lindtner has traced twenty-two quotes from the *Acintyastava*, including duplicates, all, presupposing a late date for MRP, occurring in works dating from the eighth century or later. In addition, all the Sanskrit manuscripts extant of CS include the *Acintyastava,* as does Amṛtākara in his *Catuḥstavasamāsārtha.* But the absence of quotes and references in the works of Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka (excluding MRP – another indication of its late date) does cast some doubt on the *Acintyastava's* authenticity. The fact that this *stava* apparently refers to the *trisvabhāva* theory of the Vijñānavadins was enough to make Raniero Gnoli suggest rethinking Nāgārjuna's date (Lindtner, p. 122, n. 149), but according to Lindtner there is no real problem here since Nāgārjuna was familiar with the Vijñānavada teachings from LS. Now, the *Acintyastava* doesn't in fact refer to the *cittamātra* teachings as such, but it does state that *saṃvṛti* is *paratantra*, and that a *kalpitabhāva* doesn't exist. Verse 45bc is almost identical to LS 2:189:

> AS 45bd – nāsti vai kalpito bhāvo paratantras tu vidyate/
> LS 2:189ab – nāsti vai kalpito bhāvaḥ paratantraś ca vidyate/

It seems that there is a case here for suggesting that the discussion in LS and that in the *Acintyastava* are connected, and the praising in the *stava* of the Buddha for giving these teachings indicates that chronological priority should be given to LS. However, supposing that the *Acintyastava* has been authentically attributed to Nāgārjuna, for which there remains doubts, nevertheless all one can conclude from the '*trisvabhāva*' section in the *Acintyastava* is that Nāgārjuna made a distinction between the conventional world of dependent origination and flux, and the entities which were erroneously superimposed through construction upon it, and that he called the former '*paratantra*'. The words '*parikalpita*' and '*pariniṣpanna*' aren't used even though in the latter case Nāgārjuna gives a series of synonyms for *paramārtha* in verse 45. The distinction which the *Acintyastava* seeks to make between the conventional flux and erroneous construction was essential to Nāgārjuna's teachings, albeit perhaps implicitly, in all the works which can reasonably be described as authentic (it was also, incidentally, crucial to Tsong kha pa's understanding of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka). Without this distinction either the conventional world would have to be completely false, even as seen by Buddhas, or completely true. So the only new fact derived from the discussion in the *Acintyastava* is that Nāgārjuna used the word '*paratantra*' in connection with *saṃvṛti.* It doesn't follow, therefore, that these verses entail a reference to Vijñānavāda, or that Nāgārjuna knew of the Vijñānavāda. What they *may* indicate is that the ur-text of LS, which Nāgārjuna was presumably familiar with, did speak of *paratantra* and contrast it with the false construction habitually indulged in by the *pṛthagjana,* and this may therefore be Nāgārjuna's source for the term and its use.

When we turn to BV the situation is quite different. BV, in contrast to all the other works attributed to Nāgārjuna and accepted as authentic by Lindtner, employs the full range of Vijñānavāda terminology, refers to all of the three *svabhāvas* (v. 28), speaks of Yogācārins (v. 30), the *ālayavijñāna* and so on (vv. 32ff). I have argued that there is no evidence that BV is by the Madhyamaka Nāgārjuna, and on balance it should be dated somewhat later than Candrakīrti, perhaps even a few centuries later. I have also suggested that even though Nāgārjuna may have known of LS, there is as yet no clear evidence elsewhere in his works that he knew of the characteristic Vijñānavāda teachings. If this is correct, or, given our present information, the most plausable account, then it would no longer be question-begging to assert that the presence of a fully-developed armour of Vijñānavāda terms and concepts in BV alone of all Nāgārjuna's authentic works provides a powerful additional argument against BV being by Nāgārjuna.

Before leaving consideration of Nāgārjuna's acquaintance with Vijñānavāda we should just note in passing the other sections where Lindtner asserts that Nāgārjuna refuted the absolute existence of *citta* in brief (p. 180), implying that this was in fact directed at the Vijñānavāda. *Lokātītastava* v. 10, and *Acintyastava* v. 50 simply refute *vijñāna*, or *jñāna*, and its referent because of mutual dependence, while in ŚS 56–7 Nāgārjuna is clearly refuting *vijñāna, vijñeya* and *vijñātṛ* as part of a refutation of each of the five *skandhas* in turn. No special status is given to his refutation of consciousness. His approach, here, as elsewhere in his authentic works, is to point out mutual dependence and dependent origination, and Nāgārjuna shows absolutely no awareness in these works of Vijñānavāda and its *cittamātra* terminology.

Finally, miscellaneous comments on some of the book's sections taken in turn. Lindtner doesn't offer us a translation of MK, but he does make some interesting and helpful comments on both the text and also its meaning. He points out that the titles of eight chapters differ in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* from those contained in the *Buddhapālitavṛtti, Akutobhayā, Prajñāpradīpa* and *Prajñāpradīpavṛtti,* and the version of MK commented on in the *Prasannapadā* also contains three verses missing in the other versions. (p. 25, note 79). It seems unlikely that Candrakīrti had a better manuscript than the others, Lindtner contends, and so most likely these verses and the eight chapter headings were Candrakīrti's innovations. Now, as regards the chapter headings I make no comment. But the issue of the three verses is mentioned in passing in a very useful Tibetan commentary on MK, the *Zab mo'i de kho na nyid snang ba,* by the fourteenth/fifteenth-century Sa skya commentator Rong ston Shes bya kun rig. This commentary is particularly valuable because on each verse of MK it provides a comparative digest of the views of four of Lindtner's five commentaries, omitting the *Prajñāpradīpavṛtti,* which is a subcommentary. In treating verses 12:6 and 23:20 Rong ston simple notes that these verses are found only in the *Prasannapadā*. But in commenting on 3:7, which has now been identified as a verse from RĀ (4:55), Rong ston states that the attribution of this verse to MK is incorrect, not only because it doesn't occur in the three earlier commentaries, but also because Candrakīrti himself doesn't appear to have commented on it in the *Prasannapadā.*[29] Clearly this is an interesting comment. Quite a plausible case could be made out for 3:7 as simple a quote by Candrakīrti in the onrunning argument between the verses which are now 3:6 and 3:8. Moreover, since verse 3:7 is included here as part of the opponent's position so there is no need to presuppose that it *originated* with Nāgārjuna, such that Candrakīrti would have introduced it with a suitable attribution had he been quoting Nāgārjuna himself. So one could argue that at some point after the time of Candrakīrti this quote was mistakenly considered to be a verse of MK. But at least one Tibetan writer suggested that this was a misunderstanding of Candrakīrti, and if we take his lead then in this particular case Candrakīrti can be absolved from the charge of interpolating a verse in the received text.

Turning to ŚS, Lindtner notes the considerable differences which exist between the Tibetan translations of the verses contained in the *kārikā* text and the three commentaries extant in the *bsTan 'gyur*. His edition consists of the *kārikā* version, and the verses drawn from the *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti*, attributed to Nāgārjuna himself. The variations, Lindtner claims, hardly ever affect the sense, although they may cast some light on Sanskrit-Tibetan translation techniques (p. 32, note 98). Whether the variants affect the sense or not is a matter for future detailed study, but it seems unlikely that they could indicate the same Sanskrit original in each case. For example, in verse 45 the expression "*gal te gzugs ni rang 'byung bzhin*" in the *kārikā* version has no equivalent in the commentary verse, while "*yang dag min las gzugs 'byung 'gyur*" in the latter has no corresponding line in the former. The production of a single translation from the Tibetan, dismissing as insignificant, without notes, these variants which surely must indicate variants in the Sanskrit is particularly unfortunate since Lindtner's whole book gives the impression of having been written mainly for Sanskritists. The translations are uniformly excellent, although Lindtner makes little pretense either in his notes or in his study of Nāgārjuna's thought to any great philosophical sophistication in explaining what the verses of Nāgārjuna's work actually *mean*. Philosophically difficult verses abound; they pass with little or no explanation. This isn't necessarily a fault, of course. Our author's concern is textual, not philosophical. He clearly intends to speak to Sanskritists. When he does offer a comment Lindtner prefers to put half the sentence into untranslated Sanskrit (or sometimes Latin or Greek) than to give English translations for the benefit of those trained in philosophy rather than Sanskrit. So while the translations may be of value to the philosopher who knows no relevant Oriental languages, Lindtner's own comments will often prove well nigh incomprehensible. Which is a shame, really, since it reinforces a lack of contact between Indologists and philosophers working on Nāgārjuna's contributions to Buddhist thought.

Lindtner's study and summary of VP is noteworthy for the way in which he brings out the humour of Nāgārjuna's text. This is no mean achievement since a number of the jokes are almost totally lost in the Tibetan translation, and to grasp them indicates a rare ability to systematically read through the Tibetan to the Sanskrit original. Thus Nāgārjuna comments that there can be no *dṛṣṭānta* (lit. 'seen end') because there is neither a beginning nor a middle! The Tibetan translation has this all very faithfully: *thag ma dang dbus med pa'i phyir mtha' yang mthong ba ma yin no//*. However the Tibetan completely misses the Sanskrit joke, since '*dṛṣṭānta*' in Tibetan is translated not by its etymology but by its meaning, as '*dpe*', example. So the commentary's ending (*thag ma dang dbus med na mtha' yod pa ma yin no// de'i phyir dpe med pa yin no//*) would have given rise to immense problems of interpretation, intricate and elaborate explanations, among Tibetans who knew no Sanskrit-had they not neglected VP altogether. Perhaps it was the jokes and the fallacious arguments – surely attempts to poke fun at the overinflated seriousness of the Naiyāyikas, and their absurd arrogance in claiming that reasoning was invalid unless it took place according to *their* criteria for discourse – which led later Indian writers to totally ignore the work (presupposing that the attribution of VP to Nāgārjuna is correct).[30]

I have already mentioned the particular value of Lindtner's book in incorporating into his Tibetan editions the Sanskrit verses where they have been discovered. Lindtner's reading in Indian Buddhist literature is immense; this book brings together for the first time the fragments of these important works, as well as mentioning, where located, the *āgamic* sources for Nāgārjuna's references and allusions (YṢ 34 and Dīgha I, p. 223, for example). These references enables us to see Nāgārjuna as a Buddhist monk on a direct continuum with the earlier traditions, to place him in his Indian religious context, to remove him from the position of an Indian proto-Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Hegel, Kant or who ever is the currently fashionable Western philosopher – surely it must be Foucault and/or Derrida next!

If we look at Lindtner's list of *sūtras* quoted in SS it is interesting to note not only which *sūtras* are apparently quoted by Nāgārjuna but also those *sūtras* quoted very little or completely missing. Given that there are comments and commentaries on the *Daśabhūmikasūtra, Śālistambasūtra* and *Bhāvasaṃkrāntisūtra* attributed to Nāgārjuna, placed by Lindtner in the doubtful section, it is perhaps significant that Nāgārjuna gives only one quote from the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, and none from the others. The *Daśadharmakasūtra,* mentioned in BS 95, receives no mention in SS. And there appears to be no sign of the Sukhāvatī *sūtras,* a strange fact given the early date of the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* and the references to Amitābha towards the end of SL and at length in the *Daśabhūmikavibhāṣā*, both attributed to Nāgārjuna. Moreover, given the emphasis placed on the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* in Tibetan Madhyamaka it is perhaps also surprising that there are only two quotes from this text. On the other hand among the *sūtras* much quoted is the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* – understandably, as regards its content, but significant given its comparative neglect in subsequent Indian Buddhism, indicated by the absence of commentaries in the *bsTan 'gyur.*

Since there have been a number of modern translations of SL Lindtner confines himself to textcritical and other notes on each of the letter's verses. Here, in particular, he has been able to trace many of the allusions and references to other Buddhist texts, especially *āgamic* sources. This has enabled him to suggest, for example, that all the translators have misunderstood verse 17, not realising that '*sems*' in the Tibetan text is actually a shortened '*sems can*'. The reference is to *Aṅguttara* I, p. 283, and Lindtner is surely right, but if so then not only modern translators but also the Tibetan commentators have misunderstood this verse. This is interesting given that the only extant Indian commentary on SL in the *bsTan 'gyur,* by Mahāmati, appears to have understood the verse correctly! Incidentally, one point that is thrown into highlight by Lindtner's book is just how slim the evidence is for attributing SL to Nāgarjuna. Lindtner has traced only one quote from this text, in Candrakīrti's *Catuḥśatakavṛtti*, and even there it makes no mention of Nāgārjuna or the origin of the quote.

Lindtner's last chapter supplies a summary of Nāgārjuna's philosophico-religious position in the light of the thirteen texts considered to be authentic. His main concern is to place Nāgārjuna firmly within the development of Buddhist tradition, as a monk who knew and used the *āgamic* sources of the rival and earlier traditions as well as his own, and yet was firmly and enthusiastically embedded within the Mahāyāya, the Bodhisattva tradition. And in showing this he is, I think, persuasive and convincing. Much of the last section of the book is comprised of quotes from Nāgārjuna's works and parallel sources, all in untranslated Tibetan and Sanskrit. A few philosophical comments are, perhaps, misleading – *nirvāṇa* as "ontologically . . . a world beyond *saṃsāra*" (p. 256), for example, but Lindtner's treatment of Nāgārjuna's philosophy is brief, not to say cursory, and as it stands it suffices his purposes. Footnotes, cross-refernces, abound. Unfortunately it is not always clear on checking these notes that the texts cited support Lindtner's claims for them. Thus on p. 250, for example, our author claims that Nāgārjuna attempted "to absorb the deities of popular religion, Brahmā, Indra, Viṣṇu, Rudra etc. by interpreting them as emanations of the Buddha." He cites in support of this BV verses 77–8 and YṢ verse 28. But YṢ 28 simply states that Brahmā etc., which the world consider as real, are said to be false by the Āryas. And I confess to finding BV 77–8 almost incomprehensible, but the verses seem to imply that Brahmā, Indra and Rudra attain their states through helping living beings. Anyway, none of these texts makes any mention of emanations of the Buddha – nor do the further references to RĀ and SL given by Lindtner in the footnote to BV 77–8.

Without a doubt this book by Christian Lindner is a very important and immensely rich and stimulating work. A number of these texts have been edited and translated for the first time, there are valuable textcritical notes and a vast fund of textual and referential information is brought together. This important work needs to be done. It isn't often realised that Buddhist studies, while perhaps no longer in its infancy, has not yet progressed much beyond the stage of a toddler. Christian Lindtner's welcome book will help ensure that it grows with healthy bones!

Department of Theology and Religious Studies
University of Bristol

NOTES

[1] First published in *Asia Major*, XVII, part I (December 1971), pp. 105–112. Reprinted in Gregory Schopen (ed.), *Buddhist Studies by J. W. de Jong*, pp. 555–562.

[2] D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Towards a Chronology of the Madhyamaka School', in L. A. Hercus *et al.*, *Indological and Buddhist Studies*, pp. 509–510.

[3] This neglect of the works attributed to Nāgārjuna but no longer available in Sanskrit has in one case led to the arrogant and faintly absurd suggestion that Nāgārjuna was not a follower of the Mahāyāna at all! See A. K. Warder, 'Is Nāgārjuna a Mahāyānist?', in Mervyn Sprung, (ed.), *The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*, pp. 78ff. True, as regards View the dGe lugs tradition too maintain, following Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, that there is no difference between the Mahāyāna and the View which leads to Arhatship. The difference lies in practice and motivation. Thus one would not expect to find extensive discussions of uniquely Mahāyāna doctrines in MK, or indeed in the other works primarily concerned with View. But it is quite wrong to consider that, in the light of uncertainty regarding the authentic works of Nāgārjuna so we can fraw conclusions concerning *Nāgārjuna* (or even MK) by ignoring unanimous Buddhist tradition and treating Nāgārjuna as *only* the author of MK (while grudgingly admitting that he may have written other works, which we propose to ignore).

[4] David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, in Jan Gonda (ed.), *A History of Indian Literature*, Volume VII; Fasc. I.

[5] See here C. Lindtner, articles in *Acta Orientalia* 40 (1979), p. 91 and 41 (1980), pp. 27–37, and Ruegg's 'Post-Scriptum' to the article in Hercus, p. 530.

[6] For this three-fold division see Ruegg, in Hercus, p. 509, and his *Literature*, p. 8. For just one example of dividing Nāgārjuna's works this way in Tibet see Rong ston Shes bya kun rig, *dBu ma rtsa ba'i rnam bshad Zab mo'i de kho na nyid snang ba*, p. 5.

[7] See George N. Roerich, trans. *The Blue Annals*, pp. 334 and 343. rMa bya pa's views, particularly on Madhyamaka method, are frequently refuted in dGe lugs writings. See

here Alex Wayman, trans., *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real,* note 252. Wayman's note 259 should also be read as referring to rMa bya pa.

[8] *dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi 'grel ba 'Thad pa'i rgyan*, side 13: spyir slob dpon gyis bstan bcos mdzad pa rnams la rgyu pha rol tu phyin pa'i theg pa gsal bar byed pa dang / 'bras bu rdo rje'i theg pa gsal bar byed pa dang / de gnyis don gcig tu bstan pa gsum las / dang po la gsum ste / lta ba gtso bor ston pa dbu ma rigs pa'i tshogs drug dang / spyos pa gtso bor ston pa la rgyas pa dang bar ma dang bsdus ba rim pa ltang (?) byang chub kyi tshogs dang / mdo kun las btus pa dang / bshes pa'i spring yig gsum dang / lta spyod cha mnyam pa rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che'i phreng ba'o / This commentary on MK seems to be the only work by rMa bya pa now available. It is interesting to note in passing how rMa bya pa's division of Nāgārjuna's Pāramitāyāna works compares that of Rong ston, writing many years after rMa bya pa and Bu ston, and contemporaneous with Tsong kha pa. Rong ston gives, as already noted, the 'traditional' threefold classification, '*rigs tshogs*' etc. He implies that the six works are primarily concerned with View, and accepts, against Tsong kha pa and Red mda' ba the authenticity of VS. However, under those works concerned with practice he simply mentions the *Sūtrasamuccaya, Suhṛllekha* etc. The *Ratnāvalī* is still placed in a separate section, teaching the union of means and wisdom. No mention is made of the comparative extent of the works concerning practice. Nor is there any reference to the *Bodhisaṃbhāra*, unless it is the text referred to by Rong ston's 'etc.'. This absence of reference to BS might suggest that by this time BS had become lost, or some uncertainty was felt regarding the nature, extent, and perhaps even the authenticity of BS. Rong ston is clearly aware of the older scheme of dividing Nāgārjuna's works represented by rMa bya pa, but the absence of BS and the mention of '*rigs tshogs*' etc. perhaps indicates a change over to a later scheme represented in Tsong kha pa's works (with the *Ratnāvalī* included under the dialectical treatises). For Rong ston's classification see his MK commentary, pp. 5–6.

[9] rMa bya pa, sides 13–14:dang po la'ang drug tu nges pa'ang (14) lta ba'am shes rab kyi dmigs pa chos thams cad rang bzhin stong pa nyid dam bden pa gnyis phyin ci ma log par gtan la 'bebs pa la brjod bya de'i yan lag thams cad tshang bar ston pa gtso bo lus lta bu'i bstan bcos gnyis dang / brjod bya de'i phyogs re tsam la log rtog bsal ba'i phyir bkod pa yan lag gam 'phros pa'i bstan bcos bzhi yin pa'i phyir ro / See here Lindtner, p. 31, note 95.

[10] *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*, f. 2a: ci'i phyir stong pa nyid bdun cu pa dang / rtsod bzlog pa las slob dpon gyis bstod pa ma brjod pa dbu ma 'di las brjod ce na / smras pa / stong pa nyid bdun cu pa dang rtsod pa bzlog gnyis dbu ma las 'phros pa ste / Cf. rMa bya pa, side 17: . . . drug cu pa'i 'grel par 'di la mchod brjod mdzad kyi rtsod zlog la sogs pa gzhan la mchod brjod ma mdzad pa'i rgyu mtshan du 'di rtsa ba'i shes rab ltar gtso bo'i bstan bcos yin la gzhan rnams 'phros pa'i bstan bcos yin pas so zhes. . .

[11] See rMa bya pa, side 14–16. Cf. *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*, f. 2a–b.

[12] For the sevenfold practice see, for example, RĀ, 5:vv. 65–87, or BS, verses 48ff.

[13] If PK and SS were not intended as public expressions then that might explain their relative neglect in later Buddhist circles, particularly in the first few hundred years after Nāgārjuna. Later writers would have had access to the *sūtras* themselves, and there would be no need to use Nāgārjuna's collection of excerpts. Those to whom collections of *sūtra* fragments would be useful, moreover, would be unlikely to be writers of Madhyamaka commentaries.

[14] For the *M. śāstrastuti* see J. W. de Jong, 'La Madhyamakaśāstrastuti de Candrakīrti, originally published in *Oriens Extremus,* IX (1962), pp. 47–56, and reprinted in Schopen,

pp. 541–550. The list of works attributed to Nāgārjuna is contained in verse 10, while the reference to the legend of Nāgārjuna's cutting-off his own head is in verse 7. On these legends see also K. Satchidananda Murty, *Nāgārjuna,* pp. 65–7.

[15] mKhas grub rje, *rGyud sde spyi'i rnam par gzhag pa rgyas par brjod*, edited and translated by Ferdinand D. Lessing and Alex Wayman; *Mkhas grub rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras,* pp. 86–7. See also mKhas grub rje's *sTong thun chen mo,* sides 69–72. Tsong kha pa's division of Nāgārjuna's works, although not apparently any treatment of the authenticity of VS, can be found in his commentary on MK, the *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho,* folios 4aff.

[16] rMa bya pa, side 17: de'i phyir snga rabs pa kha cig rin po che'i phreng ba bsnan nas rigs pa'i tshogs drug tu byed pa dang / rigs pa'i tshogs sam khyu zhes bya ba yin gyi drug tu grangs nges pa med do zhes zer ba dang / yang rang bzhin med par ston pa'i rigs pa'i tshogs khi bstan bcos lnga yin no. . .

[17] For T'ai Situ Rin po che's oral teachings I am relying on cassettes of his courses given at the Samye Ling Tibetan Centre in Scotland in Summer, 1981. The comments referred to here can be found on the second side of the second cassette of his teachings on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra.* Where the idea that all the five works of Maitreya form one text comes from I have no idea, although the first place to look would be in the commentaries of the *Ris med* movement, which has had such an effect on contemporary non-dGe lugs Tibetan thought.

[18] rMa bya pa, side 17: gnyis pa rdo rje'i theg pa gsal bar byed pa ni rim pa lnga pa la sogs pa yin la /

[19] *Ibid.*: gsum pa de gnyis don gcig tu ston pa ni byang chub sems kyi rnam 'grel yin te / rtsa ba dpal gsang 'dus par rnam par snang mdzad kyis don dam pa byang chub kyi sems kyi che ba brjod pa'i rgyud kyi tshig la 'grel pa mtshan nyid du bkral ba'i phyir ro /

[20] See Lessing and Wayman, pp. 334–5, together with the footnote quoting from Tsong kha pa's *sNgags rim chen mo.* This quote from Tsong kha pa can be found on folio 426a of the Lhasa edition of Tsong kha pa's works, in the microfiche edition published by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York.

[21] Lindtner's translation: byang chub sems dpa' gsang sngags kyi sgor spyad pa spyod pa rnams kyis . . . This line is also given, with a variant, in Tsong kha pa, above, and cited presumably by memory in mKhas grub rje.

[22] See Ruegg's *Literature,* pp. 66, plus note, and 116, note 339.

[23] On Asvabhāva see Ruegg, *Literature,* p. 107, note 341. According to Ruegg Tāranātha makes Asvabhāva a contemporary of Jñānagarbha and a follower of Vijñapti-Madhyamaka. But there seems to have been at least two and possibly three Jñānagarbhas. Since Tāranātha also states that Asvabhāva was a contemporary of Kambala, presumably the Jñānagarbha referred to was not the eighth-century Jñānagarbha but the ninth-century one, or perhaps even the Jñānagarbha who was a teacher of Marpa (eleventh-century). But Ruegg also refers to an Asvabhāva who was a Vijñānavādin and preceded Dharmāpala (sixth-century). Certainly, if it were shown that the Asvabhāva who wrote the *M. saṃgrahopanibandhana* was as late as the ninth or eleventh-centuries then this would harmonise perfectly with the dates of all the other references in Sanskrit texts to BV. For Mimaki see *La Réfutation Bouddhique de la Permanence des Choses (Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa)* etc., p. 309, note 432.

[24] Verse 22: gzung dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo yis//rnam shes snang ba gang yin pa/rnam shes las ni tha dad par//phyi rol don ni 'ga' yang med/ Verse 23: de phyir dngos po'i

ngo bor no//phyi don rnam pa kun tu med/rnam shes so sor snang ba 'di//gzugs kyi rnam par snang bar 'gyur/ Verse 25: bdag tu 'dzin pa bzlog pa'i phyir //phung po khams sogs bstan pa yin/sems tsam po la gnas nas ni//skal chen rnams kyis de yang spangs/ Verse 27: 'di dag thams cad sems tsam zhes//thub pas bstan pa gang mdzad de/byis pa rnams kyis skrag pa ni//spang pa'i phyir yin de nyid min/ Lindtner's edition. Verses 25 and 27 also survive in Sanskrit.

[25] See here Ruegg, *Literature*, pp. 20, note 44, 90, note 292, and pp. 122–124, See also Y. Kajiyama, 'Later Mādhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation', in M. Kiyota (ed.), *Māhāyana Buddhist Meditation*, p. 132 and p. 143, note 31.

[26] Unfortunately I have been unable to check the references in Jnānaśrīmitra, the *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha*, *Caryāgīti* and *Advayavajrasaṃgraha*, and so I have no knowledge of whether these writers and works attribute BV to Nāgārjuna or refer to the text by name.

[27] On Smṛtijñānakīrti and Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po see the *Blue Annals*, pp. 160ff, and Tarthang Tulku, *Crystal Mirror*, Volume 5, pp. 237–40.

[28] On this concept see Gadjin M. Nagao, 'The Bodhisattva Returns to this World', in Leslie S. Kawamura, (ed.), *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism*, pp. 61–79. All his references for the use of the term in describing *nirvāṇa* are to Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda sources. To be fair, though, the term does occur in the *Vajracchedikāprajnāpāramitā*, which is quoted in SS. However, it is not obvious that the term is used with '*nirvāṇa*' in the *Vajracchedikā*, and, like LS, the *Vajracchedikā* may in addition have parts dating from different periods. Whether there are any texts dating from the time of Nāgārjuna which actually use the expression '*apratiṣṭhanirvāṇa*' requires further research.

[29] *Zab mo'i de kho na nyid snang ba*, p. 77: 'dir ji ltar pha dang ma dag la / zhes sogs kyi gzhung 'byung ba ni ma dag ste 'grel chen gsum ga la mi snang ba'i phyir dang / tshig gsal la yang 'di'i 'grel pa mi snang ba'i phyir ro //

[30] One might add to Lindtner's bibliography here a little-known Sanskrit retranslation of the verses of VP, together with a Hindi introduction, translation and notes, by a certain Sempa Dorje, Varanasi, 1974.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bu ston Rin chen grub (1931/2). *History of Buddhism (Chos-ḥbyung) by Bu-ston*, (trans. Dr. E. Obermiller), Heidelberg: Institut für Buddhismus-Kunde. 2 parts. Tibetan text contained in *The Collected Works of Bu-ston* (ed. Lokesh Chandra), Śata-Piṭaka Series, Vol. 64, International Academy of Indian Culture: New Delhi, 1971.

Candrakīrti (1962). 'La Madhyamakaśāstrastuti de Candrakīrti', (ed. and trans. by J. W. de Jong), *Oriens Extremus* 9: 47–56. Also reprinted in Schopen.

Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*, in the Co-ne edition of the *bsTan 'gyur*, microfiche edition prepared by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York, Vol 23 ('A).

Candrakīrti (1960). *Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna with the commentary: Prasannapadā by Candrakīrti*, (ed. P. L. Vaidya), Darbhanga: Mithila Institute. The edition also contains, among other works, Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* (Sanskrit fragments).

Candrakīrti, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*, Co-ne edition, Vol. 24 (Ya), folios Iff.

'Gos lo tsā ba (1979). *Deb ther sngon po*. Translated as *The Blue Annals*, (trans. George N. Roerich), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Reprint of Second Edition, two volumes in one. First Edition, Calcutta, 1949.

Guhyasamājatantra (1965). *Guhyasamāja Tantra or Tathāgataguhyaka*, (ed. S. Bagchi), Darbhanga: Mithila Institute.

Hercus, L. A. *et al.* (1982). *Indological and Buddhist Studies*, Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies.

Kamalaśīla (1971). *Bhāvanākrama III*. Edited by G. Tucci in his *Minor Buddhist Texts*, Volume iii, Rome: Serie Orientale Roma.

Kawamura, Leslie S. (ed.) (1981). *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism*, Ontario: Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion.

mKhas grub rje (1968). *rGyud sde spyi'i rnam par gzhag pa rgyas par brjod*. Edited and translated by Ferdinand D. Lessing and Alex Wayman, *Mkhas grub rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras*, The Hague: Mouton.

mKhas grub rje (1972). *Zab mo stong pa nyid kyi de kho na nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos sKal bzang mig 'byed* (*sTong thun chen mo*). Edited by Lha mkhar Yongs dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan in *Madhyamika Text Series*, Volume I, New Delhi.

Kiyota, Minoru (ed.) (1978). *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii.

Laṅkāvatārasūtra (1963). *Saddharmalaṅkāvatārasūtram*, (ed. P. L. Vaidya), Darbhanga: Mithila Institute. Also translation by D. T. Suzuki, *The Lankavatara Sutra*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973 reprint.

Lindtner, C. (1979). 'Candrakīrti's Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa', *Acta Orientalia* 40. Ruegg also refers to a further article by Lindtner in *Acta Orientalia* 41 (not seen).

rMa bya pa brTson grus seng ge (1976). *dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi 'grel ba 'Thad pa'i rgyan*, Delhi: The rGyal ba Karma pa.

Madhva (1882). *The Sarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha*, (trans. E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough), London: Trubner and Co.

Mahāmati, *Vyaktapadā Suhṛllekhaṭīkā*, Co-ne edition, Vol. 94 (Ṅa), folios 73bff.

Mimaki, Katsumi (1976). *La Refutation Bouddhique de la Permanence des Choses* (*Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*) *et La Preuve de la Momentanéité des Choses* (*Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*), Paris: Institut de Civilisation Indienne.

Nāgārjuna (Siddha). *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* (*II*). Co-ne edition, Vo. 163 (Ṅi), folios 43bff.

Nāgārjuna (1977). *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*, (ed. by J. W. de Jong), Adyar: The Adyar Library.

Nāgārjuna, *Ratnāvalī*. For Sanskrit fragments see Candrakīrti (1960), above. Also translation by Jeffrey Hopkins and Lati Rinpoche (1975). *The Precious Garland and The Song of the Four Mindfulnesses*, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Nāgārjuna (1978) *Suhṛllekha*. Contained in Lozang Jamspal *et al.* (trans), *Nāgārjuna's Letter to King Gautamīputra*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Nāgārjuna, *Sūtrasamuccaya*. Co-ne edition, Vol. 31 (Ki), folios 151aff.

Nāgārjuna (1965). 'The Vaidalyaprakaraṇa of Nāgārjuna', (ed Yuichi Kajiyama) in *Miscellanea Indologica Kiotensia* 6–7; 129–55.

Nāgārjuna (1974). *Vaidalyasūtram*, (retranslated into Sanskrit, with Hindi translation and notes by Sempa Dorje), Varanasi: Tibbatī-Hiṃdī Keṃdra.

Prajñākaramati (1960). *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the commentary Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati*, (ed. P. L. Vaidya), Darbhanga: Mithila Institute.

Red mda' ba (1974). *dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa*, Sarnath: Sakya Student's Union.

Rong ston Shes bya kun rig (1975). *dBu ma rtsa ba'i rnam bshad Zab mo'i de kho na nyid snang ba*, Sarnath: Sakya Student's Union.

Ruegg, David Seyfort (1981). *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy* *in India*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. Volume VII; Fasc. I of Jan Gonda ed., *A History of Indian Literature.*

Śāntideva (1960). *Bodhicaryāvatāra.* See Prajñākaramati, above.

Satchidananda Murty, K. (1978). *Nagarjuna*, Delhi: National Book Trust. Second Edition.

Schopen, Gregory, (ed.) (1979). *Buddhist Studies by J. W. de Jong*, Canberra(?): Asian Humanities Press.

Sprung, Mervyn, (ed.) (1973). *The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Tarthang Tulku (1977). *Crystal Mirror*, Volume 5, Emeryville: Dharma Publishing.

Tsong kha pa (1978). *Lam rim chen mo.* Sections translated by Alex Wayman, *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Tsong kha pa (1966). *dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho.* Modern blockprint printed in India.

Tsong kha pa, *rGyal ba khyab bdag rdo rje 'chang chen po'i lam gyi rim pa gSang ba kun gyi gnad rnam par phye ba* (*sNgags rim chen mo*), in the microfiche edition of the *Yab sras gsung 'bum* published by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, Vol G. This is, I believe, the Lhasa edition.

Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitā (1974). Edited and translated by Edward Conze, Rome: Serie Orientale Roma.

ELI FRANCO

STUDIES IN THE TATTVOPAPLAVASIMHA

II. THE THEORY OF ERROR*

In a previous paper I tried to present Jayarāśi's critique of the criterion of truth.[1] I would now like to proceed with the different, but related problem of the theory of error. [2] At first sight, it would seem that a theory of error does not have much to do with a criterion of truth. The function of the criterion is to tell us when and where a true cognition occurs, and, by the same token, when it does not occur. If we take, for instance, the efficiency of the activity as a criterion of truth, we can conclude by its presence that a cognition is right, and by its absence that a cognition is wrong. The criterion does not have to tell us anything about the way in which a true or false cognition is produced. Apparently, therefore, a theory of error has nothing to do with the question as to whether this or that particular cognition is true or false. It should simply tell us, after we have determined with a criterion of truth that a cognition is wrong, what went wrong.

However, Indian philosophers did not formulate their theories of error innocently, for they saw clearly that a theory of error can have a limiting function: an explanation of errors in a particular way determines when and where errors are at all possible. Thus, a Mīmāṃsaka will formulate his theory of error in such a way that it could never be applied to the Veda, and a Naiyāyika will formulate his theory in such a way that at some stage of the analysis the existence of an external real object will have to be assumed.

The conflict with the Buddhists obliged the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas to defend the reality of the object.[3] Every cognition had to have its counterpart in reality to which the cognition was not allowed to add any modification. The cognition was supposed to be absolutely transparent, passive as a mirror, and not in any way responsible for its content. That is why errors presented an embarrassing problem, for errors are one clear case in which the cognition's external object (*ālambana*), if it has one at all, cannot correspond to the cognition's content, i.e., to the object which appears in the cognition (*pratibhāta-viṣaya*).

Now, if errors were to be made an exception in which the cognition has an ideal object, or no object at all, then this would constitute a dangerous

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 105–137. 0022–1791/84/0122–0105 $03.30.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

precedent and a marvelous example for the Buddhist *nirālambanânumāna*:

> All cognitions are without external object,
> because they are cognitions,
> just like an illusion.

This kind of inference will prove the unreality of the world. Therefore, the 'realist' philosophers had to account for errors in such a way that one would not be able to use erroneous cognitions as an example for the above inference.

With regard to this problem, the two most important Naiyāyikas are the Ācārya and the Vyākhyātṛ. They laid down the basic principles which all Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā philosophers up to the 9th century used in their theories of error, and they all (with the possible exception of Kumārila)[4] can be affiliated to the schools of the one or the other.

The problem of the identity of these two Naiyāyikas, which occupied Indologists for several decades, was more or less solved with the publication of Cakradhara's *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*. Commenting on *NM*, 62.15 Cakradhara says that the name *ācāryāḥ* applies to a group of commentators on Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika,* the first of which (*prabhṛti*) is the Rucikāra, whereas the name *vyākhyātaraḥ* applies to a group of commentators on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* the first of which is Pravara.[5] The Rucikāra was identified by E. Steinkellner with Adhyayana[pāda].[6] As for the name Pravara, it appears in no other text except the *NM*, which is perhaps a bit strange for such an important figure who was a founder of a school. For this reason, A. Wezler has suggested that Pravara is perhaps not a proper name, and that it may be used here to designate a Naiyāyika already known to us by a different name.[7]

The basic principle of the Ācārya theory of knowledge is that the object is not alone responsible for the cognition's content.[8] There are other causal factors which play a role in determining the way in which the object is presented to consciousness. In other words, the cognition's content and the cognition's (external) object are not equivalent terms. For instance, the same object appears differently when perceived from different points in space. The difference in the cognition is not due to the object, for it remains the same; it is due to the difference in the causal complex. This general principle was naturally applied to the theory of error. Jayanta presents three Ācārya theories, the first of which runs as follows (*NM*, 226. 14–15):

> *kaiścid ālambanaṃ tasmin uktaṃ sūrya-marīcayaḥ/*
> *nigūhita-nijâkārāḥ salilâkāra-dhāriṇaḥ//*

"By some [Ācāryas] the external object in the [case of a mirage of water] is taught to be the sun-rays, which are made to hide their own form, and carry the form of water."

It is clear that according to this *śloka*, whatever happens when there is an error, happens outside. It states that the sun-rays carry the form of water, and not that the sun-rays are cognized as water. Schmithausen (p. 167) interprets the *śloka* as if error consists in a transformation of the object (*pariṇāma*). (Note that the word occurs neither in the *śloka*, nor in Jayanta's commentary upon it.) This may be true to some extent, but the word transformation cannot be used here without modifications. When we talk of a transformation of one thing into another, we usually mean that after the transformation takes place, the thing is no longer there in its original form. To use Padmapāda's examples, when the lotus bud is transformed into a flower, or the milk into curds, the bud or the milk no longer exist as bud or milk. But here we have a different case. The form of the sun-rays is hidden when they carry the form of water, but nevertheless it exists. The theory of error described by Padmapāda (cf. below) involves a real transformation of the object, but it cannot be identical with the one referred to by Jayanta. Following Schmithausen, I shall use the word transformation to designate this theory, but the above modification should be borne in mind.

Logically, the next step in this theory is to say that when we have an erroneous cognition, it is not the cognition which is at fault (for it apprehends the object as it is at the moment the cognition arises), but the object, for it is not the cognition which deviates from reality (*vyabhicārin*), but the object. The cognition is completely passive, therefore the object is wrong.

From Uddyotakara's criticism we learn that this step was actually taken (*NV* on *NS*, 1.1.4, pp. 113–114):

> *kiṃ punar atra vyabhicāri kim artha āho jñānam iti. eke tāvad varṇayanti – arthasya vyabhicāraḥ arthas tu tathā na bhavatîti, tad-vyabhicārāt tad-viṣayaṃ jñānam api vyabhicārîty ucyate iti.*

"In the case [of error], what deviates [from reality], is it the object (*artha*) or the cognition? Some [Naiyāyikas][9] are of the opinion that the object deviates, it is the object which is not so (*tathā*) [as it really is]; because it deviates, the cognition which has it for object (*viṣaya*) is also called 'deviating'."

No matter how shocking this theory may sound to us (for we say that a wrong, false, invalid and so on object is a categorical mistake like a singing number; only cognitions can be right or wrong, objects can exist or not exist), its historical authenticity cannot be denied, for it was repeatedly attacked by Indian philosophers, Buddhists, Vedāntins and, as we have seen, by Naiyāyikas as well.

From Jayarāśi's criticism we learn that the followers of this theory accepted a further logical consequence and applied the *bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva*, the sublated-sublating relation, to the different states of the object. Here again, one usually talks of sublation as a relation between two cognitions: the cognition of the sun-rays sublates the previous cognition of water, the cognition of the conch-shell sublates the cognition of silver etc. None of these cognitions affects the external object in any way. The conch-shell was exactly the same when we took it erroneously for silver, and it does not change now when we recognize it as a conch-shell. However, this Ācārya theory implies the opposite view. Indeed, once the object was recognized to be wrong, there is no reason why it should not be sublated. But perhaps the theory is less strange than it appears. The word *bādhā* is usually used in the strict sense of 'assertion of falsity' (*mithyêti bādhakaṃ jñānam*), but it can also be used in a more general sense of 'obstruction'. In this second meaning it is certainly not restricted to the epistemological level, and it can be used as an ontological term. For instance, the subtlety (*saukṣmya*) of an object may prevent its being rightly apprehended.

Sublation is the exact opposite of error, i.e. a corrective process. Now, if the object undergoes an abnormal transformation in the case of error, then by sublation there should be a back-to-normal transformation: the object gives up the form which did not really belong to it, and takes its own form back. Padmapāda brings up in his *Pañcapādikā* two models for the transformation of the object. The first is the simple transformation of milk into curds (*kṣīrasya dadhi-pariṇāmaḥ*), but the analogy soon breaks down, because the curd is not transformed back into milk, whereas the silver is transformed back into a conch-shell when the sublating cognition arises. Therefore, the *pūrvapakṣin* gives another example, which can account for the transformation in both directions: the lotus bud (*kamala-mukula*) which bursts into bloom (*vikāsa*). The sun glow (*tejas*) is the cause of the lotus bursting into bloom, because when the sun disappears the flower turns into a bud again (*mukulībhāva*). In the same manner, as long as the defect (*doṣa*) is present, the abnormal transformation persists, but when the defect disappears, the object takes its own form again.[10]

We can turn now to Jayarāśi's criticism of the transformation theory. His refutation contains three *vikalpas*: (1) the object sublates itself, (2) the object is sublated by another thing, (3) the object is sublated by a cognition. If a rapprochement is to be made between these *vikalpas* and the examples given by Padmapāda, it seems that the first *vikalpa* fits the example of the milk, and the second the example of the lotus bud. As for the third *vikalpa*, it is no longer specific to the transformation theory and in the last set of arguments the difference between the object-sublation theory and the cognition-sublation theory seems to disappear. The arguments are equally applicable to the sublation of cognition, and they are in fact, repeated by Jayarāśi in this connection (cf. *TUS* p. 16.8–9).

The basic idea behind the arguments against the first two *vikalpas* is that if the object undergoes a real transformation, its apprehension, viz. the sublated cognition, cannot be false. The third *vikalpa* is a bit surprising. One could expect Jayarāśi to argue that a cognition cannot sublate an existent object, instead he simply states that each cognition affirms the reality of its own object, and cannot be related to the object of another cognition. *TUS* pp. 14.25–16.2:

> *yady arthasya bādhā, sa kena bādhyate? kiṃ svayam eva ātmānaṃ bādhyate, āho arthântareṇa, jñānena vā? yadi svayam eva ātmānaṃ bādhyate, tadā bādhā tena kriyate jñāpyate vā? yadi kriyate, avyatiriktā vyatiriktā vā? yady avyatiriktā, tadā bādhā kriyate ity ātmânenôtpādyate. tac ca na jāghaṭīti svâtmani kriyā-virodhāt. atha vyatiriktā kriyate, tathâpi vidyamānasya kartṛtvaṃ na pratīyamānasyâpalāpaḥ. atha bādhā jñāpyate, sâpy abhinnā bhinnā vā? yady abhinnā, tadā bādhā tena jñāpyate, kim uktaṃ bhavati? udakaṃ jñāpyate. atha bhinnā, tadā vidyamānasya jñāpakatvaṃ siddhaṃ pratīyamānasya câstitvam. athârthântareṇa bādhyate, tathâpi vidyamānayor bādhya-bādhaka-bhāvo bhūpālayor iva, na caikasya bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva upapadyate. bādhâpi tena pratīyamānasya kiṃ kriyate jñāpyate vā? yadi kriyate, avyatiriktā vyatiriktā vā? yady avyatiriktā tadâvyatiriktā bādhā utpādyate, kim uktaṃ bhavet? udakam utpādyate. tad-utpādane ca tat-saṃvido 'mithyātvam. atha vyatiriktôtpādyate, tathâpi toyasambandhitayôpalabdher ambhasa upapattir, na jātu devadattasyâsattve tan-nayana-*

> *vyavahāra-siddhiḥ. atha jñāpyate sâvyatiriktā vyatiriktā vā? yady avyatiriktā jñāpyate, tadā bādhā tena jñāpyate, kim uktaṃ bhavati? udakaṃ jñāpyate. atha vyatiriktā satī jñāpyate, tathâpy udakasyêyaṃ bādhêty anya-tantratayā pratibhāsanāt nâtyantâbhāvôpapattiḥ. tasmād arthântareṇâpi na bādhôpapattiḥ*
>
> *atha jñānena bādhyate, kiṃ tad-viṣayeṇa, anya-viṣayeṇa, nirviṣayeṇa vā? yadi tad-viṣayeṇa, tadā tat-svarūpaṃ vidhatte na tu viparyāsayati tad-ākāra-paryavasita-rūpatvāt. athânya-viṣayaṃ bādhakam, tad api na yujyate, yad yad-viṣayaṃ tat tasyaiva sattāṃ vidhatte na tv anyasya vidhāyakaṃ pratiṣedhakaṃ vā. svaviṣaya-paryavasāyinyo hi buddhayaḥ. atha nirviṣayeṇa bādhyate, na kiñcid vidadhāti pratiṣedhati vā nirviṣayatvād eva.*

"If the external object (*artha*) is sublated, is it sublated by itself, by another object, or by a cognition? If it sublates itself, is the sublation produced by it or is it made known? If [the sublation] is produced, is it [produced as something] different [from the object], or not? If it is [produced as] non-different, then [to say:] the sublation is produced [means the object] itself is produced by it (i.e., by the object). And this is totally impossible, because action upon oneself is contradictory (*svâtmani kriyā-virodhāt*).[11] If [the sublation] is produced as different [from the object], even so, [only] an existent thing [can function as] an agent [of production] (*kartṛ*), [and therefore,] there is no denial of what is perceived.

If the sublation is made known [by the object itself], once again [we ask:] is it different [from the object] or not? If it is [made known as] non-different, then [to say] the sublation is made known by it (i.e., by the object), what does it mean? [It would mean that] the water is made known! If [the sublation is made known as] different [from the object], then [only] an existent thing can make [something] known, and [,therefore,] the perceived [water] exists.

If [the object] is sublated by another object, even so, [both objects will exist, for] the sublated-sublating relation [obtains] between two existent things, just like between two kings, for the sublated-sublating relation is not possible with reference to one thing alone.

The sublation of the perceived [object], in its turn, is it produced by it (i.e., by the other object) or is it made known? If it is produced, is it [produced as] different [from the perceived object] or not? If it is not different, then [to say] the sublation is produced as non-different [from the object], what would it mean? The water is produced! And if it is produced, its cognition is not false. If [the sublation] is produced as different [from the object], even so [the existence of] the water is established, because [the sublation] is apprehended as related to the water, [for] when Devadatta does not exist, one cannot talk about his eyes. If [the sublation of the perceived object] is made known [by the other object], is it [made known as] different [from the perceived object] or not? If [the sublation] is made known as non-different [from the perceived object], then [to say] the sublation is made known by it (i.e. by the other object), what does it mean? The water is made known! If [the sublation] is made known as different [from the perceived object], even so, the absolute inexistence [of water] is not established, because [the cognition] 'this is the sublation of water', appears as dependent on/in relation to something else (i.e. water). That is why the sublation is not established by another object either.

If [the object] is sublated by a cognition, is it [sublated] by [the cognition] which has it for its object, by [a cognition] which has another object, or by [a cognition] which has no object? If [the object is sublated] by [the cognition] which has it for its object, then this [cognition] affirms [the reality of] its form (i.e., the form of the object), it does not overthrow [it], because [the cognition] has a form which terminates in (i.e., conveys no other information than) the form of its [object]. If [a cognition] which has another object is the sublating [cognition], this is also not correct: whatever [a cognition] has for its object, it affirms the existence of that very [object], but it neither affirms nor negates [the existence of] another object. For cognitions terminate in their own objects. If [the object] is sublated by [a cognition] which has no object, [this is not correct, for a cognition without an object] neither affirms nor negates anything, precisely because it has no object!"

This ultra-realistic Ācārya theory referred to by Uddyotakara and Jayanta and criticized by Jayarāśi looks archaic, and Schmithausen (p. 168–9) already raised some doubts whether, in spite of Jayanta's testimony, it should be attributed to the Ācārya. I am inclined to believe that it was not originally developed by the Ācārya, because the basic principle of the Ācārya school is that the object is not the only causal factor which determines the cognition's content, whereas this theory implies the opposite view, and, in so far, it is much closer to the Vyākhyātṛ theory (cf. below). Therefore, what suggests itself is the assumption that it was only adopted by one of the Ācāryas, who found in the above *śloka* a ready-made formula and interpreted it according to his own theory. The reason for such a supposition is that the explanation of the *śloka* given by Jayanta presents a completely different picture (*NM* p. 227.1–5):

> *tatra taraṅgâdi-sāmānya-dharma-grahaṇe sati na sthāṇu-puruṣavad ubhaya-viśeṣāḥ smaraṇa-patham avataranti. na ca sannihita-marīci-viśeṣāḥ smaraṇa-patham avataranti. kiṃ tu pūrvôpalabdha-viruddha-salila-vartino viśeṣāḥ. tat-smaraṇāc ca sthagiteṣu svaviśeṣeṣu marīcayaḥ svarūpam upadarśayitum aśaknuvantaḥ toya-rūpeṇâvabhāsante.*

"There (i.e., in the case of a mirage) when common properties [of sun-rays and water like] waves etc. are apprehended, unlike [in the case of doubtful cognition in the form] '[Is it] a trunk or a man?' the particular properties of both objects are not remembered. For[12] the particular properties of the sun-rays [which are found] in proximity are not remembered, but [only] the particular properties which occur in water which was previously perceived and which stands in contradiction [with the sun-rays]. And the sun-rays, unable to reveal their nature when their own particular properties are concealed because of the remembrance of these (i.e. the particular properties of water), appear in the form of water."

It is clear that in this theory the explanation of error is based on the model of doubt. In both cases one perceives properties common to two (or more) objects, but in the case of doubt one is aware that the information at hand does not permit the determination which of the two objects is present, because one remembers that the perceived common properties apply equally to both objects. In the case of a wrong cognition, on the other hand, the cognitive process is disturbed: one remembers the particular properties of only one of the two objects, and jumps into the wrong conclusion. The resulting content of the erroneous cognition seems to be a mixture of general properties accurately perceived which are produced by the external object (*ālambana*), and particular properties produced by traces or impressions (*saṃskāra*) left by past experience.

This is where the theory ran into trouble. It could not explain how in one and the same cognition elements produced by both sense organ and memory intermingled, and, nevertheless, claim that the form of the sun-rays remains hidden. Moreover, the Naiyāyikas considered the mind (*manas*) an atomic entity, and, therefore, it could not be in contact with both impression and sense organ at the same time. [Prabhākara, faced with somewhat the same problem, had to split the erroneous cognition into two different cognitions, the one produced by perception, the other by memory.] [13]

The arguments of Jayarāśi against this modified Ācārya-theory are quite clear, and do not need any further explanation. His main point is that since in the case of a mirage there is no awareness of the sun-rays, there is no justification for the assumption that they appear in the cognition. *TUS* p. 12.17–26:

> *atha udakâkāratayā marīcaya eva pratīyante, sa udakâkāro marīcibhyo vyatirikto 'vyatirikto vā? tad yady avyatirikto, sa tāttviko 'tāttviko vā? yadi tāttviko, katham̩ tad-avagater mithyātvam? athâtāttviko, tadā marīcīnām apy atāttvikatvam̩ prasajyate. atāttvikôdaka-tādātmye sati tad udaka-jñānam atathyam, kim uktam̩ bhavati? marīci-vijñānam atathyam. ekasmim̩ś côdakâkāre pratīyamāne kenaitad ākhyātam, marīcayaḥ pratibhānti devānām̩-priyasya. atha arthântara-bhūtaḥ, tarhi na vaktavyam̩ marīcaya udakâkāratayā pratīyante, udakâkārântaritā marīcayaḥ.*

"If the sun-rays are cognized as having the form of water, is the form of water different from the sun-rays or not? If it is not different, is it real or not? If it is real, why is its apprehension false? If it is not real, then the sun-rays too would not be real. When [the sun-rays are] identical with unreal water, then [to say] this cognition of water is false, what does it mean? The cognition of sun-rays is false! And when the form of water alone is perceived, who told [you], the beloved of the Gods (i.e., the fool), that the sun-rays appear [in the cognition of water]? If [the form of water] is different [from the sun-rays], then [you] should not say that the sun-rays are cognized as having the form of water, [because in this case] the sun-rays are made to disappear (or perhaps: are excluded) by the form of water."

The advantage of the Ācārya theory, both in what we called its archaic and modified forms, is that it renders the external object a necessary causal factor for every cognition, even an erroneous one. By that it achieves its purpose of destroying the example of the *nirālambanânumāna*.

Its disadvantage, for which it was severely criticised by the Vyākhyātṛs, is that it can explain only errors with an external object. It has no explanatory power for errors without an external object such as the *keśoṇḍuka* cognition.

Jayarāśi does not fail to criticise this point (*TUS* pp. 12.26–13.5, cf. below), and argues that if falsity is defined as the appearance or the apprehension of an object (*avabhāta-* or *pratīyamāna-* [*viṣaya*]) different from the cognition's external object (*ālambana*), then errors like the *keśoṇḍuka* cognition will not be false, because they do not have any external object to be different from. This argument can be applied to both the archaic and the modified forms of the Ācārya theory. However, the most important difference between the two is that the modified theory brings back both validity and falsity from the realm of external objects to the realm of cognitions. Jayarāśi who, as we saw (*TUS* p. 15.24–26), does not allow any cognition to affect the object of another cognition, argues further as follows (*TUS* p. 16.3–9):

> *atha jñānaṃ bādhyate, tasyâpi bādhā kā? kiṃ svarūpa-vyāvṛtti-rūpā, svarūpâpahnava-rūpā, viṣayâpahāra-lakṣaṇā vā? tad yadi svarūpa-vyāvṛtti-rūpā bādhā, tadā sarvaṃ bādhitaṃ syāt, vijñānasya vijñānântareṇa nivartyamānatvāt. atha svarūpâpahnava-rūpā, tad ayuktam, mithyôdaka-vijñānasyâpy anubhūyamānatvāt. atha viṣayâpahāra-lakṣaṇā bādhā ucyate, sâpi na yuktā. yathā ca viṣayâpahāro na śakyate kartuṃ tathânantaram eva niveditam.*

"If the cognition is sublated, what is its sublation? Does it consist in the secession of [the sublated cognition] itself, or does it consist in denying [the sublated cognition] itself, or is it characterised by removing the object [of the sublated cognition]? Among these [alternatives], if the sublation consists in the destruction of [the sublated cognition] itself, then every [cognition] would be sublated, because [every] cognition is brought to an end by another cognition.[14] If it consists in denying [the existence of the sublated cognition] itself, this is not correct, because false cognition of water too is experienced. If sublation is said to be characterised by removing the object, this is also not correct. It was just shown (cf. 15.22–16.2 translated above) that/why the removing of the object cannot be done."

Jayanta is aware of the arguments raised by Jayarāśi. (It is difficult to determine whether he has the *TUS* in mind or another work in which similar objections were raised.) However, he does not really explain how the removing of the object is done. All he says is that this is the way the cognition is produced, i.e., he refers to the empirical fact that the cognition of a conch-shell sublates the previous cognition of silver. This amounts, of course, to the acknowledgement that he could not propose any satisfying explanation. *NM* p. 476.4–15:

> *viṣayâpahāras tāvad astu bādhaḥ. viṣayasya ca na pratibhātatvam apahniyate, kiṃ tu pratibhātasyâsattvaṃ khyāpyata ity apahārârthaḥ. asattvam api nêdānīm upanatasya khyāpyate, yena pūrva-dṛṣṭa-drughaṇa-bhagna-kumbhâbhāva-pratibhāsavad abādhaḥ syāt. na ca tadānīm apy abhāva-grahaṇe vastuno dvy-ātmakatvam āśaṅkanīyam; pūrvâvagatâkārôpamarda-dvāreṇa bādhaka-pratyayôtpādāt: yan mayā tadā rajatam iti gṛhītaṃ tad rajataṃ na bhavati, anyad eva tad vastv iti. nanu sva-kāla-niyatatvāt jñānānāṃ katham uttarasya jñānasya pūrva-jñānôtpāda-kālâvacchinna-tad-viṣayâbhāva-grahaṇa-sāmarthyam? kiṃ kurmaḥ? tathā pratyayôtpādāt. na bhagna-ghaṭavad idānīṃ tan-nāstitā gṛhyate, api tu tadaiva tad asad iti pratītiḥ.*

"Let the removing of the object, to begin with, be the sublation. And it is not the fact that the object appeared [in the sublated cognition] which is denied, but the inexistence of the object which appeared [in it] is proclaimed; this is what is meant by removing. Nor is it asserted that the experienced [object] does not exist now (i.e. at the time of the sublating cognition), for this would not be a sublation, just like the appearance of the inexistence of a previously perceived not which was destroyed by a wooden mace. And it should not be suspected that when the inexistence [of the object] is apprehended even in respect to that time (i.e. at the time of the sublated cognition), the object has a double nature (i.e. existent and inexistent),[15] because the production of the sublating cognition involves the destruction of the previously perceived form: 'what was perceived by me at that time as silver, that is (was) not silver, it is something else'.

– Since cognitions are restricted to their own time, how can a later cognition apprehend the inexistence of the object of a [previous cognition] which is delimited by the time of production of [that] previous cognition?

– What [can] we do since the cognition is thus produced? Unlike [the case of] the destroyed pot, the inexistence of that [silver] is not apprehended now (i.e., with reference to the present), on the contrary, the cognition [arises with the form] 'at that time it did not exist'."[16]

We can turn now to the third Ācārya theory (for the second, cf. below) which may be considered as a modified version of the modified version of the first. Schmithausen (p. 249) considers it to be a post-Maṇḍana theory, but the fact that it was already criticised by Jayarāśi, who could not have lived much later than Maṇḍana and may even be assigned to an earlier date, indicates the possibility of the opposite assumption. This theory was probably the most up-to-date of Jayarāśi's time. In trying to follow the probable historical order, I was obliged to break the structure of Jayarāśi's arguments. In fact, he starts his refutation of falsity with this third Ācārya-theory which is formulated by Jayanta as follows (*NM* p. 228.2–3):

anyad ālambanaṃ cânyat pratibhātîti kecana/
ālambanaṃ dīdhitayas toyaṃ ca pratibhāsate//

"Some [Ācāryas say:] 'one thing is the external object, and another thing appears [in the cognition]; the sun-rays are the external object and the water appears'."

In this definition the limited role played by the object in determining the cognition's content becomes even clearer: an erroneous cognition is no longer attributing the right (general) properties to the wrong property-possessor. The object of cognition, viz. what appears in the cognition, is completely different from its external object. To illustrate the difference between the two theories, we can take the example of the conch-shell mistaken for silver. According to the modified form of the first Ācārya theory, the general properties of conch-shell appear in the cognition of silver: but according to the third theory, what appears in the cognition is simply silver – the properties and the property-possessor.

Note, however, that the role of the external object as a necessary causal factor of erroneous cognition has been retained, because it is the conch-shell that causes the recollection of silver (due to a similarity (*sādṛśya*) to silver, or to a disturbance (*doṣa*) of the sense organ). The fact that the conch-shell was considered the external object of the cognition, although it does not appear in it at all, compelled the Naiyāyikas to redefine the concept of *ālambana*. We shall deal with one of these new definitions later on, but first, in order to keep in pace with Jayarāśi, let us reproduce his arguments against the third Ācārya theory (*TUS* p. 12.6–16):

> *ko 'yam ālambanârtho nāma yenêdam udghuṣyate anyad ālambanaṃ cânyat pratibhātîti? kiṃ vijñāna-janakatvam, ākārârpakatvam, vijñānâdhikaraṇatvam, vijñānâvabhāsitatā vā? tad yadi vijñāna-janakatvan ālambanârthaḥ, tadā nayanâlokâder apy ālambanatvaṃ prasajyate. athâkārârpakatvam ālambanatvam, tad ayuktam, naiyāyika-samaye 'nabhyupagamāt. yathā ca viṣayâkāro vijñāne na yujyate tathôpariṣṭāt pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ. atha vijñānâdhikaraṇatvam ālambanatvam,* [*na*,] *na marīci-cakrôtkalitam udīyate jñānam, api tv ātma-samavetam ātmānam āsādayate. atha vijñānâvabhāsitatā ālambanatvam, tadā udaka-vijñāne udakaṃ pratīyate na marīcayaḥ.*

"What does it mean [to be] what one calls external object, by virtue of which it is proclaimed: 'one thing is the external object, and another thing appears'? Is it the fact that [the external object] produces the cognition, or the fact that it provides the form [of the cognition], or the fact that it is the locus of the cognition, or the fact that it appears in the cognition?

Among these [possibilities], if what is meant by external object is the fact that it produces the cognition, then the eye, the light etc., too would be external object. If to be external object consists in providing the form [of the cognition], this is not correct, because it is not accepted in the established doctrine (*samaya*) of the Naiyāyikas, and we shall show later on (cf. *TUS* pp. 52.15–53.3) that the form of the object cannot [appear] in a cognition. If being external object consists in being the locus of cognition, [this is not correct, for] the cognition does not arise as appearing in a multitude of sun-rays, but [on the contrary] it arises as inhering the soul. If being external object consists in appearing in the cognition, then [this is not correct, for] in the cognition of water, water is perceived, not the sun-rays."

It is clear from the above arguments that none of these definitions could apply to the third Ācārya theory which maintains that the external object does not appear in the cognition at all. The only characteristic which was retained from the older definitions of *ālambana*, viz. a causal factor of cognition, was too general to be used as the only definiens. Therefore, a new definition was required which had to fullfil the following three conditions: (1) the object does not have to appear in the cognition, (2) it has to be a causal factor of the cognition, (3) it has to be differenciated from other causal factors. Several definitions were porposed,[17] and I do not know whether the Naiyāyikas ever reached an agreement on any of them. These definitions however, represent a later stage of development, and were unknown to Jayarāśi. The definition of *ālambana* referred to in the *TUS* (p. 13.6–7), in which the object is defined as the thing found in proximity, probably represents an intermediary stage of development, i.e., one after the formulation of the third Ācārya theory, but before the definitions of *ālambana* that appear in the *NM*.

This definition must have been formulated rather hastily, immediately after the definition of falsity as 'one thing is the object and another thing appears in the cognition', for it is so 'busy' defining an object which does not appear in the cognition, that it 'forgets' to mention that the object has to be a causal factor of the cognition. As it stands, it is certainly too broad (*ativyāpti*), for it can include anything found in proximity.

Jayanta rejects this definition, possibly because of the following criticism made by Jayarāśi (*TUS* p. 13.6–12):

> *yad apy uktam: marīci-deśaṃ prati gamanāt marīcīnām ālambanatvam, yady evaṃ deśasyâpy ālambanatvam anayā rītyā upapadyate. na câvabhātôdaka-bhinnârtha-sannikarṣa-jatvam udaka-vijñānasya upapadyate, satyôdaka-jñāne 'dṛṣṭatvāt, anyathânumeya-dahana-jñānasyâpy indriyârtha-sannikarṣa-jatvam āpanīpadyeta ātma-manaḥ-sannikarṣa-jatvāt. atha pratīyamāna-dahanena saha manaso nâsti sambandhaḥ tad ihâpi pratīyamānenâmbhasā saha nâsti sambandhaḥ cakṣuṣaḥ.*

"It is said: the sun-rays are the external object [of the cognition of water], because one goes towards the place of the sun-rays. If [this is] so, by the same way (i.e., by the same reasoning) the place too is (i.e. can be) established as the external object. And the production by contact with a thing different from the water which appeared [in the cognition] is not established for [the false] cognition of water, because this is not observed [in the case of] a true cognition of water. Otherwise, the cognition of the inferred fire too will have to arise from contact between sense organ and object, because it arises from a contact between the soul and the mind. If [you object that] there is no contact between the mind and the cognized fire, then here too (i.e., in the case of erroneous cognition) there is no contact between the eye and the perceived water."

[The above analogy between error and inference is possible because the Naiyāyikas consider the mind (*manas*) to be a sense organ (*indriya*).]

There is a striking similarity between the arguments in *TUS* pp. 12.8–10 and 13.7. and those reported by Jayanta as a justification for the new definitions of *ālambana.* Again, as there is no direct quotation, it is difficult to determine whether Jayanta had the *TUS* in mind, or a different work in which the same objections were raised. If the first possibility is true, then this would be a nice example of how a sceptic, even though he does not have any thesis of his own, can stimulate a dogmatic philosopher to re-examine his position, make his definitions more precise, and inspire him to new solutions. *NM* p. 474.16–21:

> *yas tu tṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥ* (*p. 458*) *'anyad ālambanam, anyac ca pratibhāti' iti kaiścid āśritaḥ – tatrâpi na sannihitasyâlambanatvam ucyate, yena bhū-pradeśasyâpi tathātvam āśaṅkyeta. nâpi janakasyâlambanatvam, yac cakṣur-ādāv api prasajyeta. kintu idam ity aṅgulyā nirdiśyamānaṃ karmatayā yaj jñānasya janakaṃ, tad ālambanam ity ucyamāne na kaścid doṣaḥ.*

"Some [Ācāryas] advocate the third theory, (viz.) 'one thing is the external object, and another thing appears [in the cognition]'. As for this [definition] too, it is not claimed that [whatever] is found in proximity is the external object, because one might suspect that the [corresponding] place is such [an external object]. Nor [is it claimed that whatever] produces the cognition is external object, because this would apply to the eye etc. too, but [it is claimed that] that which is pointed at by the finger [to indicate] 'this [is the external object]', [and] which produces the cognition by being its direct object, this is the external object. If it is formulated so, there is no fault whatsoever."

The basic difficulties of the Ācārya theory, i.e., the explanation of errors which were traditionally assumed to have no external object and the process of sublation, remained problematic, but I shall not dwell on these problems any further here, for the later developments were unknown to Jayarāśi, and this would take us too far from our subject matter.

I would like to turn now to the rival Nyāya school of the Vyākhyātṛ.

The basic principle of the Vyākhyātṛ school is that a cognition's content is determined exclusively by its object.[18] When this principle is applied to the theory of error, it follows that the object of a mirage of water is nothing but water. As there is no such water at the present, it must necessarily come from the past. Thus, the external object is not the sun-rays but a previously perceived water. *NM* p. 227.7–8:

> *anye tv ālambanaṃ prāhuḥ puro'vasthita-dharmiṇaḥ/*
> *sādṛśya-darśanôdbhūta-smṛty-upasthāpitaṃ payaḥ//*

"Others, however, say that the external object [of a mirage of water] is water presented [to the mind] by recollection which is brought about by seeing a similarity between water and a property-possessor which stands before the eyes."[19]

We saw that the Ācāryas tried to refute the *nirālambanânumāna* by claiming that every cognition, even an erroneous one, has an object in reality. The Vyākhyātṛ position is, in a way, more moderate. They admit that the external object of cognition does not exist at the time of its apprehension. Nevertheless, they secure the reality of the world by relying on the absolute transparence of the cognition and the nature of memory: a recollection of water could not have been possible without there being sometime in the past a real water which left the impression (*saṃskāra*) necessary for the production of recollection. That is why errors whose object never existed, for instance, a flower in the sky, do not occur. Thus; a cognition with no present real object presupposes a past real object. Therefore, the Buddhist cannot infer from the fact that some cognitions have no present corresponding object that no cognition ever has one. True cognitions with real objects have a logical primacy over error. This is clearly implied in Jayanta's explanation of the above *śloka NM* p. 227.9–14:

> *yatra kila jñāne yad rūpam upaplavate, tat tasya ālambanam ucyate, na sannihitam; bhū-pradeśasya tad-ārambhakāṇāṃ ca paramāṇūnāṃ tad-ālambanatva-prasaṅgāt. idaṃ ca salilâvabhāsi vijñānam. atas tad evâsyâlambanam. tac ca nêha sannihitam. na caikāntâsataḥ kha-puṣpâdeḥ khyātir avakalpata iti deśântarâdau vidyamānam eva salilaṃ sadṛśa-darśana-prabuddha-saṃskārôpārūḍham ihâvalambanībhavati.*

"There (i.e., in the above quoted *śloka*), obviously, whatever form appears in the cognition, that [alone] is called its object, [and] not what is found in proximity, because [otherwise] the place [where the object seems to appear] and its constituent atoms would be the external object. And this (i.e. the mirage) is a cognition where water appears, therefore, its external object is nothing but that [water], but that [water] is not found here in proximity. Nor is the appearance of an absolutely inexistent [thing], like a flower in the sky possible; thus, water which must (eva) exist at another place [and another time] etc. [and] which is brought to consciousness by remembrance produced by impressions awakened by seeing [something] similar [to water], becomes the object here (i.e. in the case of a mirage)."[20]

We saw that the Ācāryas based their theory of error on the model of doubt. The Vyākhyātṛs on the other hand, used the model of recollection: the sun-rays simply remind the cognizer of similar object. This is also the case with a normal, a non-erroneous recollection, when one thing reminds us of another. Consequently, errors which were traditionally accepted as having a *present* external object had to reinterpreted as having one in the past. Thus the Vyākhyātṛs found themselves in a position diametrically opposed to but as equally awkward as that of the Ācāryas. Both theories lacked explanatory power for the broad division of errors into errors with and without external objects, or substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*), and both theories made the same false step in trying to reduce errors to one type only. Just as the Ācāryas were not very convincing in claiming that particles of light (*sūryâṃśu*, cf. *NM* p. 475.2–3) are the external object of the *keśoṇḍuka* cognition, the Vyākhyātṛs were no more convincing in denying that the sun-rays are the external object of the mirage of water (the most common designation of which is *marīcy-udaka-jñāna*). Another related, but different problem which the Vyākhyātṛs had trouble with was how to account for the cognition's content. They could not explain how the recollection of water was produced without its space-time determinants. A recollection of water is usually produced with the awareness that the water was seen at a particular place in the past, whereas in the illusion the water is apprehended as 'here and now'. No solution to this problem seemed possible without giving up, or at least seriously endangering, the basic principle, according to which the object alone is responsible for the cognition's content.

The theory needed, therefore, some modifications. It was Prabhākara who further developed the Vyākhyātṛ theory by deducing the extreme logical consequences from the Vyākhyātṛ principle. According to Prabhākara, cognitions cannot bring about changes in the properties of the object, not even in the space-time determinants as was explicitly accepted by the Vyākhyātṛs. What the cognition could do, at most, would be not to apprehend some of the object's properties, but it could not exchange one property for another (e.g. apprehend past water as present water). According to Prabhākara, therefore, error cannot be something positively new. The fact that the object appears as if it were present is nothing but the non-apprehension of the (past) space-time determinants (cf. *Bṛhatī* p. 52.6: *kathaṃ tarhi viparyayaḥ? agrahaṇād evêti vadāmaḥ.*).

However, it was not enough to say that errors are nothing but recollections. Prabhākara had to account for the fact that the object of error was experienced as present before the eyes. In order to do this he claimed that the experience of the object as present is a mere absence, viz. absence of the part 'I remember' (ibid. p. 55.6: *smarāmîti jñāna-śūnyāni smṛti-jñānāni etāni.*). Because of this failure, one mistakes a recollection for perception (*pratyakṣâbhimāna, pratyakṣa-saṃmita*). To describe this failure Prabhākara coined the term *smṛti-pramoṣa,*[21] "loss of recollection" (cf. *Bṛhatī* p. 53.8–9: *śuktikāyāṃ rajata-jñānaṃ smarāmîti pramoṣāt smṛti-jñānam uktam.* p. 56.5: *smarāmîti smṛti-pramoṣāt pratyakṣa-saṃmitaṃ tat.*), or, more precisely, the loss of awareness (*vyāmoha*) of the fact that the cognition is a recollection (*Bṛhatī* p. 55.3: *vyāmoha-hetavo mithyā-pratyayāḥ.*).

By equating error with recollection, Prabhākara tried to secure the absolute validity of the Veda. The object of the Vedic sentences – which were reduced by Prabhākara to injunctions – always lies in the future. It is something not yet done, for it remains to be done (*kartavya*). As an error presupposes a past experience, i.e., has a past object, it cannot creep into the Veda, because there is no way for a past object to appear as a future one.

Back to the *TUS*. Jayarāśi's arguments (pp. 17.8–18.4) are not directed at the difference between error and recollection, but rather at the difference between the first apprehension of an object and its recollection. From this shift of perspective, together with the fact that some of the *prasaṅgas* involve sacrifices and Vedic injunctions, we can safely conclude that he has in mind the more radical form of the Vyākhyātṛ theory as propounded by Prabhākara. The contradiction between Prabhākara's claim that nothing new appears in an erroneous cognition, and that it is, nevertheless, characterized as recollection led Jayarāśi to examine the nature of recollection. He made the point that if no new determinants are allowed to appear in the erroneous cognition characterized as recollection, or for that matter even in an ordinary recollection, then this would destroy the difference between recollection and perception, because in a recollection there is always a new factor: the object appears as a *remembered* object. The content of recollection is not a simple awareness of the object, for it takes the form 'I had a cognition of that object' (cf. *NBh*, 3.1.14 pp. 734.4–735.1: *ajñāsiṣam aham amum artham. . . jñātavān aham amum artham, asāv artho mayā jñātaḥ, asminn arthe mama jñānam abhūd iti caturvidham*[22] . . .). Thus, each recollection contains three different factors: the cognizer, the cognized object and its cognition (ibid.: *sarvatra khalu jñātā jñānaṃ jñeyaṃ ca gṛhyate.*). It cannot, therefore, be said that nothing new appears in a recollection. On the other hand, one cannot remember something which was not previously experienced. But the object appears in the recollection qualified by the cognizer and the cognition (*NBh* ibid.: *etasyā* [*smṛter*] *jñātṛ-jñāna-viśiṣṭaḥ pūrva-jñāto 'rtho viṣayo, nârthamātram*). Now the question arises: are these properties, viz. being qualified by previous cognition and being qualified by the cognizer, remembered or not?

If they are remembered, they should appear in a previous, i.e., the first, cognition of the object; but if they appeared in the first cognition of the object, then the first cognition of the object was already a recollection. On the other hand, if these properties are not remembered, i.e., if they are experienced for the first time, they cannot appear in a recollection, for, by definition, whatever appears in a recollection has to be previously experienced. In other words, is the remembered object of recollection identical with the object of a previous experience or not? If it is (absolutely) identical, then the first experience of the object would be a recollection, because the object which appears in it would be a remembered object. If, on the other hand, it is not identical, then experience and recollection would not have the same object, and, therefore, the object which appears in the recollection appears in it for the first time, that is to say it is not remembered.

Thus if one claims, as Prabhākara does, that nothing positively new can appear in an erroneous cognition characterized as a recollection, then either what is usually called recollection would not be recollection, or the first cognition of an object would also have to be accepted as recollection, because there would be no way to account for any difference between them (*TUS* p. 17.8–18.14):

> *anye tu marīcy-udaka-vijñānasya smṛtitvaṃ pratipadyante, na bhrānti-rūpatām. tasya kathaṃ smṛtitvam? kim udaka-gṛhītitvena, gṛhītôdaka-gṛhītitvena vā, udaka-grahaṇânantara-kāla-bhāvitvena*

vā, nirviṣayatvena vā, 'yam aham adrākṣam' ity anenâkāreṇôpajāyamānatvena vā?

tad yady udaka-gṛhītitvena, tadā sarvôdaka-vijñānānāṃ smṛtitva-prasaṅgaḥ. atha gṛhītôdaka-gṛhītitvena smṛtitvam, tadâdyasyâpi gṛhītôdaka-gṛhītitvena smṛtitvaṃ prasajyate, gṛhītôdaka-grāhitvâviśeṣāt. ādyasya gṛhītôdaka-grāhitvaṃ nâsti, tadānīṃ bhinna-viṣayatvam, bhinna-viṣayatve ca dvitīyasyâpi gṛhīta-grāhitvaṃ vihīyate. atha eka-viṣayatvam āyātaṃ tarhi prathamasyâpi gṛhīta-grāhitvam, aviśiṣṭârtha-gṛhīti-rūpatvāt, prathamôttara-vijñānavat. yathaika-nīla-svalakṣaṇa-grāhaka-yugapad-utpannâneka-vijñānāt[23] *nīla-jñāna-rūpatā na bhidyate tathêhâpi. tathā dhārāvāhi-vijñānānāṃ smṛti-rūpatā prāpnoti. tathā pratyabhijñānasya ca gṛhīta-grāhitvena smṛtitvaṃ prasajyate. atha pratyabhijñānasya gṛhīta-grāhitvaṃ na vidyate, tadā pratyabhijñānatvaṃ nivartate, na hy ādyaṃ darśanaṃ 'sa evâyam' ity upajāyate. tathā ānumānikam api vijñānaṃ gṛhīta-grāhitvena smṛtitvam āpadyate.*

atha udaka-grahaṇôttara-kāla-bhāvitvena smṛtitvam, tadā saṃskārasya smaraṇa-rūpatā prāpnoti, udaka-grahaṇôttara-kāla-bhāvitvena, rasa-saṃvedanasya ca.

atha nirviṣayatvena smṛti-rūpatā ucyate, tad ayuktam, pūrvôditânubhavâveditârthâkārâvedakatvena udīyamānāyāḥ kathaṃ nirviṣayatvam? atha pūrvânubhūtârtha-pratyastamaye sati samāna-kālâbhāvān nirviṣayatā, tadā codanā-janita-vijñānasya nirviṣayatvena smṛtitvam āpanīpadyate, kartavyatā-rūpârthasya tadâbhāvāt. bhāve vā kartavya-rūpatā nôpapadyate. tad-anupapattau sapta-tantu-kriyāyā vilopa-prasaṅgaḥ. yadi ca nirviṣayatvena smṛtitvam, tadā vidyamāna-ghaṭa-jāty-ādeḥ smaraṇasyâsmṛtitva-prasaṅgaḥ. atha 'adrākṣam' ity anenâkāreṇôpajāyamānatvena smṛtitvam, tad ayuktam, 'ihôdakam' ity anenâkāreṇôpajāyamānāyāḥ katham 'adrākṣam' ity evaṃ-rūpatôpapadyate?

"But others consider the mirage of water as recollection, not as having the nature of false cognition. How is it a recollection? Is it by being an apprehension of water, or by being an apprehension of apprehended water, or by arising after the apprehension of water, or by being without an object, or by being produced with the form '[this is the object][24] which I saw'?

Among these [possibilities], if it is by being an apprehension of water, then all cognitions of water would be recollections. If its being a recollection [of water] is due to its being an apprehension of apprehended water, then the first [apprehension of water] too would be recollection by being an apprehension of apprehended water, because there is no difference in the fact [that both cognitions are] apprehensions of apprehended water.

– The first [cognition] does not apprehend an apprehended water.

– Then it has a different object, and having a different object, the second [cognition] too does not apprehend an apprehended [water]. If [the two cognitions have] the same object, then the fact of apprehending an apprehended water holds good for the first [cognition] too, because it has the form of apprehension of the same object, just like the cognition which is posterior to the first. Just as several cognitions which apprehend the same particular blue [object], and which arise at the same time, do not differ in having the form of a cognition of blue, so here too [the forms of the first and the second cognition of water do not differ]. In the same manner, continuous cognitions would have the nature of recollection. In the same manner, recognition too would be recollection, because it apprehends an apprehended [object]. If a recognition does not apprehend an apprehended [object], then it is no longer a recognition, for a first cognition is not produced [with the form] 'this is exactly that'. In the same manner, inferential cognition too would be recollection, because it apprehends an apprehended [object].

If [its] being a recollection is due to its arising after the apprehension of water, then a mental impression would have the form of recollection, because it arises after the apprehension of water, and the cognition of taste [of water] too [when it is drunk after being seen]. If it is maintained that [it] has the form of recollection, because it has no object, this is not correct. How [is it possible] that that which is produced as making known the form of an object which was made known by previous experience, is without an object?

If it is without an object because the object does not exist at the same time [as the recollection] assuming that when a previously perceived object was destroyed [in the meantime], then a cognition produced by a Vedic injunction will necessarily be a recollection, because it is without a [contemporaneous] object, since an object [of cognition] which consists in the fact that something has to be done does not exist at that time (i.e. at the time of the cognition of the injunction). Or if it exists, the fact that it has the form of something to be done is not possible. When this is not possible, the sacrificial actions would disappear. And if being a recollection is due to being without an object, remembering a [still] existing pot, an universal etc. would not be a recollection.

If its being a recollection is due to its being procued in the form 'I saw', this is not correct. How is it possible that that which is produced in the form 'there is water here' has the form 'I saw'?"

In all *vikalpas* but the last, Jayarāśi argues against possible definitions of recollection. Although he never looses sight of the fact that what is at stake here is not recollection, but false cognition, his arguments apply to any kind of recollection, and not only to defective recollections characterized as *smṛti-pramoṣa*. In the last *vikalpa*, however, the perspective suddenly changes. Jayarāśi seems to find nothing wrong with the definition of recollection as such, but argues that it cannot apply to the false cognition of water. In a way, this last *vikalpa* can be considered as an introduction to the examination of *smṛti-pramoṣa* which follows immediately upon it. The opponent introduces the *smṛti-pramoṣa* in order to explain why the part 'I remember' does not appear in the cognition of water, and Jayarāśi proceeds to refute it by claiming that no matter how *smṛti-pramoṣa* is to be understood, it cannot account for the cognition of water. *TUS* p. 18.14–19.6:

> *atha vipramuṣi[ta]tā*[25] *anayā bhaṅgyā upajāyate, ko 'yaṃ vipramoṣo nāma? kim anubhavâkāra-svīkaraṇam, smaraṇâkāra-pradhvaṃso vā, apūrvârtha-gṛhītitvaṃ vā, indriyârtha-sannikarṣa-jatvaṃ vā, indriyârthâsannikarṣa-jatvaṃ vā?*
> *tad yady anubhavâkāra-svīkaraṇam, tadā smṛti-rūpatā nôpapadyate.*
> *atha smṛti-rūpatā, tadânubhavâkāra-svīkaraṇaṃ nôpapadyate, smṛty-anubhavâkārayor itaretara-parihāra-sthiti-lakṣaṇatvāt.*
> *atha smaraṇâkāra-pradhvaṃsaḥ, tad ayuktam, vijñānasya svayaṃ smṛtitvenâbhyupagamāt. pradhvaṃso hy avijñānâtmakaḥ kathaṃ smṛti-rūpatāṃ vidhatte? athâpūrvârtha-viṣaya-gṛhītitvaṃ smṛti-pramoṣa ucyate, tadâtyantânanubhūta-kanaka-panasâdi-saṃvittīnāṃ smṛti-vipramoṣatvam āpadyate. atha indriyârtha-sannikarṣa-jatvaṃ smṛti-vipramoṣa ucyate, tadā saṃvittīnāṃ smṛti-vipramoṣatva-prasaṅgaḥ. atha indriyârthâsannikarṣa-jatvaṃ smṛti-vipramoṣa ucyate, tadā codanā-janita-vijñānasyânumānôpamāna-*

> *vijñānasya ca smṛti-vipramoṣatvam āpadyate. tasmād yathā yathā vicāryate smṛti-vipramoṣaḥ tathā tathā nyāyaṃ na viṣahata iti. tasmād marīcy-udaka-vijñanasya na smṛti-vipramoṣa-rūpatā, api tu viparīta-khyātitvaṃ samyag-jñānatvaṃ vā.*

"If [the recollection of water] arises in that manner (i.e., as a direct cognition of water) by being deprived [of the part 'I saw'], what is this [thing] called deprivation? Is it the adaptation of the form of experience, or the destruction of the form of recollection, or the apprehension of an unprecedented object (*apūrvârtha*), or the production by contact between sense organ and object, or the production without a contact between sense organ and object?

Among these [possibilities], if it is the adaptation of the form of experience, then the fact of having the form of recollection is impossible. If [the cognition] has the form of recollection, then the adaptation of the form of experience is impossible, because the form of recollection and of experience are characterized by mutual exclusion.[26]

If it is the destruction of the form of experience, this is not correct, because the cognition is accepted by yourself as recollection. Since destruction does not have the character of cognition, how does it affirm the fact of having the form of recollection? If being an apprehension of an unprecedented object is called deprivation of recollection, then cognitions of absolutely inexperienced [objects like] a golden jack fruit etc. would be [cases of] deprivation of recollection. If production by contact between sense organ and object is called deprivation of recollection, then immediate cognitions (saṃvitti) would be [cases of] deprivation of recollection. If the production without a contact between sense organ and object is called deprication of recollection, then the cognition produced by Vedic injunctions and the cognitions of inference and comparison would be [cases of] deprication of recollection. That is why in whichever way the deprivation of recollection is examined, it does not stand to reason. Therefore the mirage of water does not consist in deprivation of recollection, but is either 'the appearance of a different/wrong [object] (*viparīta-khyātitva*),[27] or a valid cognition."

So far for Jayarāśi's arguments against the Ācarya and the Vyākhyātṛ schools. Now the question may arise whether he had his own theory of error. This seems to be a contradiction in terms for a sceptic like Jayarāśi, for if one does not recognize any means of valid cognition, one cannot establish any theory at all. The *TUS*, however, is full of affirmative sentences. In the last sentence of the above quoted passage, Jayarāśi says that a cognition of water is either true, or *viparīta-khyāti.* Now, the term *viparīta-khyāti* or its synonym *anyathā-khyāti* is usually used to designate the Ācarya position. If we took the sentence as a simple affirmation, we would have to conclude that the *TUS* is full of contradictions, and that by the time Jayarāśi criticized Prabhākara he had already forgotten what he had said when criticizing the Ācaryas. In fact, while criticizing the Ācarya theory he affirms the exact opposite (*TUS* p. 12.26–13.5):

> *atha keśoṇḍuka-vijñāne kim avabhāti? kim ālambate? keśoṇḍukasyaiva ālambanatvaṃ pratīyamānatvaṃ ca tathā udakasyaiva ālambanatvaṃ pratīyamānatvaṃ ca, nâlambanântaraṃ parikalpyam. na côdaka-jñānasya pratīyamānôdakânyâlambanatvena mithyātvam, api tu abhāvāt tāttvikatvena anyathā keśoṇḍuka-saṃvido 'pi mithyātvaṃ na prāpnoti, anyâlambana-vyatirekāt.*

"What appears in the hair-net (*keśoṇḍuka*) cognition? What is [its] external object? The hair-net itself is the external object, and it is perceived; in the same manner water itself is the external object and it is perceived, no other/different external object should be postulated. The cognition of water is not false because [its] external object is something different from the perceived water, but because [the water] does not exist as a real thing. Otherwise, the hair-net cognition too would not be false because there is no other/different external object [for it]."

How should Jayarāśi's contradictory statements be understood? Unless we want to affirm that they are simple contradictions and that the man is a fool, something like the following explanation has to be accepted: Jayarāśi affirms statements incompatible with his opponent's view, and which he thinks the opponent cannot refute without getting himself into trouble (mostly *avyāpti, ativyāpti* and internal contradictions). While dealing with different theories, Jayarāśi makes different statements in the different corresponding contexts. Consequently, when two theories are contradictory, Jayarāśi will make contradictory statements; he will say black when one opponent says white, and white when another opponent says black. Thus he refutes the Nyāya theory of universals (p. 4.5 f.) as well as the Buddhist refutation of the Nyāya theory of universals (p. 49.19 f.). Here we have very much the same case. We saw that the Ācaryas claim that in the case of error the external object of the cognition is different from its internal object, while for the Vyākhyātṛs, on the other hand, whatever appears in the cognition is its external object. Therefore, after refuting the Ācarya theory, Jayarāśi concludes that the cognition's external and internal object are not different, and after refuting the Vyākhyātṛ theory, that they are. Thus all affirmations of Jayarāśi's, whether they are expressed in a positive or in a negative form, should be understood as negations of their opposite, which do not affirm anything at all.

If this interpretation of Jayarāśi is accepted, it follows that two seemingly contradictory propositions are not actually contradictory, because of their different intentions. I think most readers will accept this statement intuitively, but probably without being aware of its implications, for it goes against almost every current theory of propositional logic. If, as is usually accepted, truth and falsehood belong to propositions as such, whether they are defined as properties of propositions, or as a relation between a proposition and a 'state of affairs', or as coherence among propositions, or as utility (or inutility) of a proposition etc., it is obvious that my interpretation of Jayarāśi cannot be accepted, and one is bound to conclude that he simply and stupidly contradicts himself. If, on the other hand, one follows Collingwood,[28] and more recently Manor,[29] in considering that the meaning of a propostion depends on the question it tries to answer, it follows that truth and falsehood do not belong to the proposition as such, but are relative to that question. It also follows that two propositions cannot be contradictory, unless they are meant as answers to the same question.

The interpretation of Jayarāśi's statements as conveying no positive affirmations does not differentiate him from other sceptic philosophers such as Sextus Empiricus, or even from a religious philosopher like Nāgārjuna when he says he has no *pakṣa* or *pratijñā.* There are, of course, important differences in form,[30] for sceptics are terminological parasites; just as Sextus criticizes the Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic philosophers of his time by using their own terms, Jayarāśi does the same by using Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist terms. But the phenomenon of scepticism is certainly common to the three philosophical traditions of India, China and Europe.

Nevertheless, there is, I think, something unique in Jayarāśi. The basic device of Western scepticism is to draw a sharp distinction between true and false cognitions and then make such extreme requirements for true cognitions, that no cognition will ever be able to meet. This device, which is seen at its best in discussions of the criterion of truth, presupposes, of course, that there is a distinction between true and false cognitions. As far as I know, none of the Western sceptics questioned this presupposition.[31] They all seem to accept that there is a difference between true and false cognitions; the only trouble is we cannot tell which is which. Jayarāśi, however, seems to go a step further and deny that there is any difference at all between true and false cognitions; or, to be sure, if there is some difference between them, it does not surpass the difference between two valid cognitions, such as of sweet water and of salted water. *TUS*, p. 14.14–23:

> *na ca bhāvâkāre pratīyamāne 'bhāva-kalpanā nyāyyā atiprasaṅgāt, anyathā rūpâdau pratīyamāne rasâdi-kalpanā kartavyā. na ca kriyate. tathêhâpy udakaṃ pratīyate. nanu pratīyate kintv atathyam; yady evam, udaka-prapañco 'yaṃ, dīrghôdakaṃ madhurôdakam iti yathā. nanv atra sarvāsv avasthāsv udakaṃ pratīyate, tena tāsv ambhaḥ prakalpyate. yady evaṃ tad ihâpy avasthā-dvaye 'py udakaṃ pratīyate satyôdakam asatyôdakaṃ ca. satyôdaka-jñāne satyôdakam avabhāti nâsatyôdakam anudakaṃ vā. tathā asatyôdaka-jñāne 'satyôdakaṃ pratibhāti na satyôdakam anudakaṃ vā, sva-viṣaya-paryavasāyinyo hi buddhayaḥ.*[32]

"And it is not correct to assume the inexistence [of water] when the form of the existence [of water] is perceived, because it is absurd,[33] otherwise the assumption of taste etc. would have to be made when colour is perceived. But it is not made. In the same manner, here, too, water is perceived.

– [True, water] is perceived, but it is unreal.

– If so, it is a kind of water (*udaka-prapañca*), just like [in the case of cognitions such as] 'long [stretch of] water', 'sweet water' [etc].

– There, in all [these] cases, water is perceived, that is why [the existence of] water is assumed there.

– If this is so, then here too, in both cases, water is perceived: real water, and unreal water. In a cognition of real water, real water appears, not unreal water or something different from water (lit. non-water). In the same manner, in a cognition of unreal water, unreal water appears, not real water or something different from water, for cognitions terminate in their own objects."

How is Jayarāśi's queer statement to be understood? Does he give the same ontological status to real and unreal water? The expression *udaka-prapañca* is too elliptical to provide a definite answer to this question, but at the end of the next section (i.e. after the discussion of *bādhā*, translated above) there comes a passage which leaves no doubt about it. The opponent throws the burden of proof on Jayarāśi: Suppose you convinced me that a false cognition cannot be sublated, but how come its object does not produce an efficient action (*artha-kriyā*)[34]? Jayarāśi's answer is that whatever the efficient action produced by the object of a valid cognition may be, it can also be produced by the object of a false cognition; and the arguments, especially the first one, leave no doubt that it is the external object he is talking about. *TUS* p. 16.10–24:

> *yadi na bādhyate kim ity asāv artha-kriyāṃ na karoti bhāvaḥ? kêyam artha-kriyā yā tena na sampadyate puṃsām? kiṃ vijñāna-rūpā, pravṛtti-rūpā, prāpti-rūpā, sukha-duḥkhôtpāda-bhoga-rūpā vā? tad yadi vijñāna-lakṣaṇāṃ na karoti, tad ayuktam, vijñāna-lakṣaṇām artha-kriyāṃ karoty eva toyam. atha pravṛtti-rūpāṃ na karoti, tad ayuktam, pravṛttir hi puruṣêcchânuvidhāyinī nârtha-svarūpa-bhāvâbhāvāv anugamayati. puruṣo hi kāmataḥ pravartate vā na vā, na hy etāvatā tad-abhāva-siddhiḥ. atha prāpti-rūpām artha-kriyāṃ na karoti tenâsattvam, tad apy ayuktam, candrârka-graha-nakṣatra-tārakâdeḥ prāpty-abhāve 'pi sattva-saṃbhavāt. atha sukha-duḥkha-rūpām artha-kriyāṃ na karoti, kiṃ darśana-jaṃ sukhaṃ na karoty āho deha-sambandha-jam? tad yadi darśana-jaṃ na karoti, tad ayuktam, karoty eva. atha deha-sambandha-jaṃ na karoti, tadā candrârka-graha-nakṣatrâdau vyabhicāraḥ; teṣāṃ deha-sambandha-ja-sukha-janakatvaṃ nâsti, atha ca sattvam. na cârtha-kriyâkartṛtvena vastūnām asattvaṃ sva-hetor eva vijñāna-jananamātrasyôtpatteḥ sahakāri-virahād vā na karoti.*

"If [false cognition] is not sublated, why does not this thing (*bhāva*, i.e. the object of false cognition) produce an efficient action (*artha-kriyā*)?

– What is this efficient action which is not accomplished for the people by that [object]? Does it have the form of cognition, the form of activity, [towards the object], the form of obtainment [of the object], or the form of experience which consists in the arising of pleasure and pain?

Among these [possibilities], if it does not produce [an efficient action] which is characterised as cognition, this is not correct, [for even illusory] water does produce an efficient action characterised as cognition. If it does not produce [an efficient action] which has the form of activity, this is not correct, for activity follows (i.e., is due to) the volition of men; it does not follow the existence or inexistence of the object itself, for a man acts or does not [act] according to his desire: the inexistence of that [object] is not established by that much.

– [The object of false cognition] does not produce an efficient action which has the form of obtainment, that is why [it is said to be] inexistent.

– This is also not correct, because existence is possible even if there is no obtainment, [as in the case of] of sun, moon, planets, constellations, stars etc.

If it does not produce an efficient action which has the form of pleasure or pain, does it not produce a pleasure which arises from seeing [the object], or [a pleasure] which arises from a relation to (i.e., contact with) the body?

If it does not produce [a pleasure] which arises from seeing [the object], this is not correct, it does.

If it does not produce [a pleasure] which arises from a relation to the body, then this does not hold good for the sun, moon, planets, constellations etc.; they do not produce a pleasure which arises from a relation to the body, but nevertheless they exist.

And it is not by their not being agents of efficient action that things do not exist, because [a thing may be] produced by its own cause[35] [in such a way] that it produces nothing but [its own] cognition; or due to the absence of a coproducer [the thing] does not produce [anything at all]."

Strange arguments indeed. But according to my interpretation, this passage is not to be understood as affirming that 'a false cognition of water is produced by unreal water', but rather as answering in the negative the question 'how can you prove that false cognition of water is not produced by some kind of water?'. And the answer goes: not by the mere fact that the cognition is produced (the possibility that a cognition of water is produced by sun-rays has already been refuted, and Jayarāśi does not have to repeat these arguments here); not by the absence or presence of activity on the part of the cognizer, for activity is not due to the existence of the object; not by the obtainment of the object, because certain objects cannot be obtained; and certainly not by the subjective experience of pleasure or pain. One can hardly see what other possibilities are left for the opponent in order to substantiate his claim that the object of a false cognition does not exist.

Interpreted in this manner, the arguments start to make sense, but, nevertheless, one has a quizzical feeling about them: Is Jayarāśi pulling our leg? One can detect a certain irony in his arguments and, personally, I am never sure how serious he is. It is often the case with Jayarāśi that he formulates arguments in which he does not believe, but which, he thinks (and usually with good reasons), his opponent cannot refute.

Reading through the *TUS*, the impression one gets of Jayarāśi is of an excellent logician, confident of himself, intellectually independent and self-reliant, someone for whom philosophical reasoning is a playful activity. One can distinctly feel how he rejoices in the destructive force of his arguments; and one can almost see him smiling at his opponents, as if he was saying 'Refute me, if you can'. He is certainly the most anarchical philosopher of ancient India to have come down to us.

ABBREVIATIONS

TUS:	*Tattvopaplavasiṃha* of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, ed. S. Sanghavi and R. Parikh. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 87, Baroda 1940.
NBh:	*Nyāyabhāṣya* cf. *NS*.
NBhū:	*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña, ed. S. Yogīndrānanda. Vārāṇasi 1968.
NM:	*Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed. K. S. Varadacharya. Oriental Research Institute Series 106, Mysore 1969. *Prameyaprakaraṇa*, ed. D. Śāstri. Kashi Sanskrit Series 106 Benares 1934.
NMGBh:	*Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* of Cakradhara, ed. N. S. Shah. L. D. Series 35, Ahmedabad 1972.
NV:	*Nyāyavārttika* cf. *NS*.
NVTṬ:	*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* cf. NS.
NS:	*Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, Uddyotakara's *Vārttika*, Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyaṭīkā* and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18, Calcutta 1936.
Pañcapādikā:	*Pañcapādikā* of Padmapādācārya with two comm. and *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa* with two comm. ed. S. Śrīrāma Śāstrī and S. R. Krishnamurthi Śāstrī. Madras Government Oriental Series CLV, Madras 1958.
Bṛhatī:	*Bṛhatī* of Prabhākara Miśra with the *Ṛjuvimalā* of Śālikanātha, ed. A. Chinnaswāmi Śāstri. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 391, Benares 1929.
YS:	*Yogasūtra* of Patañjali, ed. R. S. Bodas. Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series XLVI, Bombay 1917.
ŚV:	*Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila in *Ślokavārttikavyākhyātātparyaṭīkā* of Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa, ed. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri. Madras University Sanskrit Series 13, Madras 1971.

NOTES

* I am indebted to Professors A. Wezler, S. A. Śrinivasan, L. Schmithausen, and Ms. K. Preisendanz from the Indological Institute of the University of Hamburg, as well as to Professor K. Bhattacharya from the CNRS Paris for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. Some of the better points presented here were developed as a direct result of our discussions.

[1] Cf. *JIPh*, 11 (1983) pp. 147–166.

[2] In presenting Jayarāśi's opponents, I shall rely heavily on Schmithausen's admirable study in *Maṇḍanamiśra's Vibhramaviveka, mit einer Studie zur Entwicklung der Indischen Irrtumslehre*. Wien 1965. This study is one of the finest 'flowers' of the Frauwallner school, but for some reason it seems to be relatively unknown; perhaps because it is 'hidden' as an appendix to the edition and translation of the Vibhramaviveka. It goes without saying that my purpose in this paper is not a systematic discussion of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā theories of error, and I shall restrict myself only to those points which are criticized by Jayarāśi.

[3] According to Schmithausen (*op. cit.* p. 163), ever since Dignaga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, but in fact already in the *Nyāyasūtra*; cf. *NS*, 4.2.4 ff., cf. also W. Ruben, *Die Nyāyasūtra's*, Leipzig 1928, p. 216 n. 278. Schmithausen's conception of the historical development of the theory of error is probably influenced by Frauwallner's statement that Dignāga's work is the turning point, after which epistemological problems became the central preoccupation of Indian philosophers. I do not doubt the general validity of this statement, but it seems to me that, in the particular case of the theory of error, the data cannot be ordered in such a clear-cut scheme.

[4] Schmithausen suggests (*op. cit.* p. 164) that this is perhaps due to Kumārila's "andersgeartete Ontologie". If by that he means the rejection of *samavāya*, I do not see how it affects the theory of error in any way. Schmithausen's presentation of Kumārila is a bit fragmentary, probably because he missed the important discussion in *ŚV, Śūnyavāda* in which Kūmārila explains (under Śamkhya influence? Cf. A Wezler, Studien zum Dvādaśāranayacakra des Śvetāmbara Mallavādin: I. Der *Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*. in *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus*, ed. K. Bruhn and A. Wezler. Wiesbaden 1981) errors in relative terms (212 f.) immediately after the exposé of a basically Vyākhyātṛ theory (200 f.).

[5] Cf. *NMGBh* p. 44.12–13: *iha ca sarvatrâcārya-śabdena Uddyotakara-vivṛti-kṛto Rucikāra-prabhṛtayo vivakṣitāḥ, Vyākhyātṛ-śabdena ca Bhāṣya-vivaraṇa-kṛtaḥ Pravara-prabhṛtayo iti.*

[6] Cf. E. Steinkellner, Die Literatur des älteren Nyāya, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*, Vol. 5, 1961 p. 160.

[7] Cf. A. Wezler, Zur Identität der "Ācāryāḥ" und "Vyākhyātaraḥ" in Jayantabhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī. WZKS Vol. 19, 1975 p. 141.

[8] Cf. *NM* p. 218.11: *tad etad ācāryāḥ pratisamādhate – na viṣaya-bhedād eva pratibhāsa-bhedaḥ, kin tu upāya-bhedād bhavaty eva.* Cf. also B. Gupta, *Die Wahrnehmung in der Nyāyamañjarī*. Walldorf-Hessen 1963 p. 97 n. 222.

Schmithausen (*op. cit.* p. 163) uses the terms limited transparence of cognition and absolute transparence of cognition to designate the basic principles of the Ācārya and the Vyākhyātṛ respectively. There is no harm in that, of course, as long as one remembers the exact definitions he gives to these terms. Note, however, that the cognition is absolutely transparent for both the Ācārya and the Vyākhyātṛ.

[9] Vācaspati (*NVTṬ ad loc.* p. 114.14) glosses *eke* with *eka-deśa-mata.*

[10] Cf. *Pañcapādikā* p. 49.7–50.1: *kiñca – rajata-rūpeṇa cet pariṇatā śukti kṣīram iva dadhi-rūpeṇa, tadā doṣâpagame 'pi tathaivâvatiṣṭhate. nanu kamala-mukula-vikāsa-pariṇāma-hetoḥ sāvitrasya tejasaḥ sthiti-hetutvam api dṛṣṭaṃ tad-apagame punaḥ mukulībhāva-darśanāt.* Cf. also P. Hacker, *Vivarta*. Wiesbaden 1953, pp. 36–37.

[11] Cf. J. May, *Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*. Paris 1959, p. 79 n. 135.

[12] One often comes across *ca*, especially in negated sentences, where *hi*, or something similar, would be expected. Indeed, both Buddhist and Hindu commentators tell us that *ca* is sometimes used to convey reason or explanation (*co hetvarthaḥ, co yasmāt*). However, none of the dictionaries available to me (PW, MW, Apte, Renou) glosses *ca* with any word which could even remotely suggest that *ca* may convey reason. Is it therefore a mere commentator's trick, or an insufficiency of the dictionaries? I think the dictionaries are at fault on this point, but I do not care for arguing that *ca* has an additional meaning of 'for' over and above its other more common meanings (it depends very much on what one understands by meaning). That much, however, is clear: *ca* is sometimes used to connect two sentences, the second of which provides the reason for the first. Therefore, there is no reason why it should not be translated with 'for' in such cases.

[13] This theory is generally ascribed to Prabhākara, but it is not to be found in the *Bṛhatī*. Schmithausen (*op. cit.* pp. 239–240) suggests that it either appeared in one of Prabhākara's lost works, or that it was developed by one of his followers.

[14] Jayarāśi refers to the *NS*, 3.2.24: *anityatva-grahaṇād buddher buddhy-antarād vināśaḥ śabdavat.* "Cognition is destroyed by another cognition, since one apprehends that it is not eternal, just like sound."

Vātsyāyana is not aware of the problems involved in the formulation of the *sūtra*, but Uddyotakara has some trouble to explain how a cognition which has not yet been produced can destroy a cognition which is subsequent to it. In order to save the *sūtra* he has to give up the absolute momentariness of cognitions. Cf. *NV ad loc.* p. 859.9–10: *atha manyase na dve buddhī saha bhavanto yataḥ parayā pūrva nivartyate. tac ca na, yugapad-utpatti-niṣedhāt* [*cf. NS, 1.1.16*] – *yugapad-utpattiḥ niṣedhyati na sahabhāvaḥ.*

[15] Jayanta probably refers to the *TUS* p. 14.3–4:

> *yadi ca abhāva-jñānena abhāva-vyavasthā kriyate, bhāva-jñānena ca bhāva-vyavasthā, tadā udakasya bhāvâbhāvau eka-kālau syātām.*

"And if the inexistence [of water] is established by the cognition of the inexistence [of water], and the existence [of water] is established by the cognition of the existence [of water], then the water would exist and not exist at the same time."

[16] At this point Jayanta refers the reader to the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgabhaṅga* where, he says, it will be shown that the object of perception is not limited to the present. I suppose he means the section on *pratyabhijñā* (*NM, Prameyaprakaraṇa* pp. 31.20–33.22). However, as far as I understand the arguments therein, they do not add anything new to what is already stated here, but simply multiply the examples; cf. for instance p. 33.1–3:

> *nanu atīte 'rthe katham indriyaṃ pravartate? kasyaiṣa paryanuyogaḥ? nêndriyasyâcetanatvāt, puruṣas tv avisphāritâkṣo nêdṛśīṃ pratipattiṃ labhate visphāritâkṣas tu labhate iti so 'pi nânuyojyaḥ.*

" – How can a sense organ act upon a past object? – Who is to be blamed? Not the sense organ, because it is not conscious. The man, however, whose eyes are closed, does not have such an apprehension (i.e. recognition), but [a man] whose eyes are open does. Thus he is not to be blamed either."

Reading these arguments of Jayanta, I cannot help thinking that Collingwood was right in his analysis of realism; cf. Essay on Metaphysics. Chicago 1972 ed. pp. 34–5.

[17] Cf. Schmithausen *op. cit.* p. 249.

[18] Cf. *NM* p. 216.4, 7: *atra punaḥ pravarāḥ prāhuḥ – . . . na hi viṣayâtiśayam antareṇa pratibhāsâtiśayo bhavitum arhati.* Cf. also Gupta *op. cit.* p. 101 n. 229.

[19] After some hesitation I decided to follow Schmithausen (*op. cit.* p. 175), who attributes this *śloka* to the Vyākhyātṛ. Note, however, that for Jayanta this is the second of the three Ācārya theories. Perhaps the word *ācārya* is used here in a more general meaning which can include any Naiyāyika. This seems to go against the testimony of Cakradhara who says that everywhere (*sarvatra*) in the *NM* the word *ācāryāḥ* refers to the school of the Rucikāra (cf. n. 5 above). Perhaps the word *sarvatra* is to be understood as throughout the book and not in every single case, though this does not seem very likely.

[20] Cf. also *Bṛhatī* pp. 54.6–7: *svapnâdiṣu bahir-avabhāsā saṃvit, sā ca bāhyârtham antareṇa na saṃbhavati.*

[21] The formation of the term probably owes to the definition of recollection in the *YS*, 1.11: *anubhūta-viṣayâsaṃpramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ.*

[22] Vācaspati (*NVTṬ* pp. 734.16–735.14) explains the difference between the four types of recollection as a difference in emphasis; in one case the agent is predominant (*kartṛ-pradhāna*), in another the object (*karma-pradhāna*) etc. He seems though to have had a slightly different *Bhāṣya* text before him than the one quoted above.

[23] Read *vijñānānāṃ* instead of *vijñānāt.*

[24] One could expect *yad aham adrākṣam*, since all the previous *vikalpas* contain the neuter *udaka*. However, *yam aham adrākṣam* is a stock phrase in which the *yam* refers to the masculin *artha*. The origin of the expression is probably to be traced to the *NBh*, 3.1.14

[25] Read *vipramuṣitatayā* instead of *vipramuṣitatā.*

[26] Cf., however, *Nyāyabindu* 3.75 (ed. D. Malvania, Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1955, p. 203): *paraspara-parihāra-sthita-lakṣaṇatayā va bhāvâbhāvavat.*

[27] The word *viparīta* is not to be understood as 'opposite', but rather in the weaker sense of 'different'. Indeed, it would be strange to say that water is the opposite of sun-rays, or that a man is the opposite of a trunk. Cf. for instance, *NBhū* p. 32.2–3: *anyathā-pratibhāsanād viparīta-khyātir evêti.*

[28] Cf. Collingwood, *op. cit.* pp. 21–33; An Autobiography. Oxford University Press (reprint) 1978, Chapter 5.

Collingwood is, of course, not the first one to interpret meaning in terms of question and answer. As he points out, this goes back at least as far as Plato, who defined meaning as a dialogue of the Soul with itself, and, as we know from his writings, by dialogue he meant questions and answers. In India, the same view is clearly seen in the commentators' literature. For instance, the most common procedure in the commentaries is to formulate a question (often in the form of doubt) to which the *mūla*-text is introduced as an answer.

[29] Cf. R. Manor, Dialogues and the logic of questions and answers. Linguistische Berichte (Vieweg), Heft 73, Juni 1981, pp. 1–28.

[30] To give one example: Western scepticism is intimately related with doubt (the Oxford dictionary, for instance, glosses scepsis with 'philosophical doubt'). For Sextus, all cognitions are doubtful cognitions, and that is why one has to suspend judgement. For Jayarāśi, on the other hand, there is no such thing as doubtful cognition, cf. *TUS* pp. 19.7–20.14.

31 This also holds for Taoist sceptics like Chuang Tzu and Lieh Tzu. However, I am not in a position to attempt any generalisation on Chinese philosophy.

32 Cf. *NBhū* p. 33.8–10: *etena yad āhur eke – satyôdakam asatyôdakaṃ cêty udaka-pranpañco 'yaṃ madhurôdakâdivat. tatra yathā satyôdaka-buddhau nâsatyôdakaṃ pratibhāti, anudakaṃ vā, evam asatyôdaka-jñāne 'pi na satyôdakaṃ pratibhāty anudakam vêti. svaviṣaye paryavasāyinyo buddhayaḥ. tasmān na viparīto 'stîti.*

33 A friend criticized my translation of *atiprasaṅga* as 'absurd'. Granted that it is not a literal translation, I shall try to justify it shortly. There are some important differences between *prasaṅga* and *atiprasaṅga*: *prasaṅga* is used to indicate an undesired consequence (either because it is absurd, or because it is incompatible with the opponent's premises), and it always involves two propositions. (It takes such forms as "if 'p' is accepted, the undesired consequence 'q' is inevitable" or "not 'r' because (otherwise) 'q' would be inevitable", etc.) *Atiprasaṅga*, on the other hand, involves only one proposition: not 'p', because *atiprasaṅga*. Thus, no undesired consequence needs to be specified, and this is so because 'p' itself is already inacceptable. Furthermore, after checking all occurences of the word *atiprasaṅga* in the TUS, I came to the conclusion that the propositions connected with it are introduced by Jayarāśi in order to fill up purely logical holes in the argumentation, but which no opponent in his right mind would actually maintain.

34 The concept of *artha-kriyā* has strong Buddhist connotations, but it is not exclusively a Buddhist term, and it is clear from the context, i.e., the refutation of the word *avyabhicārin* of the *NS* 1.1.4, that the opponent is a Naiyāyika. The main difference between the Buddhist and the Nyāya concepts of *artha-kriyā* is that for the Buddhist an efficient action does not prove the reality of the object; an inferential cognition, for instance, may lead to an efficient action without its object, the universal, being considered real. For the Nyāya, however, the efficient action proves the reality of the object. It seems to me, therefore, that there is no essential difference between the Nyāya concept of *artha-kriyā* and the more common one of *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*. As far as I can see, *artha-kriyā* can be used more vaguely, and can have a larger semantic field than *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*, which is sometimes reduced to the strict *artha-prāpti*, the actual obtaining of the object. Thus the efficient action of an object may simply be the production of cognition, and this enables the Naiyāyikas to consider the cognitions of sun, moon, and other such objects which cannot be obtained to be valid.

It also seems that there is a difference of perspective between *artha-kriyā* and *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*. *Pravṛtti-sāmarthya* refers to an activity of the cognizer, i.e. it is a property of the subject, whereas *artha-kriyā* is mostly a property of the object.

35 Cf. similar formulations in *TUS* pp. 40.19–20, 47.16–17, 52.12–13 etc.; *svahetor eva* . . . is used when no further justification is given, and has always an undertone of arbitrariness: things are so, because they are produced in that manner by their causes. One could equally say things are so because they are so.

Note also that *arthakriyā* is used here in a narrower, more literal sense than the above, for it cannot include *vijñānarūpā arthakriyā*.

PETER FENNER

A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANALYSIS (*VICĀRA*) AND INSIGHT (*PRAJÑĀ*) BASED ON THE *MADHYAMAKĀVATĀRA*

In this paper I wish to investigate the relationship between analysis (*vicāra*) and the insight (*prajñā*) into emptiness. More specifically I will present what I believe to be Candrakīrti's view – which I also take to be characteristic and typical of developed Mādhyamika thought generally – that analysis is meant to be a direct and efficient cause for producting the insight into emptiness. I am basing this view on Candrakīrti's own independent text, the *Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya.* In the course of supporting the plausibility and accuracy of this interpretation I will develop a structural model of Mādhyamika analysis by way of proffering a *reasoned explanation* for why Mādhyamikas thought it appropriate to use analysis as a tool for gaining insight. In the first half of the paper I will ascertain the logical structures that undergird dialectical analysis and in the second half will relate these to the MA's analyses.

1. WESTERN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROBLEM

The position of western interpreters of the Mādhyamika on the general question of the relationship between analysis and insight, and the more specific issue of whether or not consequential analysis structures thought in such a way that gives rise to insight is unresolved: if a variety of divergent views is indicative of such.

The problem at issue is essentially one of the *strength* of the relationship between analysis and insight, for it is difficult not to infer – given the prominent and extensive utilization of analysis in Mādhyamika texts *and* their placement of this in a genuine religious tradition – that analysis must have *some* bearing on at least some aspects of the Mādhyamikas' quest for spiritual liberation. Hence, the opinions being expressed by Mādhyamika scholars vary in terms of the centrality that is accorded to analysis within the soteriological concerns of Mādhyamikas.

As I see the leading contemporary interpreters, K. K. Inada holds to the weakest interpretation of the relationship. He writes that "the Buddhist truth,

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 139–197. 0022–1791/84/0122–0139 $05.90.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

if forthcoming at all, is not the result of logic or dialectics."[1] J. W. de Jong similarly views the relationship as fairly weak or rather *indirect* for he feels that the negative dialectic can act only as a preparatory exercise for true insight.[2] T. R. V. Murti (along with S. Schayer) is judged by F. J. Streng[3] as similarly holding that the dialectic is just a preparatory exercise, though I think one can also read stronger and *effective* interpretation of the relationship into Murti.[4] Streng's own views are interesting for, on the one hand, he supports a very strong and *efficient* relationship, yet on the other he says that insight *can* arise quite independently of any analytical activity.[5] Though he doesn't explicitly say so, it is clear from M. Sprung's discernment of the function of Mādhyamika logic and its place in the removal of the views, that he holds a strong interpretation of the relationship. Ashok Gangadean holds the same, writing convincingly of the "radical transformation [from ordinary to *śūnya* consciousness] that is effected through analytical meditation."[6] And of the "transformational dialectic" which "purports to move consciousness beyond any and all conceptual structures".[7]

A general chronological trend in the interpretation (that this study continues) is towards seeing the relationship as strong. My feeling is that this is due to an increasing appreciation of the structure of Mādhyamika analysis. Hence, if the current interpretations are informed it is significant of coming to understand the causes, conditions, parameters, etc. that determine, bear on, and are brought into play in the relationship. The earlier and weaker interpretations of the relationship stem, I believe, from two causes. One, a pan-Indic judgement, perhaps coming from the situation obtaining in rational yet non-consequential (*prasaṅga*) religio-mystical traditions, such as Advaita Vedānta in which rational analysis is acknowledged to give out some time before religious intuition, and, two, a belief that *all* conceptual activity is elaborative, or more strictly leads to further conceptual elaboration.

2. CANDRAKĪRTI'S STATEMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP

Candrakīrti's own position in the MA on the relationship is most clearly stated in a set of four verses at the conclusion of his analysis of phenomena and prior to taking up the analysis of the person. The first verse (6.116) says that, "If there are things (*dṅos-po, bhāva*), conceptuality (*rtog, kalpanā*) is produced. [The way in which] there is nothing has been thoroughly analyzed (*yoṅs-dpyad*). In [the case of there being] no things these [conceptualizations] are not producted as, for example, without fuel there is no fire." *rTog(-pa)* is translating *kalpanā* for the Sanskrit verse is cited in the *Subhāṣitasaṁgraha.*[9] I am translating *kalpanā* as conceptuality. Other terms that are used in a similar context re indicating "what is removed" in the Mādhyamika soteriology are *vikalpa* and *prapañca.*[10] The three terms *kalpanā, vikalpa,* and *prapañca* are different though, and as we will indicate shortly, they seem to represent a genesis of ideational proliferation or *degrees* of elaboration.

This verse is quite unequivocal and clear: that conceptuality arises on the basis of perceiving things to be real and that when such false perception is eradicated, conceptuality ceases also. The rationale behind the cognition of the emptiness of entities and the cessation of conceptualization is that when the referents to thought are not presented to consciousness, thought or conceptualization itself has no basis, nothing to rest on and work with (i.e. is unfueled) and so ceases also.[11] Śāntideva in the BCA 9.34–35 writes that "When one asserts that nothing exists [and there is] no perception of the things that are the object of investigation, then how can existence, being separate from a basis, stay before the intellect? When neither things nor non-things are before the intellect, then there is no other route, it lacks any support [and achieves] the supernatural peace."[12] (We will return again to this verse of Śāntideva for it states a central assumption for Mādhyamika analysis.)

The *Bhāṣya* (229–230) to verse 6.116 does not add significantly to the dynamic that is implied, but says that saintly yogins gain the realization of reality due to analyzing things with the logic (that all four theses re production are fallacious). It also instances that (latent) impulses (*'du-byed, saṁskāra*) to the conceptions such as virtue, non-virtue, things, non-things and (with respect to) form and feelings are removed.

The points that the *Bhāṣya* makes are that the disappearance of conceptuality comes as a direct result of analysis, and such dissipation of conceptuality is concomitant with the onset of the insight into reality (*tattva*). This last point accords also with the MA's path-structure where for example, (11.6) the bodhisattvas at the *acala-bhūmi* (i.e. eighth level) – the point at which henceforward they cognize emptiness uninterruptedly – are free from conceptuality (*rnam-rtog, vikalpanā*). Likewise the buddhas' minds are non-conceptualizing (*mam-mi-rtog*) and (12.9) their peaceful basis (*źi-sku*) is free from mental elaboration (*spros*). Very likely the absence of conceptuality that is talked about here should not be taken at face value – as the removal of all thought and ideation, for example – but as the eradication of some cognitive substratum that is responsible for *ontologizing* types of conceptions.[13]

The purported efficacy of analysis in the quiescence of conceptuality becomes clearer still in the next verse (6.117) which says: "Because ordinary people are bound (*bciṅs*) by conceptualization (*rtog-pa*) [where] yogins without conceptualizations become free (*grol*), the learned śay that the reversal (*log-pa*) of conceptuality all comes as a result of conceptual analysis (*rtog-par dpyod*)." In this context *log-pa* has the sense of involution or inversion. The *Bhāṣya* (230) on this cites Nāgārjuna also as explaining that the exclusion itself (*bkag-pa-ñid*) of all conceptions is the fruit of full analysis. The RSM (f. 38bl) glosses the conceptions as those that grasp at the extremes (*mthar-'dzin*). Hence, *all* extreme conceptions become involuted via conceptual analysis.[14]

Śāntideva in his BCA likewise claims a soteriological import for the Mādhyamika analysis. In reply to a query that analysis may get bogged down in an infinite regress with no natural terminus he writes (9.111) that: "Once the object of investigation [*vicārite*] has been investigated, there is no basis for investigation. Since there is no basis [further analysis] does not arise, and that is called *nirvāṇa*."[15]

Vicāra is a *technical term* in all the schools of Buddhism. In the *Abhidharmakośa* it ranks as one of the variable or indeterminant mental factors and functions in pair with *vitarka* (*Kośa-bhaṣya*, 2.33). The *Kośa* definition of *vicāra* is the same as in the Pāli where it means a sustained application of a mind towards an object, possessing a degree of scrutiny that is lacking in *vitakka* (skt. *vitarka*). Where *vitarka* is best rendered as mental notification or the initial or cursory attention to an entity, *vicāra* signifies a close scrutiny examination, investigation, inspection or analysis of some meditative entity.[16]

In the Mādhyamika "*vicāra*" carries this same sense of investigation except that it specifically means a rational or ratiocinative investigation, a conceptual analysis (*rtog-par dpyod*) as opposed to say to a *perceptual* examination of some entity that may result in an increased attention to its behaviour and detail. The rational flavour of the Mādhyamika usage is captured best by "analysis" rather than examination or investigation. Nor does the term *vicāra* in the foregoing verses mean all types and varieties of rational analysis for Candrakīrti links it to reversing conceptuality. Hence it is a type of analysis that tends not to proliferate and perpetuate itself, but rather which does the converse and restricts and is meant finally to result in a complete attrition of conceptuality. Such an attrition of conceptuality is coterminus with the insight of emptiness and so the analysis meant in this context is rational investigation that aims at inducing the insight of emptiness by exposing in some existential sense the insubstantiality or non-intrinsic existence of entities.

This interpretation is more far-reaching than many estimates of the Mādhyamika dialectic for it credits the dialectic with more than an intellectual establishment of the *śūnyavāda.* Rather, analysis induces the very realizations which are understood to free yogins from the bonds of *saṁsāra.* The procedure is one of searching for self-existent entities and failing to find them. Though Mādhyamika texts do not specifically mark this sort of analysis off from the rational analysis that characterizes the philosophical investigations of non-Mādhyamika philosophers we can introduce a term ultimacy analysis (*paramārtha-vicāra*), what Gangadean calls the transformational dialect. Such analysis would be distinguished from conventional analysis (*saṁvṛti-vicāra*) (Gangadean's categorial analysis) such as would characterize (among other sorts of analyses) the Abhidharma *vicāra* which is concerned to investigate the details and characteristics of entities, their properties, relationships, etc. The difference here is that between a *genuine* ontological inquiry in the case of ultimacy analysis: where entities are said to be neutrally and presuppositionlessly investigated with a view of determining their ontic status (whatever that may be), and a logical-phenomenological mode of investigation in the case of conventional analysis: where entities are either (1) non-neutrally examined with a view to confirming or defending a *presupposed* ontic static (generally that they exist or non-exist) or (2) with accurately discerning the *appearance* of entities, events, etc.

Thus, ultimacy analysis in its pure form involves scrutinizing theses for a logical consistency. The theses that the MA examines in this way are those which support the self-existence of the personality and phenomena. The analyses made by Candrakīrti (and Nāgārjuna) are conducted in the material mode, and though the logical axioms around which theses are tested are not stated as *formal* axioms in Mādhyamika texts, they are stated nonetheless and it is clear that the "laws of thought" i.e. the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, are included within their axioms as basic to ultimacy analyses.

Analysis employs the *prasaṅga*, tib. *thal-'gyur,* form of argumentation, a purportedly deductive form of argument that exposes absurd consequences by drawing out logical contradictions (*rigs-pai 'gal-pa*) that are thought to naturally and necessarily inhere in *all* theses.

The rationale for exposing logical contradictions is that what is real cannot be self-contradictory, or conversely, what is self-contradictory cannot be real. From the viewpoint of Mādhyamikas, all theses are self-refuting if they are examined with sufficient thoroughness, and the Mādhyamikas act not as a protagonist with their own position but as a catalyst and prompt for the analytical exercise, i.e. they invoke an analysing mentality in themselves and others. One is reminded here of Wittgenstein when he writes that the aim of his investigations is "to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense."[17]

The remaining two verses (6.118–119) of the set which summarize Candrakīrti's thought on the relationship between analysis and insight claim a genuineness and an absence of sophistry on behalf of Mādhyamika analysists. Candrakīrti assures his readers that soteriology is the sole consideration in the deployment of analysis, and that when the analysis is applied to the theses of others with a concern only for their spiritual welfare, that this is a valid and genuine use of analysis.

In summary, Candrakīrti claims that the Mādhyamika analysis is an *actual* epistemology in that it comprises a *method* for comprehending reality. Given Candrakīrti's assertion that analysis is a causal agent for the salvific insight, how are we to interpret and understand those claims in light of the seeming distance between conceptual analysis and a purportedly non-conceptual insight?[18] Ashok Gangadean[19] has gone some way towards a solution by showing the structural foundations that underpin Mādhyamika analysis, and to him some of the ideas in the first few sections are indebted. Still, his explanation does not adequately account for the analyses that Mādhyamika's put forward in their texts. Hence, the concern of this paper is to develop an explanation that dovetails into the Mādhyamika literature.

3. THE STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF ANALYSIS

How are we to explain the purported soteriological significance of conceptual analysis? Can we legitimately read into it more than the mere logical refutation of philosophical theses? Clearly, *if* analysis is a technique for reversing the flow of thought, or at least excluding certain types of thought, its structural foundations must be involved with the principles (assuming there are such) governing the very formation of conceptuality (*kalpanā*) and its elaboration (*prapañca*), and hence the maintenance and dissolution of these too.

3.1. *Entity Discrimination* (*saṁjñā*) *and Predication*

According to Gangadean, Nāgārjuna's dialectic is best understood in terms of the classical (i.e. Aristotelian) model of predication[20] and the same is true of Candrakīrti's dialectical analyses. On the classical model, predication is the key to thought formation because thought arises in dependence on entity identification, and entity identification depends on the ascription of predicate(s) to an entity, such that define it, in the sense of giving it boundaries (*de-finire*) that mark it off from other entities. In the absence of predication there are no entities, at least for thought, and hence no basis for mental elaboration.

Such a view accords entirely with Buddhist theory: that recognition or discrimination (*saṁjñā, 'du-śes*) is predicative in form. According to the *Abhidharmakośa* (1.14b) *saṁjñā* is apprehending the features (*nimitta, mtshan-ma*) and this is echoed exactly by Candrakīrti in the MA (6.202). Under this definition, entity recognition depends on a conceptual (pre-verbal and perhaps frequently unconscious) location and ascription of features to an entity (*vastu*) that leads to class inclusion. As Paul Williams writes: "The *saṁjñā* "x (is) blue" . . . verbalizes the membership of this blue patch in the class of blue. The *nimitta* is thereby a sign of class membership and the articulation of a perception is only possible on the basis of class inclusion."[21] Thus entities are abstracted from the field of experience in dependence on their perceived possession of predicates appropriate to entities comprising different classes of entities. This structure of recognition is thus propositional and predicative for it depends on the linking of features (predicates) to entities (subjects).

There are some complications to this account, intrinsic not just to Buddhist theory but to the genesis of entity identification. For example, though entity identification via predication (i.e. the ascription of features to entities) is necessary in order to conveive of and think about experience it is not clear whether it is necessary for the having of experience as such. The experience of infants one thinks would tell against it being necessary. According to the *Abhidharmakośa* (1.44) consciousness (*vijñāna*) apprehends just the bare object (*vastumātra-grāhaṇam*) while recognition (*saṁjñā*) takes the process further by apprehending the features. On this count it seems that an entity can become an object of experience *prior* to the recognition of its features and hence that raw perception (*vijñāna*) does not depend on the mental recognition of entities. On the other hand, Nāgārjuna says (MMK, 5.2a), "In no case has anything existed without a defining characteristic."[22] And Candrakīrti (MA, 6.57cd) that distinguishables (*viśeṣaṇa*) exist in dependence on their having distinctions (*viśeṣya*), i.e. features. These statements would lead to the view that perception itself, insofar as it is aware of things, is dependent on recognition. The complication for Buddhist theory is that *saṁjñā* tends to functionally bridge and lexically float on a continuum between sense-recognition at one pole (evidenced by the use of English language equivalents such as sensation, perception and impressions) and cognitive or conceptual recognition at the other (emphasized by those using equivalents like ideas, concepts, and constructive thought). The real question is: can sense- discriminations be had independently of discriminations in thought, and if not then how and to what extent are sense-discriminations dependent on conceptual or thought distinctions?

Related to this is further problem as to the relationship in terms of dependency between concept formation and entity discrimination, both structurally and in terms of whether they form serially, and in which order, or synchronically with both being dependent on each other. The textual ground work for these problems has been done in an exemplary fashion by Paul Williams in his paper which I've just cited.

The significant and uncontentious point in our explanation at this stage is that the conceptual pole of discrimination at least depends on predication, i.e., on things being defined through their possession of qualities or characteristics (*nimitta, (sva-)lakṣaṇa, dharma, ākāra, viśeṣya,* etc.).

When entities are undefined, i.e. unpredicated, they are inconceivable, i.e. cannot be thought about, and hence are unable to provide a basis for conceptual discernment and thought construction. Hence, discrimination creates entities through a categorial abstraction. Once there is a conceptual discernment of entities, conceptuality (*kalpanā*) is established and from this the full gamut of elaboration (*prapañca*) takes off, weaving a dense and complex web of beliefs, judgements, inferences, etc. some of which become verbalized.[23] Consciousness ceases to be strictly phenomenological in its activity but engages in ontologizing and evaluative activities that lead to proliferation. As Williams writes: "“*Prapañca*” . . . designates the tendency and activity of the mind, weakly anchored to a (falsely constructed) perceptual situation, to proliferate conceptualization beyond its experiential basis and therefore further and further removed from the foundation which could lead to a correct perception via impermanence."[24] In other words, once entities have been distinguished by the process of predicate ascription, conceptuality complexifies and becomes progressively more removed form its perceptual basis.

Still, at root, conceptual proliferation and elaboration depends on and is subsequent to discriminations (*saṁjñā*) which can be analyzed in terms of subject-predicate propositions.[25] The soteriological significance of this is that *nirvāṇa* is the reversal of elaboration accomplished by a ceasing of discriminations.[26]

3.2. *The Principle of Definition Through Logical Opposites*

Given that concepts and hence thought formation depends on predication, the next question in tracing an explanation for the logical evolution and involution of conceptuality is: On what does predication depend? The insight of the Mādhyamikas, among others (for example, the Taoists, Saussure, Levi Strauss, P. Winch, Gangedean) is that predication arises out of an oppositional structure.[27] This insight, which has its weak and strong formulations, says in its general form that predicates "arise in and through a formal oppositional relation."[28] Or as Williams writes, "the referent of a *vikalpa* exists only as the negative of what it is not and vice-versa."[29] This means that all terms are *necessarily* defined (and hence gain their meaning) with reference to what they are logically not (i.e. their logical opposite). Likewise the logical opposite is defined only on the basis of the affirmed term. A logical opposite in this context, and contra Gangadean,[30] may be either a non-categorial (i.e. category unrestricted) negation or categorial (i.e. category restricted) negation. In both cases A and -A are *logically* and *reciprocally* dependent on each other. Each is defined, and so comes into being, in mutual dependence (*parasparāpekṣā*) on the other. Entity- characteristics are thus "other-defined" and not "self-defined". This is a principle of definition via logical opposites: that concepts are formed in the context of pairs of logical opposites. The concept of A is formed if and only if the concept of -A is formed and vice versa. In its predicative form this is that an entity A is defined and hence identified by some predicate P, where P is defined in relation to -P. Gangadean calls the pair P and -P an "absolute term or category".[31]

This then is the Mādhyamika's *pratītyasamutpāda*, namely the insight that all entities *depend* ontologically on their logical opposites, i.e. *all* that comprises the class of what they are not. Hence, in the MABh (228.5) definition of *pratītyasamutpāda* that "this arises from dependence on this (*'di-la brten-nas 'di 'byuṅ-ṅo*)" the two demonstratives must be referring to logical opposites, for example, (MABh: 227) permanence and impermanence, things and non-things.[33]

Though, in its weak interpretation, there is nothing particularly contentious in this we can go into it a little more by way of supporting its facticity, (Its strong interpretation, the rationale for which I'll give soon, is more contentious.) Logical contrariety says that any entity A can only be defined in terms of its logical opposite -A. Let us suppose that this is not the case. If it is not, there seem to be two possible ways in which entities may come to be defined. (1) A might be defined with reference *just* to itself,[33] or (2) A may be defined with reference to some other entity(s) B, C, etc.

We will take the second option first. This is in essence an *apoha* or exclusion theory of definition: that A is known, i.e. identified, in terms of being -B, -C, etc. The problem here is that entity A can only be so identified by such a procedure if *all* things other than A are included, for if they are not, A may be the very thing(s) that are not included. Yet, if *by definition* all things other than A must be included, we have returned to a principle of definition via logical contrariety.

As to the first option: that A may be self-defined. The presupposition here, speaking figuratively, is that a boundary of A (i.e., that which delimits it and so gives it an identity) can be found without reference to anything other than or outside of A. In other words, that A may be defined recursively.

For Mādhyamikas, though, an enity A can only be defined in virtue of having some boundary (*de-finire*). Were an entity to be without boundaries yet of the *one* constituency or medium (as would be required by it being genuinely *one* rather than several things) it would, I think, be uncharacterizable, according to Mādhyamikas. For Mādhyamikas, a boundary, as is required for something to be defined, could not be found within an entity, for by definition that would be internal to its boundary. A boundary or point where an entity A ceases to be A could only be located where and when A encounters (i.e. comes to possess properties or predicates intrinsic to) some non-A. Hence its definition requires a reference to something other than itself.

The idea that one can define A, not actually by encountering (or directly refering to) some -A, but rather by defining a limit or boundary from some point internal to A fares no better. An entity capable of being self-defined would have a *svabhāva,* under the Mādhyamika definition of *svabhāva,* and its definition would be a definition of its *svabhāva.* The point is, though, that for a *single* entity its *svabhāva,* which would be its defining characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*), would be uniform within or across the entity itself. If the characteristic were not uniform, if it *naturally* partock of divisions or internal modification, Mādhyamikas reason that one would have two or several entities depending on the number of divisions.[34] The point of this in relationship to the possibility of an entity being defined by itself is that there would be no mark internal to a *svabhāva* (given its uniform nature) that could provide a *reference point* from which one could define a boundary (i.e. a place where A would cease to be A). All points, facets, aspects, etc. of a single *svabhāva*, or we may prefer, the *svabhāva* of a single entity would be identical vis-a-vis their defining the *svabhāva* and hence could not provide a grid or texture, as it were, on or within which to discern one aspect of the *svabhāva* as being spatially and/or qualitatively closer to the boundary of that *svabhāva.* The only information that could provide a datum, as it were, as to where A would cease to be A would be where it encountered something other than itself, where it ceased to have properties or predicates deemed intrinsic to A. Hence recursive definitions do, always, include specified limits in order to obtain a category restriction.

3.3. *Dichotomization*

The creation of terms or concepts – and hence entity identification – comes about, as we have noted, via a bifurcating or *vikalpa*-type of conceptuality. As Williams writes, the prefix "*vi-*" in *vikalpa* emphasizes "the creation of a referent through the ability of language to partition and create opposition, to divide a domain into mutually exclusive and contradictory categories."[35] That is to say, entities gain their identity only within an act of dichotomization in which the defining characteristics of an entity are located in terms of *not* being their logical opposite, i.e. not being logically *other* than what they are. Though predicates arise in the context of and in dependence on their logical opposites the two mutually defining predicates that constitute the pair, P and -P, become bifurcated in the act of ascribing *one* predicate to an entity. The two contrary predicates which naturally arise together, in a relationship of reciprocity, are pared apart in order to gain a degree of predicative consistency such as is necessary if there is to be discourse and thought about experience. There is a progressive distancing of the two contrary predicates that is artifically maintained at the expense of psychological effort (and pain) and Mādhyamikas would say logical deception also. The reciprocal dependency or relational origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) of predicates is lost sight of, P and -P come to function independently of each other, as though they were self-defined, and their referents take on an independent existence of their own, i.e. appear to have a *svabhāva.* In contemporary terminology P and -P come to be conceived as externally rather than internally related.

In summary, where predicates first arise in the context of two mutually defining contraries

$$\overset{\longleftarrow}{\underset{\longrightarrow}{P\text{-}P}}$$

the dichotomizing faculty (*vikalpa*) bifuricates the two predicates and latches onto one of them in an effort to gain an entity that is serviceable as a conceptual referent.

$$P \longleftrightarrow -P$$

Entity identification is hence forward dogmatically rather than logically based.

Such bifurcation and creation of seemingly independently defined referents is *drawn out* and reinforced by elaboration (*prapañca*) in the sense that the dynamic of elaborative thought feeds on an input of concepts which become embedded in a conceptual framework by the functional role they continue to play. Hence *vikalpa* provides the concepts that can be conceptually synthesized and woven by *parikalpa* into a self-perpetuating stream of elaboration via the addition, attrition, modification, deepening, etc. of the relationships between concepts. Here then is the real *locus* for the creation of *saṁsāra*: dichotomization providing the referents for elaboration and in turn elaboration feeding back to provide the concepts that are necessary for the creation of "absolute categories" in the first place. This spiral of mutual reinforcement between dichotomization and elaboration being broken for Mādhyamikas by the tool of logical analysis.

This concludes the explanation of the genesis of conceptuality to the level of elaboration (*prapañca*). To summarize the etiology involved. (1) Conceptuality depends on entity recognition which in turn (2) is dependent on the ascription of predicates to entities such that define them. Such predicates are (3) created in dependence on their logical opposites and (4) predicative consistency (such as is necessary for recognition) is gained by hypostatizing two contrary predicates so that they can be definitionally separated and made autonomous from each other, thus conceptually isolated, this making each servicable as predicates for different things.

The fact that concepts arise through logical contrariety would go unnoticed for a pre-analytical consciousness and the act of dichotomization wherein the predicates which make up a pair of concepts are latched onto and reified would occur at a subliminal level. Only the fruition state in this process would be discerned, where concepts had gained an autonomous identity, i.e. at a point where concepts have been reified and able to enter into the flux of elaboration at the level of naming and verbalization. The subliminal or unconscious nature of concept formation would contribute to the innate (*sahaja*) quality of delusion as would the *habitual* way in which concepts are reified. A whole network of concepts would seem to be maintained in their hypostatized state, representing a continuous under-current of fixation that would be relatively uniform in nature given the quantity of concepts that are entertained by people and the complexity of the relationships between concepts. Any changes and vicissitudes in thought would appear as relatively minor and superficial when compared to a dense background of conceptuality. Hence the claimed trenchancy and deep-seatedness of ignorance.

Within the above etiological account of conceptuality (*kalpanā*) and mental elaboration one can explain why Mādhyamikas thought it appropriate to utilize logical analysis in the soteriological task of attentuating conceptuality. Hence this explanation or a variant of it likely represents a general schema of assumptions that were tacitly assumed to be true by Mādhyamikas.

There are some problems in this account which I will mention and though they may be telling I do not want to dwell on them. If the problems are telling it's because a *structural* description of the Mādhyamika analysis is open to both analytical critiques (for example, cognitive-psychological and logico-philosophical critiques) and meta-analytical critiques based on the Mādhyamika analysis itself. The latter are a real problem, I think, for any account of how the Mādhyamika analysis is meant to work can be critiqued in terms of the Mādhyamika analysis. And *if* the Mādhyamika analysis does work, it can expose contradictions in *any* structural examination of the analysis. The best that can be looked for in this case is not logical infallibility but a structural account that has an overall semblance of coherency and explanatory worth.

The first problem is that if concepts are created in reciprocal dependence on their logical opposites, i.e. are not self-defined, then how can the two terms or classes that define a pair of logical opposites, Gangadean's "absolute category", he pared apart and become (seemingly and apparently) self-defined? The problem is another way of asking the highly trenchant and problematic question of how a *svabhāva* can arise even as a fiction if *in fact* there is not a trace of *svabhāva* to be really had anywhere? To invoke a creation *ex nihilo* is obviously non-Mādhyamic, for at the *saṁvṛti* level Mādhyamikas give credence just to "birth from other." This problem has an analogue in the Advaita Vedānta with the origination of *māyā*. A problem related to this is the sense in which concept formation (and maintenance) is *necessarily* dependent on an oppositional structure if and when concepts are maintained *as though* they were independent. In other words, how do entities *retain* their identity after their bifurcation given that identity is said to be dependent on reciprocity?

A second problem is that of how an absolute or paired term comes to be created in the first place. That is to say, given that two logical opposites arise in dependence on each other, from what do the two arise? Certainly not from *prapañca* (even though we have said *vikalpa* and *prapañca* are mutually dependent) for elaboration requires the very terms that arise in an oppositional structure. And presumably not from nothing.

The answer to these questions will be in explaining the *structures* that *maintain* and *support* the seeming self-definition and independence of entities and allow the formation of even utterly false designations (*prajñapti*). Such problems as these are of course tolerable to some degree by Mādhyamikas as unavoidable in any *saṁvṛtic* account of reality, and perhaps we must content ourselves also with at least some degree of tolerance to those problems.

3.4. *The Paradoxical Structure of Predication*

The contention of the Mādhyamika philosophers, and assumption on which the consequential (*prasaṅga*) analysis hinges is that predication is logically paradoxical in virtue of being embedded within a structure of logical opposites.

The notion of identifiability via predication is inconsistent and without any sanction in logical thought because the reciprocal dependence of terms on their logical opposites means that the two terms that make up an oppositional structure must *both* be present in order for either one to be present. This is a *strong* interpretation of the principle of logical opposites in which reciprocal dependence means that one cannot have single terms, in isolation with respect to their opposites: either both or neither are present. The paradox of predication then, is that in any instance of predication there must be a simultaneous ascription of logically contradictory predicates to the *one* entity. Hence, in the very act of gaining their identity entities lose it as the presence of any attribute entails its absence. The affirmation of any predicate logically entails the affirmation of its negation (and vice versa). Wittgenstein seems to be making this last point from one angle when he speaks of a feeling "as if the negation of a proposition had to make it true in a certain sense in order to negate it."[36] And conversely, an affirmation is simultaneously a negation, meaning that an entity must be cognized as *not* what it is in order for it to be known as what it is. Thus contrary to its aims, entity identification is lost at the expense of predication, rather than gained. (On this interpretation the insight of *pratītyasamutpāda* as the dependency of terms on their logical opposites serves to negate the intrinsic identifiability of entities and in this explains the Mādhyamika equivalence that is drawn between emptiness and *pratītyasamutpāda.*[37])

The obvious query to this, assuming that terms are in fact defined in an oppositional structure, is that it is not necessary that predicates by coaligned, i.e. *both* placed or located on the same entity, it being sufficient that the two terms comprising any pair of logical opposites be at different *cognitive* loci. This is the weak interpretation of the principle. (We should remember that we are talking here about concepts and not the premediated features of objects, if such can be talked about, and hence that it is not a question here of assigning mutually contradicatory features to entities *themselves.*) The reason for the Mādhyamikas' stipulation of the copresence of two mutually negating predicates is an adherence to the letter of the principle of definition via logical opposites: that the concept -P has to be *present whenever and wherever* the concept of P is present for otherwise P could not be substained and vice versa. If they did not occupy a common spatio-temporal locus the two opposing terms would be separate from each other and so unable to define each other. In other words, P can only be defined *where* -P is defined (and vice versa). The Mādhyamika philosophers presumably felt that the copresence of opposites is logically entailed by the reciprocity of concepts involved in definition.

The aim of analysis is to clarify and expose the formally paradoxical structure of predication. In the pre-analysis situation conceptual bifurcation (*vikalpa*) is operative, Mādhyamikas would probably say rampant. It is a state where entities are identified through a process of attribute fixation. That is to say, the features of entities are fixed and assume a seemingly autonomous existence, and there is no knowledge or recognition of the principle that predicates imply their opposites. If there is an awareness of predicates *and* their negations, these are resident at different cognitive loci, at different levels of awareness and accessibility. This way predicates are isolated from their opposites and consistency of predication is maintained. Or alternatively it may be that the paradoxical structure of predication surfaces as an unconscious (or even conscious) toleration of a certain degree of predicative ambiguity that manifests as an equivocation at different points in time and/or with respect to different aspects of an entity as to its defining features. Such an ambiguity is perceived, for example, in Candrakīrti's estimation of the Sāṁmitīya conception of a self, the Sāṁkhya notion of self-birth, and the Vijñānavāda construal of the relationship between consciousness and its percepts as being different, by way of being divisible into a subject and objects of cognition, yet substantially the same.

Analysis is intended to demonstrate a paradox of predication that is opaque for a non-analytical intellect. If the structure of the subject-predicate relation is basic to analysis, it seems that any viewpoint (*dṛṣṭi*) or cognitive perspective can become an object to analyze once such a viewpoint reaches a sufficient degree of articulation and formed precision, i.e. once it becomes a thesis (*pratijña*). Presumably, also, it is expected that some commitment to a thesis is required of whoever holds it. Constructed theses are fairly formal from the outset. Natural viewpoints, by which I mean, innate cognitive and affective responses, presumably require a fair degree of investigation before they can be formalized with sufficient precision to make analysis appropriate. Various sorts of theses are able to be accommodated within the subject-predicate arrangement. The basic structure would accommodate simple theses – where single or multiple conjunctively joined predicates are attributed is a subject.

It also accommodates *substantive* theses involving nominative or substantial identifications or differentiations between entities and *complex* theses involving descriptions of the behavioural characteristics of entities.

In any instance the paradoxical structure of views is said to be clarified and made transparent by deriving a contrapositive thesis from any thesis that is being advanced. (The notions of thesis and contrapositive thesis here, are, of course, entirely relative, and the proposition that negates a predicate with respect to some subject may be advanced as a thesis, in which case Mādhyamikas would claim to derive an *affirmative* or positive rather than a negative countrapositive thesis.) The presumed paradox is that a thesis can be *only* affirmed at the expense of affirming the contrapositive thesis. In terms of the subject-predicate structure, consequential analysis claims, then, to generate antilogisms, i.e. the simulataneous affirmation of Pa and -Pa.

The basis for deriving contrapositive theses from any thesis, and so generating logical contradictions, rests on the fact that the copula itself, such as figures in *any* stated thesis taking the form of A *is* P or A *is* not P, is embedded in an oppositional structure of is/is not. The two existential or ontological qualifiers mutually define each other and hence for Mādhyamikas also mutually negate each other. Any affirmation such as is captured by the copula "is" (in either nominative or adjectival constuctions) in linking predicates to a subject, derives its *affirmative import* in opposition to the denial "is not". And likewise a denial of the form "A *is not* P" derives its import from the thesis "A *is* P". Hence the existential category: "is *and* is not", is comprised of terms that must be mutually present for either one to be present. And on this basis Mādhyamikas draw out contrapositive theses that they could claim are logically entailed in the affirmation of any theses.

In Mādhyamika texts the logical contradictions typically turn on a paradox thought to inhere in the *function* that the copula plays as *relating* the subject and predicate(s). The copula serves to *identify* some predicate substantively (as in the self-aggregation analysis) or attributively (as in the things (*bhāva*) re their mode of production analysis) with a subject. (Given these substantive and attributive uses of "is" we may prefer to think of the relationship generically as one of *joining* rather than identifying which has a substantive ring to it.) The negation of the copula, on the other hand, serves to differentiate (or we may prefer, divide) either substantively or attributively some predicate(s) with respect to a subject. Hence the copula and its negation function *relationally* to identify and differentiate respectively. But Mādhyamikas claim that identity and differential relationships mutually imply each other, and hence as logical opposites, mutually contradict (*pun-tshun 'gal-ba*) each other, and thus that the whole notion of a relationship is nonsensical.[38] A relationship of difference logically implies a relationship of identity or sameness, at least under the definition of *svabhāva* in which intrinsically or genuinely different things are necessarily *unrelated,* in that different things have no characteristics that are in common, and hence have no provision of a basis for any interrelationships at all, including that of difference. On this line of reasoning it is only where there is a similarity in the strongest sense of an identity that there can be a difference. Otherwise there is no point of commonality, and hence no *basis for a comparison* whereby things can be judged to be different. Hence Mādhyamikas have argued that whenever and wherever a relationship of difference is affirmed so a relationship of identity must be affirmed, as the notion of a difference implies a point of commonality where relata must be the same. Conversely, Mādhyamikas have also argued that a relationship of identity implies a differential relation, as relationships exist, by definition, in dependence on relata that are differentiable, i.e. that are different. Hence wherever there is a relationship there must be a difference. In the case where relata are the same they cease to function as relata and so there is no relationship. In summary then, for Mādhyamikas relata are the same *where and to the extent* that they are different and vice versa. Any relationship is paradoxical as it simultaneously affirms an identity *and* difference between the relata. Hence, in the context of their analyses the relation within a subject-predicate structure that is governed by the copula implies its converse relationship, and on this basis it is considered that a contrapositive thesis can always be derived from any thesis.

3.5. *The Destructuring of Conceptuality*

The simultaneous affirmation of a thesis and its negation is the logical fruit of the Mādhyamika analysis and it is here that the destructuring of conceptuality will be thought to occur.

The process of consequential analysis, where theses and their contrapositives mutually entail each other, can be thought of figuratively as a series of logical steps that serve to cause or induce logical opposites, theses and contrapositives (i.e. a predicate(s) and its negation with respect to the same entity) to *coalesce* at a common spatio-temporal locus. As Shohei Ichimura writes: "the predicament created by this dialectic is due to the unexpected contradiction which our convention implies, and this feature is suddenly disclosed by the particular context in which two contrary entities are juxtaposed over the same sphere and moment of illumination."[39]

A thesis and its contrapositive, which have previously become reified in relationship to each other and achieved in *artificial* autonomy, collapse into each other (as the affirmation of either is seen to imply the other) and mutually negate each other (as they are logical opposites).

$$P \longrightarrow \longleftarrow -P$$

On this interpretation the bifurcating activity (*vikalpa*) of the intellect would be opposed or countered by analysis, in the sense that analysis would act to show that the separation of logical opposites is constructed and artificial and that intrinsic- as opposed to inter- identifiability is a reification that is mentally imposed on experience.

Intrinsic identification would be negated because the only point at which there could be a real or analytically credible entity identification would be at an *interface* between P and -P but at an interface they would also mutually negate each other, (on the Mādhyamika assumption that P and -P, in order to define each other, are logical opposites). The real cutting edge of analysis, then, occurs at the cognitive interface between P and -P, at a *coincidentia oppositorum* where P and -P negate each other.

Mādhyamikas, one could guess, would say that though effort and application is required in order for an analyst to counteract the bifurcating tendency, in fact bifurcation, being an artificial condition, is maintained only at the continual investment of effort and that when such effort is relaxed that conceptuality would tend to naturally fold in on itself and dissipate. This at least would make some sense of the notion that emptiness is a natural, effortless, and primordial condition of consciousness and that *saṁsāra* if not simply the *need* to expend effort at least is characterized by an expenditure of effort.

This explanation for the destructuring of conceptuality by the Mādhyamika analysis assumes as we have said that terms arise in dependence on their logical opposites: the principle of terminological reciprocity. The explanation also assumes that the structure, formation, and development of conceptuality in the analytical context conforms to the three aristotelian principle of thought, viz. contradiction, identity, and the excluded middle, or in their predicative form

Contradiction (x) – (Fx & -Fx),
Identity (x) (Fx = Fx), and
Excluded middle (x) (Fx v -Fx).

These principles are implicated by the Mādhyamikas not simply as logical axioms but also it seems as principles of thought that are *descriptive* of the thought activity encountered in analysis. That is, they describe certain structures that govern the train and development of an analyst's thought at the time of debate and meditation, and so are *psychological* principles as well as formal axioms. And insofar as analysis is thought to have a liberative effect, they are also *prescriptive* principles, in that they represent an advocated structural basis for guiding the course of conceptuality. Mādhyamikas presumably felt that the structure of thought could be made to approximate to these principles in varying degrees and that it was in the pure form of their analysis that thought was guided by them. As these principles were approached in a process of intellectual development that culminated in their critical analysis it would also stand to reason that conceptuality would come to be governed by the principles, at least in the sense that thought would become *law-like* in its development.

It is useful to examine how these three principles function in the analytical context as logical axioms that are modelled or replicated within the conceptual development of an analyst, and how they constitute *conditions* for the *formation* of thought and, when *infused* with the principle of terminological reciprocity, a condition for its dissolution.

The principle of noncontradiction states that for any subject A, any given predicate P cannot be both affirmed and denied at the same time and in the same respect. The principle is stated formally[40] and used materially[41] by Nāgārjuna on a number of occasions, and is axiomatic for consequential analysis. Candrakīrti in the MABh (100) quotes the MMK, 25.14 and 8.7 where Nāgārjuna states and uses the principle – and says himself that something that partakes of the dual nature (*gñis-kyi dṅos-po*) of existence and non-existence cannot exist.

In the context of consequential analysis the principle of noncontradiction is used as a structure for dichotomizing the possible positions that can be assumed with respect to any matter into two contradictory and mutually excluding theses, i.e. A is P and A is not P, and in doing this the principle is structurally identical with the principle of definition via logical opposites except for the crucial fact that the principle of non-contradiction holds that A cannot be P and -P, where the principle of definition via logical opposites holds that A must be P and -P.

The principle of non-contradiction is utilized in the analytical context as serving to commit someone to a thesis at the expense and in terms of rejecting its logical opposite. In other words, a commitment to the truth of some thesis is gained in parallel fashion to the identification of entities, by assigning a false truth- value to a contrapositive thesis. And vice versa, the assignment of a false truth-value to a contrapositive thesis is possible only on affirming the truth of a thesis. The principle of non-contradiction is thus a *precondition* for the formation of theses and in a *pre-analytical* situation serves to (seemingly) provide a basis for theory validation.

In the analytical context, on the other hand, the principle of non-contradiction comes to fruition in *conjunction* with the principle of definition via logical opposites in its *strong* interpretation by the Mādhyamikas. This latter principle functions as a *condition* for analysis rather than as a precondition, though the principle of non-contradiction rightly acts as a condition *for* analysis also. The difference is that the principle of non-contradiction is at work in the non-analytical state-of-affairs in the sense that it is a tacit (and in logic a formal) assumption where the principle of definition via logical opposites is not. Together these two principles account for the destructuring of conceptuality.

These two principles force a dilemma upon the mind of an analyst. On the one hand, the principle of definition via logical opposites structures conceptuality *in the direction* of simultaneously affirming a thesis and its negation (i.e. simultaneously affirming the presence *and* absence of predicate(s) with respect to the one entity: that A is and is not P). And, on the other hand, the principle of non-contradiction structures conceptuality in a way that formally and prescriptively (and perhaps also psychologically) precludes consciousness from simultaneously affirming a thesis and its negation (i.e. it disallows that predicate(s) can simultaneously be affirmed and denied of the same entity in the same respect: that A is not both P and not P).

When conceptuality is formed by both these principles its structure is forced in the direction of assuming two mutually contradicting and excluding states to which there would seem to be two possible avenues of resolution. One, a non-analytical (and for Mādhyamikas regressive) resolution which is to retain the structure formed by one principle at the expense of revoking the other principle, *or* alternatively, an analytical (and soteriologically progressive) solution that adopts neither structure (given an analyst's commitment to the validity of both principles). The resultant effect of this last solution would be to introduce a stasis within a stream of conceptuality. In other words, the tension between the two principles can be relieved either by an analyst backtracking as it were to a non-critical standpoint where one or other of the principles lapses from its role as a structural former of conceptual development (one guesses that the principle of definition via logical opposites would be discarded) or by a dissolution of conceptuality. This last solution would take place, as we have said at an interface between two mutually contradictory conceptual structures where conceptuality would cease as the only logically forthright response to the dilemma of having to simultaneously identify and differentiate P and -P. The attempt to resolve these two opposed structures can perhaps be metaphorically likened to forcing a material into the apex of a conical tube with the difference that matter cannot destructure.

The principle of non-contradiction is revoked in this interpretation, on the insight that two logical opposites are not contradictories of which one is true at the expense of the falsity of the other, but rather are logical contraries in which both are false. In other words, the pre-analytical assumption that P and -P are contradictories is analytically rejected on the discernment – propelled by a strong interpretation of the principle of definition via logical opposites – that the two opposites mutually negate each other.

Though any central-state materialist assumptions and implications would be abhorrent to Mādhyamikas it is interesting to note in passing that the mathematician Ludvik Bass has hypothesized the the *reductio ad absurdum* method of proof may have "a radically distinct structure at the neural level"[42] when compared with constructive methods of proof. Where with the latter, neural modes may be characterized as achieving a point of stabilization or a lack of conflict, in the case of *reductio* arguments he suggests that the conflict between premises may have a neural analogue as a "persisting conflict between modes".[43] If the conflict between premises is mirrored at the neural level we could further speculate that this would involve a tendency for one neural structure to be formed or activated into two mutually excluding states, a tendency which could be responded to by assuming one state and relinquishing the other (this would be the Mādhyamikas regressive option, and would be exhibited as a failure to conclude a proof) or by a destructuring of the neural state due to its being formed into an impossible condition (this would manifest as a conclusion to a proof).

The significance of conceptuality becoming unstructured is that it cannot be identified with a concept in either its positive or negative formulation and so becomes vacuous with respect to that concept. The dissolution of conceptuality that such a vacuity of reference amounts to I would interpret as an insight into the emptiness of the concepts being analysized and so to their putative referents also. In other words the confluence of logical opposites and its resultant conceptual stasis would be the insight of emptiness. The notion of identifiability is inconsistent, and when it is seen that entities lack an intrinsic identity conceptuality dissipates.

An assumption in this explanation is that the logical falsity in simultaneously affirming a thesis and its negation also reflects a psychological impossibility, such that two logically contradictory concepts cannot be *held* within a unity of consciousness. David Armstrong[44] (among others) has questioned the impossibility of the cotemporal entaining of contradictiory beliefs and it is worthwhile briefly considering what he says as it helps to highlight the Mādhyamika's position.

Armstrong's first observation en route to his final position is that a person can hold contradictory beliefs but fail to discern the contradiction. He writes: 'It [the mind] is a large and untidy place, and we may believe 'p' and '-p' simultaneously but fail to bring the two beliefs together, perhaps for emotional reasons."[45] The Mādhyamikas would agree with this as a description of a non-analytical intellect, where in order to maintain predicative consistency, perhaps so as support cathexis towards some object, any indication of a possible predicative inconsistency would be unconsciously or consciously repressed. An individual may decide that the emotional attachment (or aversion) to be lost (or gained) or at least attenuated, on realizing an inconsistency is not worth forsaking and so prefer to remain oblivious of any inconsistency, save such an awareness destabilizing and undermining an affective response. A difference, on this point, between Armstrong and the Mādhyamikas is that Mādhyamikas would say that *all* rather than just some beliefs may be contradicted within an individual's fabric of beliefs.

Armstrong goes on to suggest that "it seems possible to become aware that we hold incompatible beliefs."[46] The (apparently) contentious part of Armstrong's claim (it seems) is that such an awareness need *not* result in any structural or categorial change to the belief situation. (He agrees that in some cases it would result in some modification in the situation, such as the revoking of one belief.) The point for Armstrong, though, is that the logically incompatible beliefs represent *two different states,* and hence the copresence of beliefs in the one mind is not their *coalignment*. Hence, there is no real conflict in his account with what Mādhyamikas would say. He is not proffering the "confusing situation" where two states are *actually* coaligned, but rather has described two or three situations of contradictory beliefs that Mādhyamikas would see as stages either prior to analysis or at some point within an analyzing context but prior to the coalignment (and concomitant destructuring) of contradictory structures. There is still to explain the roles that the principles of identity and the excluded middle play in consequential analysis.

A principle of identity is presupposed in the other two aristotelian principles and in the principle of definition via logical opposites. The principle figures as a *precondition* for analysis, and serves to guarantee predicative consistency with regard to an entity being analyized. Though it is not formally stated in Mādhyamika texts as a precondition, the notion of a *svabhāva* itself as the "object to be negated" in an analysis states a tacit if not formal assention to the principle of identity, as *ex hypothesi* whatever has a *svabhāva* cannot change its identity, i.e. cannot become something else without losing its *svabhāva.* In the meditative manuals of the Tibetans that oùtline stylized procedures for the private comtemplation of emptiness (as opposed to analysis through the medium of debate) an initial procedure is "ascertaining the mode of appearance of what is negated"[47] which in part amounts to an analyst *commiting* him or herself to the identity criteria for an entity being investigated, for example, that a certain configuration of forms, percepts, affections, etc. is a self and *regarding* that configuration to be just that self. It is reasonable also to suppose that dialecticians in the course of their debates would likewise try to irrevocably commit an opponent at the very outset to specific identity criteria for the entity(s) figuring in an investigation. The rationale behind this extraction of identity criteria is clearly an *attempt* on behalf of an analyst to *guarantee* a fruitful result to an analysis by ensuring that there is no equivocation on what is being analyzed at some point during an analysis, and to forestall the invoking of changed identity criteria, either of which would act to *dilute* an analysis to the qualitative extent of any changes in identity criteria (given the stability of other conditions for analysis). In other words were the identity of an entity that is being analyzed to be revoked in any degree *subsequent* to being established as an object to be refuted but *prior* to it being refuted, a conclusion would fail to bear on the changed entity with its revised identity criteria to whatever *extent* it was a *new* entity. So we see Candrakīrti, for example, being uncompromising with his opponents who proffer potentially ambiguous identity criteria or introduce mobile concepts, the definitions of which vacillate, and so undermine the full force of a Mādhyamika's analysis.

The principle of the excluded middle was upheld by Mādhyamikas, it seems, in order to account for the *complete* dissolution of conceptuality so as to substantiate the possibility of a thoroughly pure or unalloyed *nirvāṇa*. The principle says that any entity A, is either predicated by P or not predicated by P; that there is no other, third alternative. The principle is very clearly stated by Nāgārjuna (for example, MMK, 2.8b[48] and 2.21). Candrakīrti says (MABh: 100.16–17) that "through the pervasion [by existence and non-existence] there will not be even the slightest particularization[49] [remaining] (*bkag-pas cuṅ-zad kyaṅ khyad-par-du mi-'gyur-ro*)[50]". He also invokes the principle at various points, for example (MABh: 85.17–20) in the analysis of birth from other, the two views that a product and produce are identical or other are the only possibilities and likewise (MA, 6.169d) when the two possibilities of meeting and not meeting between a cause and effect are relinquished there is nothing else to consider. Śāntideva writes (BCA, 9.35) that "When neither things nor non-things are placed before the intellect then there is no other route (*anyagatyabhāvena*)[51] [for the mind to take], it lacks any support [and so achieves] the supernal peace." In the Tibetan meditative manuals[52] the principle is included as a second essential step (after the commitment to the predicative configuration and consistency of any entity that is to be analyzed). It is called "ascertaining invariable concomitance" and is a commitment to the principle that outside of two mutually contradictory modes of existence there is no third mode; or what is the same thing, two logical opposites pervade all modes of predication.

The principle, as Śāntideva clearly shows above, is utilized to rule out the possibility that a residuum of conceptuality remains after the dissolution of two logically opposed concepts. Were, for example, there to be a third conceptual position outside of a concept's positive and negative formulations then that third position would still be retained after the positive and negative forms were analytically dissolved. It would mean that some remnants of conceptuality would fall outside the compass of consequential analysis in the sense that they could not be analytically removed. Hence, the ascription of contradictory attributes to the one entity jointly exhausts all possible modes of predication with respect to that attribute. Thus when the paradox of of predication is exposed an entity is unpredicated (positively or negatively) with respect to that predicate.

I would like now to briefly summarize what has been a fairly elaborate explanation up to this point. What I have tried to do is (1) to isolate certain assumption that seem to be intrinsic to Mādhyamika analysis, and (2) describe an infrastructure to their form of analysis within which the Mādhyamikas can (in terms of its assumptions) claim with some measure of internal coherency that logical analysis is a technique appropriate to their practical endeavors of gaining a religious insight.

The assumptions that undergird the Mādhyamika analysis are these: (1) That conceptuality depends on the *consistent* ascription of predicates to an entity. (2) That predicates arise in the context of their logical opposites, which in its strong interpretation, as is required by the Mādhyamikas, means that the presence of a predicate implies its absence (and vice versa). This principle assumes a status equal to the aristotelian principles and its significance is that analysis is effective to the *extent* that this principle is structurally formative (*in its strong interpretation*) for conceptuality. (3)·The logical validity and formative influence and role of the three aristotelian principles of thought in structuring the development of conceptuality.

Given these assumptions, consequential analysis can be viewed as a technique for taking a stream of conceptuality that is (artifically) structured by a principle of non-contradiction (and loosely also by the principles of identity and the excluded middle) and introducing within that an awareness of a purported paradox inhering in conceptuality (on the assumption that concept formation is paradoxical). A stream of conceptuality, in other words, is redirected by consequential analysis into becoming aware of an inherent paradox in predication that by its tendency to compel consciousness to assume the psychologically impossible (or at least structurally unstable) condition of forming two mutually contradictory structures, results in a failure in the ability to predicate, and in consequence a destructuring and dissolution of conceptuality that can be interpreted as the insight into emptiness.

4. PATTERNS OF ANALYSIS IN THE MA

I now wish to link the above explanation back into the MA's analyses in order to give weight to its basic accuracy as a structural description of consequential analysis.

Let us begin by schematizing the MA's analyses. The first point to note is that the MA's schema of analysis, does not exhaust all entities that make up the universe. For Candrakīrti persons (*pudgala*) and phenomena (*dharma*) comprise the universal set, whatever is not a person is a phenomenon and whatever is not a phenomenon is a person.[53] Candrakīrti analyzes persons and [functional] things (*bhāva*), which are a subclass within the class of phenomena. He doesn't analyze non-products (*asaṁskṛta*).[54] These, though, are analyzed by Nāgārjuna, from whom we can pick out an analytical format so as to gain a full coverage of analyses here. (Person- conceptions, as I'll explain, can be both products and non-products.)

In the MA the two basic classes of persons and things are respectively analyzed by the seven-section proof based on the theses of a substantive identity or difference between the self (=person) and aggregation (and five other relationships that depend on these), and the four theses that proffer four modes of production; namely, from self, other, both, or neither.

Leaving aside the structure of the proofs (*upapatti, gtan-tshigs*) for the moment, these categories within which Candrakīrti analyzes entities are clearly rubrics from the stock and trade of the ancient Indian philosophical traditions. The person-phenomena distinction is part of the earliest Buddhist adhidharma, as is that between products and non-products. The distinction between the self as one with or different from the aggregation captures the differences between the Buddhist versus Hindu Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika selves and between innate versus intellectual conceptions of the person. Likewise, "birth from self" serves to characteristically distinguish the Sāṁkhya causal thesis; "birth from other", the Buddhist and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation; "birth from both" the Jaina view, and "birth from no cause" that of the Cārvākas.

Hence, though these categories, as I'll show, serve certain crucial *analytical requirements* by exhausting fields of discourse and conforming to the analytical structures outlined earlier (requirements that are quite independent of any *specific* categories), they are also conditioned by and speak to the Indian philosophical tradition in its own Buddhist and Hindu categories.[55] It seems that Candrakīrti (and Nāgārjuna before him) settled on their categories with both these reasons in mind, and thus that the categories reflect certain logical necessities and a historical conditioning. Our interest now, though, is with the logical reasons behind these category choices and with the proofs utilized to demonstrate the emptiness of these categories and their class members.

At this point we can usefully introduce a figure (1) that encapsulates these various categories and correlates them with the formats of analysis used with each category in the MA (and in extension from other sources).

The information above the horizontal broken line summarizes the


A is/is not a person (*pudgala*)
is a person
is the aggregation (*skandha*)
is not the aggregation
is not a person (= is a phenomenon (*dharma*))
is a product (*saṁskṛta*)
is self-produced
is not self-produced (= is other produced)
is not a product (*asaṁskṛta*)
is space
is one
is not one
is not space (= is the two stases)
exists prior to its definition
doesn't exist prior to its definition

Fig. 1. *A flow diagram of the MA's analyses.*

MA's analyses, i.e. its categories and modes of proof. Though the MA doesn't analyze non-products (*asaṁskṛta*) we can fill in below that line, though not without a little uncertainty. For Candrakīrti (and here he follows the adhidharma categories[56]) there are three types of non-produced phenomena, space (*ākāśa*), and two types of stases or cessations, a so-called non- investigational stasis (*apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha*) and an investigational stasis (*pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha*) which is the same thing as *nirvāṇa.* It is a little unclear whether there is one mode of proof that Mādhamikas consider can be utilized with all three types of non- products or whether each, or at least space and the two stases, are thought to require different types of proofs. In the MMK (7.33) Nāgārjuna gives, as it were, one generic proof that applies to the entire class of non-products. He reasons that the refutation of products (*saṁskṛta*) implicitly refutes non-products for "if a composite product is not proved, how can a non-composite product (*asaṁskṛta*) be proved?"[57] This is what I call a substantive proof rather than a modal proof for it doesn't analyze an entity in terms of its predicates. Instead it draws *directly* and non-consequentially on a principle of the interpenetration or transference of characteristics between logical opposites and in this it differs from all of the MA's and many of the MMK's other analyses. Also, it doesn't follow the structure I've outlined. I will elaborate more on this type of proof a little later.

Whether the MMK's analysis of *nirvāṇa* (chpt. 25) can be taken as paradigmatic for analyzing all the non- products, specifically space, is unclear. Further, the proof itself is rather loosly structured and relies on incompatibilites between certain definitions rather then on consequences issuing from the more stylized consequential proofs that we are accustomed to in other Mādhyamika analyses.[58] As such, this proof doesn't accord with the analytical infrastructure I have abstracted.

Chapter five of the MMK (vv. 1–5) analyzes space as one of the five base elements (*dhātu*). The analysis is consequential in form and temporal in structure. Space exists in dependence on a defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*). There are two possibilities, either space exists before it defining characteristics, or the defining characteristics exist prior to that which they define. (This last postulate is logically equivalent to space coming into existence after the existence of its defining characteristics.) The first postulate leads to the contradiction (5.1b) that space would be uncharacterized as space and hence would not be space, and the second postulate leads to the contradiction that space would exist before it existed as (5.4b) there cannot be defining characteristics where there is no subject of characterization (*lakṣya*). Though this analysis is (Pras; 103) only stated to be paradigmatic for the other base elements of earth, water, fire air, and consciousness it could certainly be applied to the two stases.

Finally we can mention that bsTan-pai ñi-ma (who like Candrakīrti works with the three primary classes of persons, products, and non-products) takes space as an example of a non-product and suggests that it be analyzed in terms of whether it be one with or different from its parts, i.e. directions.[59] It is unclear to me how the two stases could be analyzed in terms of their identity or differences with their parts for the notion of a stasis, such as *nirvāṇa,* doesn't readily lend itself to the idea that it may partake of being conceptually divisible, and so perhaps this method of analyzing space is not meant to be a paradigm for the other non-products.

In summary, there is a lack of clarity and consensus in how non-products are analyzed, and for that reason the figure is only tentative with respect to those details.

Returning to the figure, we should note that there is no *logical compulsion* behind the correlations or alignments of modes of proof and the entities that they analyze. There are some *logical restrictions* of course. For example, a production based analysis could not be used with a conception of the person that is characterized as being uncompounded or un-produced (i.e. most if not all transcendental conception of the person), nor, of course, with any other non-products.

Outside of these restrictions, though, when one goes beyond the MA and considers other Mādhyamika words, there is a considerable degree of variability as to how entities are analyzed and which proofs are aligned with which categories. The analysis based on refuting the theses of a substantial identity and difference between an entity and its constituent parts, for example, (as underpins the MA's analysis of the person) is also applied to phenomena (*dharma*). For example, the MMK (Chapter, 10) uses a five-sectioned analysis in examining the fuel-fire relationship, and bsTan-pai ñi-ma advocates its use in analyzing both products and non-products, Śāntideva (BCA, 9.80-83) analyzes the body (*kāya*) around these postulates, and Candrakīrti witnesses its use also in the investigation of phenomena by his heuristic instantiation of a carriage when describing the personality analysis. On the other hand, the analysis via the four theses of production that Candrakīrti and Nāgārjuna (MMK, chapter 1) both use with things (*bhāva*) is used in the *Ratnāvalī* (1.37) for analyzing the person (presumably a non-transcendental conception of the person, i.e. one in which the person is putatively a product). Besides a flexible utilization of the MA's analyses there are also many alternative analytical formats exemplified in the MMK, for example the temporal analysis with which Nāgārjuna investigates, among other things (Chapter 7) produced phenomena.[60]

Perhaps these textual variations represent an element of individual preference and a degree of flexibility on the part of Indian and Tibetan Mādhyamika analysts with regard to which proofs were matched to which classes of entities. Nor can we rule out that the correlations in MA, which appear as fairly standardized, represent a *natural alignment* between entities and proofs that became apparent to Mādhyamikas in the course of several centuries of analytical meditation and debate.[61] It is not impossible, for example, that the alignments in the MA represent a pairing of proofs and entities that Mādhyamikas came to believe were analytically efficient and expeditious.

A final point to note with respect to the figure is that the MA takes the person-phenomena distinction to be the initial way of dividing up the universal set of concepts through choice and not necessity. In theory a primary distinction needs only to exhaust the universal set and would also be satisfied by the products versus non-products distinction. In the instance of the products and non-products being the initial bifurcation, concepts of the self or person would have to be divided into produced and non-produced person conceptions and analyzed with the *different* analyses appropriate to each. This is possible for as we just noted the *Ratnāvalī* analyses produced self-conceptions with the tetralemma proof. Candrakīrti, though, decided for some reason not to do this, but to analyze *all* self conceptions with the seven-sections. There is no way of telling whether he decided first to bifurcate the universe of discourse around the person-phenomena distinction, and from this to align the seven-sections with all self-conceptions, or whether he has in mind that the seven-section should be applied to self-conceptions (perhaps because of the neatness and simplicity in using one method of refutation for all self-conceptions) and draw the person-phenomena distinction in dependence on his wish to utilize the seven-sections with self-conceptions.

4.1. *The MA's Analyses and the Core Structure*

The first point to observe in aligning the structural model with the MA is that the first two theses in both the seven-section analysis of the person and the tetralemma for analyzing things represent a thesis and its logical negation. Thus the contrasting relationship in the personality analysis is between a substantive identity between the self and the aggregation and a logical negation of that identity. In other words, to say that the self is *other than* the aggregation is logically equivalent to saying that the self *is not identical* with the aggregation. And likewise, the second thesis in the tetralemma that structures the analysis of things is a logical negation of the first thesis: "that a thing is born from itself", for the thesis that "a thing is born *from another*" is logically equivalent to "it *not* being born *from itself*". Thus the adjectival terms "other (than)", "(from) another", "different (from)", tib. *gźan*, skt. *anya, para, vyatirikta,* signify a difference or contrast that is between logical opposites.[62]

When we interpret the term "*gźan*" thus, we see that the first two theses in the analyses of the person and things embody the oppositional structure of contrasting a thesis and its contrapositive. At the linguistic level these two pairs of theses embody the "is/is not" structure, whereby a predicate is affirmed and denied with respect to an entity. In other words in the case of persons (*pudgala*) they *are* or *are not* the aggregation, and in the case of things (*bhāva*) they *are* or *are not* produced from themselves.

The analysis in terms of an entity being one thing or many things, likewise, embodies the same structure for "being many" is logically equivalent to "not being one". The same holds, for the more general patterns of analysis, (on which the MA's analysis of the person is based), that an entity is either the same as or different from its parts, for "being different from its parts" is equivalent to "being not the same as its parts".

The function of the term "*gźan*" in marking off a logical opposite also guarantees that these pairs of theses exhaust a universal or appropriate category domain. (I will comment on the differences between categorial and non-categorial analyses shortly.) The analytical requirements that conceptuality is structured by the principles of contradiction and the excluded middle is thus fulfilled through the creation of two logically opposed theses that exhaust a universe or category.

The second significant observation in reducing the MA's analyses to a core analytical structure is that the five final sections to the seven-section analysis of the person and the two final theses to the tetralemma proof of things *rely* on the first two sections of each analysis, and more significantly, that the analyses of the selflessness of persons and things can be *completed* within the first two theses of each of these sets of theses.

In the case of the seven-section analysis the last five relationships are structurally dependent for their refutation on the first two theses positing a sameness or difference (*tattvānyatvapakṣa*) between the self and aggregation.[63] That is to say, the refutation of these additional relations hinges on the earlier refutations of the relations of identity and difference. The five additional relations are thought to be common ways in which the self and aggregation may be related. The theses that the self is the collection (*saṅgha, 'dus* or *tshog*) or shape (*saṁsthāna, dbyibs*) are analyzed in parallel fashion to the identity of the self and aggregation, and refuted in similar grounds, namely that the collection (6.135) doesn't partake of the unitary characteristics of a self, nor (6.152a-c) the self of the plural character of a collection. Likewise the self is not the shape (i.e. form aggregate) due to similar contradictions based on the incommensurability between unitary and plural concepts. The two relations of containment and the relation of possession, on the other hand, are refuted on the basis that the relation of otherness is refutable. This is stated explicitly (6.142) for the two containment relations, and the relationship of possession is clearly dependent on the self and aggregation being different.

In summary, if the self and aggregation are the same then the aggregation cannot be *in* the self, nor the self *in* the aggregation. Likewise, if the self and the aggregation are not the same then the self cannot *be* the collection or shape of the aggregation. Hence, when the first two theses are refuted, *ipso facto* the other five theses lapse also (and any others specifying a relationship between the self and aggregation that could be conceived of).

The presuppositional role of the relationship identity and difference, and derivative or subsidary nature of the others is acknowledged by Candrakīrti in the Pras (194) where containment and possession are reduced to their presupposing a relation of difference, and is exemplified in the MMK (18.1) where the self is analyzed in terms of the two alternatives of identity and difference; according to Candrakīrti (Pras. 166) for the sake of brevity. bsTan-pai ñi-ma in his meditative contextualization of Tsoṅ-kha-pa's *Three Principal Aspects of the Path* (*Lam-gyi gtso-bo rnam-pa gsum*) likewise ascertains the personal selflessness through a procedure based just on the first two of Candrakīrti's seven section.[64] Hence, the logical consequences required for precluding possible views about the mode of being of the person, and thus the demonstration of its emptiness, are completed within the first two theses.

Likewise the analysis of things (*bhāva*) through the logic of the four can be completed – in the sense of gaining a full consequential proof for the emptiness of things – by refuting just the first two theses, that things are produced from themselves or others. This requires a little explanation. The third thesis in the tetralemma is that things are produced from a combination of self and other. In the MA (6.98) this thesis is refuted by referring back to the earlier separate refutations of production from self and other. The assumption is that any mixture (*miśratva*) can be conceptually resolved into its constituents which are then refuted individually. In some instances this seems obvious, for example, in the case where production from self and other occurs serially, such as a sprout first being born from itself and then later from another. Or, where one thing is actually composed of two developmental continua (perhaps developing in unison), where one continuum is born from itself and the other from another. What does seem problematic, though, is the instance of one thing being produced from self and other simultaneously and with respect to identical aspects of the object. This last requirement is simply the definition of an object being singular, i.e. having just one defining facet. Mādhyamikas obviously do not find this last case problematic and in so doing must be saying that there are no *real* mixtures, i.e. no compound processes that exist as a new mode of production outside of production from self and other. The problem is ameliorated, though, for in Mādhyamika philosophy the notion of production is a mental imputation (as in Humean causation) and hence it is enough that any mixture can be *conceptually* resolved into the two modes of self- and other-production. Another way of seeing the Mādhyamika's position on this (and this applies to the next thesis of production without a cause as well) is that self- and other-production jointly exhaust the possible modes of production and so production from both (or from no cause) as *novel modes* are excluded on this count.

The fourth thesis, that things can arise from no cause is excluded not only on the grounds of a joint pervasion by the first two but through a category error. As I've explained, the class of things (*bhāva*) is identical with the class of products (*saṁskṛta-dharma*), and so this last thesis in fact falls outside theses that explain the arising of things. That is to say, it does not provide an alternative at all, for it denies that very concept of a thing-product that it purports to explain. Hence, this final thesis is improperly included. The third thesis, then, is resolved into the first two, and the fourth is wrongly included in the first place.

Thus, with respect to the logical requirements of analysis (though apparently not for the psychological requirements) the five additional theses in the seven-section analysis are strictly unnecessary as are the two final lemmas of the tetralemma proof.

Given that we can discover the structure of two logically opposed theses as basic to the MA's analyses it is informative to summarize how the consequences (*prasaṅga*), or exposure of contradictions are created in these two analyses for they show the reliance on the deployment of the principle of definition via logically opposed theses. This principle states, we recall, that a thesis can be affirmed only at the expense of its denial (i.e. at the expense of affirming a contrapositive thesis). The principle accounts for the Mādhyamika generation of logical contradictions.

The logical contradictions sought in consequential analysis involve a simultaneous affirmation of two mutually opposed theses. From an analyst's viewpoint it is necessary that a contrapositive thesis is *seen* to be entailed by a thesis. With respect to the MA's analyses this means that within the first two theses in each of the sets of theses making up the analyses of persons and things, the first thesis of each set must be seen to imply the second, and vice versa, the second thesis of each set must imply the first. In other words, an affirmation of either of the first two theses of each set must imply the negation of those thesis.

4.2. *The MA's Contradictions*

This pattern, whereby theses and contrapositive theses mutually affirm each other is to be found in the key analyses of the MA.

In the analysis of things through their possible modes of production the two essential and jointly exhaustive modes are production from self and other. In the case of production or birth from self the MA raises two jointly exhaustive alternatives as to how there could be birth from self. These are that the product retains the nature of a producer or adopts a new nature. If (MA, 6.11 and MABh; 85.9–17) the product doesn't assume a nature different from that of the producer (which is viewable as either the product being the same as the producer, or vice versa) then as there are no perceivable differences between the producer and product, one doesn't have an instance of production or birth, for *ex hypothesi* this requires a product that can be discerned from a producer. Thus, here there is no birth or production *qua* production and so no production from self. The other option is (MA, 6.10cd and MABh; 84.19–85.1) that the product does lose its former nature thus fulfilling the requirement that products are different from their producers. But here the product ceases to be identical with itself as a producer and hence is an "other" with respect to the producer. As such, production from self (insofar as one is talking about production) requires that products and producers differ and so all production is production from another, including production from self if one wishes to confirm the presence of a *productive* process. The first option, then, ensures that the notion of production is retained in the thesis of birth from other by ruling out the case that the product and producer are the same, on the grounds that it forfeits the notion of production. The second option draws the consequence (*prasaṅga*) that production from self implies production from another. Thus the thesis demonstrably implies the contrapositive thesis.

The analysis of the thesis of birth from other proceeds likewise by raising two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities; namely, that a producer or cause is separate or not separate from a product or effect. The MA's analysis is not as crisp here as with the thesis of birth from self. The connection is taken in two ways, in a temporal sense and in terms of an interface between a producer and product within the continuum of a productive process. In the temporal sense the options are between whether a producer decays and product arises (or more simply, a cause and effect occur), simultaneously (tib. *dus-mñan, dus-gcig, gcig-tshi, cig-car-du,* skt. *samakāla, ekakāla*) or non- simultaneously. In the sense of an interface it is a question of whether or not a cause and effect or producer and product meet (*phrad, milana*) or fail to meet. The arguments are these. The first arguments reject the option that causes and effects or producers and products can be separate from each other, on the grounds that such an option forfeits the notion of production or causation. The claim (6.169cd) is that if the two are separate then the producer or cause cannot be distinguished from non-causes, in which case they cease to be causes or producers. The idea is that the notion of "otherness" doesn't partake of degrees or graduation, things are either the same or different. If they are different they are equally different, as it were. This makes nonsense out of the notion production as (6.14) *any* "other" could be posited with equal reason as the cause of anything else. There would be no restriction on what can cause what, outside of the requirement that causes and their effects be different. If there *is* birth from another then (MABh: 90.1–12) everything would cause everything. Thus, from this angle the notion of production or causation would be unspecified in the extreme and for this reason effectively forfeited. This conclusion can be obtained from another angle. Production, if it is to be at all meaningful, has to be a specified relationship in the sense that some "others" have to be precluded from being causes or effects in instances of causation or production. For example in the production of a sprout only seeds can be causes not elephants though both are "other" or different than sprouts, and for Mādhyamikas, other to the same degree. When the Mādhyamikas work with an assumption that things are either the same or different, and that there is no basis in conceptuality for the notions that things may be more or less different from each other, it is bogus to call on the fact of "otherness" as a means for precluding *some* others from being producers and products with respect to each other. In other words, the productive relationship cannot be delimited and so gain some specification by calling on the "otherness" between things, for if some "others" are precluded from being causally related on the grounds of their "otherness" then *all* "others" should be precluded, including producers and products that one would normally see as being related in a productive or causal continuum, such as rice seeds and rice sprouts. Hence a difference between producers and products renders the productive relationship meaningless. So far there is no consequence (*prasaṅga*), rather one option has been excluded on the grounds that it forfeits the notion of production *qua* production, and hence of production from another.

As there is no production in the first case, the only viable position for production from another would be where the producer and product are non-seperate. The MA considers a lack of separation between the producer and product in terms of their simultaneity and their meeting. The refutation of a simultaneity between the two (6.20) argues that the notions of producers and products requires that the two do not exist simultaneously, for if they did, a producer could not *give rise* to a product, in that for as long as a producer has existed so one would have a product. In other words, the product that exists contemporaneously with and for the duration of its producer could not be distinguished from its producer, for when they are simultaneous there would be no duality between a product as opposed to producer (given that products by definition arise from, and so subsequently to, their producers). Hence (MABh: 98.13–18) it is impossible for there to be a duality within a productive continuum or process of birth. A product could not be different from its producer and hence if there is said to be a process of birth at all then in the case of a simultaneity between a producer and product the process would be one of birth from self.

The argument seems clearer when considering the characteristics of an interface between causes and their effects. If there is to be a genuine meeting between causes and their effects, then at the point where they meet one must merge with the other. Were they not to be so connected one could not become the other. In other words, at the point where the producer is becoming the product (the seed the sprout) the two must be one. As Candrakīrti writes (6.169ab): "If . . . a cause produces an effect on [their] meeting, then at that time as they are a single potential (*nus-pa gcig-pa, śakyatra*), the producer and effect will not be different." And because the producer and product are identical in this case one has an instance of "birth from self". Hence, the thesis of "birth from another" is claimed to imply its negation.

In both of these cases of refuting birth from self and birth from another, one alternative is rejected on the grounds that it forfeits the notion of production, and hence could not be what is meant by *birth* or *production* from self or other. A consequence is then drawn out on the assumption that the only viable alternative (i.e. the one that retains a meaningful notion of birth or production) is correct. If it is affirmed it is claimed that it negates itself and so establishes its opposite.

The analysis of persons proceeds in much the same way. The first alternative from among the two that are essential to the analysis is that the self is different from the aggregation or what is the same thing, is *not* the aggregation. Two possibilities are adduced in this case. Such a self can be known or not known. If it is not known it cannot be known as an "other" with respect to the aggregation, so this option drops out straight away. The other option, and one from which the consequence is derived, is that a self that is different from the aggregation can be known. Mādhyamikas argue though, that if that self is known, which it must be in order for it to be known as "different from the aggregation", it must be the aggregation for the aggregation defines the limits of knowledge in the sense that what ever can be experienced is experienced in terms of the aggregation, specifically feelings, discriminations and consciousness. An assumption (6.124 and MABh: 242.2–16) is that if the self is not included in (*ma-gtogs*) the aggregation then it can be known, located, and described, etc. independently of and without reference to the aggregation, and that if this is not possible then the self is included within, and so is not different from the aggregation. If the self is "other" it is unrelated to the aggregation and so cannot be known through it. Given, though, that the aggregation takes compass of *all* cognition through the sense and mental consciousnesses and all cognizables through the formed aggregate (*rūpa-skandha*), a self outside of the aggregation cannot be known and hence a self cannot be different from it. Thus the thesis that the self and aggregation are different is seen to imply its negation.

The second basic alternative, that exhausts the modes in which the self could exist, is that the self is the same as the aggregation. This is a negation of the foregoing thesis. The refutation of this thesis hinges on whether the self and aggregation are individually discernable in the instance of their being the same thing. They either are both discernable or they *both* aren't.

If they are not discernable, one from each other, as the thesis seems to imply, then one could say that the self is the same as the aggregation for this supposes that there are *two* things which are one. There could be a self *or* an aggregation, but if both of them are in fact just one thing then there can't be the two of them. This thesis collapses because for Mādhyamikas there is no such thing as a genuine identity relationship; for relationships require at least two discernable relata. Thus, this interpretation of the thesis is not consistently formulated, and in fact describes a logical impossibility.

Hence, the thesis must be taken to mean that though the referent of the term "self" and referent of the term "aggregation" are the same, the referents can be distinguished from each other. On this interpretation, though, the identity relationship is forsaken for if things can be genuinely distinguished from each other by having different properties (such as being divisible in the case of the aggregation and indivisible into parts in the case of the self) then they are different. Thus, when a relationship is *retained* rather than forsaken as in the first interpretation, the thesis that the self and aggregation are the same, implies that they are different.

Thus, in the MA's key analyses of the person and things we find pairs of consequential arguments that purport to logically derive a negation of a thesis from its affirmation. This works for both the thesis and its negation and so the first two theses from each of the two mutually negate each other.

Though I'll not trace it now, a similar pattern is operative in the temporal analyses in the MMK and the generic analysis based on an entity's unity or separation from its parts, of which the MA's person analysis is an example.

4.3. *Category Restricted and Unrestricted Analyses*

One small point worth noting – as a correction to Gangadean's account of the dialectical logic – is that analyses can proceed (and do in the MMK and MA) through both restricted and unrestricted categories of analysis. According to Gangadean,[65] a critical formal condition of transformational dialectic is that the opposites involved are logical contraries, by which Gangadean means intensional opposites as opposed to logical complements (which by implication are extensional opposites). The difference here is that logical contraries exhaust a well-defined category within the universal set of categories whereas logical complements exhaust the universal set of categories.

In the MA it is standard (if anything more so) to analyze through logical complements and it is only when analyzing things (*bhāva*) that Candrakīrti analyzes through logical contraries as Gangadean understands that term. The internal structures of the analyses are different depending on whether the categories of analysis are restricted or unrestricted.

In the case of category restricted analyses it is necessary that the predicate in terms of which a concept is analyzed is its defining predicate or characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*). Thus, for example, in analyzing things (*bhāva*), Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti analyze their defining characteristic of "being produced" and adduce two primary possibilities that are opposites and which exhaust *only* the ways in which things can be produced, viz. from themselves or others. In the case of non-category analyses, on the other hand, the actual predicate(s) within which an entity is analyzed are immaterial, though it is necessary that the predicate exhaust the entire field of discourse. Thus, the analysis of the person could, hypothetically, be carried out not only in terms of its identity or difference with respect to the *aggregation*, but for any predicate at all. The aggregation is obviously chosen as it is a stock rubric for Buddhism. Theoretically, though, any predicate would suffice to prove the non-predicability of the person, so long as it is affirmed and denied of the person, and that the denial or negation of the predicate extensionally includes everything else in the universe. In other words, any P is suitable, so long as P and -P comprise the universal set.

4.4. *Abstract and Instantiated Analyses*

The procedure for analysis is again different depending on whether an analysis investigates a member of one of the basic categories or the class circumscribed by the category itself. This is the difference between an instantiated analysis that, for example, investigates the status of a sprout, carriage, *puruṣa,* etc. and an abstract analysis that investigates a class of concepts such as things (*bhāva*), person-conceptions, etc. The former analyses purport to demonstrate the emptiness of the concept or instance in question, and the latter claim to claim to prove the emptiness of an entire *class*, i.e. show that the class is void of any members.

The analysis proceeds a little differently in both cases due to the structural differences that we noted between category-restricted and category unrestricted analyses. In the case of analyzing a class of concepts it is sufficient that an analysis is confined to the two theses that make up a pair of logically opposed theses, even when they exhaust the modal characteristics of just one category, such as in the analysis of things (*bhāva*). Using this example, if the object of refutation is the class of *bhāvas* then a refutation of the *svalakṣaṇa* of "being produced" serves to prove that the class of *bhāvas* is empty of any members because there are no produced things. And the analysis is complete with no other category option needing to be considered for the object of of analysis was the class of *bhāvas.* On the other hand, if an instance of a produced thing, such as a sprout, chair, etc. were being analyzed it would be analytically incomplete to merely refute its failure to have been produced from itself or other, for though "being produced" is the *svalakṣaṇa* of the class of *bhāvas* it is not the *svalakṣaṇa* of any instance of a *bhāva.* For any individual *bhāva* "being produced" is one among many characteristics. Its *svalakṣaṇa* is whatever makes the individual *bhāva* that particular *bhāva* and clearly, "being produced" doesn't demarcate it from other produced things. Thus if an analysis takes as its object of negation an individual that is proffered as a *bhāva*, an analysis that refutes the characteristic of "being produced" serves only to show that the object is not a *bhāva.* It doesn't negate the individual as such for "being produced" is not its *svalakṣaṇa.* At most, such a restricted analysis shows that it is *empty of being a product*. To show that the individual in question is *empty of any real existence* the logical opposite to its being a *bhāva* would have to be considered.[66] Once it was shown to be neither a product nor non-product its emptiness would be ascertained. Hence, in instantiated analyses it seems necessary that the theses within which a concept is analyzed exhaust *all* the categories, i.e. that they are extensional opposites. Whereas with an abstract analysis that takes a *svalakṣaṇa* as the predicate in a thesis, an analysis can be completed, i.e. show a class to be empty, just by analyzing within category restricted opposites, or what Gangadean has called logical contraries. In conclusion, as a complete analysis, the category restricted analyses are applicable, in the MA at least, only to the *class* of products.

4.5. *Interpretation of the Diagram as a Flow-Chart*

As hinted at in the diagram heading of the MA's schema of analysis, the schema I've presented can be construed as a flow-diagram that traces the procedures or routes that it seems are meant to be followed by an analyst both in the course of his own private contemplations where he analytically processes his conceptual structures, and in the case of his acting as an analyst for some analysand, such as a non-Buddhist Sāṁkhya or Vaiśeṣika philosopher, or Buddhist Vijñānavāda, Saṁmitīyas, Svātantrika Mādhyamika etc. or any philosopher displaying these philosophical mentalities. Perhaps Mādhyamikas also acted in the roles of analysts and analysands within their own Mādhyamika fraternity. This is what happens in contemporary Tibetan colleges where Mādhyamika philosophers feign a commitment in debate to non-Mādhyamika tenets, presumably to facilitate their comprehension of those tenets, and perhaps with a view to eradicating traces of those tenets from their own philosophical viewpoint.

Interpreting the diagram in this way it reads from left to right. As an analyst works through, or *directs* his analysand to work through the procedure, he is confronted with a series of alternative categories that are logical opposites and which exhaust a universe of conceptuality or some well defined category structure within that (if the principle of the excluded middle is a structural *former* of conceptuality). He is confronted, as it were, with a series of Y intersections, at which he decides which route to take in dependence upon the definition of the concept being analysed and the MA's categories. One route or another is traced out which leads to a terminus which is a Mādhyamika method of proof that is appropriate to the concept being analysed, for example the seven-sections or tetralemma (or strictly the first two theses within these.) The proof, which consists of refuting a thesis and its negation that purport to define the concept in question, is applied to the concept and theoretically it is shown to be void of any intrinsic or self-referential identity. In other words, each route leads finally to a consequential proof for the emptiness of the concepts in question. *All* branches for *all* concepts that comprise the universe of discourse are in theory closed by the Mādhyamika analysis. The different routes serve to *locate* the thesis within which the self-existence of a concept will be refuted.

If an analyst were analytically processing his own conceptual make-up the procedure would theoretically be fairly straight forward. If he knew well the definitions of the conceptual categories that are used in Mādhyamika texts and *thought* in those same categories himself, then any concept would be allocated to its appropriate category and analyzed in terms of the analytical structure appropriate to that category. If the MA's schema were used as a guide then concepts would be allocated as person-conceptions or phenomenal-conceptions, etc. and analyzed with the designated method of refutation. Thus, rather than working through a route on the flow diagram from its very beginning at the person-phenomena distinction until locating the appropriate category and its method of refutation the knowledgeable Mādhyamika would be able to go directly to the appropriate category and refutation.

On the other hand, in the case where the Mādhyamika was unclear about the alignment of some concept within the Mādhyamika categories of analysis he would begin at the start of the schema with the person- phenomena distinction or at some subsequent distinction where he was sure, or able to easily ascertain, which category his concept was included within.

In fact the MA's schema here, is probably misleading in its simplicity for two reasons. (1) Analysts would probably have at their disposal the MMK's battery of analyses, this giving them a significantly more extensive array of both categories and methods of consequential analysis than the MA's. We have indicated just a few of the analytical additions and alternatives from the MMK before. The MMK's categories are more elaborate than the MA's and come mainly from the Sarvāstivāda abhidharma, and I guess its most significant difference from the MA is that it analyzes *processes* such as movement (Chapter 2), action (Chapter 8 and 17), time (Chapter 19), and the twelve linked relational origination (Chapter 20). Perhaps analysts devised their own hybrid schemas that drew on both the MA and MMK and also used proofs culled from other texts such as the *Śūnyatāsaptati, Yuktiṣaṣṭikā Ratnāvalī* and *Catuḥśataka*.

(2) If the twenty emptinesses that the MA (6.179-223) defines represent

categories that were analyzed in their own right in order to empty en bloc the entire membership of a particular class, or were categories within which instances of concepts were analyzed, for example, a particular phenomenon (*dharma*) as a thing (*bhāva*), non-thing (*abhāva*), external (*bahirdhā*) entity, etc. then an additional complexity would be introduced into the routines employed by an analyst. (In the cases of unit categories that have just one member, such as great=space, and perhaps the ultimate=*nirvāṇa,* etc. the abstract category and its instantiation are the same.)

Two procedures are possible with these twenty emptinesses. They could be allocated to one or other of the MA's three primary categories of persons, products, and non-products, and analyzed with the analyses suggested for these in the MA (and MMK for non-products). Or, alternatively, they could be analyzed with any one of the many analyses to be found in the many Mādhyamika texts that are suitable for the category in question. If the former course were followed the allocations seem to be these. The category of person is roughly coextensive with 1. the internal (*adhyātma*). The category of produced phenomena (*saṁskṛta-dharma*) or things (*bhāva*) would seem to include 7. products, 11. non-rejection (*anavakāra*), 14. self-definitions (*svalakṣaṇa*), 17. things (*bhāva*), 19. self-nature (*svabhāva*), 20. others' things (*parabhāva*). The category of non-products (*asaṁskṛta*) would seem to include 4. emptiness, 6. the ultimate (*paramārtha*), 8. non-products, 9. what is beyond limits (*atyanta*), 10. what is temporal (*anavarāgra*), 12. the (unmade) nature (*prakṛti*), 15. the unperceived (*anupalaṁbha*), 16. non-things (*abhāva*), 18. non-thing (*abhāva*). These allocations are fairly straightforward. There are some complications, though, with several of the bases for they bridge more than one of the MA's three basic categories. For example, 2. the external (*bahirdhā*) and 13. all phenomena (*sarva-dharma*) bridge products and non-products, and 3. the internal and external bridges all of the MA's three categories. At least in the case of these dual-natured categories one can hazardaguess that the problems involved in making *abstract* analyses (though probably not instantiated ones) of those categories means that they were not slotted into the MA's schema, for this would require a simultaneous application of different patterns of analysis, and perhaps means that these categories were not even used as classes to be analyzed in the context of debate and contemplation, their memberships being analytically captured by using two or more of the simpler categories.

In summary, is seems likely that Mādhyamika analysts would not have used the MA's schema alone. They may either have used the MA's infrastructure as a basic guide which was modified and expanded to accommodate other Buddhist categories such as the abhidharma and bases to the twenty emptinesses, or have used it just as a supplement to some other schema, perhaps based on the MMK.

Even if the twenty emptinesses, abhidharma categories, etc. were used by Mādhyamikas in their private practice and in debate with their contempories in something like the way I've suggested, the procedure would necessarily be quite different when a Mādhyamika was trying to engage in an analysis an opponent who held a different set of theses (*siddhānta*). The most significant difference is that the analyses could not presuppose the Mādhyamikas' categories. At the start of an analysis, at least, they must assume the phenomenological details of the opponents categories. That is to say, the Mādhyamika would have to agree (if there were to be any point to an analysis at all) that what was being committed in an analysis were the entities defined by the theses of their opponents. Thus, for example, if they are refuting a mind-only (*citta-mātra*) thesis or appreception (*svasaṁvedanā*), in the first instance at least, the Mādhyamikas are refuting these *as they are understood* by their opponent, here the Vijñānavāda.

In terms of the distinction between abstract and instantiated analyses, the MA for the most part takes the theses of other philosophical schools to be instantiations of its own primary categories. Thus, for example, the Sāṁkhya concept of *puruṣa* and the Vaiśeṣika *ātman* are taken to be instances of the transcendental theories of the person, and so are allocated to the category of transcendental self-conceptions for analysis. The Vijñānavāda theses of phenomenalism or mind-only and apperception exemplify 'birth from self' presuppositions and so are allocated to that generic thesis of the Mādhyamika. Likewise, the Sarvāstivāda thesis *against* the efficacy of the Mādhyamika analysis is viewed as being based on the assumption of 'real or inherent birth from another'. It seems that the abstract analyses in the MA of non-Mādhyamika philosophical viewpoints already correspond to the MA's basic categories, for example, the Sāṁkhya theory of 'birth from self' and the Jaina theory of 'birth from both self and other'. I am not sure whether the thesis that entities substantially exist (*dravya-sat*) is an abstract category. Where it is purportedly refuted in the MA it is specific concepts whose referent is claimed to substantially exist, namely the self for the Saṁmitīyas and consciousness (*vijñāna*) for the Vijñānavāda.

The procedure of the Mādhyamika generally is that *any thesis* establishing any concept, be it referring to an entity or process, can be allocated to one or other of a pair of categories that exhaust the universe or a well defined domain of concepts. The pervasion of all possibilities by a pair of concepts, such as the self and phenomena, self-born and other-born, etc. ensures that no concept of an opponent can fall outside the Mādhyamikas categories, and means that all theses are accommodated within the MA's schema. It is not really clear from the MA who actually assigns an opponent's thesis to one or other of the Mādhyamikas' generic theses. In theory at least, there is no need for the Mādhyamikas' themselves to assign an opponent's thesis to one of its own generic formulations. It is valid for an opponent to make an assignment himself (and one would think most skilful for the Mādhyamika to do it this way, for then there is presumably no question of coersion on the part of the Mādhyamika). In theory, also, this allocation to one of the Mādhyamika's categories is an innocuous exercise for an opponent as it doesn't require any modification at all in the identity criteria for a concept.

If the MA reflects the real climate and action of Indian inter-religious philosophical debate,[67] it seems (and is quite to be expected) that there were real problems when it came to the practice of analysis between Mādhyamikas and holders of other Buddhist and Hindu philosophies. The Mādhyamika analyses demand (and require) a rigid designation of whatever concepts are analyzed. Mādhyamikas speak in blacks and whites, of things existing or not existing, being one or many, etc. for the reasons I mentioned earlier when detailing the role of the principle of identity. The analyses also demand a rigour of logical development.

The impression one gains from the MA is that an opponent to the Mādhyamikas' analysis may not wish to be directed through the various decisions that need to be made en route to a final consequential refutation of a thesis. At the least he may *hesitate* at the various intersections on the flow-chart or at worst, from the Mādhyamikas' viewpoint, may refuse to proceed. He may *resist* in various ways the Mādhyamikas' efforts to analytically process his theses. For example, by moves such as failing to commit himself to a sufficiently rigorous and syntactically precise elaboration of his thesis, i.e. by obscuring his philosophical commitments, as it were and by *refusing* to clarify opaque concepts when asked to by the Mādhyamikas. Finally, an opponent may change the definitions or identity criteria of the concepts being analyzed part way through an analysis (presumably when he feels that he is getting on tenuous ground with respect to the integrity of his concept(s)). Any of these moves serves to avoid the Mādhyamika logic.

We see these efforts to avoid the Mādhyamika logic and the Mādhyamika's own treatment of such moves in Candrakīrti's treatment of the Sāṁkhya's 'self-birth' thesis and Vijñānavāda thesis of the substantial existence (*dravya-sat*) of consciousness (*vijñāna*). In the first case Candrakīrti makes short shrift of the Sāṁkhya view that the effect exists in an unmanifest form at the time of the cause. In this case Candrakīrti requires the Sāṁkhya to commit itself to a *genuine* identification of causes and effects rather than to speak in terms of a non-manifest existence. The implication for Candrakīrti is that if they don't mean a genuine identification then they must mean a genuine difference, as this is the only option left. And if this is not what they mean then the Mādhyamikas have every right to classify their thesis as implying a *genuine* identification (even if this is not what the Sāṁkhyas mean) for this is the only option left once they have rejected the interpretation that they mean a genuine difference between causes and effects.

Candrakīrti repeats his seemingly harsh treatment of an opponent's views, and alignment of an opponent's categories with his own, in his treatment of the Vijñānavāda concept of the substantial existence of consciousness. Consciousness either exists or it doesn't. If it doesn't exist the Vijñanavāda violate their tenet of the existence of consciousness. If it exists in anyway other than as a nominality it exists under the Mādhyamika definition of self-existence (*svabhāva*). Here we see Candrakīrti construing a substantial existent (*dravya-sat*) to be functionally the same as a self-existent even though the Vijñānavāda could hardly agree with that alignment. That is to say, Candrakīrti ascribes the same properties to substantial existence as he does to self-existence, for example, that things so characterized are unable to enter into causal (*hetu*) or conditional (*pratyaya*) relationships with other entities, and refutes their thesis on the basis of those properties (for example, that a consciousness so characterized could not be modified by factors such as the quality of sense-organs) even though the Vijñānavāda themselves ascribe contrary properties to their notion of substantial existence, for example, that it is dependent on other things. The rationale behind Candrakīrti's distortion here is of course highly questionable, and must be that a functional distinction between substantial and self-existence must be bogus for in the analytical context at least there is only existence and non-existence.[68]

In summary, then, the schema as presented in the figure applies to analysis conducted within the Mādhyamikas' own school and also *guides* the dialogical exchanges between the Mādhyamikas and other philosophers, as these are reported in the MA. For Mādhyamika philosophers, who would have been religiously committed to the worth and validity of consequential analysis, the procedures were presumably followed in a step-wise and fairly methodical fashion. For non-Mādhyamikas the assumptions and logic underlying consequential analysis would have been at variance with their own epistemologies with the tension between the two meaning that analysis would naturally be laboured, and from a Mādhyamika perspective perhaps oftentimes incomplete, i.e. inconsequential.

4.6. *Model Analysis and Substantive Bi-Negative Conclusions*

Before concluding this paper I wish to make some brief remarks about the ontological ramifications of analysis and look at the question of implicative (*prayudāsa*) versus non-affirming negations (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*).

The two key analyses in the MA (and temporal and "one versus many" analyses also) are modal in structure for they analyze an entity in terms of its modalities or characteristics. That is to say, the consequences refute theses that establish an entity as having certain modal properties such as being born from themselves, different from some other entity, etc. In doing so they reflect the predicative structure of conceptuality. Though the analyses are modal in structure their conclusions have a substantive import. That is to say, though the analyses *directly* take up the question of the presence or absence of the characteristics of entities the conclusions made with respect to their characteristics bear on the onological status of the entities themselves. This is because for Mādhyamikas there is an ontologically reciprocal dependence (*parasparāpekṣā*) between the status of the subject of characteristics (*lakṣya*) and characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) themselves. The dependency at work in the case of claiming a substantive import to these analyses is that the existence of entities depends on the ascription of defining characteristics to them.[68] Thus, the event of a modality being simultaneously neither affirmed nor denied of an entity takes it outside the realm of predication (with respect to the modalities in question) and so beyond findability or knowability in the *saṁvṛtic* sense.

The important point to see is that non-predicability is different from a negative predication. Where as the absence of a predicate tells one *something* about an entity (it gives information that can help in the identification of an entity), non-predicability, as expressed in the logical syntax of the bi-negative disjunction, doesn't help in the identification of an entity. In other words, it doesn't give one *any* information that could help in ascertaining whether or not an entity exists. Thus the bi-negation leaves the ontic status of a concept undertermined.

The substantive conclusion is derived differently depending on whether an analysis is category restricted or unrestricted. In the case of a category restricted analyses the predicate or modality chosen to be analyzed is the defining characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) of some entity. The conclusion to a category restricted analysis is that the defining characteristic of some entity is neither present with nor absent from the entity in question. The substantive import of this conclusion derives from the fact that if the defining charactistic is not present the entity *cannot* be affirmed to exist. If the defining characteristic is present the entity *must* be affirmed to exist. Thus, if the defining characteristic is neither present nor not present the entity which is identified by the characteristic neither exists nor doesn't exist. This amounts to saying that the entity is empty of an intrinsic identity.

In non-category restricted analyses an entity is shown to be empty rather than non-existent through the exclusion of *all* possible predicates as being inapplicable to an entity. The entity A is neither a P nor a -P where P and not P exhaust the universal set of modalities. The nihilistic conclusion that A doesn't exist would be errantly drawn from the modal conclusion for the non-existence of something presupposes the applicability of predicates to an entity which are in actuality absent. In other words, in order to determine that A is non-existent one would have to know that A is, such that one could know it didn't exist. If A goes uncharacterized because all predicates are inapplicable to it, its existence or non-existence is unascertainable as the entity itself would be unidentifiable. In other words, A couldn't be a non-existent entity for it wouldn't be an entity at all.

The bi-negative conclusion is also arrived at more directly, it seems, by reflecting directly on the dependency of concepts on their logical opposites. Thus, when it is escertained that there is no existence, no non-existence is also ascertained for in the absence of existence there is nothing to be negated. Thus, the negation of existence in Mādhyamika logic implies the negation of non-existence.

Reflecting directly in this way, from a negation of existence (or an existent) to the bi-negative conclusion that there is neither existence nor non-existence, (or neither an existent nor a non-existent) is what I would call a substantive analysis for it goes directly to the bi-negative conclusion without analyzing the modality involved in *analytically* ascertaining the *lack* of non-existence. (It relies on the fact that the concept of non-existence logically implies "existence" insofar as a negative implies the concept that is negated.) A substantive conclusion is tacked onto one prong of a consequential (or partitive) analysis[70] that establishes non-existence *qua* existence, or the non-existence, or the non-existence of the proffered existent.

Nāgārjuna analyzes directly to the bi-negative conclusion from one half of an ultimacy analysis on several occasion in the MMK.[71] Perhaps this method of analysis represents an insider's technique for it *presupposes* a commitment to an awareness of the principles of the reciprocal dependence of concepts and their logical opposites and the transference of characteristics between logical opposites. Thus, when existence is negated so is non-existence. On the other hand, a modal analysis (which is genuinely consequential in structure) doesn't presuppose an appreciation of these two principles even though they are integral to the consequential method of proof.

4.7. *Implicative and Non-Affirming Negative*

As I am trying to read certain practical aspects of the Mādhyamika logic into the MA I'd like to make some basic observations about the applicability of the distinction between implicative (*parudāsa*) and non-affirming negations (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) in the context of Mādhyamika praxis.

The distinction between these two types of negations in Mādhyamika logic is well defined. An implicative negation implies the affirmation of a contrapositive thesis by the negation of a thesis. A non-affirming negation negates a thesis. In other words, it is a pure and simple negation that doesn't establish anything positive. It may be difficult at first to see how the negation of a thesis can fail but to affirm the negative of the thesis. The idea of a non-affirming negation, though, is that it *removes* the thesis but does not affirm the contrapositive thesis. A non-affirming negation of either a thesis or contrapositive thesis would establish the middle-view in that it avoided affirming either the thesis or contrapositive thesis. In other words, the non-affirming negation states a mere absence or vacuity of a thesis formulation.

The *doctrinal* position of the Prāsaṅgika- Mādhyamika is that its own negations are non-affirming. Candrakīrti states this quite clearly in the *Pras*[72] as a point that distinguishes him from the Svātantrika philosophy of Bhāvaviveka.[73] The point is also made in the MABh (81.15–19) where

Candrakīrti characterizes the negations (*ma-yin*) involved in the refutation of all four theses of the tetralemma comprising the productive analysis as having no affirmative import because they mean a prohibition or exclusion (*dgag-pa*).[74] This means, for example, that when Candrakīrti negates the thesis of "birth from self" he does not mean to imply that the negation affirms that things are born from another. Although Candrakīrti specifies only that the negations in the analysis of things (*bhāva*) are non-affirming we can assume with consistency that the negations in the analysis of the person are likewise non-affirming and that from the viewpoint of Mādhyamika theory the refutation that the self is identical with the aggregation doesn't entail that it is different from the aggregation and vice versa.

The most significant observation that can be glossed from the MA – where theses and contrapositive thesis are *serially* refuted – is that the theoretical position of Candrakīrti: that his negations are non-affirming, is unlikely to always have been borne out in the context of practice. There seem to be two reasons for a serial refutation. By a serial refutation I mean the *connected* refutation of a thesis and its negation, not the occurence of refuting one thesis and then a subsequent but *unrelated* refutation of its negation as seems to be the case when, for example, Candrakīrti refutes the Sāṁkhya conception of self-birth and then the Buddhist conception of other-birth. Firstly we can note that Candrakīrti uses two consequential arguments refuting both a thesis and its negation is his refutation of the Saṁmitīya's conception of the self. In this case Candrakīrti needn't be deviating from his claimed theoretical stance of furnishing only non-affirming negations. To refute the Saṁmitīya conception of a self, Candrakīrti must refute both a thesis: that the self is the aggregation, and its negation: that the two are different, even where both refutations are non-affirming, for if only one of the positions is refuted a residuum to the Saṁmitīya's self would remain. The meditative contextualization of consequential analysis where *both* theses: that the self is the same and different are refuted, can be interpreted like this also. Thus the one meditator (even in the one meditation) may refute both theses because his *natural* and hence relevent conception of the self is formalized as a combination of the two theses, much as the Saṁmitīyas describe it.

Even so, from the viewpoint of praxis it seems that the Mādhyamikas' negations may not always be non-affirming, and that the non-affirming aspect of their negation is a statement of *intention* and not something intrinsic to their style of logic.[75] From this perspective, the mere intention by Mādhyamikas that their refutation of a thesis doesn't affirm a contrapositive thesis need not preempt the possibility (even likelihood!) that an opponent may, subsequent to a convincing refutation of his thesis, slide in his viewpoint so as to affirm, however moderately or tentatively, the negation of his initial thesis. And in such a case the Mādhyamikas – realizing that an opponent may slide in his viewpoint, and wishing also to bring him to the point of rejecting all viewpoints – would have to frame refutations to a thesis and its negation. Hence, another interpretation of the serial refutation of theses and contrapositive theses in both the MA and in the meditative contextualization is that Mādhyamikas were wise to a tendency among their adversaries (and perhaps within their own thought also) to construe their negations as implicative.[76] Hence when Candrakīrti caps his refutations with an affirmation of a negation he may be meaning to vocalize and bring to consciousness what he believes to be a conclusion in the thought of his analysand.

Disregarding a case such as the Saṁmitīya's amalgamed self-conception, these two different types of negation, the implicative and non-affirming, respectively make for conjunctive and disjunctive use of consequences. If negations are affirming then both a thesis and its negation must be refuted in order to exclude the possible views that can be adopted. If the negations are intended and more importantly are *taken* as non-affirming then the middle-view that precludes all viewpoints can be gained by the refutation of a single thesis in isolation from the refutation of its contrapositive thesis, for in forsaking a thesis a philosopher does not take up the contrapositive thesis.

With respect to the confluting or coincidence of opposites that we talked about earlier, the conflution would seem to take place naturally and as intergral to analysis in the case of non-implicative negations, as the basis for refuting a thesis is by the derivation of its negation or opposite. On the other hand, the conflution would seem artifical, and a separate exercise to analysis itself in the case of affirming negations as two contradictory conclusions are generated *serially* within a mind-stream and would have to be temporally aligned as an act separate and subsequent to the derivation of those two appropriately juxtaposed consequences.

5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it seems that the core logical structure outlined in the first half of this paper is at work in the MA's analyses, and hence, that given the Mādhyamika's assumptions about the formative influence of the three principles of thought on the formation and maintenance of conceptualization, and their presupposition that concepts depend on their logical opposites, it can be believed with some measure of consistency and coherency that dialectical analysis did have a salvific effect.

Dept. of Studies in Religion,
University of Queensland
St Lucia, Queensland, Australia 4067

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS

BCA	*Bodhicaryārvatāra* of Śāntideva. V. Bhattacharya (ed.). *Bodhicaryāvatāra.* Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1960.
JIABS	*Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies.*
JIP	*Journal of Indian Philosophy.*
MA	*Madhyamakāvatāra* of Candrakīrti. Louis de la Vallée Poussin (ed.). *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti.* Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag (reprint), 1970.
MABh	*Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya* of Candrakīrti. Louis de la Vallée Poussin (ed.). *op. cit.* Also abbreviated as *Bhāṣya.*
MMK	*Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* of Nāgārjuna.
PEW	*Philosophy East and West.*
Pras	*Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti. M. Sprung (tr.). *Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way.* Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1979.
RSH	*dBu-ma-la 'jug-pai bstan-bcos-kyi dgoṅs-pa-rab-tu gsal-bai mi-loṅ* of dGe-'dun-grub. In the *Collected Works (gSuṅ-bum) of dGe-'dun-grub-pa.* Sikkim, Gangtok: Dondrup Lama, Deorali Chorten, 1978.
VPTd	Louis de la Vallée Poussin (tr.). "*Madhyamakāvatāra* Traduction d'apres la version tibertaine." *Le Museon,* N. S., 8 (1907), 249–317; 11 (1910), 271–358; and 12 (1911), 235–328.

NOTES

[1] K. K. Inada, *Nāgārjuna, A Translation of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an Introductory Essay* (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970), p. 18. He also writes with more caution (p. 34, n. 23) that "whether *prasaṅga* is really a method for educing truth or only a method of criticism is a moot question."

[2] J. W. de Jong, 'Emptiness', JIP, 2 (1972) p. 14 writes that the "negative dialect does not lead to the understanding of the Ultimate Truth but prepares the ground for the true insight to be gained through concentration." de Jong's observation that concentration is thought to be necessary and integral to insight is obviously correct, witness the

doctrine of *śamatha-vipaśyanā- yuganaddha*. On this see Geshe Sopa, 'Śamathavipaśyanā-yuganaddha' in Minoru Kiyota (ed.), *Mahayana Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1978), pp. 46–65. de Jong seems to imply that dialectical analysis is a necessary condition for insight.

[3] F. J. Streng, *Emptiness – A Study in Religious Meaning* (Nashville, N.Y.: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 76.

[4] See T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960) for example pp. 160 and 219.

[5] He writes, for example, *Emptiness*, p. 148, that "the dialectic is itself a means of knowing" and (p. 149) that in "Nāgārjuna's negative dialectic the power of reason is an efficient force for realizing Ultimate Truth." Yet (p. 94) that the ultimate truth (*paramārthata*) may "manifest itself through logical reasoning as well as intuition." Streng has confirmed this view with me in conversation.

[6] Ashok Gangadean, 'Formal Ontology and the Dialectical Transformation of Consciousness', PEW, 29.1 (Jan. 1979), 37.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[8] Both *kalpanā* and *vikalpa* were translated by Tibetan translators as *rtog-pa*, though *vikalpa* often as *rnam-par rtog-pa* as well.

[9] See VPTd. p. 280.

[10] MMK 25.24 speaks of *nirvāṇa* being gained by the halting of *prapañca* (Inada, *Nāgārjuna*, p. 159).

[11] See Pras on MMK 18.7 (M. Sprung, *Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way* (Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1979), 179.)

[12] Sanskrit and Tibetan in V. Bhattacharya (ed.) p. 194. The Tibetan verses here are out of step by one line. For M. J. Sweet's translation see *Śāntideva and the Mādhyamika: The Prajñāpāramitā- pariccheda of the Bodhicaryāvatāra* (unpub. Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1977), p. 82.

[13] Of the Pras, Sprung, in the intro. to *Lucid Eposition. . .*, p. 20, writes that "Beatitude – *nirvāṇa* – is understood in terms of two criteria: (1) the coming to rest of all ways of taking things (or of all ways of perceiving things); (2) the coming to rest of all named things [prapañca] (or of language as a naming activity). These two criteria are in Candrakīrti's application virtually one, though the second is the preferred formulation." A more elaborate account of what ceases (at Pras 25.24) are (Sprung, p. 20) "(1) assertive verbal statements, (2) discursive thought, (3) the basic affliction, (4) innate modes of thought (*vāsanā*), (5) objects of knowledge, (6) knowing".

[14] MA (6.160a-c) likewise relates that reality is easily entered by the seven-sectioned analysis of the person due to its showing that the person is unfindable.

[15] M. J. Sweet, *op. cit.*, p. 129. For the Sanskrit see V. Bhattacharya (ed.) p. 214.

[16] See *Milinda Pañha*, T. W. Thys Davids (tr.) as *The Question of King Milinda* (New York: Dover (reprint), 1980), pp. 95–96.

[17] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (tr. G. E. M. Anscombe) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), p. 133.

[18] The extent to which analysis is an integral meditative technique in Buddhist traditions other than the Mādhyamika is a complex question. Certainly all Buddhist traditions use *vipaśyanā* meditations but only the Prāsaṅgika-mādhyamikas *say* that consequential analysis is a necessary condition for liberation. According to Hopkins, Prāsaṅgikas hold that they and Hīnayāna Buddhists alike cognize emptiness through the use of consequences with the only difference being that Mahāyānists have a larger variety of

logical approaches at their disposal, for example the many establishments in the MMK. See P. J. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (unpub. Ph. D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1973), p. 488. Though at first sight Ch'an and Zen Buddhists would not appear to use consequences – they have a reputation for the repudiation of all logical and rational thought – their employment of paradox and *non sequitur* may indicate otherwise. Richard Chi has some comments on the logical content and procedure in Ch'an in "Topic on being and logical reasoning", PEW, 24.3 (July 1974) 298–99, though these do not permit one to conclude whether or not Ch'an Buddhists use consequences. It is possible that they do analyze, but only privately and in the advanced and closing stages of their meditations. If so they would by-pass dialectical debate. Also see the *inter alia* comments by Dale S. Wright in "The significance of paradoxical language in Hua-yen Buddhism," PEW, 32.3 (July 1982), 325–338.

[19] Ashok Gangadean, *op. cit.*

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[21] Paul Williams, 'Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Mādhyamika', JIP, 8 (1980), 16.

[22] Streng, *Emptiness*, p. 188.

[23] The term *prapañca* is often used to mean just verbal elaboration or even to denote elaboration, as in an exposition, yet clearly it must refer to mental or conceptual elaboration as well. The RSM, f. 19a4. for example, glosses *spros-pa* as *sgra-rtog-gi spros-pa.* Also were it just verbal elaboration then people would absurdly gain *nirvāṇa* whenever they were silent.

[24] Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[25] See Gangadean, *op. cit.*, p. 23 that "any well formed or significant thought may be analyzed into a relation between a logical subject and predicate."

[26] Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 24–25.

[27] The principle is recognized by Nāgārjuna, for example MMK, 23.10–11 and Candrakīrti, *Pras*: 220.

In Taoism it is the deeply rooted principle of terminological reciprocity. See for example, chapter two of the *Tao te ching*. There, existence suggests non-existence, beauty-ugliness, goodness-evil, short-long, etc.

See Antonio S. Cua, 'Opposites as Complements: Reflections on the Significance of *Tao*', PEW, 31.2 (April 1981), 123–140.

There is an interesting book by Paul Roubiczek called *Thinking in Opposites – an investigation of the nature of man as revealed by the nature of thinking* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952) that treats oppositional definitions lightly and in a non-rigorous way. Basically Roubiczek reduces various scientific, philosophical, and religious concepts to their existence in virtue of being defined through their conceptual opposites. Thoughts, percepts, and feelings, he shows, all arise through their opposites; e.g. good and bad (-good), light and dark (-light), inner and outer (-inner), pride and humility (-pride), pleasure and pain (-pleasure), etc. He also (pp. 170–171) indicates a spiritual efficacy in the practice of what he calls "interconnected opposites".

[28] Gangadean, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[29] Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[30] See *infra*, p. 44.

I prefer to use the term logical opposites rather than logical contraries, as Gangadean does, for the later is usually to be constrasted with logical contradiction, irrespective of whether the opposites involved are category restricted or not. Gangadean's constrasting of contraries and complements is borrowing on logical and set theoretic definitions respectively.

[31] Gangadean, *op. cit*., p. 29.

[32] Tsoṅ-kha-pa in the *Legs-bśad sñiṅ-po*, trans. by R. A. F. Thurman as *Essence of the Eloquent* (mimeograph, 1977) confirms such an interpretation of the notion of *pratītya-samutpāda* where he defines the logic of relativity (i.e. reasoning by way of being relationally originated as (p. 156 and p. 347, n. 66) the perception of the contradictory opposite (*'gol-zla dmigs-pa*).

[33] This is, for example, G. E. Moore's non-naturalist position on the concept of "good" which cannot be analyzed in terms of properties, relationships, etc. Rather "good" just is what is "good" and cannot be defined or analyzed any further.

[34] See MMK, 14.3 that *one* entity cannot have two self-characterizing natures.

[35] Williams, *op. cit*., p. 27.

[36] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations, op. cit.*, p. 131. He elaborates that: "If I say I did *not* dream last night, still I must know where to look for a dream; that is, the proposition 'I dreamt', applied to this actual situation, may be false, but mustn't be senseless." – Does that mean, then, that you did after all feel something, as it were the hint of a dream, which made you aware of the place which a dream would have occupied?

Again: if I say "I have no pain in my arm", does that mean that I have a shadow of the sensation of pain, which as it were indicates the place where the pain might be?"

[37] See Nāgārjuna's famous verse from the MMK, 24.18 and VV closing dedication.

[38] See, for example, MMK 14.5–6.

[39] Shohei Ichimura, 'A study of the Mādhyamika Method of Refutation and Its Influence on Buddhist Logic,' JIABS, 4.1 (1981), 92.

[40] For example, MMK, 8.7b (Streng, *Emptiness*, p. 193) "For indeed, how can "real" and "non-real", which are mutually contradictory, occur in one place?"

[41] For example, MMK, 7.30b and 25.11 and 14 (Streng, *Emptiness*. pp. 192 and 216 respectively).

[42] Ludvik Bass, 'The Mind of Wigner's Friend', *Hermathena*, 112 (1971), p. 65.

[43] *Idem.*

Bass himself has noted the soteriological import of absurdities in Nicholas Cusanus and made the interesting suggestion (p. 65) that "a persisting conflict of neural modes might itself exert an evolutionary pressure" and that it may be actually modified by mystics.

[44] D. M. Armstrong, *Belief Truth and Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 104–106.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

[47] For example, see bsTan-pai ñi-ma's (fourth Panchen Lama) *gSuṅ-rab kun-gyi sñiṅ-po lam-gyu gtso-bo rnam-pa gsum-gyi khrid-yig gźan-phan sñiṅ-po* translated as *Instructions on the Three Principal Aspects of the Path* by Geshe L. Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins in *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider and Company, 1976), pp. 38–39.

[48] This verse (Streng, *Emptiness*, p. 185) says: "What third [possibility] goes other than the "goes" and "non-goer"?"

[49] VPTd, "ne donne aucune déterminination." p. 298.

[50] Candrakīrti also says (MABh: 100.12) that "there isn't an existent separate from the two (*gñis-ka daṅ bral-ba yod-pa . . . ma-yin*) [of existence and non-existence]."

[51] Tibetan has *rnam-pa*, i.e. no other mode. For the Tibetan and Sanskrit or the verse see n. 12, p. 53.

[52] See G. Sopa and J. Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

[53] The origin for the two-fold division as basic *analytical* schema seems to be with Candrakīrti, though the division has been made earlier in Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Yogācārabhūmi.* See Isshi Yamada, "Premises and Implications of Interdependence," in S. Balasooriya, *et al.* (eds.), *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula* (London: Gordon Fraser, 1980), p. 290, nn. 60 and 61.

[54] This requires a little explanation. For Candrakīrti (and all Buddhists except for the Vaibhāṣikas) the class of *bhāvas* is coextensive with the class of produced phenomena (*saṁskṛta-dharma*). (For Vaibhāṣikas, space (*ākāśa*) which is a non-product is a *bhāva* for it can perform a function such as failing to obstruct and thereby allow the movement of obstructibles. See the gloss by Geshe Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 71.) The MA brings this out implicitly. *Bhāvas* are only defined extensionally in the MA (6.219) as the five aggregates. (They are *implicitly* defined, though, through being analyzed in the MA in terms of the characteristic of being born (*jāti*) or produced (*utpāda*).) Non-things (*dṅos-pa med-pa, abhāva*), though, which are the logical opposite of things, are defined (6.220) as unproduced phenomena (*'dus-ma-bya chos, asaṁskṛta-dharma*). Products (*saṁskṛta*) are defined (6.191) as what *arises* from conditions (*rkyen, pratyaya*) and non-products are unborn (*skye med, ajāti*). Therefore, by deduction, *bhāvas* are *saṁskṛta-dharmas* and a defining characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) of both classes is that their members are produced (*skye, jāti*) from conditions. The equivalences are stated explicitly in the MMK where (26.5) Nāgārjuna says that if *nirvāṇa* is a *bhāva* then it is a *saṁskṛta* and that *bhāvas* are never *asaṁskṛta*. These equivalences mean, incidently, that there is a certain degree of overlap and duplication in the typology of twenty emptinesses. Hence, as *bhāvas* and *saṁskṛtas* are identical, then, Candrakīrti has analytically accounted for all classes of entities except unproduced phenomena (*asaṁskṛta-dharma*).

[55] Cf. the MABh (120.17) quote (of the *Catuḥśataka*? VPTd. p. 344, n.) that at the level of *saṁvṛti* one talks the language of ones opponents, which for Mādhyamikas includes refuting opponents within their own categories.

[56] See, for example, *Abhidharmakośa*, 1.5. The MABh (339) mentions just space (*nam-mkha'*, *ākāśa*) and *nirvāṇa* as unproduced phenomena.

[57] Streng, *Emptiness*, p. 192.

[58] The argument is framed around a tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*) that refutes the theses that *nirvāṇa* is a thing, a non-thing, both or neither. (1) *Nirvāṇa* is not a thing (26.4–6) as this would make it a product and things are never non-products. Also, if *nirvāṇa* where existent it couldn't be independent. These arguments are definitional in character. (2) The argument that *nirvāṇa* is not a non-thing (26.7–9) draws on the transference of characteristics between logical opposites. If *nirvāṇa* is not a thing (as just proved) then neither is it a non-thing. Additionally it couldn't be characterized as independent (or anything else) if it were a non-thing. (3) *Nirvāṇa* is not both a thing and non-thing (26.11–14) for being both would contradict its nature as an *asaṁskṛta*. Also, and this is the first genuine consequence, it could not have two mutually opposed natures. (4) Nor is *nirvāṇa* neither a thing nor non-thing for if it can't be both (as just proved) it cannot not be both. This, like the proof at 2. is based on the transference of characteristics.

[59] G. Sopa and J. Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

[60] The MMK's second chapter analysis of motion is the paradigmatic temporal analysis.

[61] Hopkins in *Meditation on Emptiness*, writes (p. 490) that "the two sets of reasonings [as found in the MA] are divided not because they *exclusively* prove either the person

or other phenomena to be selfless but because the various Mādhyamika teaches have *mainly* used them this way."

[62] MMK, 4.6 (Streng, p. 188) supports this interpretation saying that it doesn't obtain that the product is the same as the cause or is *not* the same as the cause.

[63] For a reconstruction of Candrakīrti's seven-section analysis see P. Fenner, 'A Reconstruction of Candrakīrti's Analysis of the Person', JIABS, 7.2 (1983).

[64] G. Sopa and J. Hopkins *op. cit.*, pp. 39–41.

[65] Gangadean, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–29.

[66] This is perhaps the only theoretical requirement, for one can hazardaguess that for Buddhists anything other than the three types of *asaṁskṛta-dharmas* would in all likelihood not even been considered as unproduced. It would go without saying (and without analysis) that a sprout, chair, etc. were not non-products and thus when the postulate of their being a product was ruled out the universe of discourse may be thought for practical purposes to have been exhausted.

[67] The MA is not clear as to whether these are theoretical exchanges, i.e. hypothetical fabrications created by Mādhyamikas, or reports of typical interchanges that actually took place. Although it is to be expected that the MA would report the exchanges with an unquestioned bias to the superiority of their own system, it is my feeling that Candrakīrti is reporting exchanges that were historical. Several reasons lead one to this conclusion. (1) Debate was a very central business in the Indian philosophical arena as evidenced by the manuals on debating procedures, and a serious metter also if we are to believe at least the sentiments expressed in the numerous hagiographical reports of inter-religious debates and loss of face and even religous adherence on the part of losers in debate. (2) We have no reason to believe that all the philosophers in the large *vihāras* were of the same philsoophical commitment. The histories report that the seminal thinkers of many and varied Buddhist schools were influential and active in the large *vihāras*. (3) Perhaps the most telling sign is the very devices that the MA uses in relaying its philosophy such as interjection (e.g. 6.129), *ad hominem* arguments (e.g. 6.141) and the distortion of opponents theses. These various devices were probably spawned in and mirror the spirit of interpersonal debate.

[68] In such analyses as these the Mādhyamikas do not seem willing to bifurcate an opponent's thesis into a combination of two theses, as one sees, for example, in the third tetralemma of the productive proof. Such would be another way of trying to allocate an opponent's thesis within the Mādhyamika's categories. In the case of an abstract analysis, for example, the opponent's categories, rather than being envisaged as a subclass within one Mādhyamika class would *bridge* two categories and be analyzed in a two pronged refutation. *Prima facie* this might seem to be a more honest way for the Mādhyamika to accommodate certain theses of their opponents, though it is questionable (and unlikely) that a thesis of "self and other birth" would be acceptable to the Sāṁkhya or a thesis of the "existence yet non-existence" of consciousness" to the Vijñānavāda.

[69] Cf. MMK, 5.4a (Streng, p. 188) that there is no object of characterization (*lakṣya*) in the absense of any functional characteristic.

[70] A partitive analysis is non-consequential and involves ascertaining the non-existence of an *entity* through a failure to find it in and among its parts.
In the case of a partitive analysis of the self, the aggregation is searched for a self by dividing the consituents of the aggregation into coarse and then finer parts. Such forms of analysis establish that the self is not the aggregation but fail to exclude the possibility that the self is separate from the aggregation. They thus establish the non-phenomenality

of the self but not its emptiness. See BCA, 9.58ff and *Ratnāvalī* 2.2 for this type of analysis.

[71] For example, MMK, 5.6: that if something *is* not at all of what will there be non-existence. Also 15.5 and 25.7 And BCA, 9.34.

[72] See Sprung, *Lucid Exposition,* p. 36: that "this negation [of birth from self] is not intended to imply an affirmation.

[73] Bhāvaviveka proffers a thesis at the close of a consequence by way of drawing a conclusion. He claims that it is an analytical necessity that the Mādhyamika arguments expose and *affirm* the negations of a thesis rather than merely exposing an absurdity, which Prāsaṅgika claims is sufficient. In fact Bhāvaviveka takes the Prāsaṅgika Buddhapālita to task for asserting the opposite as a conclusion to his consequence and claims that Buddhapālita therefore goes against the Prāsaṅgika proclamation that the negations issuing from their consequences are non-affirming. The point, though, for Prāsaṅgikas is that Buddhapālita is not at fault, for when he asserts the opposite of the thesis being analyzed this is not in the *context* of the consequential argument itself but rather is a summary statement of the thesis being refuted. See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* p. 156. As Candrakīrti sometimes affirms his conclusions the same rationale is applicable to him.

[74] VPTd. p. 279. "purement négatif".

[75] Even so, perhaps the non-affirming character of Prāsaṅgika-mādhyamika negations is a formal condition for their logic as it would seem that a logically generated non-affirming negation could only be derived through a consequence or *reductio ad absurdum* where the logical affirmation of the negation of a thesis could be derived through a syllogistic inference or what I've called a partitive analysis. Where both a thesis and contrapositive thesis are negated and their opposites affirmed through these affirming negations it is feasible that a coincidence of opposites, and hence demonstration of emptiness, could be gained through non-consequential analyses, which would go against Prāsaṅgika tenets. These are just some thoughts and I'm not sure whether there is a genuine distinction to be made here between the affirming character of consequential and partitive analyses.

[76] Perhaps there is a greater propensity to slide to an opposite viewpoint in the case of a self-conception given the janus-like nature of the self. In the case though of refuting say "birth from another" it seems that such a negation would in practice (as well as theory) be non-affirming for it is unlikely that its refutation would result in the adoption of the "birth from self" thesis. This is born out by Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa who says that of the four alternatives re production only the second need by refuted, presumably because all other are so unreasonable as not to be ascribed to in practice. (Communciation from Jeffrey Hopkins.) On the other hand, a slide couldn't be ruled out in the case of a refutation of the "birth from self" thesis, given the common-sense plausibility of the thesis of "birth from another".

BOOK REVIEW

The Evolution of Hindu Ethical Ideas, by S. Cromwell Crawford, Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 28. Second Revised Edition, Honalulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1982, xvii + 180 pp. U.S. $14, paper.

S. Cromwell Crawford's timely and lucid, but far too ambitious essay, *The Evolution of Hindu Ethical Ideas,* is at its best in the final chapter, "Summary and Critical Résumé of Hindu Ethics." As much an introduction as a conclusion, the chapter presents a thoughtful and nicely crafted overview of Hindu ethics seen as embedded in Hindu categories of *puruṣārthas* (aims of human life), *ásrama-dharma* (duties of stages in life), *varṇa-dharma* (duties of castes) and *sādhāraṇa-dharma* (duties encumbent upon all humans). The author orders his presentation in terms of an ascending series of Objective Ethics of duty, Subjective Ethics of virtue and a transcendent level of life wherein one "does not consciously follow the ethical path, but neither can he deviate from it." (p. 149) He argues plausibly for the presence of a high degree of freedom of moral and spiritual actions according to Hindu thought. He concludes with the striking observation that Hindu thought provides strong grounding for currently needed global ecological ethics.

The penultimate chapter, "The Ethics of the Darśana Period", also has merit, sketching out in brief, almost diagramatic, fashion the main categories of each of the traditional six viewpoints (*darśanas*) of Hindu philosophical theology and showing how ethical concerns take shape in relation to the respective viewpoints. The section on Vedānta, with its special consideration of Rāmānuja's thought, is the longest and most helpful. One wishes, however, that the author had settled down to but one or two of the *darśanas* and had probed the ethical implications in some depth, for he does have a grip on the place of ethics in Hindu philosophical theology.

Where the book disappoints is in the first two of its four chapters, where the author seems to be out of his depth. In "The Ethics of the Vedic Period" his overly confident attempts to interpret diverse and ambiguous evidence lead to naive extolling of the ethical devotional piety alleged to characterize

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 199.

the early Vedic period and to correspondingly naive dismissal of the Brāhmaṇa period as steeped in unethical magic and ritual. The chapter on "The Ethics of the Sūtra and Epic Period" disappoints for brevity and shallowness of treatment. In a book on Hindu ethics one would expect more than twenty-four pages on *dharma-sūtras, dharma-śāstras* and epics. Whatever evidence is culled from such sources tends to be presented anecdotally rather than systematically. Only the fine little section on the ethical thought of the *Bhagavadgītā* escapes this criticism. Considering that neither notes nor bibliography cite the works of such Vedic scholars as Dandekar, Renou and Gonda nor of such *dharma-śāstra* scholars as Kane, Lingat and Derrett, the vagaries of the first two chapters are less surprising though no less disappointing. In place of the encyclopaedic command of Hindu cultural history which a single scholar would need to do justice to the evolution of Hindu ethical ideals, the author draws upon the opinions of a variety of writers, often not the most authoritative in their fields, and upon his own predilections, to supply what is wanting in comprehensiveness and perspective.

For its not infrequent crisp formulations of ideas and hints of work needing to be done – as well as for its value as an object lesson in the pitfalls of over-ambition – *The Evolution of Hindu Ethical Ideas* deserves a reading by those who would themselves teach or write upon Hindu ethics. Students, if cautioned against the deficiencies of the first half of the book, may expect to find in the second half a clear, reliable and attractive introduction to Hindu ethics, albeit one that is better attuned to the six *darśanas* than to the *dharma-śāstras*. The book does not, however, live up to its title and should not be treated as a satisfactory reference work on the whole evolution of Hindu ethical ideals.

University of Toronto JOSEPH T. O'CONNELL

CHARLES CRITTENDEN

SERENITY

Interest in the compatibility of Eastern and Western thought has typically focussed on issues in metaphysics or ethics and consequently on questions of whether various metaphysical principles or value-commitments can be justified. Without wanting to underestimate the value of this focus I wish to suggest a slightly different procedure – the analysis of concepts central to both traditions. It seems to me further that there is a set of concepts where analysis may be particularly illuminating, the family of notions which might broadly be called 'spiritual'. Among them are the concepts of spiritual serenity, freedom, enlightenment, detachment and loss of "ego", compassion, and a higher form of truth or knowledge. This is a suitable area for several reasons. First, these are extremely important notions as practically all the major Eastern traditions and many Western thinkers – from Plato to Wittgenstein – have recognized. They are crucial to a concern with achieving a better and higher state and not merely to becoming more virtuous, a concern central to Eastern thought generally and to Western religion and many of its philosophers. So it should be illuminating to compare their treatments of the spititual without having to face, as major issues anyway, problems in metaphysics and epistemology. Secondly, the concept of the spiritual has relations with notions in metaphysics and ethics but is not located fully in either area. Hence a study of such concepts offers the chance for a fresh look at familiar terrain from a rarely exploited vantage point. Finally there just has been very little attention recently by analytic philosophers to phenomena of this type. Whatever the reason – whether because this subject-matter does not fall squarely within any one standard (Western) scholarly field, or because it is associated with the occult or "metaphysical" in a popular and academically unfashionable sense or with a vanishing counter-culture – there is a gap to be filled. Yet here if anywhere is a set of phenomena toward whose understanding both East and West are well prepared to contribute. The present essay incorporates some of what each tradition has to offer in attempting partly to rectify the situation.

The particular notion on which I will focus is *serenity* – or *hysuchia*,

Journal of Indian Philosophy **12 (1984) 201–214. 0022–1791/84/0123--0201 $01.40.**
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

quies, peace of mind, tranquility, to mention other terms for it. This concept turns up in very many if not all spiritual traditions and in many important philosophical outlooks as well. It is also a notion which occurs in everyday, non-technical thought; one does not have to be an adherent of a particular religious or spiritual viewpoint to have a grasp of the idea. Hence there are pretheoretical intuitions concerning it to which we can appeal. This may seem doubtful, for we will be dealing with a notion which has been given definite technical senses, usually within the context of some elaborate framework, and it might appear problematic that the notion can be detached from such schemes. And if so then the project of analyzing serenity would require looking at specialized schemes as a whole and attempting somehow to isolate and compare relevant principles. This would render the project immensely complex at best. Indeed no doubt it would be illuminating to compare the *quies* of the Desert Fathers with the mokṣa of the Māhāyana Buddhist or the *hysuchia* of the Epicurean. But let me emphasize that on my view this would carry analysis to a further stage, past that of giving an elucidation of what might be called the ordinary notion. On the standpoint I am adopting we can find a rather definite notion of serenity in non-ideological use and then come to see how this notion is fitted into various specialized frameworks where it acquires conceptual connections specific to each scheme. The task of searching out these further connections is one I shall not undertake here, at least not to any great extent. Of course this whole idea of what the conceptual situation is can be questioned – we have all learned that the terminology of science, religion, and metaphysics is "theory-laden" and not to be understood apart from embedding frameworks – but I can only trust that the forthcoming discussion will put such reservations to rest. As a last preliminary it seems appropriate to disavow any claim to completenesss or finality in the analysis to follow. Anyone attempting to delineate such a subtle, elusive, many-sided, yet important phenomenon as spiritual serenity ought to be fully aware of how far short he is likely to fall of an adequate account. I am only too keenly aware of this here and offer this discussion in the hope that it will lead to more satisfactory investigations.

It will be useful to distinguish between several questions: what is serenity? What justification or explanation does the serene person have for his serenity? and finally, how does an individual come to be in this state? These issues are not always conveniently separable but starting with these distinctions at least allows us to begin the analysis.

What is serenity? We might begin with a remark by Candrakīrti: "Just as, though a certain imperturbability is common to the ordinary man who has not achieved a tranquil mind and to the saint who has, there is a great difference."[1] What this difference is (Candrakīrti does not specifically say) we shall have to inquire in a moment. But he is implying that to achieve a tranquil mind is at least to be imperturbable, i.e. to have the disposition to act in a certain way, and it is worthwhile making clear the differences between this and a state of character like spiritual serenity. This should be distinguished from a mood or an emotion as these are transient and their presence or departure is subject to explanation: we ask 'Why is he in a good mood/angry this morning?', but not 'Why is he serene today?' – at least not in the relevant sense of the term. Similarly emotions have familiar objects: 'What was he angry about?' makes sense, but not 'What was he serene about?'. Perhaps it might be said that a mood such as good humor was about everything – but even if so there remains the difference that moods come and go ("his good humor lasted only for the morning") while relatively permanent states such as serenity do not (a spiritually serene person would not be serene only for a morning). This is not to say that there are not changes in character – indeed one of the goals sought by religion or spiritual practice is the attainment of a "tranquil mind" – but such changes are monumental and (in the spiritual case) often have their special descriptions ('conversion', 'enlightenment'). So at this point we can say that serenity is a state of character including imperturbability and not a mood or an emotion.

What though distinguishes it from mere imperturbability? -- to return to Candrakīrti's remark. In the first place, one might be brought up or taught to be imperturbable: the principle of always remaining undisturbed or "keeping your cool" could be taught to someone who might then adopt it as a principle of conduct. It might even become part of his basic character; he might always or generally remain calm out of principle. Then imperturbability would have the status for him of a moral virtue in the Aristotelian sense. Candrakīrti however cannot have meant that serenity is merely a matter of acting on principle or as the result of training, for then it is hard to see how it would differ from imperturbability. Indeed 'bringing up a child to be serene' or 'teaching serenity' sound odd and would have to be taken to mean something more than bringing about merely a way of behaving.

But what else than merely imperturbable behavior is implied? One suggestion might be that the serene individual has in addition a *theory* of things, or of the world, which justifies his behaving as he does. This suggestion might be prompted by reflection on outlooks which emphasize serenity: the Christian who conceives the world as under God's providence, the Stoic who believes that he is a part of the logos, the Māhāyana Buddhist who sees things as "empty". However, although the element of theory certainly must be accounted for, the adoption of an appropriate theory cannot be all that imperturbability lacks to become serenity. In the first place Candrakīrti remarks that although there is no difference in their theories between the Mādhyamikas and the nihilists the latter "have not fully realized the real nature of things".[2] So for Candrakīrti there is a difference between having a true account of the nature of things and "realizing" this nature and only the latter constitues, or is essentially connected with, tranquility. Secondly, Thoreau distinguishes a person's "creed" from his "real faith": this last "is never adopted. This it is that permits him to smile ever, and to live even as bravely as he does".[3] Ones "real faith" is what enables a person to live cheerfully, imperturbably one might say, and although he does not here use the term 'serenity' it appears elsewhere.[4] So, if we can take it that this is what he means here, for him too there is a difference between being serene and having a theory of the world. Indeed Thoreau goes further: no theory could express the kind of understanding the serene individual has. In fact one could achieve this state without having any theory of things at all: "The wisest man teaches no doctrines; he has no scheme".[5] Thoreau's view illustrates the claim earlier that one can advocate serenity without being committed to any traditional religious position; the immediate point however is that he agrees with Candrakīrti: spiritual tranquility is not behaving with cheerful imperturbability even on the basis of a theory about the world.

For help let us turn again to Candrakīrti. He offers two further comparisons illustrating the difference between the saint who has serenity and the individual who merely has the right theory or acts properly. First, there is the eye-witness who testifies truly as constrasted with the person who, urged by the defendant's enemies and though not recognizing the criminal beyond doubt, nevertheless testifies against the defendant. Second is the case where both a sighted man and one blind from birth "are lost in a difficult and precipitous region".[6] In both instances although there is something in common to the individuals involved there is nevertheless a great difference. This appears to be that the eyewitness and the sighted man have experience or knowledge based on experience which gives them a deeper, more genuine contact with the situation they are concerned with. This deeper grasp may not show itself in their *present* situation but would in others easily possible – if the witness were asked to describe details of the crime, or if the terrain were to become fully lighted and easily traversed. The suggestion seems to be that the superior individual in each instance has special knowledge based on a particular experience or kind of experience and which is potentially manifested through the exhibition of certain discriminations not at the moment called for. The merely imperturbable person has neither the direct knowledge nor the potential discriminations. As we have seen this knowledge is not adequately expressible propositionally, and Candrakīrti would no doubt explicate it in terms of the specialized Buddhist terminology – realization (prajñā) of emptiness (śūnyatā) and conditioned existence (pratītyasamutpāda), etc. resulting in freedom (mokṣa) and nirvāṇa. Looking into these notions would take us too far into the technicalities of Mahāyāna Buddhism; instead I will turn to another tradition where the same phenomena are dealt with.

John the Solitary, writing in the Christian tradition, similarly distinguishes between the "spiritual man" (Pneumatikos) and "the merely rational and virtuous man whom he calls 'psychicos' ".[7] The latter "has overcome his grosser passions and lives virtuously" but "has not attained to the spiritual freedom which loves all men perfectly in and for God".[8] Merton goes on to remark "It was in this freedom alone that they [desert solitaries] could find authentic purity of heart and true *quies*".[9] So for John the Solitary as well there is the distinction between ordinary virtue and genuine serenity, where the latter is explained by his tradition as love of God. According to John "The love of God is not acquired by bodily asceticism but by insight into the mysteries".[10] Presumably this insight is not to be stated propositionally and not a matter for rational discussion, being, as St. Paul puts it, a spiritual matter and thus "foolishness" for the wise.[11] So in Christian thinking too serenity or *quies* is contrasted with having a virtuous character and similarly it is believed to be achieved through a special sort of insight which the merely virtuous individual does not have. The consequences of this state are profound for the Christian as well. He thus acquires genuine love for all men; indeed Merton suggests: "This freedom and tranquility are the 'good ground' in which the seed of grace and wisdom can bring forth fruit a hundredfold".[12] So it is clear that the same general distinctions and claims regarding serenity are made in both Christian and Buddhist thought.[13]

There is more to be said about the basic mental state here; certainly one would want as full an account as possible of the condition which issues in just those actions typical of serenity. The features I have in mind are logical characteristics rather than psychological or phenomenological ones and so we will not be able to rely on commentary found in religious literature. Instead we shall simply have to look at the concepts themselves and try to discern the relevant implications. The first point is that for a person to be serene he must have adopted the attitude of accepting the universe. The notion of an attitude is a very important one, I think, and has had very little attention, but I can say only a bit about it here. We speak of someone's taking an optimistic attitude, or a fatalistic one, etc., and this means his adopting a broad way of evaluating or reacting to an object or set of events. In particular one might adopt an attitude toward the world in general, e.g. "accepting the universe" as the expression goes. To get the sense of this let us consider a case of *not* accepting the world, Melville's Capt. Ahab: he "did not accept the universe; he saw an implacable evil and an inscrutable malice at its heart, and he raved and ranted at it and vented all the hatred and wrath he could summon against it".[14] There are several features of the concept here to be noted. First, *rejecting the universe* has an object, namely the universe. This is the object of Ahab's attitude in that in some sense his mental state is about the totality of things, and not about any particular event or object. For Ahab might well have welcomed clear weather, for example, in his quest for the white whale. To reject the universe does not require rejecting each part of the universe. Secondly, Ahab's attitude need not be something which can be formulated in terms of a theory of the nature of things. It need not be expected that Ahab should be able to articulate a general metaphysical view to explain or justify his actions, or even that he is committed to the possibility of some appropriate account. This consideration is reflected in the remark above which notes that for Ahab the malice at the heart of the world is "inscrutable"; and certainly in the novel he never proposes an account of the world explaining his stance. Thirdly, Ahab's attitude is expressed in suitable emotions and actions – hatred, wrath, and raving and ranting, and in fact in the pursuit and killing of the symbolic whale. Indeed some such phenomena are *criterial* for the presence of an attitude: they do not exhaust it (for it is something over and above its expressions) but if there were no such manifestations there would be no logical grounds for saying that it was present. Finally, Ahab's attitude is clearly not a transient mood or emotion but a very deep part of his character, to mention a conceptual feature already introduced. Attitudes toward reality as a whole, then, are toward reality as a *whole* and do not entail that each part bear that evaluation, are not necessarily grounded in theories, have manifestations, and are not transient. The next step is to apply these remarks to serenity.

This state includes the sort of attitude just described, as I shall now try to show. It would be wrong however to think that serenity just *is* acceptance, as there are forms of acceptance – *reluctant*, for one – which would issue in actions not characteristic of spiritual tranquility. (Similarly one might imagine other forms of rejection than Ahab's – *quiet* or *resigned*, e.g.) Still, to have achieved this state is to accept the world as a whole and not to take up this attitude to all parts, or to any particular part, of it. It might be puzzling how there could be such a distinction – how one could take up this (or any) attitude toward the whole of things without thereby taking it up toward each part. Consider, however, the behavior characteristic of the spiritually tranquil person. He lives with a sense of the well-being of things, a basic trust and sense of safety. He meets crises with calm and self-control, and even fear for his own welfare is not cause for undue alarm. We would not expect to find him generally despairing over occurrences in life or exhibiting constant anxiety or hopelessness. Yet he need not have a theory about the world explaining his way of reacting; rather the description of him as accepting the universe is based upon his general way of dealing with events and not on any doctrine he may accept. At the same time this individual may, consistantly with his basic attitude, criticize, dislike, or even condemn various things. He may become genuinely angry or upset at events in his own life or sincerely sympathetic and understanding of the misfortunes of others. If he is upset at something, or sympathetic with another's tragedy, and nevertheless retains a basic sense of trust and calm; we would still describe him as a serene person.[15] The merely imperturbable person, on the other hand, may generally meet crises with self-control and an absence of agitation. Yet there is nothing about his demeanor which suggests that he has a basic trust in things – a tranquil *mind* to repeat Candrakīrti's emphasis – which enables him to meet these crises in this way. As indicated earlier his imperturbability results from his natural inclinations or from adopted principles rather than from a general outlook on whatever happens. To meet a difficult situation with imperturbability is simply to act in a certain way and does not imply any real understanding of the dangers, emotional consequences, or human factors which may be part of a situation. If these should become real to the merely imperturbable person his natural disposition may well be overturned as now there is nothing in his make-up on which he can rely for steadiness. The individual who has adopted the attitude of accepting the universe, however, can act with calm even when fully understanding these factors: his behavior is based not on natural inclination but on a deeper acceptance of things such that, whatever he is confronted with – e.g. a difficult or tragic situation together with full realization of the emotions and consequences for everyone concerned – he can maintain his calmness and basic composure. The difference here is at least part of what is meant by behavior which is steady and unagitated, on the one hand, and that which is compssionate and fully understanding yet calm and controlled, on the other.

The logical features of the notion of an attitude toward reality as a whole exactly fit this complex phenomenon. Because an individual living as characterized above acts in a certain way, not through a disposition but because of a kind of outlook, it is natural to describe him as having an attitude of accepting the world. Yet an aspect of this concept is that having a given broad reaction to the totality of things is not incompatible with having the opposite reaction to parts of the totality – as has appeared in Ahab's case. This explains how the serene individual can find the world as a whole acceptable and yet reject, criticize, find regrettable, and the like, particular events. These considerations can be employed to meet an objection sometimes raised against serenity as a spiritual ideal. It is not my purpose to defend this ideal but only to clarify it; nevertheless the issue is an important one and deserves a remark. The objection is that someone who has a generally positive outlook toward reality thereby precludes his having a motive to act to improve the world, e.g. to change a social condition. For if reality is good, and this condition is a part of reality, it must itself be good or at least connected essentially with the basic goodness of things. Hence is it not something which ought to be changed. Thus serenity implies passivity – which makes it unacceptable as an ideal, since passivity is very often morally wrong. This contention may have force against some views, noteably varieties of idealism which classify particular events as manifestations of a perfect source or creator. But it need not bear against all views which include the idea of accepting the world as a whole. For, as just noted, so approving is compatible with finding some part unacceptable, when there would be justification for acting to remove that part. Serenity then does not always requires passive acceptance. Of course, that a situation is undesirable or tragic *need* not in itself be sufficient grounds for acting against it. The point is that adopting a serene general outlook does not compel one to adopt particular evaluations for specific situations or to act towards them in specific ways. Situations can be judged on their individual merits; such judgments are conceptually independent of ones attitude toward the universe.

This completes my discussion of the nature of serenity and perhaps it is appropriate to summarize conclusions: this is a basic state of a person, not a mood or emotion or a disposition to behave, but including an attitude toward the world as a whole, and which results from insight or experience which is essentially inexpressible and which enables its possessor to live in a certain way. I want now to say something about justification for accepting such a state. It is clear from the foregoing that the possession of an appropriate theory about the world, or even a commitment to the possibility of such a thing, is not part of the concept of a general attitude. Nevertheless it would be natural for someone to try to give an account of the world to justify his attitude, or conversely to try to come to a suitable attitude because of accepting a particular theory. On the face of it there need be no one type of account which alone could qualify as 'appropriate' here. The Christian would justify his sense of peace – *quies* – by his belief that the world is created and overseen by a benevolent deity. The Mādhyamika Buddhist would explain his compassionate acceptance of the world of suffering through his realization of the emptiness (śūnyatā) of things. And the Advaita Vedaṇtin would appeal to Brahman as the source of all phenomena. Notice that although all these accounts make serenity the appropriate attitude the rationale varies: the Christian and Vedāntin look to theories of super-sensible reality, but the Buddhist provides an analysis of everyday things (or concepts of everyday things). Thoreau on the other hand offers no theoretical justification, his advocacy relying on appeals to common moral perceptions – although he often borrows descriptions from Western or Eastern spiritual writing. But his intention, perhaps, is not to imply that there is a correct theory but to emphasize aspects of the world corresponding to his general outlook. These cases suggest that no one account of the world, or even sort of account, provides a more appropriate kind of justification for serenity than any other.

Still there are limits on what could be a suitable view: it would be irrational for the serene person to think of the world as governed by malevolent powers – here Ahab's angry rejection would seem in place. Nor could Ahab explain his attitude by belief in a Christian God or Vedāntic Absolute. So there are constraints although rather indefinite ones on what would could count as an appropriate explanation.

Still, one would not expect the relation between attitude and theory to be straightforward. For, first, the basis of the attitude is an inexpressible experience or insight, and so the justifying account, which presumably attempts to capture this, can never be fully adequate. Secondly this experience – in the case of serenity anyway – typically brings about profound changes in feelings and behavior. This transformation cannot be just one of coming to adopt a theory, even if this should be a metaphysical or religious one based on very personal events. For merely coming to have a theory of nature or the world, whatever its content and on whatever basis, is not *itself* to change ones attitude. So it is not to be wondered at that no expression of the experience which is the basis for the transformation or account offered in justification can fully state its full content for the individual concerned. At this point we can agree with Wittgenstein that there is a "tendency in the human mind" to "say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable" and which must fall short of expressing everything that is grasped.[17] That this can be recognized and nevertheless it still be felt that such explanations are appropriate is an aspect of this natural tendency. On this topic it does not seem appropriate to go further here than simply to point this out.

Finally I want to say just a little about the way one comes to be in the state of spiritual serenity. Philosophers have generally respected a distinction between the analysis of concepts applying to psychological states and causal explanations of these states, and it might be felt that this distinction is in danger of being violated. Certainly the processes resulting in serenity are appropriate for psychological study. Still it is hard to draw sharp lines in this kind of issue, and anyway certain changes and procedures are traditionally associated with this state and thus seem appropriately considered. In the first place, achieving serenity is often thought of as necessarily connected with changes in ones conception of ones own importance. Merton describes the goal of the desert monk as coming "to a state of detachment from his own will and ego" where he gains "spiritual liberty in which, instead of being guided by his own subjective fantasies and desires, he completely accepts objective reality".[18] In the Buddhist tradition Nāgārjuna writes "freedom (mokṣa) is the cessation of karma and kleśa (acts and passions); these arise from vikalpa (imaginative constructions); this ceases with knowledge of their falsity (śūnyatā)".[19] And while Thoreau does not describe any particular changes integral to achieving basic tranquility he recommends a detachment from standard social concerns and a return to more fundamental values. Whether one should say that serenity always involves an actual alteration of ones self-evaluation is a moot point: there seems to be nothing wrong with the conception of simply being born with this attitude, as indeed is assumed in traditions which allow that individuals can be born into a spiritually advanced state.[20] Nevertheless there seems to be general agreement on the principle of overcoming "ego", so one might take this as a *typical* even if not *necessary* part of achieving this condition.

The notion of 'overcoming self-centered desires' or achieving 'detachment from ego' is not transparently clear, but let me suggest that at least one part of the process meant is being able to leave off looking at things solely from what might be called the natural standpoint – i.e. where one considers himself as a being in a social setting and thus acts in accordance with the motivations prompted by his physical constitution, natural emotional responses, and socially-encouraged values. Such a person need not be a morally bad person at all; in fact he could have many or possibly all of the standard virtues. He could not have achieved serenity however, as he thinks of things solely from within a social context and not also from the standpoint of an attitude toward reality as a whole. To achieve this he would have to break the hold on him of the system of conceptions based solely on the natural standpoint. Our common-sensical, scientific, and specialized notions all assume this sort of context and have various kinds of natural entity as their objects. Only by suspending the entire complex of these concepts can one come to a standpoint which has the world as a whole as its object.[21] So it is important to have techniques of suspending this framework, and of course the use of such techniques is an integral part of practices intended to promote serenity. Asian traditions all emphasize the importance of achieving "one-pointedness" through objectless meditation – the discipline of being conscious but not so as to think discursively about anything. The Zen koan or Tantric indulgence in morally prohibited activities also have the purpose of interrupting ordinary patterns of thought. In the Christian monastic tradition as well objectless meditation has occasionally been practiced;[22] the early Desert Fathers recommended simply living in ones cell: "Stay in thy cell and it shall teach thee all things".[23] Withdrawal and solitude, usually by advanced practitioners and under the guidance of a master or guru, also have this general goal. Thoreau went to live in nature for this same reason.[24]

Undergoing these practices is of course not sufficient to bring about the desired attitude and it is extremely difficult to untangle the various psychological elements this would include. There must be at least a release of old habits of thinking and the adoption of new ones based on a grasp of the possibility of looking at things from the standpoint of reality as a whole, and also there must be an acceptance of things at this level – perhaps as seen under a metaphysical description. One might speculate on further elements: insight into the world and oneself, application of theory or belief, concept-acquisition, deliberate effort and choice, and simply the workings of an indescribable process which is at bottom beyond the individual's control. Adherents of particular traditions would explain the phenomena in their specialized terminology – as the workings of the Holy Spirit, śūnyatā, satori, etc.) and certainly it is difficult, for me anyway, to suggest anything more satisfactory by way of a "neutral" account. The *conceptual* change however is the grasp and adoption of a new standpoint for ones thought: this makes possible a new set of emotions and motivations, and typically brings about an entire change of character. The philosophical analyst is on safe ground in pointing this out, but if those who have undergone this experience find it mysterious and indescribable it would surely be more than presumptious for me to attempt anything more here.

California State University,
Northridge

NOTES

[1] *Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: the Essential Chapters from the Prasanapadā of Candrakīrti*, translated from the Sanskrit by Mervyn Sprung (Boulder, Colo.: Prajna Press, 1979), p. 180.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 180. This comment just precedes the remark about imperturbability.

[3] Henry David Thoreau, *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1961), p. 91; see also pp. 80–81.

[4] E.g., in 'Life Without Principle', reprinted in ed. M. Meltzer, *Thoreau: People, Principles, and Politics* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963), p. 217, and *Week, op. cit.*, p. 186.

[5] *Week, op. cit.*, p. 81; see also pp. 80 and 82.

[6] Candrakīrti's concern with these cases is not especially to illuminate the distinction which concerns us; still we can use them for this purpose.

[7] Thomas Merton, 'The Spiritual Fathers in the Desert Tradition', in *Contemplation in a World of Action* (New York: Doubleday, 1973), p. 303. Merton points out that in this distinction John is following St. Paul and gives a reference to I Corinthians 2:14.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 304.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 304.

[11] See I Corinthians 1:18–22, 2:6–14, and also Merton, *ibid.*, p. 305.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

[13] With regard to Thoreau, our example of the non-traditionalist advocate of serenity, matters are not so explicit. He does not specifically indicate what the basis of this state may be. Throughout his writing there is a distinction between the superficial, ordinary, and trivial on the one hand, and "reality" and "truth" on the other. The suggestion seems to be that one discerns the latter by "living deliberately" and thus facing "the essential facts of life", particularly through using ones "intellect" which "discerns and rifts its way into the secret of things" ('Where I Lived and What I Lived For', reprinted in ed. M. Meltzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–101, 105, 106–107; such passages are numerous in his writings). We are to withdraw from the presssure of ordinary activities and look with freshness and discrimination at the facts of life; this will enable us to distinguish the trivial from the essential. What is not specified is the relation between the insight resulting from this process and serenity: could the process result merely in acting according to these discriminations and hence in genuinely moral actions but without the achievement of spiritual tranquility? This is not fully settled in these passages. However his remarks about the inexpressible state which enables a person to "smile ever" – which I have taken to concern serenity – are closely followed by a long quotation from the Sufi poet Sadi which describes a mystical experience of being "above the flights of conjecture, opinion, and comprehension" (*Week*, *op. cit*., pp. 91–92). Perhaps Thoreau is suggesting – the quotation simply ends his long discussion of religion without comment – that such an experience is, or can be, the basis for the state of serenity. If so Thoreau's views would parallel the others discussed above. But perhaps the judicious conclusion is that Thoreau is simply inexplicit on the issue.

[14] Paul F. Boller, Jr., *American Transcendentalism, 1830–1860* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1974), p. 166.

[15] For examples think of acts by saints and bodhisattvas.

[16] There is, of course, much more to be said about the notion of an attitude toward reality as a whole. The early Wittgenstein seems to identify "ethical" considerations entirely with such attitudes (see, e.g., the discussion and references in Max Black, *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 370–373). This is extreme; without going this far one can think that such considerations are ethically – or spiritually – of deep importance but still need to be related to what happens *in* the world.

[17] L. Wittgenstein, 'A Lecture on Ethics', in ed. J. H. Gill, *Philosophy Today No. 1* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 14.

[18] Thomas Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 301. He goes on to say "In the language of the Fathers, this transformation was the result of a complete substitution of God's will for the will of the individual ego".

[19] Mulamadhyamakakarikas XVIII, 5, quoted by T. R. V. Murti, 'Saṁvṛti and Paramārtha in Mādhyamika and Advaita Vedānta', in ed. M. Sprung, *The Problem of Two truths in Buddhism and Vedānta* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1973), p. 21. Murti also remarks on a similar conception of loss of ego in the Vedāntic tradition (*ibid.*).

[20] It might be claimed that for these traditions such individuals have undergone transformations in previous lives. This may be sometimes assumed but it is not clear that there *always* must have been such a change: for Christians Jesus as the Son of God never had to eliminate his subjective desires in order to do God's will.

[21] This remark of Wittgenstein's catches the idea: "The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view *sub specie aeternitatis* from outside" (*Notebooks 1914–1916* (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1961), p. 83e). Similarly Buddhists and others sometimes talk of reality as fiction, suggesting that we regard the world from the standpoint of being outside it, the attitude we take in reading stories or watching films or plays. For a discussion of this latter idea see my 'Everyday Reality as Fiction – a Mādhyamika Interpretation', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 1981, pp. 87–98.

[22] For details and an interesting survey and comparison generally of Eastern and Western techniques, see H. M. Enomiya Lasalle, *Zen Meditation for Christians* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974).

[23] Thomas Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 297; see his 'The Spiritual Fathers in the Desert Tradition', *op. cit.*, pp. 282–305 for elaboration.

[24] See *Walden*, Ch II: 'Where I Lived, and What I Lived For'.

SHORYU KATSURA

DHARMAKĪRTI'S THEORY OF TRUTH

In the tradition of Buddhist logic and epistemology established by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660) yielded probably the greatest influence upon succeeding Buddhist and non-Buddhist logicians in India. The aim of this article is to try to reconstruct Dharmakīrti's theory of truth from the remarks on *pramāṇa* (a means/source of true knowledge) scattered in his works.[1] It is to be noted at the outset that by the word 'truth' I do not mean metaphysical or religious truth, such as the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha, but rather empirical truth. For Indian theories of truth (*prāmāṇya-vāda*) deal with empirical knowledge alone[2] and Dharmakīrti in his preserved treatises is primarily concerned with the epistemological and logical problems of our worldly experience. Although the Sanskrit original for the word 'truth', *prāmāṇya*, literally means 'the property of being a means of true knowledge', to Dharmakīrti it means 'the property of true knowledge' (or 'the truth of knowledge') as well. For as we shall see, he insists upon the essential identity between the means of knowledge and the resultant knowlege. Hence the word '*pramāṇa*' in this article carries both the sense of 'a means of true knowledge' and that of 'true knowledge' itself.

If I may state my conclusion first, Dharmakīrti seems to hold two different criteria of true knowledge or truth, one pragmatic and the other purely epistemological. According to the pragmatic criterion which is found in his discussion of the definition of *pramāṇa*, true knowledge should not be contradicted (*avisaṁvādin*) by our experience, but lead to the satisfaction of our expectation towards the object, and the object of true knowledge should be both real and something new. Now, when we closely examine Dharmakīrti's analysis of perception (*pratyakṣa*) – more precisely, sensation – and inference (*anumāna*), the only two kinds of *pramāṇas* recognized by him, we discover that the former alone is regarded as 'non-erroneous' (*abhrānta*). According to Dharmakīrti, sensation is total and direct knowledge of an object and possesses the true representation of the object, while inference is a partial and indirect understanding of the object because it grasps only one of the many general characteristics of the object. In a purely epistemological sense, sensation alone

Journal of Indian Philosophy **12** (1984) 215–235. 0022–1791/84/0123–0215 $02.10.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

is free from error and ultimately true because it keeps some real 'correspondence' with the actual object, namely resemblance (*sārūpya*) of the forms or images; inference, however, is ultimately 'erroneous' (*bhrānta*) because it does not grasp an object as it really is. Nonetheless, truth of inference should not be doubted in practice as long as it leads to an expected result. As a matter of fact, from a pragmatic point of view, inference is in a sense truer than sensation, for in order to be pragmatically valuable the latter should be followed by some conceptual knowledge (*vikalpa*) which alone enables us to have some decision (*niścaya/adhyavasāya*) about an object, while the former does not require such knowledge. In what follows, I hope to present as clearly as possible this somewhat complicated theory of truth. However, before embarking on the main discussion, it may be helpful to clarify some fundamental presuppositions of Dharmakīrti's ontology and epistemology.

ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF DHARMAKĪRTI

One of the fundamental doctrines of the Buddhists is that everything is impermanent, except for some 'uncaused/unconditioned' (*asaṁskṛta*) items, such as Nirvāṇa. Dharmakīrti believes this doctrine in its most rigorous form: namely, whatever exists is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) because only momentary existence can produce an effect (*arthakriyā-samartha*).[3] Thus, according to him, to be is to be capable of producing an effect,[4] so that what really exist are innumerable point-instants or moments (*kṣaṇa*) of material objects (*rūpa*) and mental phenomena (*citta*).[5] Such moments are considered to form a sort of natural flow, for each moment is believed to cause the immediately succeeding moment of a similar kind until such a process is obstructed for some reason. For instance, a moment of seed (A_1) causes the next moment of seed (A_2) which in turn will cause the next moment of seed (A_3); this will continue until a seed of moment i (A_i) with enough maturity produces the first moment of sprout (B_1) with the help of such co-operating conditions (*sahakārin*) as the earth, water, heat, etc. of the moment i.[6] Thus what appears to us as a solid seed that continues to exist at least for some period of time, is, according to Dharmakīrti, actually a series of moments of seeds. Without yogic power, however, we are incapable of recognizing each moment distinctly;[7] hence, we are forced to deal with a sort of apparent continuum (*santāna*) of moments insead of moments themselves.

'Moment' and 'continuum' seem to be the two key words to the understanding of Dharmarkīrti's ontology and epistemology. They are characterized by him in the following manner.

(i) A moment is characterized by the causal power (*arthakriyā-śakti*) and regarded as ultimately real (*paramārtha-sat*). A continuum, on the other hand, is a mere conceptual construct imagined by us upon a series of actual moments of a similar kind, and consequently it is not real but fictional. A continuum is characterized by its lack of causal power.

(ii) Each moment is unique in the sense that it is distinguished not only from other moments of a similar kind (say, a seed) but from those of a dissimilar kind (non-seed).[8] Hence it is called 'particular' (*svalakṣaṇa*). A continuum represents some universal or general characteristic (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) common to every moment which constitutes that continuum. It gives rise to our sense of continuity and identity. It is to be noted here that such a continuum of, say, seed-moments distinguished from other continua of seed-moments somewhat corresponds to our concept of an 'individual' seed and that a universal or general characteristic superimposed upon a group of seeds distinguished from non-seeds corresponds to a 'generic class' of seed.[9]

(iii) A single moment is changeless because it cannot be subject to any external influence due to its momentary nature. As for a continuum, however, we can conceive of various kinds of external influence upon it and speak of its gradual change, e.g. the gradual maturation of a seed.[10]

(iv) A moment or particular is the object of sensation, while a continuum or universal is the object of such conceptual knowledge as inference, judgement and verbal knowledge. The former gives rise to a clear image of an object, the latter merely to an obscured image.[11]

(v) A moment or particular is inexpressible because only a continuum or universal can be the object of our verbal expression.[12] Consequently, it is to be noted that whenever I refer to a moment by a word like 'seed', the word is used only in a metaphorical sense, for a continuum of seed-moments alone can be called 'seed'.

In summary, a moment is causally efficient, real, unique, changeless, inexpressible, particular and related to sensation, while a continuum is causally inefficient, ficitional, common or general, changeable, expressible, universal and related to judgement, etc.

According to Dharmakīrti, knowledge too forms a natural, momentary flow. For example, a moment of sense perception is the result of a set of co-operating causes (*sāmagrī*) belonging to the immediately preceeding moment, viz. knowledge, the sense-organ, an object, attention, light, etc.[13] As long as such a set of causes continues to produce additional similar sets, there will arise a series of moments of similar sense perception.[14] It is essential for such a set of causes to be in approximation (*saṁnidhi/pratyāsatti*) in space and time with each other in order to produce their expected result.[15] The resultant sense perception is essentially unique in nature because of its momentariness; yet, it is characterized by a variety of properties due to its variety of causes: it is knowledge because it is the result of the preceeding knowledge, it takes a particular object (say, color) because it is caused by a particular sense-organ (the eyes), it resembles its object because it is the result of that object, and so on.[16] The theory that knowledge resembles its object or knowledge possesses the form or image of its object (*sākārajñānavāda*) is one of the fundamental presuppositions of Dharmakīrti's epistemology. According to him, the object of knowledge should be the cause of knowledge which is capable of projecting its image into knowledge.[17]

If we may focus on the object of knowledge, a moment of the object possesses the causal power to produce a sensation of it in the next moment. It may be called 'particular causal power' of the object.[18] By sensation, the object (say, a seed) is grasped as it really is and with all its specific properties, e.g. seedness, momentariness, reality, roundness, minuteness, brown color, etc. Each of such specific properties, however, is to be grasped in its general form by judgements or conceptual knowledge which follow the sensation.[19] Consequently, it may be said that a moment of the object possesses a sort of 'general or universal causal power', as well, which produces judgement of a specific property of the object, such as 'this is a seed', immediately after the sensation of the seeed-moment. Such a causal power is 'universal' in the sense that it is common to every judgement of a similar kind. As mentioned above, at the level of judgement we are dealing not with each moment but with a continuum of moments or so-called an individual object, such as a seed, a pot and a fire, and we form some expectations from such objects, e.g. that a seed can produce a sprout, that a pot can contain milk, and that a fire can cook a meal. In other words, in forming judgements, we may superimpose some practicality or the power to fulfill some human purpose (*arthakriyā=prayojana-niṣpatti*)[20] upon a continuum of the object. Such a power seems to correspond to the universal causal power mentioned above.

Although I have mentioned two kinds of causal powers, viz. particular and universal, it is to be emphasized that, at the level of the momentary object, there is only one and the same causal power, i.e. the capacity to produce its result in its natural flow. This causal power of the momentary object is regarded as particular when we are dealing with sensation or moments, while the same causal power is regarded as a universal causal power to fulfill a human purpose when we are dealing with judgements or continua. Thus one and the same momentary object produces both sensation and judgement, and in fact, human activity in general. Sensation grasps that object directly and entirely, judgement indirectly and partially through one of its many universal characteristics. Yet, only when judgement is made about an object, can activity towards that object become possible.[21] Therefore, in practice, we are able to approach an object not through sensation or a single moment but through judgement or a continuum. Let us now turn to the main discussion.

DHARMAKĪRTI ON THE DEFINITION OF PRAMĀṆA
(Pramāṇavārttika, Chapter II: pramāṇasiddhi, vv. 1–6)[22]

§1. THE FIRST DEFINITION OF PRAMĀṆA

Pramāṇa is non-contradictory knowledge (*avisaṁvādi jñānam*). Non-contradictoriness [here] means the existence of the fulfillment of a human purpose (*arthakriyā-sthiti*). v. 1a–c$_1$

§1.1. VERBAL KNOWLEDGE IS PRAMĀṆA[23]

Verbal knowledge (*śābda*), too, [is non-contradictory,] for it indicates an intention [of a speaker]. Verbal knowledge is *pramāṇa* with reference to that which is an object of a speaker's activity [i.e. intention] and which appears in his [conceptual] knowledge. [But its truth (*prāmāṇya*) is] not based upon reality (*tattva*) of the object. vv. 1c$_2$–2

§1.2. CONVENTIONAL KNOWLEDGE IS NOT PRAMĀṆA[24]

Conventional knowledge (*sāṁvṛta*) is not regarded [as *pramāṇa*], for it grasps [merely] what has already been grasped. v. 3a-b$_1$

§1.3. PRAMĀṆA IS NOTHING BUT KNOWLEDGE[25]

Knowledge is *pramāṇa* because it is the main cause of a human activity (*pravṛtti*) towards a thing to be avoided or taken, and because difference of an objective image (*viṣayākāra*) in knowledge causes difference of understanding [of an object], for only when there is the former [difference], does the latter [difference] exist. vv. $3b_2$–4c

§1.4. ASCERTAINMENT OF TRUTH

Knowledge itself is known for itself, [but] its truth [is known] through an experience (*vyavahāra*). [Then] a philosophical treatise (*śāstra*) [on truth may look useless, yet it] dispels ignorance. vv. 4d–5b

§2. THE SECOND DEFINITION OF PRAMĀṆA

Or [*pramāṇa* is] what reveals a [previously] unknown object (*ajñātārtha-prakāśa*). v. 5c

§2.1. RESTRICTION TO THE SECOND DEFINITION[26]

[Opponents:] "[According to the second definition, conceptual] knowledge of a universal (*sāmānya*) arising after knowing [i.e. perceiving] an object itself would become [*pramāṇa*, which would be unacceptable to Dharmakīrti]." [Answer: The second definition was stated] with the intention that when a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) is not known, knowledge [of that unknown object may become *pramāṇa*]. For people [who look for the fulfillment of a human purpose] examine [by *pramāṇa*] a particular [alone].[27] vv. 5d–6

Although the above discussion may suggest that Dharmakīrti holds two alternative definitions of *pramāṇa* (Note: 'or' in §2), it should be noted that the two definitions are regarded as interdependent.[28] Thus, to Dharmakīrti, *pramāṇa* is non-contradictory knowledge which reveals an object not known before (§§ 1, 2).[29] In other words, it is (i) knowledge, (ii) non-contradictory, and (iii) refers to a previously unknown object.

(i) PRAMĀṆA IS KNOWLEDGE[30]

According to Dharmakīrti, *pramāṇa* or a means of knowledge should be the most efficient (*sādhakatama*) cause of knowledge. As mentioned before, he believes that a moment of knowledge is the result of a variety of causes, viz. knowledge, the sense-organ, an object, etc., belonging to the immediately preceeding moment. No one of them, however, is regarded as more efficient than any other. They are, in fact, considered to contribute equally to their common result. Then what is the most efficient cause of knowledge? It is, according to Dharmakīrti, that which ultimately differentiates (*antya-bhedaka*)[31] one knowledge from the other, e.g. knowledge of a cow from that of a horse. In this context, a particular object cannot be regarded as *pramāṇa*, for when it is observed by two persons (A and B), it becomes an object common to them and we cannot differentiate A's knowledge of it from B's. An object is merely one of the variety of causes contributing equally to resultant knowledge. Dharmakīrti proposes that what ultimately differentiates knowledge is the objective image projected into it by the external object (§1.3). Thus, *pramāṇa* or the means of knowledge is nothing but the resultant knowledge itself or, more precisely, an aspect of this knowledge, i.e. its possession of an objective image (*viṣayākāratā*) or its resemblance to its object (*arthasārūpya*).[32] Therefore, from Dharmakīrti's point of view, anything other than knowledge, such as the sense-organ or the contact between the sense-organ and the object, should not be regarded as *pramāṇa*.[33]

It is customary for Indian logiciains to describe the process of knowing an object in terms of four distinct factors, viz. the knower (*pramātṛ*), the means of knowing (*pramāṇa*), the object of knowing (*prameya*) and the resultant knowledge (*pramāṇaphala/pramiti*).[34] Since the Buddhists do not admit the existence of any persisting agent or 'soul' (*ātman*), the knower has no scope in the Buddhist analysis of knowledge. Another unique feature of the Buddhist theory is that it insists upon the essential identity between the means of knowing and the resultant knowledge, as discussed above. Buddhist logicians like Dharmakīrti believe in the most rigorous theory of momentariness and maintain that a moment of knowledge is the result of a sort of natural causal flow. Therefore, only the fact of a moment of knowing an object actually exists and what we call '*pramāṇa*' and 'result of *pramāṇa*' (or the resultant knowledge) are mere mental constructs superimposed upon this fact. Knowledge may be regarded as *pramāṇa* in that it possesses an objective image which decisively differentiates it from other knowledge, or it may be regarded as a result in that it is the knowledge of the object concerned. Consequently, *pramāṇa* and the result are not distinct factors as held by other Indian logicians, but aspects of one and the same knowledge. As a matter of fact, Dharmakīrti goes on to say that even the object of knowing is nothing but an aspect of the resultant knowledge because all knowledge is self-cognizing (*svasaṁvedana*).[35] This of course leads to the idealistic position that there is no external object, but I will not go into this topic in this article.

So far the problem why *pramāṇa* is knowledge has been dealt with from the epistemological point of view. Dharmakīrti discusses the problem from a pragmatic point of view, too (§1.3). According to him, *pramāṇa* or the means of knowledge should be the main cause of a human activity towards an actual object which is either to be avoided like a poison or to be taken like a piece of gold, and knowledge alone can be the main cause of such an activity, since other alleged *pramāṇas*, such as the sense-organ, do not necessarily lead to such an activity. Therefore, *pramāṇa* is conceived as knowledge in the pragmatic perspective, too.

(ii) PRAMĀṆA IS NON-CONTRADICTORY KNOWLEDGE

Dharmakīrti further specifies *pramāṇa* as non-contradictory knowledge. By 'non-contradiction' he means the existence of the fulfillment of a human purpose (*arthakriyā*) (§ 1). In other words, knowledge is *pramāṇa* and true if it does not deceive our expectation towards the object of that knowledge. For example, knowledge of water, if true, should be able to lead to real water which will satisfy our expectation by quenching our thirst; it should not deceive us like the knowledge of a mirage. According to Dharmakīrti, whether or not knowledge is true, i.e. the truth of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*), is ascertained by our experienee of, or practical activity towards the object of that knowledge (§1.4).[36] In short, to be true is to be uncontradicted by our experience and to be able to lead to the satisfaction of our expectation.

Here a problem arises. If we adopt with Dharmakīrti the rigorous theory of momentariness, the object of knowledge should be different from the object of a practical activity induced by that knowledge, and consequently, the truth of the knowledge cannot be ascertained. This is quite true and perhaps in the strict sense, truth of knowledge cannot be ascertained in any way, for if we deal with the problem in the realm of moments and at the level of sensation, neither an action in general nor a practical human activity will come under consideration.[37] Nonetheless, it is to be noted that while discussing the nature of *pramāṇa*, Dharmakīrti refers to 'the fulfillment of a human purpose', 'human activity', and 'experience' (§§1, 1.3, 1.4). As noted above, these concepts presuppose not the world of moments, the particular causal power and sensation, but that of continua, the universal causal power and judgement. Therefore, the object of knowledge under consideration should not be understood in its momentary nature but should be grasped as a continuum of moments or an individual. Continuity and identity of the object being thus preserved, we can safely say that the truth of knowledge can be ascertained by our later experience despite the temporal difference of the actual objects. Now, all of this points to the pragmatic and conventional nature of Dharmakīrti's definition of *pramāṇa* or true knowledge.

How truth of knowledge is ascertained is one of the main points of debate in the later Indian theory of truth.[38] Some hold that it is ascertained intrinsically (*svataḥ*), others that it is ascertained extrinsically (*parataḥ*), and furthermore there is a sort of mixed theory. In this context, Dharmakīrti appears to accept the theory of extrinsic ascertainment of truth, yet it is to be noted that he fails to comment further on this problem (§1.4). His followers seem to hold a mixed theory, according to which sense perception of a familiar object and inferential knowledge are intrinsically true, while sense perception of an unfamiliar object requires some other knowledge to ascertain its truth.[39]

Although truth of knowledge is known through our experience, knowledge itself is known for itself, according to Dharmakīrti (§1.4). This is merely a brief statement of one of his main epistemological convictions, i.e. that all knowledge is self-cognizing (*svasaṁvedana*); yet it seems to suggest that truth, being the essential property of true knowledge, should have been known at the same time as that knowledge was self-cognized. Therefore, it would be better to say that self-cognized truth of knowledge comes to be realized or recognized through our later experience.

There remains one minor question to be answered. Some people may wonder why we argue about the truth of knowledge if it can be ascertained by our experience, i.e. they may consider all philosophical treatises useless (§1.4). To this Dharmakīrti replies that a philosophical treatise is useful because it aims to dispel people's ignorance about the nature of truth as well as things beyond our experience such as the other world.[40]

(iii) PRAMĀṆA REVEALS A PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN REAL OBJECT

Next Dharmakīrti tries to characterize *pramāṇa* through its object. Namely, the object of *pramāṇa* or true knowledge should be real as well as something new (§§2–2.1). According to him, people resort to *pramāṇa* when they are looking for the fulfillment of their purpose. Therefore, the object of *pramāṇa* should be a real object which is capable of fulfilling a human purpose. It is a momentary existence in the ultimate analysis; yet, as has been pointed out above, the real and momentary object of sensation is grasped as a continuum or an individual at the level of judgement and ascertainement of truth, so that it can be the object of a practical activity. In short, a particular real object (*svalakṣaṇa*) is the object of both *pramāṇa* and a practical activity induced by *pramāṇa.*[41]

Furthermore, according to Dharmakīrti, the object of *pramāṇa* should be something new. This idea is probably derived from a sort of common sense belief that knowledge is meaningless unless it contains some new information. Thus, memory or recognition and, as we shall see below, perceptual judgement are excluded from the realm of *pramāṇa*. A continuous perception, on the other hand, is regarded as *pramāṇa*, though it appears to take in the same object, since, according to the momentariness theory, what appears to be a continuous perception is in fact a series of moemnts of perceptions which take in a new object with each ensuing moment.[42] The definition of *pramāṇa* so far discussed can be called 'the pragmatic criterion of *pramāṇa*' of Dharmakīrti. Now let us see what types of *pramāṇa* he recognizes.

PERCEPTION (OR SENSATION) AND INFERENCE

It is well-known that Dharmakīrti recognizes only two types of *pramāṇa*, viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).[43] According to him, perception is the initial and direct acquaintance with an object. Supposing that we are in thick darkness, we touch something and have the sensation of, say, hardness even before we judge it to be something hard and identify it as a stone wall. Such immediate sensation prior to linguistic formulation is what Dharmakīrti refers to as 'perception'. It is characterized by him as 'free from conceptual construction' (*kalpanāpoḍha*) and 'non-erroneous' (*abhrānta*).[44] Perception is free from conceptual construction because it is direct and total knowledge of a real object. By such knowledge not only an object itself but all of its minor details and specific properties are supposed to be perceived or sensed. Furthermore, perception is non-erroneous knowledge. Dharmakīrti admits two classes of direct knowledge, viz. erroneous and non-erroneous. He considers that erroneous one can occur if we have some physical defect; for example, the moon may look double to someone suffering from a certain eye disease.[45] Erroneous direct knowledge should not, of course, be regarded as *pramāṇa*. Non-erroneous direct knowledge alone is considered to be perception as *pramāṇa*.

Now let us see how perception fulfills the criterion of *pramāṇa* discussed above. Perception is non-contradictory knowledge, for it can lead to the satisfaction of our expectation. For instance, perception of water can lead us proceed to real water, if, immediately after the perception, we judge that there is water in front of us. It is to be noted here that since perception is free from conceptual construction, it lacks the nature of decision (*niścaya*)[46] and determination (*adhyavasāya*), the driving causes of our practical activity. Hence, perception cannot directly lead to the fulfillment of a human purpose – it does so only indirectly with the help of conceptual knowledge (*vikalpa*). If perception is not followed by conceptual knowledge, there will be a sort of continuous perception until the attention is shifted.[47]

Perception reveals a previously unknown real object, for its object is supposed to be a unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) which is both real and new every moment. Thus, we can state that perception as defined by Dharmakīrti fulfills his criterion of *pramāṇa*. In short, perception is non-erroneous, non-conceptual, non-verbal, direct and total knowledge of a real particular object, and it is related to the realm of moments and sensation.

What is opposite to perception is conceptual construction or conceptual knowledge. It is erroneous, conceptual, verbal, indirect and partial knowledge of an object in universal characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), and it belongs, of course, to the realm of continua and judgement. Since conceptual knowledge is regarded as possessing the nature of decision and determination,[48] it invariably leads us to a practical activity.

Like direct knowledge, Dharmakīrti seems to admit two classes of indirect and conceptual knowledge, viz. contradictory (*visaṁvādin*) and non-contradictory. Even when we perceive an object correctly, we may form a wrong judgement if there is some obstructing cause or if there is no condition for decision. For instance, we may misjudge a shell as a silver coin on account of the close resemblance of their features, and we may be under the illusion that things last for a certain period of time because we lack the supernatural power to recognize momentary existence.[49] Such judgements are contradictory in the sense that they lead us to unexpected results.

On the other hand, if there is no obstructing cause and there is a condition for decision, such as repeated experience (*abhyāsa*) of a given object, then we will form a non-contradictory judgement which results in a successful activity. For instance, immediately after perceiving a woman, we normally form the judgement that she is a woman. I would like to call such judgement 'perceptual judgement'. Perceptual judgement differes in accordance with the inclination of the perceiver; a lustful man may consider her an object of his passion, a monk in the midst of meditation may regard her as a mere skelton, and a hungry dog may conceive of her as a nice dinner.[50]

Unlike perception, perceptual judgement[51] is indirect and partial knowledge of an object, for it grasps a particular object through one of its many universal characteristics (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). That is why it is regarded as erroneous. Nonetheless, perceptual judgement is not contradictory because, as mentioned above, it helps perception lead us to the fulfillment of our purpose. However, it is not regarded as *pramāṇa* by Dharmakīrti, for it does not fulfill the second part of his criterion of *pramāṇa*; namely, perceptual judgement does not reveal a previously unknow object (§1.2). The immediate object of conceptual knowledge is a universal, but the ultimate object of it is always a unique particular, as explained above. Thus perceptual judgement gives no new information about its object since the object has already been grasped by the immediately preceeding perception.

Such perceptual judgement is called 'conventional knowledge' (*sāṁvṛta*),[52] perhaps because it deals with such conventional existence (*saṁvṛtisat*) as 'substance' (*dravya*) like a pot, 'number' (*saṁkhyā*) like one, two, and three, 'motion' (*karman*) like lifting, 'universal' (*sāmānya*) like potness, etc.;[53] in other words, it is knowledge based upon normally accepted linguistic convention (*saṁketa*).[54] Perceptual judgement can be called 'concealing' (*saṁvṛti*)[55] because it conceals the totality of an actual unique object by highlighting one of its universal characteristics. Perceptual judgement can be called 'recollecting decision' (*smārta-niścaya*)[56] or simply, 'recollection' (*smṛti*)[57] because, as mentioned above, it grasps what has already been grasped by perception. Apart from provoking a practical activity, another important function of perceptual judgement is to prevent wrong judgement from arising.[58] It must be emphasized again that though it is not *pramāṇa*, perceptual judgement is most valueable from the pragmatic point of view, for perception without it will have no practical significance at all.

Perceptual judgement is not the only type of indirect and conceptual knowledge which is non-contradictory. Dharmakīrti admits at least two other types of non-contradictory indirect knowledge, viz. inference (*anumāna*, or knowledge derived from an inferential mark, *liṅga*) and verbal knowledge (*śābda*, that derived from a verbal expression). He regards inference as *pramāṇa*, unlike perceptual judgement, and considers verbal knowledge a special case of inference.[59]

Let us first examine inference. A unique particular, which is the only reality capable of causal efficiency, gives rise to perception or sensation if it is in a perceptible condition; then perceptual judgement follows it if there is no obstructing cause and if there is a condition for decision. However, not every particular is in a perceptible condition, and even if it is perceptible, there may be some obstructing cause which, by preventing correct perceptual judgement, gives rise to wrong judgement. Inference plays an important role in such a case.

A well-known example of inference in India is: when we see smoke on a faraway mountain, we can infer the existence of a fire there. According to Dharmakīrti, an actual fire on the mountain is not perceptible (*parokṣa*) but it can be inferred by the following process[60]: (1) a particular fire produces particular smoke, (2) the mountain together with the smoke gives rise to perception of the smoky mountain, (3) perceptual judgement of a mountain in general and that of smoke in general follow that perception, (4) there arises recollection of the invariable relationship (*pratibandha*) between smoke in general and a fire in general, and (5) finally conceptual knowledge of fire in general appears with reference to that mountain; namely, "there is a fire on the mountain." It is to be noted that though the immediate object of inference is a universal fire, it is essentially related with the real particular fire on the mountain.[61]

The above inferential process would not occur, if there were no wrong judgement or superimposition (*samāropa*) that there was no fire on the smoky mountain. In fact, inference is meant to dispel misjudgement and suspicion[62] just as perceptual judgement is meant to prevent them. For example, the misunderstanding that things last for some time can be removed by the celebrated proof of momentariness.

Like perceptual judgement, inference is conceptual knowledge and does not grasp a real particular object as it really is. It merely understands the object through one of its universal characteristics: we infer the real fire on the mountain through its universal characteristic, i.e. fireness.[63] Therefore, inference is essentially erroneous knowledge (*bhrānta*) unlike perception.[64] Nonetheless, like perceptual judgement, it is not contradictory knowledge (*visaṁvādin*), for it can lead to the satisfaction of our expectation; e.g. after inferring the fire, we can reach the actual fire if we climb up to the top of the mountain. Since inference is conceptual knowledge, it never lacks the nature of decision and determination which lead us to a practical activity.

Time and again Dharmakīrti discusses why inference, though essentially erronueous, can be *pramāṇa* or non-contradictory knowledge.[65] His reasoning is as follows: Inference does not deceive us but it leads to the fulfillment of our purpose (*arthakriyā*), for it is indirectly but invariably derived from the real object. Inferential knowledge of a fire in general is indirectly related to the real fire on the mountain because it is derived by the above-discussed process, and it is invariably related to the real fire because the smoke on the mountain, which is the object of the perception initiating the inferential process, is actually produced by that fire. Dharmakīrti proposes two types of invariable relationships which enable inference, viz. causal relationship (*tadutpatti*, e.g. between a fire and smoke) and integral relationship or essential identity (*tādātmya*, e.g. between the nature of a tree and that of a Śiṁśapā tree).[66] As a matter of fact, the question of how conceptual knowledge like inference is related to reality constitutes one of the chief philosophical interests of Dharmakīrti. He explains it away by the Apoha theory that can be applied to various problems related to conceptual knowledge such as the object and the function of conceptual knowledge, the nature of universal, and the meaning of a word. Though of great importance and interest, a full discussion of the Apoha theory lies beyond the scope of this article.[67] In any case, inference can be regarded as non-contradictory because it is firmly rooted in reality.

So far there has appeared to be little difference between perceptual judgement and inference, but they differ significantly with regard to the problem of whether or not they reveal a new fact. To reiterate, perceptual judgement does not give new information; inference, however, can reveal a previously unknown real object, because the actual fire on the mountain is not directly perceived by one who relies on inference.[68] Thus, we can state that, unlike perceptual judgement, inference as defined by Dharmakīrti fulfills his criterion of *pramāṇa*.

Verbal knowledge is regarded by Dharmakīrti as a kind of inference. According to him, the hearer of a verbal expression infers what is intended by the speaker who utters it. He seems to presuppose the following process of verbal knowledge: When someone utters a word, say 'cow', he has a certain idea of cow in general in his conceptual knowledge. To one who hears the word 'cow', there occurs knowledge in which an idea of cow in general appears on account of his previous experience of verbal expression as well as impression (*vāsanā*) of linguistic convention.[69]

Like inference proper, verbal knowledge is non-contradictory in the sense that it can correctly indicate the intention of the speaker, or more precisely, that it can indicate what appears in the conceptual knowledge of the speaker when he utters a word (§1.1). Since the speaker's intention is not directly accessible to anybody but the speaker himself, it cannot be perceived by the hearer; hence, it can be said that verbal knowledge reveals a new fact as long as it indicates the speaker's intention correctly. Thus, verbal knowledge too fulfills Dharmakīrti's criterion of *pramāṇa.* There is, however, one important difference between inference proper and verbal knowledge; namely, while the former is indirectly but invariably related with reality, as discussed above, the latter has no basis in reality (§1.1) because verbal knowledge is based wholly upon linguistic convention.

We have so far seen how perception and inference fulfill Dharmakīrti's criterion of *pramāṇa*: Non-contradictory knowledge which reveals a previously unknown real object. According to this 'pragmatic' criterion, both perception and inference are regarded as *pramāṇa* or true knowledge. However, it should be remembered that Dharmakīrti characterizes perception as 'non-erroneous' and inference as 'erroneous'. This clearly indicates that he holds another criterion of true knowledge and truth apart from the pragmatic one.

Dharmakīrti defines error (*bhrānti*) as 'that which grasps x as non-x' – the time-honored definition of error in India.[70] This implies that non-erroneous knowledge is that which grasps a real object as it really is. As mentioned above, one of the fundamental presuppositions of Dharmakīrti's epistemology is that the object is capable of projecting its image into the resultant perception and, hence, perception resembles its object. Thus, it is clear that Dharmakīrti believes in some kind of real 'correspondence' between perception and its object, namely, resemblance of the image.[71] In other words, he holds that perception possesses the true representation of its object. That is why perception is regarded as non-erroneous.

We have seen above that, according to Dharmakīrti, not only inference but also conceptual knowledge in general merely grasp one universal aspect or characteristic of the real object. In other words, inference takes a universal as its immediate object and possesses a partial and generalized picture of the object rather than the true representation of it. There is no real correspondence between inference and its real object, but merely an indirect causal relationship. In short, inference grasps the object through its universal characteristic. Therefore, Dharmakīrti considers inference to be erroneous. As a matter of fact, he even seems to suggest that within the entire process of inference described above only the initial perception of an inferential mark (*liṅga*) on the locus of inference (*anumeya*) is *pramāṇa*, because the rest of knowledge which contributes to inference is nothing but conceptual knowledge.[72]

Thus, we can say, from a purely epistemological point of view (not from the pragmatic one), that perception alone is regarded as true knowledge, while inference and other conceptual knowledge are erroneous.

CONCLUSION

Dharmakīrti holds two distinct criteria of true knowledge or truth. Namely, (1) from a pragmatic point of view and in the realm of continua, universals, universal causal powers and judgement, both perception (or sensation) and inference (including verbal knowledge) are non-contradictory and true in the sense that they can lead to the fulfillment of a human purpose and give new information about the object. (2) From a purely epistemological point of view and in the realm of moments, particulars, particular causal powers and sensation, only perception is non-erroneous and true in the sense that it alone possesses the true representation of its object. Inference is not true according to the epistemological criterion of truth, but it may be considered to be truer or at least more valuable than perception according to the pragmatic criterion of truth. For perception, devoid of the nature of decesion and determination, requires perceptual judgement in order to attain the fulfillment of a human purpose, while inference is of the nature of decision and determination and does not require any such knowledge. Finally, it is to be noted that perceptual judgement plays an indispensable role in both perception and inference, though it is not regarded as *pramāṇa* or true knowledge by Dharmakīrti.

Hiroshima University


OBJECT (viṣaya) PRAMEYA
heya/upādeya
KNOWLEDGE (jñāna)
DIRECT & NON-CONCEPTUAL (kalpanāpoḍha)
INDIRECT & CONCEPTUAL (vikalpa) 'erroneous' (bhrānta)
HUMAN ACTION (vyavahāra) pravṛtti/nivṛtti
MOMENT (kṣaṇa) /PARTICULAR (svalakṣaṇa) with the particular CAUSAL POWER (arthakriyā-śakti) & the universal causal power of fulfilling a human purpose (arthakriyā) when grasped as CONTINUUM (santāna) / UNIVERSAL (sāmānya)
1. with physical defect, etc. 'erroneous' (bhrānta) e.g. taimira
2. without physical defect, etc. 'non-erroneous' (abhrānta) PERCEPTION/ SENSATION PRAMĀṆA
2a. 'continuous' PERCEPTION
'contradictory' (visaṁvādin) JUDGEMENT (bhrāntijñāna)
1. with obstructing cause & without condition for decision 'contradictory' JUDGEMENT (bhrānti jñāna)
*
2. without obstructing cause & with condition for decision 'non-contradictory' (avisaṁvādin) PERCEPTUAL JUDGEMENT
'doubt' (saṁśaya)
'decision' (niścaya) 'non-contradictory' INFERENCE & VERBAL KNOWLEDGE PRAMĀṆA
'unsuccessful action' without fulfillment of a purpose
'successful action' with fulfillment of a purpose

* A jewel in a room will be obtained by a person who mistakes a light of the jewel in a keyhole as the jewel. (See PV III. 57)

NOTES

[1] For the study of the present topic, I owe much to Stcherbatsky, p. 59ff., Shah, p. 187ff., Steinkellner (=HB II), pp. 92–93, and Tosaki.

[2] See Mohanty, pp. 2–3.

[3] See e.g. HB I, p. 4*, 6–7 (*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva, akṣaṇikatve 'rthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇaṁ vastutvaṁ hīyate*) and p. 19*, 10–13. For the detail of Dharmakīrti's proof of momentariness, see Steinkellner (1968/69).

[4] See e.g. HB I, p. 3*, 14 (*arthakriyāyogyalakṣaṇaṁ hi vastu*), PV I.166ab, III.3ab, NB I.14–15. For the double meaning of the term '*arthakriyā*', see Nagatomi and Mikogami; it corresponds to the double meaning of the term '*svabhāva*' discussed in Steinkellner (1971).

[5] While discussing epistemological and logical problems, Dharmakīrti generally presupposes the Sautrāntika ontology which admits two categories, viz. *rūpa* and *citta.*

[6] See e.g. HB I, pp. 8*, 22–9*, 3, and HB II, pp. 136–137.

[7] See HBT p. 37, 10f.

[8] *sajātīya-vijātīya-vyāvṛtta*; cf. Kajiyama (1966) p.56, Tosaki, p. 184, PV I. 40.

[9] The later Buddhist logicians admit two classes of universals: vertical (*ūrdhvatālakṣaṇa*) and horizontal (*tiryaglakṣaṇa*); the former is *sajātīya-vyāvṛtta* and the latter is *vijātīya-vyāvṛtta*; see Kajiyama, pp. 58–59. Since the vertical universal represents the concept of an individual, I shall refrain from transalating '*svalakṣaṇa*' as an individual. I must mention that the characteristics of 'moment' and 'continuum' discussed in (ii) are not necessarily apparent in Dharmakīrti.

[10] See HB I, p. 15*, 15–23.

[11] See PV III.1, 8, NB I.12–13, 16–17.

[12] See PV III.2.

[13] See e.g. HB I, p. 10*, 19f; cf. HB II, pp. 136–137.

[14] See HB I, p. 3*, 17-p. 4*, 1.

[15] See HB I, p. 12*, 1–18, PV III.46–47, Tosaki pp. 114–115.

[16] See HB I, pp. 10*, 19–11*, 10, HB II, p. 127.

[17] See PV III.247–248; for *sākārajñānavāda*, see Kajiyama, fn. 148.

[18] I owe the idea of the particular and universal causal powers to Mikogami.

[19] See PV I.40–45.

[20] See NBT ad NB I.15.

[21] See e.g. HB I, pp. 3*, 14–16, 25*, 6–10, 17–19; cf. NBT, p. 84, 5ff (*tasmād adhyavasāyaṁ kurvad eva pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇaṁ bhavati* . . .), Kajiyama, pp. 44–45.

[22] A similar discussion is found in HB I, pp. 2*, 18–4*, 2.

[23] Cf. PV I.213, etc., Shah, p. 290ff.

[24] Cf. HB I, pp. 2*, 20–3*, 16.

[25] Cf. PV III. 301–319 (esp. 307ab & 311), PVin I, pp. 78, 12–82, 28, NB I, 18–21, II.4.

[26] Cf. HB I, pp. 2*, 20–3*, 16.

[27] Cf. PV III.54ab.

[28] See PVV ad PV II.5c (*tasmād ubhayam api parsparasāpekṣam eva lakṣaṇaṁ boddhavyam*). Prajñākaragupta suggests another view: the first definition is conventional (*sāṁvyavahārika*) and the second one is ultimate (*pāramārthika*), PVBh p. 30, 22.

[29] Cf. HB I, p. 2*, 18–19 (*tatra yad ādyam asādhāraṇaviṣayaṁ darśanaṁ tad eva pramāṇam*) and HBT p. 25, 17–18 (*anadhigataviṣayatvam arthakriyāsādhanaviṣayatvaṁ*

ca pramāṇalakṣaṇam), TBh p. 1, 5 (*pramāṇaṁ samyagjñānam apūrvagocaram*), etc. Since Dignāga gave no general definition of *pramāṇa*, Dharmakīrti was probably the first Buddhist logician who discussed that topic, while his senior contemporary Mimāṁsaka, Kumārila, gave the definition of *pramāṇa* which was very similar to Dharmakīrti's (see two verses of Kumārila quoted in Ratnakīrti's Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa, Mimaki, pp. 88–89).

[30] Cf. PS I.8cd; see Bandyopadhyay.

[31] See PV III.311–317.

[32] See PV III.305–306, Tosaki p. 399, NB I.20.

[33] See PV III. 310.

[34] See e.g. NBh ad NS I.1.1, Hattori p. 99.

[35] See PV III. 327, 354, etc., NB I.10 (*sarvacittacaittānāṁ ātmasaṁvedanam*).

[36] For Dharmakīrti 'experience' (*vyavahāra*) is threefold, viz. mental (*jñāna*), verbal (*śabda*) and physical (*pravṛtti*); see PVSV p. 4, 8, NBT p. 122, 1–3, Kajiyama, p. 79.

[37] See PVV, p. 7, 16 (*tattvatas tu svasaṁvedanamātram apravṛttinivṛttikam*). Cf. AK, p. 31 (*nirvyāpāraṁ hîdaṁ dharmamātraṁ hetuphalamātram*); Hattori, p. 107.

[38] See Mohanty, Intro.

[39] See PVV, p. 6, 17–21; cf. Kajiyama, p. 27 & fn. 19.

[40] See PVV, p. 7, 21–23.

[41] See PV III, 53d.

[42] See HB I, pp. 3*, 17–4*, 1.

[43] See PV III.1ab, PVin I. lab, NB I.2–3.

[44] See PVin I. 4a, NB I.4.

[45] See PV III.293–300; cf. PVin I. p. 40. 3–5 & NB I.6.

[46] See e.g. PVSV, p. 31, 21 (*na pratyakṣam kasyacin niścāyakam*); cf. Kajiyama, p. 126.

[47] See Note 14 above.

[48] Cf. Kajiyama, p. 126.

[49] See PV I.44 and Svavṛtti.

[50] See PV I.58 and Svavṛtti; cf. SSS IV.7 (*parivrāṭkāmukaśunām ekasyāṁ pramadātanau, kuṇapaḥ kāminī bhakṣyam iti tisro vikalpanāḥ*).

[51] For 'perceptual judgement', see Stcherbatsky, p. 204ff, Shah, pp. 278–281, and my forthcoming article, "On Perceptual Judgement".

[52] See PV II.3a–b_1 (= §1.2).

[53] See NM p. $3b^{28}$–c^1 (*samvṛtisaj-jñāna*); cf. PS I.7cd–8ab.

[54] See PV III.290.

[55] See PV I.68–69.

[56] See PVSV ad PV I.49 & 57.

[57] See HB I, p. 2*, 22, p. 3*, 11.

[58] See PV I. 48–49 and Svavṛtti; there are other names for 'perceptual judgement', e.g. *ekapratyavamarśa* (PV I.73, 109, 119), *adhyavasāya*, etc.

[59] See PV I. 216.

[60] Cf. Shah, p. 278.

[61] See PV III.81–82, Tosaki p. 154ff.

[62] See PV I.45, 47.

[63] See PV III.54, Tosaki, pp. 124–126.

[64] See PVin II.1cd and Comm. (*atasmiṁs tadgrāho bhrāntir api sambandhataḥ pramā // svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena bhrāntir apy arthasambandhena tadavyabhicārāt pramāṇam*).

[65] See PV III.55–58, 69–72, 81ff, PVin II quoted in Note 64; cf. Shah, p. 276ff.

[66] See e.g. PVSV, p. 17, 12–14, NB II.21–22, III.31.

[67] For the Apoha theory, see Frauwallner, Vetter, p. 47ff, and Steinkellner (1971), p. 189 ff.

[68] See HBT pp. 28 & 34.

[69] See PV I.205–206 and Svavṛtti.

[70] See PVin II quoted in Note 64; cf. NBh and NS I.1.4 (*yad atasmiṁs tad iti tad vyabhicāri*), etc., Schmithausen, pp. 154, 156.

[71] Note the terms like '*artharūpatā*' (PV III.305), '*meyarūpatā*' (PV III.306) and '*arthasārūpya*' (NB I.20).

[72] See HB I, p. 4*, 1–2.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ABBREVIATIONS

AK: *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya of Vasubandhu*, ed. by P. Pradhan, Patna. (1967).

Bandyopadhyay, N. (1979). 'The Buddhist Theory of Relation between pramā and pramāṇa', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 7: 43–78.

Frauwallner, E. (1932, 33, 35). 'Beiträge zur Apohalehre, I. Dharmakīrti', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 39, 40, 42.

Hattori, M. (1968). *Dignāga, On Perception*, Harvard Oriental Series 47, Cambridge, Mass.

HB I: 'Dharmarkīrti's Hetubinduḥ', Teil I, *Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*, by E. Steinkellner, Wien (1967).

HB II: 'Do', Teil II, *Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, Wien (1967).

HBT: *Hetubindu-ṭīka of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa*, ed. by S. Sanghavi and Jinavijayaji, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 113, Baroda (1949).

Kajiyama, Y. (1966). *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy*, Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University No. 10.

Mikogami, E. (1979). 'Some Remarks on the Concept of arthakriyā', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 7: 79–94.

Mimaki, K. (1976). *La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses et la preuve de la momentanéité des choses*, Paris.

Mohanty, J. (1966). *Gangeśa's Theory of Truth*, Santiniketan.

Nagatomi, M. (1967–68). 'Arthakriyā', *Adyar Library Bulletin* 31–32: 52–72.

NB: *Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti*, ed. with NBT & *Dharmottarapradīpa* by D. Malvania, Patna (1955).

NBh: *Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*.

NBT: *Nyāyabindu-ṭīka of Dharmottara*.

NM: *Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*, Taisho No. 1628.

NS: *Nyāyasūtra of Gautama*, ed. with NBh by G. Jha, Poona (1939).

PS: *Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga*, Chapter I edited and translated in Hattori.

PV: 'Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti', ed. by Y. Miyasaka, *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971–72) – I do not follow his Chapter order but Frauwallner's (Festschrift Weller, Leipzig, 1954).

PVin: *Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti*, Chapter I, ed. & tr. by T. Vetter, Wien (1966), Chapter II by E. Steinkellner, Wien (1973, 79).

PVBh: *Pramāṇavārttika-bhāṣya of Prajñākaragupta*, ed. by R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna (1953).

PVSV: *Pramāṇavārttika-Svavṛtti of Dharmakīrti*, ed. by R. Gnoli, Roma (1960).

PVV: *Pramāṇavārttika-vṛtti of Manorathanandin*, ed. by Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi (1968).

Schmithausen, L. (1965). *Maṇḍanamiśra's Vibhramavivekaḥ*, Wien.

Shah, N. (1967). *Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy*, Ahmedabad.

SSS: *Sarvasiddhāntasaṁgraha*, ed. by La Vallée Poussin, Le Muséon III (1902) pp. 402–12.

Stcherbatsky, Th. (1962): *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, Dover ed.

Steinkellner, E. (1968/69): 'Die Entwicklung des kṣaṇikatvānumānam bei Dharmakīrti', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens* 12–13: 361–377.

Steinkellner, E. (1971): 'Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti', *WZKS* 15: 179–211.

TBh: *Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta*, ed. by Rangaswami Iyengar, Mysore (1952); English tr. in Kajiyama.

Tosaki, H. (1979). *A Study of Buddhist Epistemology*, Vol. I (in Japanese), a critical edition and annotated translation of PV III. 1–319, Tokyo.

Vetter, T. (1964). *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*, Wien.

ROY W. PERRETT

SELF-REFUTATION IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

I

Contrary to what is still too popularly believed, classical Indian philosophy – like all rational discourse – cleaves to the principle of non-contradiction.[1] Not only is it implicitly affirmed in philosophical practice as displayed in the vast body of argumentation that the Sanskrit literature records, but it is also explicitly affirmed in various authoritative works. To offer but three examples: the Buddhist dialectician Nāgārjuna (2nd century) in the *Mādhyamikakārikā* (8:7) rejects his opponent's views "since they are mutually contradictory; where are there both real and unreal in the same place?"[2]; the great Advaitin philosopher Śaṃkarāchārya (7th or 8th century) opposes Jainism in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (II.2.33) on the grounds that "it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing"[3]; and the Naiyāyika Udayana (11th century) in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (3:8) clearly states that "there cannot be also unity of two contradictories, for the mere statements of them will cancel each other".[4] Three instances may seem too small a sample to be significant. However, though more examples could be cited, it is important to note that each of the three philosophers mentioned is of outstanding ability and influence. Moreover, taken together they represent both a temporal slice of 900 years of Indian philosophy and an enormous diversity of philosophical views and methods. Thus even three examples can count as significant evidence for a thesis which is undoubtedly true: viz. that it was never permitted in Indian philosophical discourse for a person to assert both *p* and not-*p*. To convict an opponent of such self-contradiction was considered a refutation of his position.

However there is a special class of self-contradictory statements that has fascinated philosophers both in India and in the West. These are self-refuting statements, i.e. statements of a sort such that they are in some way self-contradictory in themselves.[5] Sometimes the philosopher merely wishes to point out that his opponent has made a claim which is self-contradictory in

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 237–263. 0022–1791/84/0123–0237 $02.70.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

this way. Sometimes the philosopher seeks to establish a particular view by showing that contrary views are self-refuting. In either case the argument mode used is distinctively philosophical and both were indeed employed in classical Indian debates. In this paper I want to discuss some Indian uses of self-refutation arguments both in order to appreciate better the intrinsic logical interest of such arguments and also in order to indicate how larger questions about the nature of philosophical inquiry are often at issue in evaluating the success of particular instances of such modes of argument.

Apropos of my second concern it may be appropriate to make some preliminary remarks about the nature of Indian philosophical debate. In particular I want to distinguish between what Shlomo Biderman has called "minimal" and "general" argument.[6] In minimal argument the philosopher bases his attack upon his opponent's assumptions and tries to draw out consequences that are unacceptable to the opponent himself. General argument, in contrast, occurs when a philosopher is unwilling to accept his opponent's assumptions even for the sake of argument. Rather, invoking assumptions of his own, he tries to argue against his opponent's views. Now Indian philosophy has a long tradition of formal public debate dating from Upaniṣadic times and legends abound as to the debating prowess of philosophers like Śaṃkara, Udayana and Dharmakīrti. A skilled debator was assured of a wide fame and following. Debates were conducted according to agreed rules and conversion to the views of the winner was often the cost of losing the argument, as in the well known story of Maṇḍana's defeat by Śaṃkara. Such philosophical debates are obviously most effectively pursued by the use of minimal argument, for persuasive success requires that the opponent be willing to recognize the force of the arguments used and arguments based upon assumptions foreign to him are unlikely to be accepted. Indeed Biderman goes so far as to say:

> Although I do not wish to generalize too broadly, it seems to me that most of the arguments to be found in Indian philosophical literature are minimal arguments of this kind.[7]

However this general claim requires some qualification. True, some Indian philosophers like the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas or the Advaitin dialectician Śrīharṣa avowedly utilize minimal arguments only. But most Indian philosophers seem to use both minimal and general arguments. Moreover, even when the arguments employed are ostensibly minimal, we often find that they require certain concealed presuppositions in order to go through. Many Naiyāyika "minimal" arguments, for example, are rather theory-bound – perhaps inevitably so given the Nyāya holistic conception of inquiry.[8] Similarly, much Vedāntin argumentation about the nature of the self can seem question-begging to an outsider. Self-refutation arguments are a revealing case in point here. Apparently they are minimal arguments but when we come to examine some of the more interesting Indian examples a little closer below, we shall see that their success often requires a background of shared assumptions that their proponents cannot justifiably suppose.

II

Self-refutation arguments can take a variety of forms, as Indian philosophers noticed. Udayana, for instance, draws some interesting distinctions in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* between contradiction in language (*svavacanavyāghāta*), contradiction in action (*svakriyāvyāghāta*) and contradiction in thought (*svajñānavyāghāta*).[9] Contradiction in language involves the admission of the co-existence of mutually exclusive attributes in the same subject. For example: "My mother was barren". Contradiction in action is illustrated by the act of a man uttering, "I am dumb". It is not that (as in *svavacanavyāghāta*) mutually incompatible attributes are asserted of the same subject. Rather it is the performance of the speech act that furnishes the contradiction. There is no contradiction in asserting "I am dumb" in writing. Contradiction in thought is involved in an assertion of the form "I do not know *this X*" where "know" means knowledge by acquaintance.

However for the purposes of this paper I want to utilize a different taxonomy of types of self-refutation.[10] Thus a first type of self-refutation is where we have a proposition that refutes itself because it is self-contradictory or because it entails its contradictory. For example, the proposition "It can be proved that nothing can be proved" must be false. Note that self-refutation arguments of this sort do not merely involve demonstrating that the opponent has asserted *p* on one occasion and not-*p* on another. Rather they require that one and the same proposition is either of the form "both *p* and not-*p*", or is of the form "*p*" and logically entails "not-*p*". This will be referred to as *absolute* self-refutation.

A second type of self-refutation is *pragmatic* self-refutation. For example, someone uttering the sentence "I am not speaking". This sort of case involves the notion of performative inconsistency, i.e. inconsistency between what is asserted by a statement and facts given in and by the *making* of the statement.

A third type of self-refutation is *operational* self-refutation. This occurs with propositions that cannot be coherently asserted because any assertion of them would be falsifying. For example, the proposition "I do not exist". The proposition itself is not self-refuting, but trying to assert it is. Moreover *any* assertion of it is self-refuting. Thus it differs from "I am not speaking" which can be asserted in writing. An operationally self-refuting proposition either contradicts the proposition "X asserts that *p*" or else contradicts some proposition entailed by "X asserts that *p*". To assert *p* is also to commit oneself to asserting whatever propositions are entailed by *p*. Where *p* is operationally self-refuting *p* contradicts at least one of those entailed propositions. An argument that tries to show an opponent's claim to be operationally self-refuting is particularly interesting philosophically because it often requires considerable skill in locating the implicit commitments of the opponent's assertion. Such an argument appeals to facts overlooked by the opponent, facts present through the opponent's very act of assertion.

With this typology in mind let us now turn to some actual examples of self-refutation arguments in Indian philosophy.

III

Because of their apparent minimal commitments to background assumptions self-refutation arguments have frequently been employed against sceptics, both in Indian and Western philosophy. Let us consider an Indian example: the Cārvāka scepticism about the validity of inference as a *pramāṇa*. "Inference" in Indian philosophy meant generally (though not exclusively) inductive inference. In Indian logic a valid inference requires that a relation of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) obtain between the *hetu* and *sādhya* of the inference. But how can we be certain that this relation actually obtains? How do we justify: (i) a generalization about the universal concomitance of As and Bs when we have not seen all past instances of As and Bs, let alone established that all non-Bs are non-As; and (ii) the projection of past concomitance of As and Bs into the future when we have not seen any future As and Bs yet? According to the summary of their views in Madhava's *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, the Cārvākas argued that since inference is dependent on the *vyāpti* relation, this relation must itself be knowable by one of the other *pramāṇas* for inference to be justified as a means of knowledge.[11] But it cannot be known by perception, testimony, etc. Hence inference cannot be a valid means of knowledge.

The Cārvāka scepticism on this matter elicited various defences of the validity of inference.[12] However here I want only to consider one particular type of counter-argument: the charge that the Cārvāka position is self-refuting. Now sometimes this anti-sceptical charge only amounts to the *ad hominem* claim that the sceptic acts in ways that do not cohere with his assertions. Thus Udayana in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, advancing a line later taken over by Gaṅgeśa, complains that the Cārvāka doubt is unreal.[13] The Cārvāka claims to doubt the existence of a concomitance between smoke and fire but lights a fire when he wants to produce smoke. His behaviour contradicts his purported doubt. This sort of argument, however, is unsatisfactory. Firstly, the Cārvāka can always just reply that we are so constituted psychologically that we expect a uniform regularity between instances of fire and smoke. Nevertheless there is no *logical* justification for this expectation. Secondly, the Naiyāyika argument here is ingeniously opposed by the Advaitin Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*. The Naiyāyika contention is that there is a contradiction involved in the incompatibility of the sceptic's volitional activity of fire-lighting with his avowed doubts. But, Śrīharṣa argues, this Naiyāyika claim about the mutual incompatibility of doubt and activity itself in turn requires that there be a universal concomitance between activity and absence of such doubt. Thus the Naiyāyika charge itself presupposes what is in dispute: the justifiability of a belief in universal concomitance.

A more promising move is to accuse the Cārvākas of a self-contradictory use of inference to deny the validity of inference. Thus the Cārvāka argument for the invalidity of inference is claimed to be *pragmatically* self-refuting. The argument itself provides a counter-example to its conclusion. As Mokṣakaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā* puts it, "how can the Cārvāka be sane when he argues by means of inferential knowledge, while saying that inference is not valid knowledge".[14] But this too is unsatisfactory on its most obvious construal. Distinguishing (as Indian logic does not) between inductive and deductive argument, we can represent the Cārvāka argument as a valid *deductive* argument. It goes: If inference is a *pramāṇa* then *vyāpti* must be knowable; but *vyāpti* is not knowable; therefore inference is not a *pramāṇa*. (This is an instance of *modus tollens*: "If *p*, then *q*; not-*q*; therefore not-*p*"). Thus the Cārvākas were not self-refutingly using an inductive argument to establish the invalidity of inductive reasoning. Rather they were using a valid *deductive* argument to establish the invalidity of *inductive* arguments.

The self-refutation argument just outlined is unsound then, but it is a genuinely minimal argument. Other arguments, though *prima facie* minimal, rely on tendentious assumptions. For example, in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* (1456) we find a different sort of self-refutation charge levelled against the Cārvāka argument:

> Some short-sighted people have asserted that "Inference is not a Means of Right Cognition", though, by these very words, they offer up their own 'desire to speak' (intention, idea in the mind, as something to be inferred from these words).[15]

Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* provides the following gloss:

> This shows that the assertion of these people involves self-contradiction. For instance, when a man makes a statement to another person, it is on the basis of the understanding that 'the idea present in one's mind is understood from the words he uses, which are *indicative* of that idea'; so that when the people denying Inference make the statement, – by this statement itself – they admit the fact of Inference being a Means of Right Cognition; – and yet this same he denies by the statement that 'Inference is *not* a Means of Right Cognition'; – and this is self-contradiction.[16]

Now this argument is clearly not a minimal argument. Rather it appeals to a particular theory of meaning that holds understanding a statement to involve inferring the idea or intention present in the speaker's mind. Such a theory is highly disputable and one the Cārvāka is unlikely to want to commit himself to, given his materialistic bias. On the Cārvāka view the only referents are material and direct perception of such material referents is the only valid form of knowledge. Hence to convict the Cārvāka of self-refutation Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have to establish independently the falsity of the Cārvāka view and the truth of their own theory of meaning with its implausible notion of private mental referents providing the meanings of terms. Similar considerations vitiate another argument of Kamalaśīla's:

> How have you come to the conclusion that your opponent has accepted Inference as a Means of Knowledge? The idea of another man cannot be known by Sense-perception; and for you there is no other Means of Right Knowledge whereby you could derive a definite Cognition? (1484)[17]

Here it is presupposed that a belief is an idea in a person's mind and that beliefs about others' beliefs involve inferences from their behaviour to their private ideas. A dispositional analysis of belief dissolves the theoretical framework Kamalaśīla is appealing to.

Thus it seems that the charge that Cārvāka scepticism about the validity of inference as a *pramāṇa* is self-refuting is in fact unfounded. Moreover the arguments offered in support of this charge display an interesting feature: the genuinely minimal argument is too weak to yield the required conclusion, whereas the argument that yields the stronger conclusion requires general theoretical presuppositions that the Cārvāka need not and does not admit. This feature is characteristic of a number of instances of self-refutation charges in Indian philosophical debate. The genuinely minimal arguments will frequently be insufficient to yield a real self-refutation, while the stronger arguments will only establish a case of self-refutation given an assent to certain background assumptions that a genuinely minimal argument cannot take for granted. For further illustration of this claim let us turn from the Cārvāka epistemological debate and consider some other examples afforded by certain metaphysical discussions about the self.

IV

Advaita Vedānta, it is well known, is predicated upon the doctrine that the Self (*ātman*) is identical with the Absolute (*Brahman*). Many Indian philosophers disputed the identity claimed here and some also disputed the very existence of the *ātman*. In support of their views Advaitins sometimes claim that the denial of the Self is self-refuting, appealing to a sort of *cogito* argument.[18] Versions of the argument can be found in Śaṃkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. For example:

> Moreover the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being the Self of every one. For every one is conscious of (his) Self, and never thinks "I am not". If the existence of the Self were not known, every one would think "I am not". And this Self (of whose existence all are conscious) is Brahman. (I.1.1)[19]

And again, though rather gnomically:

> The existence of the witnessing Self is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied. (II.2.28)[20]

Finally:

> Just because it is the Self, it is impossible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable of refutation. For the (knowledge of the) Self is not, in any person's case,

> adventitious, not established through the so-called means of right knowledge; it is rather self-established . . . . And to refute such a self-established entity is impossible. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be refuted, but not that which is the essential nature (of him who attempts the refutation); for it is the essential nature of him who refutes. (II.3.7)[21]

Understood as a minimal argument for the existence of the *ātman*, this is unconvincing. And indeed Śaṃkara's argument here has been criticized as an equivocation. Hence Eliot Deutsch objects:

> The argument is not without its difficulties. A subtle and unsupported transition is made between the Ātman and the *jīva* (the individual conscious being) so that the argument does not so much prove the Ātman as it does the *jīva* – the *jīva*, which has the kind of self-consciousness described in, and presupposed by, the argument, and not the Ātman, which is pure consciousness.[22]

Now there may be some force in this line of criticism if Śaṃkara's argument is thought to be attempting a proof of the existence of the *ātman*. Moreover, it is true that he sometimes seems ambiguous on this point. Thus N. K. Devaraja writes:

> In his enthusiasm to vindicate the self-established character of the self, Śaṅkara sometimes confuses the pure *cit* with the conditioned self. Thus . . . he describes the nature of the self as perpetual presence (*sarvadā – varttamāna – svabhāva*). This description can obviously not be true of the conditioned self which is inactive or unrevealed at least in dreamless sleep.[23]

However Śaṃkara's argument can be interpreted to evade the objection raised. Thus Vācaspati Miśra, commenting in the *Bhāmatī* on the first passage from Śaṃkara quoted above, sees the argument as only purporting to establish the existence of the *jīva*. On his reading the argument begins from the fact that a person clearly cannot coherently deny his own existence. Moreover he cannot know that he exists and yet not know the self:

> He would not have the cognition "I exist". If he did not cognise the *jīva*-self, which is the substrate of "I-ness", he would not have the cognition of "I"; this is the sense.[24]

This reading coheres quite well with Śaṃkara's remarks in the immediately succeeding passage at *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* I.1.1:

> But if Brahman is generally known as the Self, there is no room for enquiry into it! Not so, we reply; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its special nature.[25]

Śaṃkara then goes on to mention various opinions about the nature of the self that have to be combatted including the Cārvāka identification of the self with the body, Buddhist "no-self" theories and the views of Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Thus the self that is self-established is not claimed to be the full *ātman* of the Vedāntin theory. Though denial of the self is supposed to be self-refuting, the nature of the indubitable self is allowed to be open to debate.

Thus construed Śaṃkara's argument bears some resemblance to a claim that underpins the Nyāya proof for the existence of the soul. In the *Nyāyavārttika* Uddyotakara also maintains that it would be self-refuting to assert that the self does not exist. What is controversial is only the nature of the self:

> No one actually disagrees about the existence of the self but disagrees only with this or that particular manner of determining its nature, e.g. (as to whether) the self is simply the body or it is the cognitive faculties like the Understanding, or it is a bundle of all these (physical and mental phenomena) or it is some (substance) other than all these. And that is a controversy regarding the specific nature of the self which could not be reasonably raised unless the existence of the self was taken for granted as established.[26]

However Śaṃkara's and Uddyotakara's arguments are not identical. Śaṃkara seems to want to claim that the denial of the self is *operationally* self-refuting in the sense that one cannot coherently assert "I do not exist". This "I" is then identified with pure consciousness. The view in question is well brought out in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* dialogue between the teacher and pupil when the pupil argues that pure consciousness must be an accidental property of the self since it is not known in deep sleep. The teacher replies that the proposition that the self is pure consciousness is impossible to deny. The pupil's supposed objection involves a contradiction:

> Although you are [in truth] seeing, you say, "I do not see". This is contradictory . . . . Then you are seeing in the state of deep sleep; for you deny only the seen object, not the seeing. I said that your seeing is pure consciousness. Thus as [It] does not depart [from you]. [Its] transcendental changelessness and eternity are established solely by Itself without depending upon any means of knowledge.[27]

There are, of course, various ways to challenge this argument. For example, one might question the notion of pure, contentless consciousness and urge, as Rāmānuja does in his *Śrībhāṣya* (I.1.1), that consciousness is irreducibly intentional: "all states of consciousness have for their object something that is marked by some difference, as appears in the case of judgments like 'I saw this'."[28] However for our purposes here it is more important to clarify the status of Śaṃkara's self-refutation argument. Firstly note here once again the very important Advaitin insistence that the self cannot be an object of inference. Thus the self-refutation argument is presumably not so much a "proof" of the existence of the self as a claim that the self cannot be disproved or refuted. But then it seems that the denial of the existence of the self is only supposed to be *operationally* self-refuting. That is, it is only the *assertion* of this claim that is self-refuting. Even if this is conceded, however, the claim might nevertheless be true. Compare "All our assertions are false"; this may be true, but no one can coherently assert that it is so.

The Naiyāyika argument, despite similarities with the Advaitin view, is rather different. This is evident in Uddyotakara's treatment of the Buddhist claim that the self does not exist:

> But in the above the words "Self does not exist" give rise to a contradiction. The expression "does not exist" is intended to be equireferential with the expression "the self" (i.e. they are purported to be true of the same object) . . . . By using the (referring) expression "The self" we speak of the being (of the self) whereas by saying "does not exist" we go on to deny the same.[29]

Thus Uddyotakara maintains that the claim "The self does not exist" is *absolutely* self-refuting since it is self-contradictorily false. Here he is appealing to the Nyāya analysis of negation. An absence or negation must be an absence of something. This something is called the counterpositive (*pratiyogin*) of the absence in question.[30] Uddyotakara explicitly invokes this doctrine:

> A certain object which is denied in a certain locus must be existent in some place other than that locus; thus when (the predicate) ". . . does not exist" is applied to an object to which the term "The Jar" is also applied, the application of the term "The Jar" in such a context (in an identifying manner) does not allow us to assert the absolute non-existence of the jar, but only permits us to assert that it is absent from a certain place or at a certain time – by the words "The Jar does not exist".[31]

But, the argument continues, the self is not located in time or space and hence it cannot be significantly denied in this way.

A putative counter-example is now offered to the Nyāya account: "What happens if it (the statement "The self does not exist') is compared to the obviously true statement 'The rabbit-horn does not exist'?"[32] But Uddyotakara refuses to acknowledge this example as telling. Rather than see the statement as a denial of existence to a fictitious object, he prefers to analyse it as follows:

> The (compound) term "rabbit-horn" refers to a relation (does not refer to any unreal

entity!). Hence we are not here denying the existence of a particular (named) object but are simply denying a relation (between two existent objects).[33]

By now we can see that the Nyāya charge that the denial of the self is absolutely self-refuting requires a number of presuppositions to be convincing. Once again we can see that what appears *prima facie* to be a minimal argument turns out to depend upon a number of contentious theoretical assumptions, here a referential theory of meaning tied to a realist ontology:

> While going to deny the self one uses the word "The self"; one must be able to articulate what one is talking *about*. We don't find a single [i.e. simple] term which is meaningless [i.e. non-referring].[34]

These assumptions were not shared by the opponents Uddyotakara is arguing against, particularly the Buddhists. Thus the Nyāya self-refutation argument is clearly not minimal unless employed against a Naiyāyika. Moreover the Nyāya view can be resisted in various ways: e.g. by denying the referential theory of meaning which in turn underpins the *pratiyogin* doctrine, as was done by the Buddhist logicians. However one interesting instance of a different sort of counter-argument that is particularly apposite to our concerns here is a self-refutation argument offered by the Buddhists against the Naiyāyika assertion of their implicit principle.

The argument is reported in Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka* in the context of his criticism of the Buddhist theory of momentariness. Udayana claims that the Buddhist argument for momentariness is vitiated by its inability to provide a "disagreeing example" (*vipakṣa*). That is, if the Buddhist wants to prove "Whatever exists is momentary" he has to provide an instantiation of the contrapositive of the universal proposition, viz. "Whatever is non-momentary does not exist". This the Buddhist cannot do, Udayana argues, because an example cannot be an unreal entity and yet clearly the Buddhist thesis maintains that *all* entities are momentary. The Buddhist replies by offering an example like "The rabbit's horn is non-momentary (and also non-existent)". But Udayana, invoking the Nyāya theory we have already mentioned, refuses to allow that a fictional object can be the subject of a proposition. However now he is open to the following rejoinder from the Buddhist. Nyāya claims that an unreal entity cannot be the subject term of a proposition because subject terms must refer to something real. But the assertion of this claim will be *pragmatically* self-refuting because "an unreal entity" is the subject of the proposition expressing the claim.[35] Furthermore, when the Naiyāyika claims that an example cannot be an unreal entity he himself has to provide a disagreeing example for the thesis "All examples are real". But any proferred candidate would commit the Naiyāyika to an assertion of the form "x is an non-example because x does not exist". And this, of course, should be an assertion that on Nyāya principles is *absolutely* self-refuting.

With regard to this line of argument two points are of particular interest. Firstly, Udayana opens himself to such counter-argument by apparently conceding that "rabbit's horn" is non-referring and hence fictitious. Correspondingly his treatment of "absence of rabbit's horn" differs from Uddyotakara's. We saw that Uddyotakara analysed "rabbit-horn" as a compound term referring to a relation. Now to assert "The rabbit-horn does not exist" is to assert that there is an absence of rabbit-horn in a particular locus. And indeed Uddyotakara accepts the term "absence of rabbit-horn" as meaningful and holds it to refer to an absence, the counterpositive of which is the relation between a rabbit and a horn. Udayana, however, maintains that "absence of rabbit-horn" is not a genuine absence since its counterpositive (rabbit-horn) cannot be known through any of the *pramāṇas*. Potter suggests that the discrepancy here results from the fact that the two philosophers are considering different propositions.[36] Uddyotakara has in mind the proposition "There is absence of horn on (a) rabbit's head". Both horns and rabbit heads are perceptible and so too is the absence of one on the other. Udayana, however, has in mind the proposition "There is absence of rabbit's horn here" and he assumes that we are never going to see a horned rabbit.

Secondly, Udayana is willing to concede that the Nyāya assertion of the principle that nothing can be affirmed or denied of a fictitious entity violates that very principle:

> In order to avoid a self-contradictory object not established by any means of knowledge, you [i.e. the Buddhists] have conceded that one can make statements about the non-existent. Similarly, in order not to allow any statement about non-entities in our discourse on the means of knowledge, we concede that a self-contradictory statement (prohibiting the use of non-entities) is possible although it is not supported by any means of knowledge. If you treated both the cases in the same manner, we would not have said anything about non-entities. (We have made the above self-contradictory statement because you first raised the question.)[37]

In other words, Udayana prefers to embrace a "superficial" self-contradiction rather than abandon the more deeply entrenched commitment to realism. To adopt the Buddhist approach and allow fictitious entities as subject terms will, he fears, collapse the crucial distinction between actual and fictitious entities. The Buddhist, however, is unconcerned by this feared consequence. Adopting what Matilal has called a "pan-fictional approach", the Buddhist places all intentional objects on the same level.[38] This is not surprising if we remember that the Buddhist logicians are sometimes classified as the logical tradition of the Vijñānavāda school (*nyāyanusarino vijñānavādinaḥ*). Hence the idealistic conclusion that objects are to be identified with consciousness may not be particularly unwelcome. On the other hand, however, the theory of objects is also compatible with a Sautrāntika conception of real objects as only momentary *svalakṣaṇas*.[39] Clearly the Buddhists are more concerned with epistemology than ontology, whereas the Nyāya is fundamentally realistic in both spheres. Thus Udayana's commitment to realism and theory-construction determines his approach to the problem of empty subject terms. He is willing to accept a lower-level contradiction rather than abandon a high-level principle, i.e. the fundamental realism expressed in the Nyāya axiom "whatever is, is knowable and nameable" (*astitva jñeyatva abhidheyatva*). The rationality of this procedure is to be justified in terms of the Nyāya holistic conception of system construction: overall the Nyāya system is more coherent and of greater explanatory power than its rivals.

Now although the Buddhist logicians are less concerned with ontology than the Nyāya, they are nonetheless systematic "progress philosophers" and as such committed to certain presuppositions shared by Nyāya.[40] Udayana naturally takes these for granted in his debate with them. He assumes, for example, that the holistic justification of the Nyāya system will be a rationally acceptable procedure and that the philosophical task is a theoretical explanation of the world. Against philosophers who do not share these assumptions the Nyāya approach is vulnerable and their "minimal" arguments are much less convincing. Examples of Indian philosophers of this sort include the Buddhist Nāgārjuna and the Advaitin Śrīharṣa.

V

In Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* we find a number of criticisms of the Mādhyamika philosophy along Naiyāyika lines together with Nāgārjuna's replies. One of these objections is of particular interest here because it prefigures some of the arguments in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* that we have just been looking at. The Nyāya opponent construes Nāgārjuna as maintaining the thesis that things have no intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). However such a thesis is claimed to be open to a familiar Naiyāyika objection:

> It is only an existent object that is negated, not a non-existent one. For instance, when it is said: "There is no pot in the house", it is an existent pot that is negated, not a non-existent one . . . In like manner it follows that the negation "The things have no intrinsic nature'. . . . is the negation of an existent intrinsic nature, not of a non-existent one. In these circumstances, the statement that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature is not valid. By the very fact that a negation is possible, the intrinsic nature of all things is non-negated. If that intrinsic nature does not exist, what, then, do you negate by this statement? (XI–XII)[41]

Nāgārjuna's reply is brilliantly dialectical:

> If negation is only of the existent and not of the non-existent . . . , and if you negate the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things . . . , then the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things is established. (LXI)[42]

In other words, the Naiyāyika thesis is that all things are not devoid of an intrinsic nature because one cannot significantly negate a non-existent. But the assertion of this thesis is self-refuting since its truth implies its own falsity. If the Nyāya principle is correct, the universal voidness that is being negated must exist. This argumentative exchange is clearly an ancestor of the Nyāya-Buddhist charges of mutual self-refutation we looked at earlier.

However, rather than dwell on this exchange, I want to consider instead a more fundamental variety of self-refutation objection that is raised in the first verses of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. The objection in question is posed thus:

> If an intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of the things. . . , whatever they may be, exists nowhere . . . , your [very] statement must be devoid of an intrinsic nature (*asvabhāva*). It is not, therefore, in a position to deny the intrinsic nature [of the things]. (I)[43]

Nor will it do to except the statement "All things are void" itself:

> Your statement is included in all things. . . [Now] if all things are void, for what reason is your statement non-void, – that statement which has denied the intrinsic nature of all things because it is [itself] non-void? . . . . Thus, if your statement exists . . . , there arises the following discordance: some things are void, and some other things, non-void . . . And you should state the special reason for that discordance, explaining why some things are void, while some others are not. You have however, not stated that reason. In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid. (II)[44]

The point here is clear enough. The Naiyāyika opponent seeks to catch Nāgārjuna in a dilemma – or, as it is called in Indian logic, a "double noose" (*ubhayataḥ pāśā*). Let "S" stand for the proposition "All things are void". Now if someone asserts S, then either: (i) S itself is a thing which is also void, and hence cannot serve to assert that S; or (ii) S is not a thing that is void, in which case one has to present a reason for its exceptional status, as Nāgārjuna has not done. Either way, S is untenable.

It is important to note with regard to this dilemma that the two horns appear to involve appeal to different types of self-refutation. The first horn presses home the charge that the assertion of S would implicitly commit one to asserting that S itself is void. Thus the assertion of S would be *operationally* self-refuting. It may be that S is true, but no one can coherently assert it to be so. Recall our earlier example "All our assertions are false"; this may be true, but no one can coherently assert that it is so. The second horn of the dilemma, however, seems to allude to a weaker *pragmatic* self-refutation. Thus if a person asserts S, it might be argued that there is a direct self-contradiction between asserting such a proposition and what is asserted in it. Compare the assertion of "All universal propositions are false", where the form of the proposition seems to provide a counter-example to what the proposition says. A charge of pragmatic self-refutation, however, is always weaker than a charge of operational self-refutation because it can be evaded by denying that the alleged counter-example is in fact a counter-example. Thus a theory of types might be invoked to claim that "All universal propositions are false" is not a first-order universal proposition (all of which are indeed false), but a second-order proposition.[45] Again, appeals to metalanguages provide a similar sort of escape route. Another way to evade the pragmatic charge is to interpret S as a self-excepting statement: "All things are void *except this statement*".[46] Now the Naiyāyika fears that Nāgārjuna will try to claim that the self-refutation purportedly involved here is only a pragmatic one that can be evaded. It is this escape route that the Naiyāyika opponent seeks to block with his second horn. He insists on some grounds being supplied for considering S to be self-exceptive. No such argument, he complains, has been provided by Nāgārjuna. Moreover, the Nyāya has an independent argument for not regarding S as self-exceptive. Working with a theory of natural classes, they urge that if all members of a class save one individual possess a property, then this is an argument for disqualifying that one individual from membership of the class. Hence if S is self-exceptive, it cannot be a statement.[47]

In fact Nāgārjuna ignores the second horn of the dilemma altogether.

He does not try to dispute the Nyāya suggestion that making S a self-exceptive statement would be unsatisfactorily *ad hoc*; nor does he appeal to the notion of a metalanguage, or a theory of types. Rather he grasps firmly the first horn of the dilemma and agrees that S is itself empty (*śūnya*), as are all other things:

> Now the voidness of this statement of mine is established because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature. And just as this statement of mine is void because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature, so also are all things void because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature. (XXI)[48]

But then what about the charge that the assertion of S is self-refuting? Nāgārjuna replies:

> You have not understood the meaning of the voidness of the things. So you have set out to criticize me, saying: "Since your statement is devoid of an intrinsic nature, the negation of the intrinsic nature of the things is not valid". That nature of the things which is dependent is voidness. – Why? – Because it is devoid of an intrinsic nature. Those things which are dependently originated are not, indeed, endowed with an intrinsic nature . . . . Likewise it follows that my statement also, being dependently originated . . . , is devoid of an intrinsic nature, and hence void. – But things like a cart, a pot, a cloth, etc., though devoid of an intrinsic nature . . . because of being dependently originated, are occupied with their respective functions . . . Similarly this statement of mine, though devoid of an intrinsic nature because of being dependently originated, is engaged in the task of establishing the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of the things. (XXII)[49]

In other words, the fact that S too is empty does not prevent it performing its function, which is to direct the hearer towards a realization of the emptiness of all things. Thus S is not a thesis, a proposition to be proved:

> If I had any proposition (*pratijñā*), then this defect . . . would be mine. I have, however, no proposition . . . Therefore there is no defect that is mine . . . . When all things are void, perfectly appeased and by nature isolated, how can there be a proposition? (XXXIX)[50]

Hence Nāgārjuna evades the opponent's dilemma not by claiming special status for S, but by not *asserting* S:

> If I apprehended something with the help of the four *pramāṇas* . . . , then only would I either affirm or deny. [But] since I do not even apprehend an object of any kind . . . , I neither affirm nor deny. (XXX)[51]

But then what, cries the opponent, is the point of all these arguments? Nāgārjuna's reply alludes to the "two-truths" view of his *Mādhyamikakārikā*

(25:10): "The transcendent truth cannot be taught without having recourse to the conventional truth. [And] Nirvāṇa cannot be attained without realizing the transcendent truth". The statement "All things are void" can be taken as a thesis for debate only at the *saṃvṛti* level:

> We do not speak, however, without having recourse to the conventional truth (*samvyavahāra*) . . . . It is not, however, without having recourse to the conventional truth . . . , it is not by rejecting the conventional truth, that we say: All things are void. For it is not possible to teach the absolute truth (*dharma*) without having recourse to the conventional truth. (XXVIII)[52]

Anyway, continues Nāgārjuna, the opponent's position is much shakier than he seems to realize. The Nyāya conceives of a philosophical debate as involving defence of a propositional thesis that is to be proved or disproved by means of the *pramāṇas*. But what about these *pramāṇas* themselves?

> If such and such objects are established for you through the *pramāṇas* . . . , tell me how those *pramāṇas* are established for you . . . If the *pramāṇas* are established through other *pramāṇas* there is an infinite series (*anavasthā*) . . . . Now, if you think: those *pramāṇas* are established without *pramāṇas*, the objects to be cognized . . . , however, are established through the *pramāṇas*, then your position that [all] objects are established through *pramāṇas* . . . is abandoned . . . And you should state the special reason why some objects are established through *pramāṇas*, while some others are not. But you have not stated this. (XXXI–XXXII)[53]

Hence the *pramāṇas* cannot be established by themselves, or by other *pramāṇas*. Nor can they be unestablished. Furthermore, neither can they be established by the truths (*prameyas*) they reveal, because this leads to a vicious circle: the *pramāṇas* establish the *prameyas* and the *prameyas* establish the *pramāṇas* (XLVII–L).[54] In sum then, the opponent's confidence that philosophical debate involves the establishment of theses through the *pramāṇas* rests upon dubious foundations.

At this point a systematic realist philosopher like the Naiyāyika will probably be tempted simply to construe the Mādhyamika as a variety of sceptic. If this is so, he might pose Nāgārjuna another dilemma; this time a version of "that expeditious way which some take with the sceptics" spoken of by Hume:

> If the sceptical reasonings be strong, say they, 'tis a proof, that reason may have some force and authority: if weak, they can never be sufficient to invalidate all the conclusions of our understanding.[55]

Hume himself rejects this argument by pointing out that all the sceptic has to do is produce an argument as good as any other argument offered by his opponents. Thus if any arguments are held to be sound, his arguments must be too. This has some of the flavour of the *prāsaṅgika* method of those Mādhyamikas like Candrakīrti who favour the purely negative form of debate, claiming only for their arguments that they draw out the consequences of the opponents' theses using logical principles conceded by the opponents themselves. Nor will it do to try to press home the charge that even this implies the validity of an argument to the effect that if the anti-sceptical arguments are sound, so too is the sceptical one.[56] The Mādhyamika scepticism is thoroughly Pyrrhonian so that the Mādhyamika does not *assert* even this argument; he simply allows the opponent to perceive that he (the opponent) is on his own principles committed to asserting that.[57]

VI

We have seen, then, that the charge that the Mādhyamika view that "All things are empty" is self-refuting seems unfounded. It certainly is not *absolutely* self-refuting for it involves no proposition that is self-contradictory. Nor is it clear that it is *pragmatically* self-refuting to utter the sentence "All things are empty". Anyway, pragmatic self-refutation is a weak charge to bring. It can always be argued that the utterance providing the alleged counter-example to what the sentence says is not a real counter-example. The charge of *operational* self-refutation was the most promising strategy for the opponent to take. That is, to claim that the proposition "All things are empty" is not itself self-refuting, but any assertion of it would be. As we saw, Nāgārjuna parries this objection by refusing to *assert* "All things are empty".

To the systematic philosopher, however, the cost of a reply like Nāgārjuna's is far too high to be attractive. Thus a modern author referring to this sort of approach writes:

> The sceptic can always maintain coherence by *asserting* nothing (and so the ancient sceptics commended the *epoche* or suspension of judgment). But the price of this is that he does not maintain a *position*, i.e. any part in rational discourse or in a "profound disagreement". Coherence is not the only requirement of rationality (animals never fall into self-contradiction).[58]

The claim is, then, that there are certain conditions of rational discourse that are violated by the refusal to assert anything. Now it seems plausible enough that there may be conditions of discourse. Indeed the Mādhyamika implicitly recognizes at least one of these when he seeks to avoid the charge of operational self-refutation. But the acknowledgement of the fallaciousness of operational self-refutation only commits one to the recognition of the limits of what can be conherently asserted, i.e. the way in which one assertion commits us to asserting something else. It has not yet been shown that a condition of rational discourse is assertion, unless by "rational discourse" one question-beggingly means only systematic philsophy with its programme of theory-construction and explanation. Indeed it has not even been shown that a weaker thesis is true: viz. that assertion is essential to philosophical discussion in general.

The contention that the *prāsaṅgika* approach is incompatible with the practice of philosophical discussion was in fact maintained by some Indian philosophers. The Naiyāyikas, for example, tended to dismiss the Mādhyamikas as mere cavillers (*vaitaṇḍikas*) and to see the real Buddhist opponents as the systematic logicians of the school of Dignāga. Thus there arises a controversy in Indian philosophy between the *pramāṇavādins* and the *prāsaṅgikas*. The first group (which includes the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Jains) maintain the necessity of admitting the existence of means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇas*) for genuine philosophical discussion to take place. The second group (represented by the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas and some Advaitin dialecticians) utilizes only the negative form of argument and does not assert the existence of any *pramāṇas* on the basis of which a philosophical system is to be constructed. We have already noted Nāgārjuna's attack on the epistemic foundationalism of the *pramāṇavādins*. Let us now attend to how in the introduction to his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* the Advaitin philosopher Śrīharṣa (whose methodology is self-avowedly indebted to Mādhyamika), also forcefully challenges the *pramāṇavādin* dogma that prior to entering into debate both parties to a philosophical discussion must admit that the *pramāṇas* exist.

Śrīharṣa begins his attack by analysing this dogma into four possible claims:

> . . . the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc. which is to be admitted by the disputants follows from what logical reason? (1) From the fact that discussion, invariably accompanied by the admission of the means of valid knowledge, etc. cannot be undertaken by two debators who do not admit their existence? (2) From the fact

> that these things are the causes of the discussion which is to be undertaken by the disputants? or (3) From the fact that these things are commonly accepted? or (4) From the fact that failure to admit their existence would lead to an improper result in the establishment of truth or determination of victory?[59]

All four alternatives are rejected. Thus (1) is untenable because philosophers like the Cārvākas and the Mādhyamikas refuse to admit the *pramāṇas* and yet enter into philosophical discussion. Indeed, the very attempts of the *pramāṇavādins* at refutation of these philosophers imply that they are to be taken seriously.[60] Similar considerations refute alternatives (2) and (3).

The opponent now modifies his thesis. It is not discussion is general that requires the admission of the *pramāṇas*, but discussion that is capable of proving or refuting anything. Śrihārṣa's reply is twofold. First, he denies that there is an invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the admission of the existence of the *pramāṇas* and proof or refutation. This is shown by the fact that mere admission of *pramāṇas* does not entail that discussion leads to successful proof or refutation. This in turn leads to his second point, viz. that the real determinant of unsuccessful argument is specious reasoning. To indicate specious reasoning on the part of an opponent all that is required is a provisional acceptance (*abhyupagama*) of the *pramāṇas*. By the use of negative argument the debator can show that if the opponent accepts a particular *pramāṇa*, then certain logical consequences result that are incompatible (on the opponent's own terms) with the original admission.

At this point the opponent presents a familiar type of objection along Nyāya lines: "But if there were no means of valid knowledge, etc., then how could discussion itself, the locus of the quality in question exist . . . ?"[61] In other words, so far the dispute between Śrīharṣa and his opponent has been about whether or not discussion is invariably accompanied by the admission of the *pramāṇas*. But this dispute amounts to a disagreement about what qualities are properly to be attributed to a particular substratum (i.e. "discussion"). However, (invoking once again a basic Nyāya principle), to significantly deny an attribute of a particular entity implies in turn the existence of that entity. Now the opponent holds that Śrīharṣa is committed to denying the existence of the substratum since a debate about an attribute of something requires proof of the existence of that entity. But Śrīharṣa also wants to deny that the substratum ("discussion") has a particular attribute (viz. that it is invariably accompanied by an admission of the *pramāṇas*). This, of course, results in a contradiction: denial and admission of the same entity.

Śrīharṣa replies as follows:

> We do not say that debate is to be undertaken having admitted that the means of valid knowledge do not exist, but that debate may be undertaken by individuals who are indifferent to the question whether the means of valid knowledge do exist or whether the means of valid knowledge do not exist, and yet carry on just as you do having admitted their existence.[62]

Indeed the very debate in progress between Śrīharṣa and the *pūrvapakṣin* is an illustration of this. All that is required for debate is the acceptance by both parties to the debate of certain conventional rules. Moreover, by insisting on this requirement alternative (4) in the original analysis is eliminated. Victory in debate is assigned by a neutral judge (*madhyastha*) on the basis of whether or not the debator has violated these conventional rules.[63]

Śrīharṣa's own view is that all definitions are illogical and the bulk of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* is devoted to trying to show that the Nyāya definitions in particular all entail contradictions and hence (on Nyāya principles) must be unsound. As an Advaitin Śrīharṣa believes in the self-luminous Brahman of pure consciousness, but the world is indefinable (*anirvacanīya*) as existent or non-existent – as the dialectical criticisms of attempts at definition show. However this engenders another objection: If all things are indefinable (i.e. one can say neither that they exist nor that they do not exist), then one must admit both the existence of the objects that are the counterpositive of the negation and the existence of indefinability itself.

Śrīharṣa's reply is worth quoting at length since it clarifies his conception of philosophical discussion:

> All of this is the objection of one who has not understood his adversary's intentions. For how is he, who maintains that nothing can be defined as existent or non-existent, to be criticized as if he had asserted the existence of this very indefinability? Indefinability is included within the word "all" which refers to anything and everything in the phenomenal world. It is only in accordance with what the opponent admits that this results: definability being refuted, indefinability remains, for it is he who claims that of a negation and its counterpositive the denial of the one is the assertion of the other. And so, it is only in accordance with our opponent's conceptions that this is said, "Everything turns out to be indefinable". In reality, we avoid categorizing the phenomenal world as existent or non-existent; placing our all on self-established consciousness, the real Brahma alone, we rest in peace, our purpose accomplished. But those who undertake debate by means of a set of proofs and refutations which they themselves design, and hope thereby to establish the truth, to them we say, "These arguments of yours are not correct, for they are contradicted by the very principles

> which you admit". And for this reason, all objections to the faults which we adduce are without occasion, for we do no more than to point out that your principles are contradicted by your own admissions.[64]

Of course, the Naiyāyikas did not view Śrīharṣa's criticisms in this spirit. Rather they just tried to refine their definitions. Hence much of Navya-nyāya consists in the construction of extremely complicated and subtle definitions, together with the growth of a sophisticated technical language to express them in. Indeed Dasgupta suggests that "Śrīharṣa may therefore be said to be the first great writer who is responsible indirectly for the growth of verbalism in later Nyāya thought."[65] Nevertheless it does seem to me that Śrīharṣa succeeds in vindicating his methodological approach, though in doing so he brings out certain fundamental metaphilosophical differences between himself and his opponents. What generates the distrust of philosophers like the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Jains towards purely negative minimal argument is a conception of pholosophy as a systematic theoretical attempt to explain the world we live in. The explanation is required by the fact that these philosophers are all, in Potter's phrase, "progress philosophers" committed to mapping out the necessary and sufficient conditions of freedom (*mokṣa*).[66] For Śrīharṣa and the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas, on the other hand, the world is *māyā*; not something to be explained, but something to be transcended. As "leap philosophers" they view freedom quite differently; there is no route to it along a path of causes and effects. Hence they are unconcerned to present a map of the network of causal relations that "progress philosophers" concern themselves with. They refuse to offer an alternative systematic theoretical account of the world to that offered by their opponents. Thus Nāgārjuna, for example, warns us in the *Mādhyamikakārikā* (13:8) that those who seek to make of *śūnyatā* just another theory or view are incurable. For these philosophers minimal argument is obviously the only appropriate style of argumentation. The metaphilosophical difference here between the two groups of philosophers is a large and important one, but it is certainly not the difference between "rational discourse" and its opposite.

VII

To sum up then. Utilizing a particular taxonomy of types of self-refutation, we have examined a number of Indian philosophical debates in order to clarify the structure and status of some of the varieties of self-refutation arguments used. We have seen that upon close inspection some of these arguments, though ostensibly minimal arguments, invoke concealed presuppositions. Once these presuppositions are revealed the arguments often are unsuccessful, or at least are unsuccessful as *minimal* arguments. In the case of arguments purporting to show the opponent guilty of *absolute* self-refutation, this is not surprising: it is usually quite difficult to catch a good philosopher in the act of asserting something that is self-contradictory. *Pragmatic* self-refutation, on the other hand, is rather less interesting as a charge since it can be evaded simply by making the assertion involved a special case. The most philosophically pregnant variety of self-refutation argument is *operational* self-refutation, where one tries to catch the opponent contradicting the implicit commitments of his assertion. But even here we find that the employment of what looks like a minimal argument can turn out to involve a tendentious appeal to a particular conception of philosophical inquiry.

The examination of these arguments seems to me worthwhile in at least three respects. First, for the light it throws on the logical structure of philosophical argument in general, and self-refutation arguments in particular. Second, for the historical interest involved in investigating the patterns and presuppositions of Indian philosophical argumentation. Third, because the central issue about the role of assertions and the nature of philosophy that emerges from our examination of these arguments is an absolutely fundamental philosophical problem which ramifies beyond the confines of these particular debates or even of Indian philosophy itself. This issue has, for example, underpinned some of the most discussed work in recent analytic philosophy.[67] All three respects indicate once again the perennial philosophical value of studying Indian philosophy.

Philosophy Department,
University of Otago,
New Zealand

NOTES

[1] For fuller documentation of this claim see Staal (1962).

[2] For this and further references see Robinson (1967), pp. 50–58.

[3] Thibaut (1890), Part I, p. 429.
[4] Matilal (1977b), p. 97.
[5] For discussions of self-refutation in relation to Western philosophy see particularly Passmore (1961), Chapter 4 and Mackie (1964). Also relevant are Boyle (1972) and Finnis (1977).
[6] Scharfstein (1978), pp. 166–171.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 166.
[8] For an illuminating discussion of the Naiyāyika conception of inquiry as the construction of a philosophical system see Potter (1977), pp. 38–46.
[9] C.f. Bagchi (1953), pp. 178–179.
[10] What follows here is indebted to the taxonomy in Mackie (1964).
[11] Radhakrishnan and Moore (1957), pp. 231–233.
[12] For more on Cārvāka scepticism about inference and various responses to it see my (1984).
[13] The debate here alluded to is reviewed in Bagchi (1953), Chapter III.
[14] Kajiyama (1966), p. 31.
[15] Jha (1937), p. 716.
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 727.
[18] For a comparative study of Śaṃkara's and Descartes' "*cogitos*" see Scharfstein (1978), Chapter 5.
[19] Thibaut (1890), Part I, p. 14.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 424.
[21] Thibaut (1896), Part II, p. 14.
[22] Deutsch (1969), p. 51.
[23] Devaraja (1962), p. 181.
[24] Sastri and Raja (1933), p. 113. On this point compare Matilal (1971), p. 334.
[25] Thibaut (1890), Part I, p. 14.
[26] Chakravarti (1982), p. 228.
[27] Deutsch and van Buitenen (1971), p. 144.
[28] Thibaut (1904), p. 39.
[29] Chakravarti (1982), p. 228.
[30] On this Nyāya doctrine see Ingalls (1951); Matilal (1968); Potter (1977).
[31] Chakravarti (1982), pp. 228–229.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 232.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 230.
[35] Matilal (1970), pp. 90, 103–104.
[36] Potter (1977), p. 145.
[37] Matilal (1970), p. 104.
[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 102–103.
[39] Apropos of the compatibility of these Buddhist logical theories with different ontological commitments, it is interesting to note that the Tibetan authority dKon-mchog 'Jigs-med dbang-po (18th century) in his synoptic treatment of the schools of Indian Buddhist philosophy says that both the Sautrāntikas and Cittamātrins can each be divided into two types: those who follow scripture and those who follow logical reasoning. Both groups who follow reason, however, base themselves on the seven logical treatises of Dharmakīrti. See Sopa and Hopkins (1976), pp. 92, 110–111; Guenther (1971), pp. 78, 107.

[40] On "progress philosophers" and "leap philosophers" see Potter (1963).

[41] Bhattacharya (1978), pp. 12–13.

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 40–41.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

[45] C.f. Passmore (1961), p. 71.

[46] C.f. Rescher (1968), p. 16.

[47] Matilal (1977a), pp. 11–12.

[48] Bhattacharya (1978), p. 17.

[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 24. C.f. Matilal (1977a), p. 12; Prior (1976). pp. 74–75, 144.

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26.

[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 32–33.

[55] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. I, Part IV, Section I (p. 237).

[56] C.f. Passmore (1961), p. 73.

[57] Here I am presenting the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika method. The Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, on the other hand, held that it was possible to present a positive argument for the thesis "All things are empty".

[58] Finnis (1977), p. 267.

[59] Granoff (1978), pp. 71–72.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 85–86.

[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 140–141.

[65] Dasgupta (1932), p. 146.

[66] C.f. Potter (1963).

[67] Thus Feyerabend (1975) and (1978) represent a lively defence of what is essentially the *prāsaṅgika* method applied to problems of methodology in the philosophy of science and Rorty (1979) makes fundamental to his conception of Western philosophy and its history a distinction between "systematic" and "edifying" philosophy that parallels in many respects the division between "progress philosophy" and "leap philosophy" in India.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bagchi, Sitansusekhar (1953). *Inductive Reasoning: A Study of Tarka and its Role in Indian Logic*. Calcutta: Śrī Munischchandra Sinha.
Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar (1978). *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (Vigrahavyāvartanī)*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Boyle, Joseph M. (1972). 'Self-Referential Inconsistency, Inevitable Falsity and Metaphysical Argumentation', *Metaphilosophy* 3: 25–42.
Chakravarti, Arindam (1982). 'The Nyāya Proofs for the Existence of the Soul', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 10: 211–238.
Dasgupta, Surendranath (1932). *A History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Deutsch, Eliot (1969). *Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction*. Honolulu: East–West Center Press.

Deutsch, Eliot and J. A. B. van Buitenen (1971). Editors. *A Source Book of Advaita Vedānta*. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii.

Devaraja, N. K. (1962), *An Introduction To Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Feyerabend, Paul K. (1975), *Against Method*. London: NLB.

Feyerabend, Paul K. (1978). *Science in a Free Society*. London: NLB.

Finnis, J. M. (1977). 'Scepticism, Self-Refutation, and the Good of Truth' in P.M. S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds.), *Law, Morality, and Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Granoff, Phyllis (1978). *Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta: Śrī Harṣa's Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Guenther, Herbert V. (1971). *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972.

Hume, David, *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Edited by Ernest C. Mosner. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969.

Ingalls, Daniel H. H. (1951). *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Jha, Ganganatha (1937). Translator. *The Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*. Vol. I. Baroda: Oriental Institute.

Kajiyama, Yuichi (1966). *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy*. Kyoto: Kyoto University.

Mackie, J. L. (1964). 'Self-Refutation – A Formal Analysis', *Philosophical Quarterly* 14: 193–203.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna (1968). *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna (1970). 'Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1: 83–110.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna (1971). Review of *Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction* by Eliot Deutsch, *Philosophy East and West* 21: 332–335.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna (1977a). *The Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna (1977b). *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* in J. Gonda (ed.), *A History of Indian Literature*. Vol. VI, Fasc. 2. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Passmore, John (1961). *Philosophical Reasoning*. London: Duckworth, 1970 (2nd ed.)

Perrett, Roy W. (1984). 'The Problem of Induction in Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West* 34: 153–166.

Potter, Karl H. (1963). *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.

Potter, Karl H. (1977), Editor. *Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

Prior, A. N. (1976). *Papers in Logic and Ethics*. Edited by P. T. Geach and A. J. P. Kenny. London: Duckworth.

Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli and Charles A. Moore (1957). Editors. *A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Rescher, Nicholas (1968). *Topics in Philosophical Logic*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Robinson, Richard H. (1967). *Early Mādhyamika in India and China*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Rorty, Richard (1979). *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Sastri, S. S. Suryanarayana and C. Kunhan Raja (1933). Editors and translators. *The Bhāmatī of Vācaspati on Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (Catussūtrī)*. Adyar: Theosophical Publishing House.

Scharfstein, Ben-Ami *et al.* (1978). *Philosophy East/Philosophy West. A Critical Comparison of Indian, Chinese, Islamic, and European Philosophy*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Sopa, Geshe Lhundup and Jeffrey Hopkins (1976). *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*. London: Rider.

Staal, J. F. (1962). 'Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 25: 52–71.

Thibaut, George (1890). Translator. *The Vedānta-Sūtras with the Commentary by Śaṅkarācārya.* Part I. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968.

Thibaut, George (1896). Translator. *The Vedānta-Sūtras with the Commentary by Śaṅkarācārya*. Part II. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968.

Thibaut, George (1904). Translator. *The Vedānta-Sūtras with the Commentary by Rāmānuja*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.

KENNETH J. PERSZYK

NEGATIVE ENTITIES AND NEGATIVE FACTS IN NAVYA-NYĀYA

It is the purpose of this article to discuss two closely linked sub-topics in the Nyāya's lengthy discussion of negation, viz., negative entities and negative facts. According to Navya-Nyāya, continuing what became the predominant view in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, absence (*abhāva*) is an ontological category (*padārtha*), which is to say, there are negative entities.[1] With little fear of contradiction, one can say that most Western philosophers would find this notion counter-intuitive and in need of justification; and judging from the lengthy debates in Indian texts on this point, it has been far from universally accepted by the majority of Indian philosophers.[2] By no means do I intend or pretend to provide an exhaustive discussion of the Nyāya's reasons or arguments for postulating negative entities in their ontology; rather, I wish to discuss what strikes me as the primary motivation(s) behind this acceptance. While their arguments will no doubt remain unconvincing for most, my aim in the following discussion is to make their thesis less puzzling. As we shall see, the Nyāya's thesis that there are negative facts is a corollary of their thesis that absence is an ontological category; hence, the latter discussion will precede the former.

I

It is important to realize that by 'absence' the Nyāya does not mean 'nothing', for otherwise one might rightly object that by giving absence ontological status, the Nyāya makes nothing into something. According to the Nyāya there is no pure absence; an absence is always the absence *of* something *in* some locus. There can be no negation without a negatum (counterpositive); i.e., that which is negated must have ontological status, for if it were unreal, we would be negating that which is nothing. That is to say, although absence is an ontological category, it is not an independent category. By 'absence is an ontological category', we mean 'the absence of something is an ontological entity'. We use 'entity' in the broad sense of 'whatever has objective status', 'a property', or 'a constituent of a fact'.

Journal of Indian Philosophy **12** (1984) 265–275. 0022–1791/84/0123–0265 $01.10.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

The context of much of the Nyāya's discussion of absence as an ontological category is a debate with the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṁsā. Perhaps the primary reason for believing that there are no negative entities is the identification of an absence with its locus, and in fact, the Prābhākaras wanted to identify every instance of an absence with its locus. For example, the cognition described by 'The ground has an absence of a pot on it' is a cognition of the ground which is empty (or mere ground). In opposition to this, the Nyāya contends that this cognition is a cognition of the absence of a pot characterizing the ground.

By interpreting and extending B. K. Matilal's anotated translation of Gaṅgeśa's *Abhāva-Vada* (*A Discourse on Absence*)[3], we can reconstruct a standard Nyāya argument in response to the Prābhākara school. In the cognition described by 'The ground has an absence of a pot (i.e. no pot) on it', the sole content of the cognition is not the ground, for in that case there is no distinction between the cognition that the ground has no pot on it and the cognition of the ground (i.e. the content is the same). That the absence of a pot is not to be identified with the ground is demonstrated by the fact that neither our cognition that the ground has an absence of a pot on it nor the sentence which describes it (i.e., 'The ground has an absence of a pot on it') says 'The ground *is* an absence of a pot'; rather, they tell us that '*On* the ground is an absence of a pot'.

We can supplement this point by drawing attention to some aspects of the Nyāya's concept of cognition. Every qualificative cognition is expressible in the linguistic form 'aRb', where a is a qualificand, b is a qualifier, and R is a qualification-relation, such that the direction of the dyadic relation is from b to a. That is to say, the qualifier is related to the qualificand by the relation R. In the cognition described by 'The ground has a pot on it', the qualificand is the ground, the qualifier is a pot, and the qualification-relation is conjunction (*on*), such that a particular pot is related to a particular ground by the conjunction relation. In the cognition described by 'The ground has an absence of a pot on it', a particular ground is qualified by the absence of any particular pot such that the counterpositive, pot, is limited by potness and by the relation of conjunction (*on*), not identity (*is*).

In this connection, we should note that in opposition to contemporary Western philosophy, the Nyāya holds that there *can* be negative subject-terms. We usually want to say that if a sentence has the form 'aRb', 'a' is the subject-term and 'b' is the predicate-term. If this is applied to '(The) ground has a pot on it', we might say that 'ground' is the subject-term and 'pot' or 'has a pot' is the predicate-term. Now, the negation of '(The) ground has a pot on it' is '(The) ground has an absence of a pot on it'. I have intentionally chosen to negate the sentence '(The) ground has a pot on it', rather than 'A pot is on the ground', in order to avoid the notion that the Nyāya would say that in the latter's negation (viz., 'Absence of a pot is on the ground'), 'absence of a pot' is the subject-term. On the contrary, for the Nyāya, as soon as we say that the absence of a pot is somewhere or occurs in some locus (in this case, on the ground), 'absence of a pot (no pot)' becomes the second-term (member), which roughly corresponds to the West's 'predicate-term', of an absential *svarūpa* relation, whose first-term is 'ground'. That is to say, 'absence of a pot' is not the real subject-term in 'Absence of a pot is on the ground'. That which is negated (i.e. pot) is the second member of a relation, which is to say, the counterpositive (pot) must be present somewhere by some relation; the absence of a pot must be present somewhere else by an absential *svarūpa* relation. If by 'atomic' we mean 'has the form "aRb" such that *a*, R, and *b* are not further divisible', the Nyāya would admit that there can be no atomic sentence with a negative subject-term. However, an example of an atomic sentence for the Nyāya (following Jagadīśa, e.g.), as opposed to the usual Western interpretation, would be 'a cow' with an accusative case ending (*gaum*); i.e., 'a cow' in the sentence 'Bring a cow' is itself an atomic sentence for the Nyāya. From the view that no atomic sentences can have a negative subject-term, it does not follow that there can be no negative subject-terms. Once you have a negative entity, the term corresponding to the negative entity can be used as a negative subject-term. For example, absence of a cloth and absence of a pot are ontological entities, and the terms 'absence of a cloth' and 'absence of a pot' separately are the second members of an absential *svarūpa* relation; however, the Nyāya admits that each can be used as a negative subject-term. For example, the Nyāya says 'Absence of a cloth is different from absence of a pot' and 'Absence of a pot is different from absence of a cloth'.[4]

Gaṅgeśa says, 'An absence is always apprehended along with a counterpositive entity, for our apprehension is in such forms as "[It is] not a pot", "[It is] not a cloth"; so [an absence] is not a mere that . . . . Neither the mere locus nor a cognition of the mere locus is absence, because we may have a cognition of a mere that (viz., a mere locus) without a cognition of a counterpositive, and because a counterpositive is not included in the objective content of a cognition of a mere that.'[5] Gaṅgeśa's argument can be summarized in the following way: We have a cognition that the ground has an absence of a pot on it. Now, neither the empty ground nor the cognition of the empty ground is sufficient to explain the cognition that the ground has an absence of a pot on it. The cognition of the absence of a pot is possible only if the cognition of a pot is possible; i.e., absence is always dependent upon its counterpositive. Neither the absence of a pot nor a pot, however, is a constituent of the cognition of the empty ground (the ground as a "mere that"). If we identify the absence of a pot with the ground, we fail to provide an adequate explanation of the cognition that the ground has an absence of a pot on it (in fact, we destroy the cognitive difference between the cognition that the ground has an absence of a pot on it and the cognition of the ground), and ignore an essential feature of negation, viz., the dependence of an absence upon its counterpositive. In keeping with their realism, the Nyāya holds that knowledge corresponds to reality; for a cognitive difference there often corresponds an ontological difference. If the cognition that a pot is on the ground is valid, a pot is a property of the ground; if the cognition that the ground has an absence of a pot on it is valid, the absence of a pot is a property of the ground. Just as in the cognition that the ground has a pot on it, we do not identify that pot with the ground which is its locus, so too in the cognition that the ground has an absence of a pot on it, the absence of a pot is not to be identified with the ground which is its locus.

The Nyāya's acceptance of negative entities (i.e. the claim that absence, as a category, exists – *abhāvaḥ asti*) is less puzzling when we realize that Sanskrit has at least four terms used for 'exists' or 'existence' (viz., *sattā*, *bhāva*, *astitva*, and *asti*). The word 'exists' (*asti*) can mean 'occurrence' or 'to be present in some locus by some relation'. For example, '*gauḥ asti*' ('A cow exists') means that there is an occurrence of a cow. Now, once we admit that there is a locus for an absence, *a fortiori* we admit that a negative entity exists (in the sense of *asti*). For the Nyāya, x is a property if and only if there exist a y such that y is a locus of x. If x is a property, the Nyāya urges that consistency demands that the absence of x is given equal status with x; i.e., the absence of x is also a property, provided x is not a universal property. In other words, the absence of x has as much claim to ontological status as x has, despite the fact that it is dependent upon x.[6] It should be noted that even if x is not a property of y, the absence of x might still be a property of *y*. To use a Nyāya example, color can never be a property of the air, but the absence of color is a property of the air.

The Nyāya's theory of predication provides another motivation for the claim that there are negative entities. We can draw the following comparison between the dominant views of contemporary Western philosophers and the Nyāya: In the West and for the Nyāya, when we say '*a* has *F*' and '*a* has not-*F*', '*F*' and 'not-*F*' are predicates. However, whereas in the West when we assert '*a* has *F*' we mean '*F* is true of *a*' and when we assert '*a* has not-*F*' we mean '*F* is not true of *a*', the Nyāya says that when we assert '*a* has *F*' we mean '*F* is true of *a*' and when we assert '*a* has not-*F*' we mean 'not-*F* is true of *a*'. I prefer to use '*a* has *F*' and '*a* has not-*F*' instead of '*a* is *F*' and '*a* is not-*F*' because the Nyāya can draw the distinction between the *is* of predication and the *is* of identity in terms of the distinction between '*a* has *F*' (which is the West's *is* of predication) and '*a* is *F*' (which is the West's *is* of identity). For the Nyāya, when we say '*a* has *F*', *F* is to be taken as a property of *a*, whereas when we say '*a* is *F*', *F* is not to be taken as a property of *a*. This corresponds to the distinction between occurrence-exacting and nonoccurrence-exacting relations. The Nyāya holds that just as we say that the fact which makes '*a* has *F*' true includes *a* and *F* as parts of reality, the fact which makes '*a* has not-*F*' true should include *a* and not-*F* as parts of reality. In discussing why philosophers have been puzzled by negation, A. J. Ayer says, 'They have been at a loss, not to understand what negative statements are, but only to account for their existence. Holding that the absence of a given quality is not itself a quality . . . they have been unable to see how it is possible that statements which merely deny to a given individual the possession of a certain quality . . . can yet be true and verifiable. What predicate, they ask, am I applying to someone's eyes when I say only that they are not blue?'[7] The Nyāya eliminates this puzzlement, and the subsequent difficulties associated with trying to map every true negative sentence onto a positive sentence which describes a positive fact, by asserting that there are negative entities. When I say, e.g., 'Your eyes are not blue', I mean 'not-blue (absence of blue) is true of your eyes'.

In addition to the charge of subscribing to an over-populated ontology, the Nyāya has poised itself in the unenviable and seemingly awkward position of saying that we perceive an absence by the senses; i.e., 'The ground has an absence of a pot on it' is a sentence describing what we see. To say that the proof of negative entities is in the cognition of them, is, it will be argued, not terribly helpful insofar as it is precisely whether there is such a cognition and the Nyāya's analysis of it, if there is one, that is subject to dispute. The Nyāya faces the obvious objection that 'The ground has an absence of a pot on it' is not a description of what we see. The Nyāya's opponent might offer an alternative suggested by the Nyāya's insistence that the absence of x is always dependent (linguistically, epistemologically, and ontologically) upon its counterpositive: I see the ground. I also see that the pot is on the bookshelf, and I know that if the pot is on the bookshelf, it is not at the same time on the ground. From this it follows that 'The ground has an absence of a pot on it' is true, without recourse to negative entities. Of course, this alternative may not be entirely free of difficulties and stands in need of further clarification. However, my purpose here has not been to defend any thesis, but simply to attempt to clarify the grounds for the Nyāya's acceptance of negative entities.

II

According to the Nyāya there cannot be a negative entity which has no occurrence; i.e., 'an absence exists' (*abhāvaḥ asti*) means 'the absence of x has an occurrence or is present in some locus by some relation'. Therefore, corresponding to every negative entity there is a sentence which asserts its occurrence somewhere, and if by a 'fact' we mean 'whatever makes a sentence true (or false)', a sentence which asserts that the negative entity characterizes a locus is made true, if it is true, by virtue of a fact, which we call a "negative fact". So, corresponding to each negative entity there is at least one negative fact. For example, absence of a cat is an ontological entity. Since there cannot be a negative entity without its occurrence somewhere, the sentence, say, 'The mat has an absence of a cat on it' is made true, if it is true, by virtue of the negative fact that there is no cat on the mat. That is to say, the Nyāya's thesis that there are negative facts is a corollary of their thesis that absence is an ontological category.

The Nyāya would suggest that we have been misled into thinking that the only motivation for claiming that there are negative facts is to account for true negative sentences; rather, negative facts are also useful in accounting for false positive sentences. The Nyāya would agree, for the most part, with the following passage found in Russell's 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism': 'I think you will find that it is better to take negative facts as ultimate.

Otherwise you will find it so difficult to say what it is that corresponds to a proposition. When, e.g., you have a false positive proposition, say, "Socrates is alive", it is false because of a fact in the real world. A thing cannot be false except because of a fact, so that you find it extremely difficult to say what exactly happens when you make a positive assertion that is false, unless you are going to admit negative facts.'[8] If by a 'negative fact' we mean something of the form 'A has not B', and by a 'positive fact' we mean something of the form 'A has C', the Nyāya accepts negative and positive facts and insists that negative sentences are not reducible to positive sentences in the sense that a negative sentence is not made true by a positive fact which is described by a positive (affirmative) sentence, and even if a negative sentence is logically equivalent to a positive sentence, we must preserve their cognitive differences. We cannot eliminate negative facts in favor of positive facts.

The opposition does not so much provide proofs for why there are, or can be, no negative facts, but argues that negative facts are superfluous. Certainly, it is argued, there are true negative sentences, but what makes them true are positive facts. A. Prior sums up the opponent's view by saying that 'what deters the philosophers is partly the multiplicity of the objects involved. They cannot believe that there should be not only the fact that Charles I died on the scaffold but also, over and above that fact, the additional facts that he did not die in his bed, that he was not immortal, that he did not die by drowning, and, furthermore, the facts that he did not die in his bed of appendicitis, of consumption, ...'[9] What makes 'Charles I did not die in his bed' true, it is thought, is the one positive fact that he died on the scaffold. The opponent to the Nyāya's thesis of negative facts might posit any or all of the following: (1) for a true negative sentence there corresponds a positive (affirmative) sentence, which in turn describes a positive fact; (2) a negative sentence is made true by a positive fact; and (3) a true negative sentence in some sense points to the positive fact which makes it true. According to Rafael Demos, 'the reason why such a view [that there are negative facts] must not be entertained is the empirical consideration that strictly negative facts are nowhere to be met with in experience, and that any knowledge of a negative nature seems to be derived from perception of a positive kind.'[10] The Nyāya would initiate their response to this by saying that while it is true that negation is dependent upon affirmation, it does not follow from this that there are no negative entities and no negative facts.[11] Demos goes on to say, 'Granting that there are no negative facts, then, in so far as a negative proposition is asserted of fact at all, the term of reference must be the world of positive facts.'[12] Again, 'the world of positive objects is re-established as the ultimate term of reference in all assertions of a particular nature. Negative propositions refer to positive propositions and positive propositions in their turn assert positive facts.'[13]

The Nyāya criticizes this attempt to eliminate negative facts. Take, for instance, the following case: Upon entering the cabin of a commercial airliner, the flight attendant asks me for my boarding pass. I reach for my coat pocket, but I discover no boarding pass there. I exclaim, in utter horror, 'The boarding pass is not in my coat pocket'. Let us assume that this sentence is true. According to the Nyāya what makes it true and known to be true is the fact that the boarding pass is not in my coat pocket. It may be the case that it is in my briefcase, but this discovery (which is a different fact) comes after the discovery that it is not in my coat pocket. The knowledge of the truth of the sentence 'The boarding pass is not in my coat pocket' does not depend upon the boarding pass being in my briefcase. That I know that it is not in my coat pocket is sufficient. If we insist upon the distinction between the truth of the sentence and the knowledge of its truth, the question arises as to whether its truth depends upon the boarding pass being in my briefcase, to which the Nyāya would reply in the negative. What makes the negative sentence true is the fact that the boarding pass is not in my coat pocket, and if this is what is meant by a 'negative fact', let there be negative facts. From this it does not follow that the Nyāya says that a fact is dependent upon what I think about it; the Nyāya does draw the distinction between 'there exists an x such that y believes that x is ϕ' and 'y believes that there exists an x such that x is ϕ'. While a true positive sentence describes a positive fact, and a true negative sentence may have the same truth-value as a positive sentence (which is the case in our example), it does not follow that a negative sentence is made true by a positive fact. Moreover, since what is asserted by any true sentence is a fact (on one interpretation of what a fact is), and since the true sentence 'The boarding pass is not in my coat pocket' does not assert that the boarding pass is in my briefcase (much less that it is anyplace else in particular), what makes the sentence true appears to be the negative fact that it is not in my coat pocket. The Nyāya would agree with the following statement made by A. J. Ayer: 'As for the difficulty about positive facts, I do not know how a positive fact is to be defined except as that which is described by some affirmative statement. But, if this is so, to say that negative statements do not state positive facts is merely a way of saying that they are negative, and not affirmative. It does not follow that, in the event of their being true, they are not as closely related to fact as any other statements.'[14]

While the Nyāya admits that if the boarding pass is in my briefcase, the sentences 'The boarding pass is not in my coat pocket' and 'The boarding pass is in my briefcase' have the same truth-value, they do not have the same cognitive value (much less the same linguistic components). These sentences describe different cognitions. The attempt to eliminate negative facts by saying that a negative sentence which is true is made true by a positive fact which is described by a true positive sentence, destroys the cognitive differences between negative and affirmative sentences. In my hypothetical case, 'The boarding pass is not in my coat pocket' and 'The boarding pass is in my briefcase' have the same truth-value. Nevertheless, no sleight-of-hand trick, however often it is repeated, will change the fact that these two sentences are linguistically and cognitively (epistemologically) different. Whereas contemporary Western philosophers, perhaps following Frege's inspiration, tend to ignore the cognitive differences of two sentences in favor of asking their truth-conditions, the Nyāya stresses the importance of cognitive differences. If two sentences are true and the corresponding cognitions are valid, how do we account for their differences on the factual level? The Nyāya preserves their linguistic and cognitive differences by affirming that there are two facts corresponding to the two sentences or cognitions generated (or able to be generated) by the sentences.

In the case presently under consideration, it is possible for the negative sentence ('The boarding pass is not in my coat pocket') to be true and the positive sentence ('The boarding pass is in my briefcase') to be false (e.g., it may have been in the pocket of my trousers). The question now arises as to what happens in the case of logical equivalence, i.e., when any two sentences are extensionally equivalent in all possible worlds. Those who subscribe to truth-conditional semantics would say that if they have the same extension in all possible worlds, they are made true (or false) by the same fact or truth-condition; and if by 'meaning' we mean 'the condition which makes them true', they have the same meaning. Take, for instance, the two sentences 'x killed y' and 'y was killed by x'. Those who subscribe to truth-conditional semantics will say that these two sentences have the same truth-value in every possible world. Now, the Nyāya will agree with this but insist that even in this case it does not follow that there is one fact which makes both true or false together. These two sentences have different cognitive values; i.e., the structures or contents of the cognitions they generate, or are able to generate, must be different. The Nyāya resists any attempt to collapse one into the other, or to make any or all logically equivalent expressions true or false by virtue of one and the same fact. As noted previously, the Nyāya emphasizes the direction of a relation. The direction of the relation in '*x* killed *y*' is different than the direction of the relation in '*y* was killed by *x*'. There are two different facts corresponding to these two sentences. In opposition to the early Wittgenstein's thesis that atomic facts are independent, the Nyāya claims that if two facts are different, it does not follow that they are independent. In the case of '*x* killed *y*' and '*y* was killed by *x*', there is an entailment relation between the corresponding facts such that there is no possible world in which there is the one fact without the other. We can extend the Nyāya's insight to the case of logical truths and contradictions. Since all logical truths are equivalent, does it follow that they are all collapsible into one logical truth? Or are all true by virtue of one fact? If so, which logical truth or which fact is to be taken as primary? And why is there any need to study the axiomatic system and prove theorems? There is a cognitive difference between the equivalent expressions $[(p \cdot q) \supset p]$ and $[(p \supset q) \equiv ({\sim} q \supset {\sim} p)]$, e.g., and knowing the one does not imply knowing the other. Again, since no contradiction is true in any possible world (i.e., all contradictions are logically equivalent), does it follow that there is only one contradiction? The Nyāya accounts for the difference between any two expressions which are extensionally equivalent by asserting that there is a different fact which corresponds to each of them. In their view, the attempt to eliminate negative facts in favor of positive facts is doomed to failure.[15]

University of Hawaii at Manoa,
East-West Center,
Honolulu, Hawaii

NOTES

[1] In what follows I use the term 'Nyāya' to refer to the Navya-Nyāya. In the strict sense the views I will be discussing belong to the Navya-Nyāya, although many of them are compatible with much of what I take to be the mainstream of later Old Nyāya thought. I am aware that not all Navya-Nyāya philosophers are in total agreement with every point

I call "the Nyāya view"; when I say 'according to the Nyāya', I mean 'according to the predominant view in Navya-Nyāya'.

[2] It appears that other than Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers, only Kumārila Mīmāṁsikas admit negative entities (and negative facts), though the latter diverge from the former in arguing that negative entities are not perceptible by the senses.

[3] B. K. Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 46, Daniel H. H. Ingalls (ed.), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 108–142.

[4] For the standard Western arguments for why there can be no negative subject-terms, see Peter T. Geach, *Reference and Generality*, emended edition, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 32ff.; Geach, *Logic Matters* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 45, 70–71, 73–74, 78–80; Geach, 'Strawson on Subject and Predicate', in *Philosophical Subjects*, Zak Van Straaten (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); P. F. Strawson, 'The Asymmetry of Subjects and Predicates', in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, pp. 96–115; Strawson, *Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar* (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1974), pp. 6–7, 11, 18–29.

[5] Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, p. 128.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 93: 'One may, of course, ask why an absence of red-color should be construed as a real or genuine property like a patch of red-color, and not as a pseudo-property. The Nyāya answer to this is alarmingly simple. A property is real or genuine, and can be used in all logical or philosophical discourse, if and only if there is something, i.e., some locus, that it characterizes. . . . Thus if red-color characterizes things that are red, absence of red-color characterizes things that are not red.'

[7] A. J. Ayer, 'Negation', *Journal of Philosophy* XLIX (1952), p. 803. The Nyāya would urge Ayer to be more careful in his terminology here; i.e., he slips from 'quality' to 'predicate', whereas the Nyāya would want to draw the distinction between them.

[8] Bertrand Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', in *Logic and Knowledge*, Robert C. Marsh (ed.), (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956), p. 214.

[9] A. N. Prior, 'Negation', *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, p. 459.

[10] Rafael Demos, 'A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition', *Mind* XXVI (1917), p. 189.

[11] One might say that the important philosophical questions as to what counts as an experience and what is the precise nature and ontological status of "positive" facts remain open. The question of positive facts, or facts in general, is so less nebulous than the question of negative facts; the clarification of the nature of a fact should precede any discussion of whether or not there are positive and/or negative facts. That is to say, positive and negative facts may be two sides of the same dubious coin.

[12] Demos, 'A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition', p. 189.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 194.

[14] A. J. Ayer, 'Negation', p. 803.

[15] I wish to thank Professor J. L. Shaw for spending so much of his time discussing the Nyāya with me and answering my numerous questions, and for his critical comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am indebted to him for several points in this paper. I also thank the East-West Center for the grant which helped make this paper possible.

ANDREW O. FORT

THE CONCEPT OF SĀKṢIN IN ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

The nature of knowing and the knower are central concerns in many schools of Indian thought. Several refer to an unchanging knower or seer "behind" the ever-fluctuating intellect. Adherents of advaita Vedānta in particular have examined the fundamental difference between the knowing self and the intellect. In advaita, the knowing self is often called the sākṣin, commonly rendered witness.[1]

I propose to look at the use of this concept by various advaitin thinkers from Śaṅkara (c. 700–750, following Nakamura (1983)) to Dharmarāja (c. seventeenth century), attending to persisting themes as well as varying emphases.[2] My primary interest is to differentiate two conceptions of sākṣin: sākṣin as witness, an eternal, passive observer, and sākṣin as field, the context or "space" for all contents or form. The distinction between witness and field should be of interest to students of advaita or other Indian schools of thought and of philosophy of mind generally.

Almost all advaitin writers ascribe certain characteristics to the sākṣin. It is eternal, non-dual, and unchanging[3]; moreover, it is particularly differentiated from the mind or intellect (antaḥkaraṇa, dhī, buddhi) and the perceiver, perceiving, perceived triad.[4] The sākṣin is also linked with pure consciousness (caitanya) and the self (ātman, versus the jīva or īśvara). It is self-luminous and self-evidencing. The image of pure light is suggestive here: like the sākṣin, light immediately reveals all objects and is not dependent on them; the sākṣin and light are pervasive and unconditioned.

The sākṣin is often described as a passive knower or observer (thus "witness"). From this point of view, a problem immediately arises: using such a concept assumes something to be witnessed (sākṣya), thus intrinsic differentiation or limitation. There must be some limitation for there to be witnessing *of* anything. If the sākṣin is described as pure, pervasive consciousness, is it then appropriate to call it a "witness"?

The advaitin consensus seems to be that this witnessing arises from the self's merely adventitous connection with the intellect or antaḥkaraṇa (internal instrument). This mental instrument, part of everyday appearance

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 277–290. 0022–1791/84/0123–0277 $01.40.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

(vyavahāra/saṁsāra), relates the sākṣin to "things" which are seen. It performs the active seeing of "objects". Ultimately, however, the ātman, being all, is merely observing itself (as appearance).

Another way of looking at the sākṣin may also prove illuminating.[5] This way is focussed less on its knower/observer aspect. From this point of view, the sākṣin is the "field" of consciousness/being within which the knower/knowing/known distinctions arise. By the term field, I am not suggesting a physical area (kṣetra), part of the objective realm, but rather the context for contents, or "space" in which forms may appear (as an energy *field* in physics). Sākṣin is the field of consciousness *and* "external" being.

In this conception, the falsely individualized "I" discriminates specific contents (thoughts and "objects") within the pervasively illumined field or context. This "I" identifies itself with a portion of the field (or takes a specific point-of-view, depending on whether one wants to emphasize the physical or mental aspect). The field is more extensive than, and the "ground" of, the viewer.

In advaitin terms, the non-dual field consists of unmodified, eternally pure consciousness (caitanya) within which specific, momentary modifications/manifestations take place. What we call the known is that which a vṛtti (mental modification)[6] is holding before the intellect or internal instrument.

Active seeing (observing or viewing a particular thing) thus arises in the "localized" antaḥkaraṇa and its vṛttis, which are not intrinsic to the sākṣin. This conception therefore minimizes the witnesser/witnessed duality, emphasizing that conditioned "things" appear within the unconditioned field. In the conclusion, I will suggest that these two conceptions indicate two different but related usages of sākṣin: ontologically, sākṣin is essentially (svarūpa) ātma-caitanya, and psychologically or empirically, sākṣin is the observer, the first and last vestige of person-ality. In the writings considered below, we shall see elements of both conceptions.

I now turn to a discussion of some advaitin thinkers who have analyzed the concept of sākṣin, starting with Śaṅkara, the main progenitor of this school.

ŚAṄKARA ON THE SĀKṢIN

Śaṅkara refers to the sākṣin in a number of texts, the most important of which are the Brahmasūtra (BS) bhāṣya and the Upadeśasāhasrī. Śaṅkara most commonly regards the sākṣin as a facet of the self, calling it the eternal, immediate, and self-luminous witness of the mind and senses. It observes and illumines the internal instrument and its manifestations (vṛtti), which, along with the senses (indriya) and objects (viṣaya), are part of lower, everyday seeing (lokadṛṣṭi). Śaṅkara does not give an elaborate explanation of the perceptual process; the nature of the illuminer is his main interest.[7]

The BSbhāṣya contains a number of references to the sākṣin, although most are in passing. In the commentary on I. 1. 4, the self is said to be the witness of the I-notion (ahaṁpratyaya), and different from the actor. The unchanging self is witness of the three states (waking, dream, and deep sleep) according to the II. 1. 9 commentary,[8] and brahman is said to possess sākṣitva of all objects (dṛśya) in the remarks on III. 2. 23.

In II. 2. 28–30, Śaṅkara discusses the sākṣin in a bit more detail. Here, Śaṅkara is arguing against the Buddhist vijñānavādins, asserting that there is an unchanging consciousness beyond particular cognitions (pratyaya). He states that the witness and cognitions are by nature different; from this difference the apparent perceiver/perceived (upalabh) relation arises. The witness, unlike particular cognitions, is self-established (svayaṁsiddha) and undeniable (thus overcoming any problem with infinite regress, anavasthā). Śaṅkara concludes that all cognitions need a basis (adhiṣṭhāna); here the basis is the unchanging seer.

The discussion of perception in the commentary on BS II. 3. 32 and 40–1 also illumines the role of the sākṣin. At issue is the nature of the knower. The purported knower is the internal instrument (also called manas or mind). To Śaṅkara, this "knower" is actually only an adventitious limitation (upādhi) of the self, the witness and true knower. The antaḥkaraṇa only registers manifestations arising from the senses. The intellect's attention (avadhāna) or non-attention to this sense data is what varies in perception (upalabdhi); thus, the intellect is the cause of apparent change and diversity. The self is the constant knower (cetāyatṛ), or witness, of the intellect and is itself the basis of perception (thus suggesting field as well).

It is surprising to note the absence of the term sākṣin in Śaṅkara's Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BāU) bhāṣya. Of course, the term does not appear in the BāU itself, and Śaṅkara is often reticent to use terms not present in śruti. However, the BāU does discuss perception and seeing in many places. For example, the light of the self (ātma-jyotir, ātma-caitanya) is discussed in IV. 3. 6–7, but even when the illuminer of the buddhi is considered, the sākṣin goes unmentioned. Similarly, when two types of seeing (loka- and ātma- dṛṣṭi) are analyzed in BāU I. 4. 10 and III. 4. 2, the eternal, self-luminous seer is never called the sākṣin, just the self.[9] This would seem to confirm the close relationship of the sākṣin and the self, with the self being the key term, and sākṣin indicating one facet of the self.

Śaṅkara gives us a clearer idea of the sākṣin in the Upadeśasāhasrī, his most important statement not in commentary form. The term sākṣin is quite common in the verse portion, unlike the BS and BāU commentaries (or the prose portion of the Upadeśasāhasrī itself for that matter). Here the self is repeatedly called the witness of the intellect (dhī, buddhi) and its notions. The sākṣin is pure, non-dual, and without quality (aguṇa, here suggesting the field conception). It is similar in some respects to the seer (draṣṭṛ), but the latter is more tied to the everyday seeing (of both thoughts and objects) called dṛṣṭi. Verse 15. 4 states that the sākṣin is different from all mental activity as the seer is different from any particular object.

For Śaṅkara, the sākṣin is particularly the knower (boddhṛ, cetṛ) and observer as opposed to the actor. The witness' pure observation is unrelated to change or action (akriya, avikāra, akāraka). The limited buddhi is what changes. In fact, the intellect and the I-notion constantly vary.

To sum up, Śaṅkara seems to be making three main points regarding the sākṣin, emphasizing the witness conception. First, the sākṣin is an aspect of the eternal, unchanging self. Second, the sākṣin is different from and the basis (adhiṣṭhāna) of the mind/intellect (antaḥkaraṇa, dhī, buddhi). Third, the sākṣin observes the notions or manifestations (pratyaya, vṛtti) of the intellect as well as so-called external objects. Thus, Śaṅkara seems to be arguing for the sākṣin as passive observer, rather than field or context of observation. However, by linking the sākṣin to the self, the field aspect must be present, for the ātman is, in its essence, the unconditioned field of consciousness/being.

SUREŚVARA ON THE SĀKṢIN

Of Śaṅkara's immediate followers, only Sureśvara (c. 720–70) regularly refers to the sākṣin. Both the field and witness ideas are evident. A number of references appear in his Naiṣkarmyasiddhi and Saṁbandha-vārttika. In the latter text, verses 150–1 introduce one of Sureśvara's prominent themes, that of the self as field which lies beyond the apparent pramātṛ/pramāṇa/

prameya triad.[10] The witnesser-witnessed relation which appears to function on the pramāṇa level does not exist in the pure field-like essence (sākṣi-vastu). Witnessing is actually a splitting of the self's fundamental sākṣin-sākṣya unity (1087).

Also in the Saṁbandha-vārttika, Sureśvara points to the immediacy (sākṣāt) and unconditioned (aviśeṣa, avilupta) nature of the sākṣin's seeing (793, 796). Finally, he emphasizes the similarity of the self and the sākṣin. The sākṣin is called pratyag-ātman, ātmasvarūpa, and ātma-anubhava in the above-mentioned verses.

Like Śaṅkara in the Upadeśasāhasrī, Sureśvara in his Naiṣkarmyasiddhi emphasizes that the sākṣin is unchanging (avikriyā), unlike the intellect. II. 66–7 and 76–7 assert that the witnessing self illumines and pervades the intellect, unmoved by the latter's motions (vṛtti, vikriyā). The sākṣin merely observes sufferings (and joys) attached to the buddhi (II. 80).

In the above, Sureśvara partially follows Śaṅkara's understanding; passive observation is the predominant theme. Yet the sākṣin as field conception is evident: the unchanging sākṣin is like the self (implicitly a context or field) and unlike the intellect. Both conceptions appear in Sureśvara's strong emphasis on the difference between knower/known duality and the seeing of the immediate, non-dual sākṣin.

PADMAPĀDA, VĀCASPATI MIŚRA, AND SARVAJÑĀTMAN ON THE SĀKṢIN

Later advaitins such as Padmapāda, Vācaspati Miśra, and Sarvajñātman[11] refer occasionally to the sākṣin, though it is not a major concept in advaitin thought at this point.[12] In Pañcapādika verse 41, Padmapāda says the sākṣin is unified, immediate consciousness.[13] The sākṣin is different from the I-notion (ahaṁpratyaya, ahaṁkāra), which is superimposed on it. In fact, the sākṣin witnesses the transformations of the I-notion (121, 316).

Vācaspati Miśra, in his Bhāmatī on Śaṅkara's BS bhāṣya, mentions the sākṣin briefly in his comments on I. 1. 4 and II. 2. 28. In the former, Vācaspati writes that the paramātman witnesses the jīvātman (that is, the agent and object of ahaṁpratyaya). Ultimately, jīva- and parama- ātman are one, but jīva is the conditioned form and sākṣin is the pure form. In II. 2. 28, he adds that the immediate and eternal sākṣin seizes experience (upalabdhi). Above, both Vācaspati Miśra and Padmapāda emphasize the witness conception of sākṣin.

In Sarvajñātman's Saṁkṣepaśārīrika, it is plainly stated that the concept of witnessing implies duality between witnesser and what is witnessed (which are mutually dependent). This idea of duality, Sarvajñātman adds, is caused by ignorance (III. 67, 132, 190). He also says the unchanging non-dual puruṣa illumines and witnesses that which is imagined (parikalpita, II. 29–30).

Sarvajñātman thus makes explicit the problem of duality in the concept of the witness, although he does little beyond pointing it out. He simply asserts that the witnesser/witnessed dualism is ignorance, and affirms that a non-dual self (here called puruṣa) underlies all.

VIDYĀRAṆYA ON THE SĀKṢIN

Vidyāraṇya (c. fourteenth century) is the next author for whom the sākṣin plays a significant role. The sākṣin appears repeatedly in his Pañcadaśī (although rarely in his Jīvanmuktiviveka). Vidyāraṇya emphasizes that the sākṣin underlies the individual buddhi.

Vidyāraṇya, like earlier advaitins, generally links the sākṣin with the ātman, which is the witness of the world with all its forms, the mind with its manifestations, and impermanence in general. The sākṣin also witnesses sleep and that which is empty (śūnya). Without an observer, sleep and emptiness cannot be known (VI. 76). Further, as Śaṅkara says, the sākṣin is not the doer (kartṛ); it reveals the doer, doing, and resulting objects (X. 9).

There are two passage where the sākṣin is particularly prominent. In the first (VII. 215–42), the qualityless sākṣin is said to be beyond the enjoyer/enjoying/enjoyed (bhuj) triad; duality and suffering are connected to the cidābhāsa, or mind-semblance.[14] The mind-semblance superimposes the reality proper to the sākṣin onto the enjoyer, and this superimposition causes delusion (bhrānti). When this delusion is discriminated (vivic), even cidābhāsa thinks on (cint) the witnessing self (231–4). The mind-semblance then emulates (anukārī) the sākṣin, as a prince does a king (240), and ultimately destroys itself (sva-vināśa) to be absorbed into the sākṣin. The basic point is, of course, that the mind-semblance is deluded and ultimately longs to be merged into the self.

The second group of verses which discusses the sākṣin is X. 10–25; this passage describes the sākṣin as a lamp in a theatre. The sākṣin's self-luminous (sva-prakāśa) nature is emphasized. These verses state that the sākṣin shines through (or en-light-ens, bhā) sense-experiences like a lamp illumines a theatre, whether or not an audience (the viṣaya) or dancer (the ahaṁkāra, dhī) are present (X. 10–12). The ever mobile intellect (dancer) goes in and out, moving in time and space, while the unmoving sākṣin (lamp) illumines all. Vidyāraṇya stresses that the intellect's movement (cañcala) is falsely superimposed on the sākṣin. Ultimately, the intellect conceives (kḷp, meaning reveals a object's presence), while the sākṣin pervasively illumines (prakāś, meaning reveals the field for the object's presence or absence). We see again that the sākṣin is prior to the intellect or mind; it passively illumines mental movement and manifestation.

Vidyāraṇya thus concurs with Śaṅkara's main points regarding the sākṣin: it is an aspect of the self, it underlies the intellect, and it is a passive observer. However, with the lamp image, there is more emphasis on the concept of the sākṣin as luminous field, within which all activity takes place. The cidābhāsa's absorption (avaśiṣ) into the sākṣin also suggests the field idea.

MADHUSŪDANA SARASVATĪ ON THE SĀKṢIN

We now turn to a later and exceptionally challenging thinker, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (c. sixteenth century). His analysis of the sākṣin, and his thought in general, is more refined than that of earlier thinkers. Below, I will briefly explore some issues concerning the sākṣin in Madhusūdana's Advaitasiddhi (AS) and Siddhāntabindu (SB), particularly the relationship between ignorance (avidyā, ajñāna) and the sākṣin. More research on this topic, and his thought in general, would be welcome.[15]

To Madhusūdana, the sākṣin is eternal, non-dual, and firmly fixed (kūṭastha). It is the knower and unseen seer[16] which illumines and is other than the object-ive world.[17] The sākṣin is also distinct from the three states of waking, dream, and sleep. (SB 150, 172).[18]

Like many earlier advaitins, Madhusūdana emphasizes that the sākṣin is invariable (avyabhicāra) as it observes the varying knower/knowing/known triad. This knower (pramātṛ) cannot witness its own changes (vikāra); it is an object, subject to transformation (pariṇāma, SB 59–60). According to SB 169–170, the sākṣin becomes knower due to conditioning by upādhis (adventitious limitations).[19] In the Advaitasiddhi, Madhusūdana adds that the sākṣin is not dependent on the pramāṇas and does not grasp objects with particular marks (dharmin, 802). While sākṣin as witness is predominant here, the sākṣin as field concept can also be seen. The sākṣin is the pervasive context within which the knower and known arise.

Madhusūdana elsewhere mentions the sākṣin's relationship with the jīva and īśvara, particularly on SB 139. In the Advaitasiddhi, he writes that the sākṣin is different from, yet common among, all jīvas (754). In the Siddhāntabindu passage, the jīva, īśvara, and sākṣin are all called the self, seen as three due to different upādhis. Caitanya figures prominently here: there are references to sākṣi-caitanya, jīva-caitanya, and īśvara-caitanya. Pure self-consciousness (ātma-caitanya) pervades the others.

Madhusūdana continues that īśvara is limited because it is the non-eternal cause of entities and the jīva is limited in being tied to the antaḥkaraṇa and its modifications. He also relates īśvara and the sākṣin as follows: either the sākṣin is the image (bimba) and īśvara its reflection (pratibimba) or īśvara is the image and the sākṣin is the examiner (anusaṁdhātṛ) of the image. In this context, the sākṣin is clearly used in the sense of witness/observer.

Madhusūdana commonly links the term caitanya (consciousness) with the sākṣin. In the SB, he differentiates two kinds of caitanya: sākṣi- and buddhi-. Sākṣi-caitanya is non-different, underlying mental states and their modifications. Knowledge of it gives direct rise to mokṣa (SB 104, 106). Buddhi-caitanya makes consciousness appear to be different in different bodies, for each person has her/his own buddhi (SB 88). In SB 115, Madhusūdana adds that there are two kinds of concealing (āvaraṇa) -- one residing in the sākṣin when particularized (avachinna) in the internal instrument, the other residing in buddhi-caitanya when particularized in objects.

In the Advaitasiddhi, emphasis is on the relationship among consciousness, the sākṣin, and ignorance. Madhusūdana repeatedly defines the sākṣin as consciousness reflecting (pratiphalita) an avidyā-vṛtti, the mental modification of ignorance (557, 575, 754). In other places, Madhusūdana states that the sākṣin is associated (upahita) with ignorance (261, 441, 545, 754). The latter two references explicitly differentiate the sākṣin from pure cit or brahman. Madhusūdana further writes on AS 395 that all faults (doṣa) arise, not from pure caitanya, but from the particularizing (avacchedika) avidyā-vṛtti.

As Sanjukta Gupta (1966) points out,[20] Madhusūdana seems to be using the sākṣin in two senses: as metaphysical reality and as epistemological fact. The sākṣin ultimately is ātma-caitanya, metaphysically real and eternal, but it is also essentially limited epistemologically by an avidyā-vṛtti, that is, the sākṣin arises and ceases only with this vṛtti. The avidyā-vṛtti is special in that it is a mode of avidyā and not of the antaḥkaraṇa, as are other vṛttis. The avidyā-vṛtti, unlike antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttis, never ceases (in sleep, swoon, etc.).

The sākṣin, then, is fundamentally linked to a flawed, limiting avidyā-vṛtti (AS 397, 410, SB 163). We can go further, saying that the sākṣin does not arise without ignorance, which returns us to Sarvajñātman's point about the intimate relation of witnesser-witnessed dualism and ignorance.[21]

The Advaitasiddhi's references to what is known by, or object to, the witness (sākṣi-vedya) also bear on this issue.[22] Madhusūdana repeatedly says that ajñāna/avidyā is known by the sākṣin.[23] Further, the sākṣin is not limited by objects in any way; rather, it reveals all objects, including ignorance. What is not entirely clear is how a witness can observe (or grasp) ignorance as an object while being fundamentally linked with it.

In sum, then, we are told that the sākṣin is not pure brahman or caitanya. With pure or non-dual consciousness, a "witness" is superfluous. The sākṣin is somehow modified by ignorance; there is no witness without avidyā. Further, the sākṣin is primarily regarded as the observer/examiner, due to its tie to avidyā. Emphasis is on its difference from the ever-changing knower (pramātṛ), rather than on the sākṣin as field of knowing. An important question remains, however: how exactly is the sākṣin associated with ignorance, especially when it is often said that ignorance is known by (or an object to) the witness?

DHARMARĀJA ON THE SĀKṢIN

The final text considered here is Dharmarājādhvarin's Vedāntaparibhāṣā, a seventeenth century discussion of advaitin epistemology. There are a number of references to the sākṣin in the first chapter, which is on perception (pratyakṣa) as a means of knowledge. Apparently influenced by Madhusūdana, this understanding of the sākṣin is even more refined than earlier conceptions. Dharmarāja even differentiates between a kevala-sākṣin (field of consciousness/being) and plain or simple sākṣin (the witness).

We are introduced to the kevala-sākṣin in I. 52–4. The antaḥkaraṇa and its marks (dharma) are objects (or contents) within the kevala-sākṣin's field; the contents rest there without any pramāṇa functioning. The kevala-sākṣin comes to know (vid) the internal instrument (and its marks) by vṛttis, the manifestors of mental activity. In fact, the vṛttis are indispensible for the kevala-sākṣin to know any "thing" or object. For example, VII. 9 states that even absence (abhāva) is not known by the kevala-sākṣin because it is not known to vṛtti-jñāna. Thus, the kevala-sākṣin is the context of mental activity, and its "knowing" arises through vṛtti-jñāna.

A later twist is added in I. 89, where viṣaya-caitanya (object-consciousness) is equated with the plain or simple sākṣin (see also I. 67) in that both manifest things (here, silver) to be known by (or within) the kevala-sākṣin. This again suggests that the kevala-sākṣin is the illumining field and some manifestor (here sākṣin, not vṛtti) is needed to know objects.

The sākṣin is specified further in I. 66–74, where the jīva and jīva-sākṣin, īśvara and īśvara-sākṣin, and the plain sākṣin are mentioned. We learn that the jīva is consciousness particularized (avachinna) in the internal instrument, while the sākṣin is consciousness associated with (upahita) the internal instrument. Put another way, the antaḥkaraṇa is a viśeṣaṇa or basic constituent of the jīva, whereas the antaḥkaraṇa is an upādhi or adventitious associate of the sākṣin. Thus the jīva is fundamentally limited by one's internal instrument, while the sākṣin is not.[24] A result is that the jīva-sākṣin (versus simple sākṣin) essentially varies with each individual (pratyagātman) according to his/her antaḥkaraṇa. Another implication is that the apparent differences in the sākṣin are due merely to their adventitious connection with the jīva and the antaḥkaraṇa's vṛttis. Thus, the plain sākṣin is related to mental limitations, but is not essentially tied to these limits.

The īśvara-sākṣin is consciousness associated with single, eternal māyā (illusory appearance); this association is also adventitious. Finally (in I. 74), Dharmarāja introduces parameśvara, which is caitanya particularized in māyā. He elaborates by stating that īśvaratva arises when māyā is particularized, while sākṣitva is merely associated with māyā. In the next line, Dharmarāja concludes that while īśvaratva and sākṣitva are different (because linked with māyā differently), īśvara and sākṣin (their bases) are not different.

In the above, Dharmarāja makes two main points. First, the kevala-sākṣin (the field of consciousness/being) needs a manifestor (either vṛtti or plain sākṣin) for knowing particulars. Second, the jīva, īśvara, and sākṣin are interrelated but different, and the differences focus on their relationships with the antaḥkaraṇa and māyā. All are somehow implicated in apparent duality, which accounts for the simple sākṣin being conceived as knower/observer. A more extensive discussion of the witness by Dharmarāja would have been intriguing.

In this paper, I have shown some continuing themes and some divergent emphases in the advaitin analysis of the sākṣin. The sākṣin is consistently regarded as eternal, non-dual, self-luminous, unvarying, and like consciousness and the self. It is also particularly differentiated from the mind or intellect and the knower/knowing/known triad. However, the sākṣin is taken to be more complex in the thought of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Dharmarāja: the former emphasizes its twofold relationship with consciousness and ignorance, while the latter introduces a variety of witnesses (jīva-, īśvara-, kevala-, and plain sākṣin) which are similar but not the same.

I have also stressed the role of two related (but not identical) conceptions of the sākṣin: one suggests the sākṣin is a passive observer or witness, in some way implicated in duality; the other considers the sākṣin as a luminous field or context of consciousness/being. We can consider these related conceptions as two facets of the sākṣin, as Devabrata Sinha (1965) has suggested.[25] On the highest level (paramārtha), or in essence (svarūpa), the sākṣin is non-dual, pure consciousness, and field or context terminology is appropriate. On the psychological or empirical level, however, the sākṣin is the first and last vestige of individuality, the evidencer of all knowing. Here, to speak of the passive observer or witness is more accurate. While these distinctions should not be overdrawn, awareness of these differing emphases should prove useful in further study of advaitin thought.

Texas Christian University
Dept. of Religious Studies
Fort Worth, TX 76129, U.S.A.

NOTES

I would like to thank Wilhelm Halbfass of the University of Pennsylvania for looking over a prior draft. I would also like to express my gratitude to Harvey P. Alper of Southern Methodist University for his close reading and numerous useful suggestions. The remaining flaws are, of course, my responsibility.

[1] I would like to mention here Tara Chatterjee's (1982) recent article on the same topic for this journal. While making some useful points, this essay showed a tendency to use technical terms, in both English and Sanskrit, with insufficient precision. Textual support for important points was also limited or lacking.

For example, the sākṣin is termed the individual's "principle of consciousness . . . which sees all our experiences" (p. 339). The precise meanings of "consciousness" and "experience" are not discussed, nor are Sanskrit equivalents for these terms given. Such is also the case for references to mental "state", "occurrent", and "mode" on p. 343. Neither do we find textual evidence for assertions like "Advaita philosophy entertains the concept of ahaṁkāra side by side with the concept of sākṣin." (p. 354), or "the antaḥkaraṇa is almost identical with mind" (pp. 350–1). Definitional clarity and textual support would, I believe, have strengthened Chatterjee's case.

[2] The source of sākṣin as a philosophical concept is obscure. It is virtually unattested in the major Upaniṣads (one reference each in Śvetāśvatara 6. 11 and Maitri 6. 16.) It is mentioned once in the Sāṅkhya kārikās (19), where the puruṣa is said to be the witness of prakṛti.

The sākṣin becomes more prominent in relatively late disputes between advaitins and the Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā schools. Advaitins argue against the Nyāya idea of anuvyavasāya or retrospection which reveals the original cognition. Advaitins say that an unchanging revealing subject is necessary to avoid the problem of infinite regress (anavasthā) with such retrospection. For examples of these discussions, see Devabrata Sinha's "The Concept of Sākṣin in Advaita Vedānta." *Our Heritage* (1954): 325–32.

[3] As Vācaspati Miśra says in his Bhāmatī on Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya "asya sākṣiṇaḥ sadā asaṁdigdhāviparitasya nityasākṣātkāratā anāgantuka prakāśatve ghaṭate." (Bhāmatī II. 2. 28, quoted in Devabrata Sinha, *The Idealist Standpoint*, p. 82).

[4] Pramātṛ, pramāṇa, and prameya are commonly used. Forms of dṛś, bhuj, and grah also appear.

[5] Both T. R. V. Murti (*Ajñāna*, pp. 171 ff.) and Devabrata Sibha (*The Idealist Standpoint*, pp. 72–9) have facilitated my understanding here.

[6] The concept of vṛtti is complex and bears further investigation. In brief, a vṛtti is a mental modification which is transformed into (or takes the shape of) an object (viṣaya) and, upon entering the antaḥkaraṇa, is passively illumined by the sākṣin. The antaḥkaraṇa is the unconscious and contingent mental instrument which connects the vṛttis with luminous consciousness. The perceptual process goes something like this: the object appears (which does not mean it is ultimately real), the vṛtti goes out and transports the object back to the antaḥkaraṇa after taking its shape, and the antaḥkaraṇa then presents the vṛtti to the sākṣin, which illumines it.

[7] It is interesting to note that N. K. Devaraja, in his book on Śaṅkara's epistemology, repeatedly refers to the advaitin distinction of sākṣi- versus vṛtti- jñāna, despite the fact that Śaṅkara himself never directly uses these terms. Such a distinction comes much later, with Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Dharmarāja. (See *An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge* [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2nd rev. ed., 1972], pp. 94–5).

[8] I would like to mention briefly here Tara Chatterjee's (1982) discussion of the advaitin conception of deep sleep (suṣupti) as pure, unvarying Self-manifestation. She writes that this idea "fails to impress me. For a theory which attaches more importance to a sleeping individual rather than a waking one fails to attract me." (p. 353) First, rather than focussing on one's personal feeling about this idea, one might ask *why* advaitins would argue for this apparently strange position. Second, an advaitin could argue that Chatterjee's position is based on the waking perspective, which is the most deluded and nonself-like condition. Finally, advaitins do not say that the sleeping *individual* is more important than a waking one – they argue that the sleeping *condition* is more like the self.

[9] In IV. 10. 4, however, there is a passing mention of the parātman as witness to the notions of all beings (sarva-prāṇita-pratyaya-sākṣi). A similar phrase, substituting buddhi for prāṇita, appears in the commentary on Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad II. 2. 4 and 9.

[10] The Naiṣkarmyasiddhi also refers to the sākṣin's freedom from apparent seizer/seizing/seized (grah) differences (II. 107–8).

[11] According to Hajime Nakamura, their dates are: Padmapāda (720–70); Sarvajñātman (750–800); Vācaspati Miśra (c. 840). See *A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy* (Delhi: Motilal Benarsidass, 1983), p. 88.

[12] Many so-called minor Upaniṣads were also written during this time, and the term sākṣin is rare in them as well. Sometimes there are brief references to the witness of senses, mind, or world (Annapūrṇa, Mahā, Tejobindu), but these references are not elaborated or analyzed. The largest number of references are in the Nṛsiṁhottaratāpanīya,

where the sākṣin is a synonym for seer (draṣṭṛ), but still merely one term in a list of epithets for the self.

[13] Aviśeṣa, kūṭastha, aparokṣa, and ekarasa caitanya.

[14] Cidābhāsa is a key term in the Pañcadaśī. I translate it as mind-semblance, i.e. the apparent individual conscious element in the jīva which "enjoys".

[15] The best available current resource is Sanjukta Gupta's *Studies in the Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bandar, 1966).

[16] Referring to the BāU III. 7–8; he elsewhere calls the Upaniṣads the "king of pramāṇas".

[17] SB 62, 172, AS 276. There are many different editions of both the SB and AS. My references are to the page numbers in the following editions: *Siddhāntabindu*. S. Subrahmaṇya Śāstrī, ed. (Varanasi: Mahesh Research Institute, 1978); *Advaitasiddhi*. Ananthakṛṣṇa Śāstrī, ed. (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1917).

[18] In this context, the sākṣin is called turīya, the fourth beyond the three ever-varying states which are subject to ignorance. The Advaitasiddhi adds that the sākṣin's avidyā-vṛtti is different from that of suṣupta (AS 559).

[19] Quoting Sureśvara's BāU vārttika here, Madhusūdana says the witnessing self observes the seer, which then perceives object-ive changes. Sureśvara is also mentioned on 139 as identifying Īśvara with the sākṣin, unlike Madhusūdana's examiner/mirror concept (see following note). Also, mention of cidābhāsa (SB 88) could refer back to Vidyāraṇya (p. 282).

[20] See Gupta (1966), pp. 134–38.

[21] Surendranath Dasgupta, in his useful account of Madhusūdana's thought, states explicitly that there is no sākṣin without an avidyā-vṛtti. According to Dasgupta, Madhusūdana also says that sākṣi-caitanya, rising above the buddhi and its vṛttis, reveals objects *and* ignorance, unlike vṛtti-jñāna, which opposes ignorance. See *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV: 263–75, 290–4, 307.

[22] The most extended account of the essential nature (svarūpa) of sākṣi-vedya is on AS 557–8, and contains an elaborate series of pūrvapakṣin and siddhāntin exchanges.

[23] AS 410, 548, 550, 575, 650, 876.

[24] Jadunath Sinha emphasizes this point in his *History of Indian Philosophy* (Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House, 1952), Vol. II: 493–5.

[25] See D. Sinha, *The Idealist Standpoint*, pp. 73–79.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary texts

Śaṅkara (1980). *Brahmasūtra-śaṅkarabhāṣyam*. Edited by J. L. Sastri. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Śaṅkara (1977). *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*. Translated by Swami Gambhirananda. 3rd edition. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama.

Śaṅkara (1964). *Īśādidaśopaniṣad-śaṅkarabhāṣyam*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Śaṅkara (1973). *Upadeśasāhasrī*. Edited by Sengaku Mayada. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press.

Sureśvara (1906). *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. Edited by G. A. Jacob. Bombay Sanskrit Series No. 38.

Sureśvara (1958). *Saṁbandhavārttika*. Edited and translated by T. M. P. Mahadevan. Madras: Univ. of Madras Press.

Padmapāda (1948). *Pañcapādika*. Edited and translated by D. Venkataramiah. Baroda: Oriental Institute (Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 107).

Sarvajñātman (1972). *Saṁkṣepaśārīrika*. Edited and translated by N. Veezinathan. Madras: Univ. of Madras Press.

Vācaspati Miśra (1933). *The Bhāmatī of Vācaspati on Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*. Edited and translated by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja. Madras: Theosophical Publ. House.

Vidyāraṇya (1965). *Panchadashi*. Edited and translated by H. P. Shastri. 2nd edition. London: Shanti Sadan.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (1917). *Advaitasiddhi*. Edited by Ananthakrsna Sastri. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagara Press.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (1978). *Siddhāntabindu*. Edited by S. S. Subrahmanya Sastri. Varanasi: Mahesh Research Institute.

Dharmarājādhvarin (1942). *Vedāntaparibhāṣa*. Edited and translated by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. Madras: Adyar Library.

Secondary Sources

Dasgupta, Surendranath (1922). *A History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. IV. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Devaraja, N. K. (1972). *An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge*. 2nd revised edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Gupta, Sanjukta (1966). *Studies in the Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī*. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bandar.

Mahadevan, T. M. P. (1969). *The Pañcadaśī of Bhāratatīrtha-Vidyāraṇya: an interpretive exposition*. Madras: Univ. of Madras Press.

Malkani, G. K. (1933). Editor. *Ajñāna*. London: Luzac.

Nakamura, Hajime (1983). *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Sastri, C. Markandeya (1973). *Sureśvara's Contribution to Advaita*. Vemur, Andhra Pradesh: Sundari Samskrita Vidyalaya.

Sinha, Devabrata (1965). *The Idealist Standpoint*. Visvabharati: Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy.

Sinha, Jadunath (1956). *A History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. II. Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House.

Articles

Chatterjee, Tara (1982). 'The Concept of Sākṣin', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 10: 339–56.

Chaudhuri, A. K. R. (1953). 'The Concept of Sākṣin in Advaita Vedānta', *Our Heritage* (1953): 69–76.

Sinha, Devabrata (1954a). 'The Concept of Sākṣin in Advaita Vedānta', *Our Heritage* 325–32.

Sinha, Devabrata (1954b). 'An Inquiry into Self-Consciousness', *Calcutta Review* 105–14.

PHYLLIS GRANOFF

HOLY WARRIORS: A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF SOME BIOGRAPHIES OF SAINTS AND KINGS IN THE CLASSICAL INDIAN TRADITION

Accounts of the lives of saints and kings in Sanskrit often rely for their essential structure on the same general and widely held beliefs. Both sage and king are regarded as *avatāras*, incarnations of a God, come to rescue mankind by ridding the earth of evil doers and heretics (the two are synonymous in the texts) and by giving their support to the pious and the good.[1] This doctrine of *avatāras* is familar from all the *purāṇas*, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the epics as well. In some cases a finite number is given and exact lists of *avatāras* are provided, but often the list is simply open-ended, allowing for history to provide its witnesses at will with example after example of God at work in human garb.[2] Both king and sage as God incarnate to free the world of sinners must wage war; both of them are equally committed to battling as Gods against demons in the *purāṇic* paradigm. The war that kings fight is always violent; the wars of the sages most often involve words, magical spells, miracles and more subtle forms of persuasion. The demonization of the enemy is accomplished in religious and royal biographies by similar means, relying on traditional texts. In the religious sphere, a host of myths associates the rise of the heresies, Jainism, Buddhism and the Carvāka materialism, with efforts on the part of the Gods to delude the demons and deprive them of their power by causing them to renounce the religious rites which give them their strength.[3] The conclusion to be derived from these myths is that practitioners of the heretical religions are in fact demons to whom the Gods and their representatives taught wrong views. Sectarian *purāṇas* in fact explicitly state as much. The *Viṣṇudharmapurāṇa* declares that anyone who denies Viṣṇu has his origin from a part of the asuras,[4] and the *Devībhāgavatapurāṇa* likewise asserts that heretics today are yesterday's rākṣasas, reborn as humans.[5] The *Saurapurāṇa*, vehement in its attacks against the followers of Madhva, in a similar vein declares them to be *mlecchas*, outside the Hindu fold and early regarded as demonic by the orthodox Hindu tradition, as shall be shown below.[6]

In the political sphere biographies of kings who waged war against foreigners or non-Hindus, either the Huns in the biographies of the earlier

Journal of Indian Philosophy **12** (1984) 291--303. 0022--1791/84/0123–0291 $01.30.

© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

kings or the Muslims in the case of the later kings, rely on the very ancient identification of the *mleccha* or outsider with the demons, an identification that occurs as early as the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and then continues from the epics to modern times.[7] Where the enemy is a rival Hindu king, his demonic nature is easily inferred from his behavior, for example his inattention to the Vedic sacrifice and his lack of concern for keeping the different castes apart.

Biographies of saints and biographies of kings make frequent allusion to this doctrine of *avatāras* and the mission of the God as king or sage to destroy the enemy demons. This paper will explore briefly the prominence of this mythological paradigm in the biographies of a number of kings and religious figures, drawing mainly on material from the Sanskrit tradition, though mention will be made of vernacular texts where particularly applicable. The paper will seek to establish that because of their common mythological background biographies of royal figures and sages must in fact both be treated as "religious" biographies and that the distinction between "secular" and "religious" biography does not in fact hold for the classical Indian tradition. The paper will also suggest that the blurring of the distinction between secular and religious biography that results from regarding both sages and kings as Gods come to fight demons among men could lead also to a blurring of the distinction in the means they employ for their warfare, saints sometimes venturing to raise armies for their spiritual conquest as did their likenesses in royal houses, both fighting the same war and the same enemy.

I. HISTORICAL BIOGRAPHIES

Sanskrit writers often devoted their talents to historical poems, although our present knowledge of the historical *kāvya* in Sanskrit remains somewhat sketchy in part due to the poor preservation of this category of texts and their inadequate publication to date. It is thus impossible to offer a complete historical survey of the *avatāra* doctrine and its development in the Sanskrit historical *kāvya*. What follows, then, is a selection of examples, sufficient to illustrate the important role the myth plays in this type of writing.

The notion that the king is divine is an ancient one in India; early texts regarded kings as manifestations of the *lokapālas* or guardians of the quarters, and the *purāṇas* and the *Mahābhārata*, in keeping with the growing popularity of the Gods Viṣṇu and Śiva regard kings as incarnations of those deities.[9]

All of the medieval biographies of kings in Sanskrit that I have examined to date follow this later practice, regarding the king they extol as an *avatāra* of the deity that was the patron of the king's dynasty, come to earth at the specific request of the Gods in order to destroy some demons who are then correspondingly regarded as the human enemies of the king.

For example, the *Rāmacarita* of Sandhyākāranandin,[10] written during the reign of Madanapāla, the son of the king Rāmapala (ascended the throne 1144), deals with the history of the unfortunate rebellion of the vassal Divvoka, a Kaivarta or fisherman by caste, which resulted in the death of Rāmapala's predecessor Mahīpāla II, and with Rāmapala's valiant and ultimately successful efforts to restore his captured homeland and quash the rebellion in his domains. Throughout the poem Rāmapāla is regarded as an incarnation of Viṣṇu (I. 19). He is called the destroyer of the demons (IV. 13) whom the commentator quickly identifies with the rebel Kaivartas, and again a new incarnation of Nārāyaṇa (kavipraśasti, vs. 7). By skillful use of double meanings which make each verse apply also to the well-known *avatāra* of Viṣṇu, Rāma, with whom Rāmapāla shares his name, the poet reinforces his assertions of their essential identity and the oneness of their task – to extirpate demons and make the world safe for the pious.

A more explicit use of the myth is made in a later historical poem, the *Raghuñathābhyudaya* of Rāmabhadrāmbā written by a mistress of the king it describes.[11] Raghunātha belonged to the Nāyika dynasty and the events in the poem probably occurred around 1620. The date of the composition of the poem is assumed to be around 1625, and thus like all of the historical *kāvya* discussed in this paper was written by someone who knew the king in question and was close to the events. The poem clearly states that Raghunātha is an incarnation of his namesake, the God Rāma (3.1). In chapter 6 the story is told of Raghunātha's father, King Acyuta, who along with his wife performed *tapas* in order to procure a child (vs. 30). Viṣṇu appears to him and promises him a son who will conquer the earth. In fact he promises himself to be reborn as their son. The purpose of this *avatāra* soon becomes clear. Viṣṇu, it is to be recalled, in the *purāṇas* and in the Gītā promises to come to earth when the earth is burdened by demons.Chapter 7 of the poem names the demons that this new incarnation will destory:

> Tathāpi kimcittava kāryabhāgam āvedaye
> rātrimcarāṃśajātāh/dākṣinyasatkarmadayāvihīnāś

> caranti loke yavanāḥ sagarvāḥ 50
> payoruhākṣāṃśbhavam vinā
> anyair vāryā na te bhūpavarair mahīndo 51a
> O king, listen to my words. The proud Muslims, born from the
> demons, devoid of compassion, good deeds and generosity
> of spirit, roam the earth. Only that one who has been born from
> Viṣṇu can stop them, and no one else, though he be among the
> best of kings.

Thus we learn that King Raghunātha is an incarnation of Viṣṇu born to extirpate the demons in the form of King Rahunātha's Muslim adversaries, and as befits his divine status he accomplishes all that is expected of him in a mingling of history and myth that is this poem.

A similar poem, the *Śāhendra Vilāsa,*[12] makes the king who was a Śaiva an incarnation of Śiva who comes down to earth in order again to rid the world of the demonic Muslims (1.50).

> Dharā purāsau yavanair
> udagrair upaplutiṃ gacchati durnivāram
> mahīpate tatra mayāvatāraḥ
> kāryo nikāryo vasudhāvasādaḥ
> Soon the earth will be overrun with the terrible
> Muslims who are difficult to conquer. I must take human form;
> this wretchedness on earth must be overcome.

This notion forms almost a leitmotif of the poem, repeated in praises of the king's victory, and elsewhere (2.93, 96; 7.10, etc.).

In the *Vikramānkābhyudaya*[13] of Someśvara written about his father, the Chalukya King Vikramāditya VI whom he succeeded to the throne in 1127 A.D., the enemy is Hindu but still demonized in accordance with the purāṇic pattern that the God incarnate kills demons incarnate. The Chalukyas' main enemy was the Rāshtrakūṭa dynasty, whose many Hindu temples and inscriptions leave no doubt as to their actual religious affilation. And yet the pattern we have observed still prevails: the Gods go to Viṣṇu as they often do in the purāṇic myths and tell him that they are oppressed by demons who have taken on human form. Viṣṇu replies that he knows well the evil deeds of the demonic Rāshtrakūṭa dynasty and that now the earth is suffering under their wickedness. Sacrifices are not properly performed and the citizens are all unsafe. Viṣṇu promises that he will be born in the womb of Bonthādevī, the wife of Vikramāditya. This is Viṣṇu's first *avatāra* in the Chalukya lineage; he is born as King Tailapa. Later on Śiva requests him to assume yet another incarnation, and this is finally the birth of Vikramāditya VI at whose birth it is predicted that he will extirpate the demons, the Rāshtrakūṭas, and usher in a new age of righteousness and plenty (p. 4). This is not our only biography of King Vikramāditya; Bilhaṇa's *Vikramānkadevacarita* also utilizes the myth (I. 45; III 62, 77).

This should suffice to indicate that a variety of historical poems from a variety of different periods in history descirbe their heroes as Gods along the *avatāra* theory and their exploits as part and parcel of that long war we are familiar with from the epics and *purāṇas*, the ongoing battle between righteousness and unrighteousness, between the Gods and the demons. The kings are then not merely upholders of the secular state and their stories are not stories of secular individuals; kings are here divine and their stories are made to conform to the archetypal pattern of holy war. It is also well to remember that all of the poems talked about represent eye-witness accounts; the mythological paradigm is thus not the result of subsequent divinization but represents a contemporary vision and interpretation of events.

II. RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY

Most religious biographies in Sanskrit conform to the pattern observed for the historical *kāvya*; in fact the exceptions are biographies of individuals whose ties were closer with the vernacular tradition (Caitanya) or the Tantric tradition (Sarvānanda). It seems safe to assert at this point in the research that the biography of the orthodox Hindu saint regards him as an incarnation of a major deity, explicitly come to destroy demonic enemies, namely everyone outside the system of beliefs of the saint whose life is being told.

The *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* of Vidyāraṇya illustrates this point clearly.[14] In the very first chapter of the poem the Gods approach Śiva and bowing down to him tell him their tale of woe. They begin (vs. 30) by reminding Śiva of Viṣṇu's incarnation as the Buddha in which to delude the demons he preached to them the worthless and dangerous doctrine of Buddhism. Now, they tell Śiva, the whole earth is overrun with Buddhists who hate Brahmins and disparage the caste system, denying the authority of the Vedas which they say are nothing more than a clever tool with which Brahmins may earn their living (31–32). No one practices Vedic rites any longer; everyone on earth has become a heretic (33). The Gods request Śiva to assume human form in order to eradicate all of these evils, and remove the Buddhists and other practitioners of evil ways (39). Śiva assents and promises to be born as the sage Śaṅkara. The rest of the text is in effect an account of his battle with the heretical demons; Śaṅkara sets off on a *digvijaya*, a world conquest in which he uses all his resources to defeat those who do not follow his philosophy.

The *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* is by no means alone in its clearly antagonistic position towards other philosophical and religious standpoints, nor are the Śaṅkara biographies as a group unique in this respect. The Śankaraites were equalled in their intolerance by all of their opponents. The *Maṇimañjarī*, of Nārāyaṇācārya,[15] is more interested in defaming Śaṅkara, Madhya's opponent, as a demon, than even in establishing Madhva's intellectual credentials. Śaṅkara is represented in the text as a *daitya* named Maṇimān (Chapter 6), who is called Śaṅkara, meaning *saṃkara* or of mixed caste, because of his ignominious birth. Śaṅkara's appearance on earth is moreover regarded as a larger plot on the part of the demons, who in Chapter 5 decide to descend to the earth, write false texts and destroy the true Vedic worship. They choose Maṇimān as their main representative and ask that he disguise the real secret of the Vedas, namely that Viṣṇu or Brahma is different from the individual soul (Madhva's doctrine) by propounding the preposterous notion that the Lord and the individual soul are one (the doctrine of Advaita). Eventually, while the demons are spreading all sorts of heresies, from Advaita to Buddhism, all of the Dvaitins are beaten and converted to Advaita, and for a while the true doctrine must circulate underground. This odd text is attributed to a direct disciple of Madhva, and its mythological aspects cannot be therefore traced to a gap in time between the author of the text and its subject. It is a clear indication of the usefulness of the mythological paradigm in sectarian dispute, heaping calumny on the opponent and glorifying as God the favoured teacher.

It is not possible to look into all the religious biographies in a paper such as this. I would mention only one other to show the prevalence of the mythological pattern, and that is not even a Hindu biography but a Sanskrit biography of the Sikh guru Nānak, the *Nānakcandrodaya* of Devarājaśarmā written in the late 17th century.[16] Here Nānak is regarded in conformity to the purāṇic paradigm as an incarnation of Viṣṇu come to earth to remove the troubles caused by the heretics (Chapter 2.32). The Sikhs made repeated use of this paradigm; the tenth guru, Guru Gobinda Singh to whom is attributed the formation of the *khalsa*, the military arm of the Sikhs, in his autobiography the *Bachitra Natak Granth*, written in Punjabi, speaks clearly of his mission. He does not use the word *avatāra*, but tells how he was absorbed in meditation on the mountain Seven Peaks where the Pandus rule when his soul was called to earth to teach the true religion and remove those who transgress against it.[17] Guru Gobinda Singh's interest in the *avatāras*, evidenced by his compositions like the *Caubis Avatar*, again reflects his commitment to the militant paradigm implied by the *avatāra* doctrine.

Lengthy biographies or autobiographies are not our only indications of the strength and importance of the purāṇic myths in sectarian and political disputes in medieval India. A curious inscription of the time of Mahāmaṇḍalevśvara Kāmadeva (1181–1203) at Ablur tells of a devotee to Śiva, a follower of the Lingāyat movement who persecuted the Jains. The inscription reproduces a "biography" of the pious man Ekāntada Rāmayya; the pattern is predictable. Ekāntada Rāmayya is an incarnation of Vīrabhadra, sent by Śiva in order to stop wrong religious practices and make sure that the right religion is followed. Ekāntada Rāmayya does just this; he miraculously defeats the Jains and destroys their temple besides. Like Guru Gobinda Singh this incarnation waged his war with both words and stronger means. What is significant is that this is an absolutely contemporary account and allows us to infer the propaganda value of the mythological paradigm; religious persecution championed by an assertion that the persecutor was a divine incarnation carrying out part of that ancient and cosmic struggle between good and evil.

Examples from the literary texts could be multiplied,and a careful reading of the inscriptions should provide further instances of the use of the doctrine of *avatāras* in the political and religious sphere.[19] Nevertheless, it is hoped that the above selection will surffice to illustrate the character of much of sectarian biography of religious and political figures in medieval India.

III. CONCLUSIONS: SOME DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE BIOGRAPHIES OF KINGS AND SAINTS

As this paper has shown, religious and royal biographies equally make abundant use of a mythological paradigm which gives them a crusading and militant tone. Kings and sages are functional equivalents in an ongoing struggle between good and evil, divine and demonic. Often their means of warfare diverge, however, and invariably their preparation for battle and their right to their imperial conquest are differently handled in the texts. Warfare is considered a natural adjunct to kingship. In its discussion of the behavior and duty of kings the *Mahābhārata* (*Śāntiparvan* XII. 60. 14) declares: *nityodyukto dasyuvadhe raṇe kuryāt parākramam* "Constantly alert and engaged in the slaying of evil ones the king should show his valour in battle". Similarly, *Mahābhārata* XII. 57. 3 states, "*Dvau imau grasate bhūmiḥ sarpo bilaśayāniva / rājānam cāviroddhāram brāhmaṇam cāpravāsinam*". "The earth swallows up these two as snakes swallow up creatures lying in their burrows, a king who does not fight and a Brahman who does not go forth to study the Vedas". References could be multiplied, both from the *Śāntiparvan* and from the *dharmaśāstras* and *arthaśāstra*, which agree completely that making war is one of the prime duties of a king.[20]

By contrast the course the sage chooses is an extraordinary one. Renunciation is the exception and not the rule in the life of an ordinary man. The biography of a religious figures thus must take pains to establish the credibility of the course of action its subject follows, establishing his unique character and justifying his right to assume the role of saint. This takes many forms in the biographies. The saint is described from childhood as different from others; he learns quickly, and begins to show a lack of interest in mundane and routine affairs.[21] His progress is marked by miracles as he seeks his proper teacher and eventually his mission becomes clear to him and to the reader of his life, usually in a moment of divine revelation, where the saint encounters the chosen deity who speeds him on his course and instructs him in his quest. For example, in the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*, Chapter 6 Śaṅkara sees a Caṇḍāla surrounded by four dogs (vs. 25). Śaṅkara, on his way to the river Ganges to take a midday bath, fears ritual pollution from such unclean beings and abruptly orders the outcaste to move away. The Caṇḍāla replies that according to the Vedānta all creatures are one; Śaṅkara is thus at fault when he sees a distinction between high caste and low caste. The Caṇḍāla is Śiva, who then reveals to Śaṅkara what he must do: he must write the *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras* and conquer all the philosophers who oppose him, Bhāskara, Abhinavagupta, Nīlakaṇṭha, Prabhākara, Maṇḍana Miśra and others. (vs. 39–47). Śaṅkara is now ready to begin his conquest. The instigation for his *digvijaya* is thus his encounter with the God Śiva, for which he has been prepared through his religious austerities and his lessons from Govinda. Śankara is also uniquely fit for his mission because of his extraordinary brilliance and piety, as the text makes clear. The biography thus in its early chapters establishes the credentials of Śaṅkara, often interspersing tales of miracles in its recital of Śaṅkara's early years.

Other biographies of saints take equal pains to establish the right of their subject to his spiritual conquest. The *Patañjalicaritra*, a biography of the grammarian Patañjali, has much in common with the religious biographies discussed in this paper.[22] Patañjali is described as an *avatāra* of Śeṣa, Viṣṇu's serpent, who is sent to earth to write the *Mahābhāṣya* to quell the dispute between Pāṇini and Katyāyana, and witness Śiva's dance at Cidambaram. The *avatāra* theory here is not connected with any great battle between demons and Gods, perhaps because sectarian rivalry among the grammarians was of lesser importance than it was among other medieval groups. At any rate, the text still takes great pains to establish Patañjali's credentials and his suitability for the intellectual conquest he will make. Patañjali watches Śiva dance, and then Śiva commands him to write his *Bhāṣya*, in a scenario highly reminiscent of Śaṅkara's encounter with Śiva (Chapter 4 vs. 75). Pantañjali also performs religious austerities before his encounter with the God, and his career is studded with maraculous events that help establish his difference from other mortals, and thus justify his extraordinary accomplishments.

Madhva's biography follows a similar pattern, divine intervention signalling the saint's special status, and miracles proclaiming his powers.[23] This attention to the training of the saint, his mental inclination towards spiritual matters, his encounter with a God and his super-human powers distinguishes to an important extent the biographies of saints from those of kings. If both fight the same battle, the king does so as a matter of course, as a natural exercise of his kingly powers and duties. Divine intervention is called for only when the battle threatens to violate the rules of warfare, as in the succession battle of Vikramāditya VI, against his elder brother Someśvara II (*Vikramāṅkadevacarita*, VI. 62–65, VI. 93).[24] The saint, on the other hand, represents a break from the norm, a rupture of the mundane. He must prepare himself for his fight by special religious practices and study, and the public must be prepared for his greatness by accounts of miracles and divine inspiration. This difference between saints and kings is evident from a text that might properly be called a "pseudo-biography", the *Kalkipurāṇa*, which details the life and deeds of Kalki, the future and final *avatāra* of Viṣṇu.[25] Kalki is to be born on earth, the son of Brahmans, in order to rid the world of the *mlecchas* and heretics. He will reestablish the *Kṛtayuga* and then return to heaven. Kalki does not himself in this text become king, but appoints Maru and Devāpi, representatives of the lunar and solar dynasties, to rule. He is thus not quite a king, though his life story follows closely the pattern observed for royal biographies, which are accounts of military exploits and amorous adventures. Kalki is also not a saint in the traditional terms of sainthood; he has no philosophical school to champion and confines his endeavors to extirpating demons and heretics; he does not propound his own viewpoints and convert his opponents. What little philosophical speculation exists in the *Kaikipurāṇa* is derivative of the *Bhagavadgītā* and there is little attention given to philosophical dispute, in contrast to the biographies of all the major saints in the Hindu tradition and the *Nānakcandrodaya*, modelled clearly on Hindu biographies. At the same time Kalki's mission is unique. It was not the norm for Brahmans to rise up and wage holy wars against infidels; war was the prerogative of kings. And so the *Kalkipurāṇa*, like the biographies of saints, must justfiy Kalki's acts and provide some explanation of his motivation and the inspiration for his unusual choice of behavior. Kalki hears from his father an account of how all the Brahmans have become wicked in the *kaliyuga*. He is aroused by this depiction of evil and determines that he will fight to destroy the sinful age into which he has been born. (Chapter 2). His preparation for his fight again resembles more the career of the saint than that of the king. He encounters a God, Rāma Jāmadagnya, who teaches him, and he is given concrete instruction and a magical horse, sword, and bird from another God, Śiva. Only then is he fit to embark on his *digvijaya*, neither king nor sage, but partaking of the character of both.

Biographies of kings and sages are thus variations on a common theme that allows for flexible treatment. As the *Kalkipurāṇa* indicates it is possible to have texts that mingle both royal biography and history of a saint, the mythological paradigm providing an overall structure which a writer could thus expand to satisfy both his own creative urges and the needs he envisioned his text as meeting.

Department of Religious Studies,
McMaster University,
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada L8S 4K1

NOTES

[1] *Bhagavadgītā* iv. 7/8; *Harivaṃśa* 42 vs. 2212 ff; *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, V. 1.3.2; *Mahābhārata* III. 189, vs. 12976 ff., etc. References from Emil Abegg, *Des Messiaglaube in Indien und Iran auf Grunde der Quellen*, Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1928, p. 44. V. S. Pathak in *Ancient Historians of India: A Study of Historical Biographies*, London: Asia Publishing House 1966, misinterprets the role of mythology in the historical *kāvya*, regarding the allusions of myth for one as a simple by-product of the important role the Bhṛgvangirases played in writing history and more consistently, as an attempt of later dynasties to associate themselves with famous kings of olden days. Pathak continually refers to the 'anachronistic representation of contemporary rulers in the role of ancient heroes such as Rama or Bhīma' as evidence of nostalgia for the past (p. 26, see also pp. 59, 82). In fact the *avatāra* theory is open-ended, allowing for numerous future and present incarnations as well as the past incarnations celebrated in the epics and the *purāṇas*. The subjects of historical poems are thus not Rāma by anachronistic reference but in the very same way that Rāma is Viṣṇu (*Rāmāyaṇa* 14. 19–21). Rāma of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the heroes of the historical *kāvyas* are equally *avatāras* of a main God, of necessity assuming human form to right the world and destroy evil. The paradigm of the purāṇic myth of the battles between Gods and demons and the *avatāra* theme allow for the appearance of all of these kings as well as of Rāma himself. Both are also common to biographies of saints and thus show the dominance of a broader pattern of thinking, where saints and kings function in a like manner, preserving order and combating sin. Mythological reference here is not a throwback to the past but a mode of perceiving and understanding the present. Pathak also associates the mythological pattern with the strictly medieval biography, a contention ill-supported by the evidence of such an early text as the *Bhagavadgītā* where Kṛṣṇa proclaims himself to be "narāṇam narādhipam", "of men the king" (10.27). It is interesting to note that Pathak mentions an *ākhyāyikā* or historical tale called *Devāsuram* from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* XI, 1.6.9, suggesting that the use of the cosmic battle between the Gods and demons as history has itself an ancient pedigree.

[2] Compare *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, I. 3.26; *Harivaṃśa* 42 vs. 2209, 2366, 2374. From Abegg, *ibid.*, p.46.

[3] These myths are discussed at length by Wendy O'Flaherty, *The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology*, Berkeley: University of California, 1976, pp. 176ff.

[4] Cited by R. C. Hazra, *Studies in the Upapuranas*, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1957, p. 152.

[5] *Devībhāgavatapurāṇa*, 6.11.42.

[6] *Saurapurāṇa* 39.76–77, cited Paul Hacker, "Religious Toleranz und Intoleranz im Hinduism", *Kleine Schriften*: Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1978, p. 383.

[7] *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 3.2.1.24; *Mahābhārata* 1.79.12; *Kathāsaritsāgara* xvii. 19. For the modern period see the citation from the extremist Bengali periodical *Yugantar*, 1980, cited K. C. Chaudhry, *Role of Religion in Indian Politics 1900–1925*, Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 1978, p. 122.

[8] *The Vikramānkābhyudaya: A Historical Sanskirt Campū* by Śrī Someśvara of Kalyāna, edited Murari Lal Nagar, GOS 150, Baroda 1966, p. 19. See Also *Śukranītisāra* I. 70, cited p. V. Kane, *History of Dharma Sastra*, Vol. 3, Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, 1946, p. 24.

[9] *Vāyupurāṇa* 57.22; *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* IV. 14. 26–27; *Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvan* 59 vs. 128, cited Kane, *ibid.*, p. 23, 33.

[10] Edited R. C. Majumdar and Dr. Radhagovinda Basak and Pandit Nanigopal Banerje, Rajshahi: Varendra Research Museum, 1939.

[11] Edited T. R. Chintamani, University of Madars, 1934, Bulletin of Sanskrit Department, No. 2.

[12] *Śāhendravilāsa: A Poem on the Life of King Śāhaji of Tanjore, 1684–1710*, by Śrīdhara Venkaṭeśa, edited V. Raghavan, Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal Series No. 54, Tiruchi: Kalyan Press, 1952.

[13] See Note 8.

[14] Edited Vinayaka Ganesa Apate, Pune: Anandasrama Sanskrit Series. 22, 1932.

[15] *Maṇimañjarī*, Dacca: Manomohan Press, N. D. See also O'Flaherty, *op. cit.*, pp. 208–210.

[16] *Nānakcandrodaya of Devarāja Śarmā*, ed., Pt. Vrajanath Jha, Varanasi: Sarasvata Bhavana Granthāmāla, Vol. 105, 1977.

[17] Dr. Dharam Pal Ashta, *The Poetry of the Dasam Granth*, New Delhi: Arun Prakashan, 1959, pp. 42–43; Surjit Singh Gandhi, *History of the Sikh Gurus*, Delhi: Gur Das Kapur and Sons, Ltd., 1978, pp. 395, ff.

[18] *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. 5, p. 239 ff.

[19] See for example V. S. Pathak, *op. cit.*, pp. 59, 69, 92. Pathak also suggests that inscriptional evidence indicates that at least one king, the Hoysala Viṣṇuvardhana, was spurred on in his military conquests by his belief in his divine mission. Other inscriptional evidence will undoubtedly be forthcoming. The Gahadavāla King Jayacandra is treated as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in the 1175 A. D. copper plate discussed by F. Kielhorn, "The Copper Plate Grants of the Kings of Kanauj", *Indian Natiquary*, 18, 1889, p. 129 vs. 12. A reading of modern sources would provide numerous parallels. Compare for example Guenter Lewy, *Religion and Rebellion*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 287 ff; Stephen Fuchs, *Rebellious Prophets, A Study of Messianic Movements in Indian Religions*, Bombay: Asian Publishing House, 1965; Bhai Manilal C. Parekh, *Sri Swami Narayana (A Gospel of Bhagwat-dharma or God in Redemptive Action)*, Rajkot: Sri Bhagwat-dharma Mission House, 1936, and the reference in note 7. The Marāṭhā Peśwas made ample use of the paradigm in their political campaigns in the 18th century. See *Vallabha's Paraśarāmacaritra: An Eighteenth Century Maratha History of the Peśwās*, Narendra Wagle and A. R. Kulkarni, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1976.

[20] See U. N. Ghosal, *A History of Indian Political Ideas: The Ancient Period and the Period of Transition to the Middle Ages*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 57, 86, 129, 167, 235 ff.

[21] *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*, Chapter 5 vs. 1, 34, etc; *Nānakcandrodaya*, Chapters 2, 3; *Madhvadigvijaya*, cited C. M. Padmanabhacarya, *Life and Teachings of Sri Madhvacarya*, Udipi: Sri Palimar Mutt, pp. 20–24.

[22] *Patañjalicaritra*, Rāmabhadradīkṣita, edited Sivadatta Kasinath Pandurang Parab and Wasudev Laxman Shastri, Pansikar, Kāvyamālā Series 51, 1934, Chapter 4, vs. 75.

[23] Padmanabhacarya, *op. cit*, p. 64, 93.

[24] Pathak, *op. cit.*, p. 69. An exception to this is provided by the *Madhurāvijaya* of Gaṅgādevī (ed. P. Subrahmanyaśāstrī, Tenālipattanam, 1969) in which the poetess, a consort of the king whose life she describes, heightens the predominant poetic sentiment, *vīrarasa*, by introducing *karnuṇarasa* in sarga 8. The Goddess of the city

Madhurā appears to the king Kampilarāya and plaintively details the misery of her city under the Muslims. She gives to him a magic sword and stirs him to conquest. That such divine intervention is not always present in the royal biographies suggests that its function here is poetic rather than structural. Stories of magic swords re not uncommon in folk literature in India.

[25] Edited Asoke Chatterjee Sastri, Varanasi: Sarasvati Bhavana Granthamala, Vol. 103, 1972.

BOOK REVIEW

Ruegg, David Seyfort, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, Wiesbaden, O. Harrassowitz, ix + 146 pp. (A History of Indian Literature, Jan Gonda (ed.), Vol. VII, Fasc. 1.)

There is no reason to summarize a book which is in itself a critical summary of half a century of learned research, since Winternitz's venerable History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, appeared in Calcutta in 1933. Suffice it to say that in a remarkably short space Professor Ruegg succeeds in laying before the reader a clear and comprehensive survey of the history of Madhyamaka literature in India, which stretches over about a millennium. The information of the author is as flawless as usual. All hypotheses, theories, datings put forward or another during these fifty years of research are recorded, with the comments and reservation required. The chapters on late Indian Madhyamaka are particularly valuable in their substantial brevity.

A reference book in every respect.

Buddhist Studies,
University of Loussanne, Switzerland

JACQUES MAY

Journal of Indian Philosophy **12** (1984) 305.

K. H. POTTER

DOES INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY CONCERN JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF?*

Of the various topics which are taken up in classical Indian philosophy, *prāmāṇyavāda*, equated with epistemology in the critical literature, strikes the Western philosopher of today as being most akin to something of deep concern to him. On the basis of the translations of the Sanskrit literature provided in the best contemporary expositions of Indian thought, questions about the nature of knowledge and truth appear to be clearly broached in Indian texts, and the intricacies of some of the analyses to be found in those texts rival the intricacies of analysis as practiced by the best of recent and living Anglo-American professional philosophers.

In my opinion the most outstanding exposition of Indian thinking on the topic of *prāmāṇyavāda* is to be found in the work of Jitendranath Mohanty, and most notably in his ground-breaking book, *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth.*[1] In his Introduction to a translation of the (*Jñapti*) *Prāmāṇya* section of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* Mohanty first disambiguates a number of key terms and lays out in exemplary fashion the issues which appear to separate the two sides in the classical polemic concerning whether the awareness of *prāmāṇya* is "intrinsic" (*svataḥ*) or "extrinsic" (*parataḥ*). This review distinguishes the positions not only of the many important Indian systems involved – Mīmāṃsā, Advaita and Nyāya – but also succinctly identifies the positions of subschools within these as well as the opinions of individual philosophers found in their writings. This Introduction is followed by a faithful translation of Gaṅgeśa's chapter with copious explanatory remarks without which the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, extremely laconic in its style, could not be understood by anyone not initiated into Sanskrit and Navyanyāya. The entire volume is a tour de force, a subtle, critical illumination of the most intricate kind of materials calling for that rare combination, brilliance as Indologist and philosopher rolled into one.

Though the paper that now follows takes issue with some of Mohanty's conclusions, this in no way should be thought to mitigate against what I have just said about the book. It is only because of rare efforts such as his that it becomes possible to push further into important matters and argue issues in a fashion that promises to provide general insights.

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 307–327. 0022–1791/84/0124–0307 $02.10.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company*

Mohanty's conclusion to his Introduction is that both the *svataḥ* and *parataḥ* theories about awareness of *prāmāṇya* are "valid in their own ways"[2] because two critical terms, "jñāna" and "prāmāṇya", have different meanings for the proponents of the two competing views. Translating "jñāna" as "knowledge", Mohanty writes

> "The *svataḥ* theory understands 'knowledge' in a strict sense such that the theory becomes an analytic consequences of its conception of knowledge",

whereas

> "the *parataḥ* theory takes 'knowledge' in a rather weak sense so as to include within its scope both true knowledge and false knowledge."[3]

As for "prāmāṇya", translated as "truth", Mohanty distinguishes some three different senses of this term that are held by one or another of the *svataḥ* proponents, and says that "The Naiyāyikas mean something else by truth",[4] since the *parataḥ* view is referring to the truth of a belief, whereas the *svataḥ* theorists are talking of the truth of knowledge. The former allows of an opposite; the latter does not. Thus

> "the two points of view do not necessarily clash but may be brought into a happy reconciliation",[5]
> "both the theories are thus in their own ways correct."[6]

The conclusion Mohanty arrives at is that the *svataḥ* vs. *parataḥ prāmāṇya* controversy is another illustration of what I have called[7] the "incommensurability thesis", to the effect that no real substantive issue has been joined since, though the two parties think they are talking about the same thing, they aren't. An issue taken by classical Indian philosophers over many centuries to involve a fundamental clash of views turns out to be merely verbal. As a result, Mohanty adds, some things the tradition says, e.g. about the related question of the origins of truth, turn out to be things they shouldn't have said; because of verbal confusion, they should have said something else.[8]

Now there are, I realize, those who find the incommensurability thesis inherently attractive, promising eventual sweetness and light free from controversy. I am not one of those. It seems to me that Mohanty's conclusion downgrades the importance of epistemological discussions in Indian philosophy. Thus, to take a pertinent example out of Mohanty's own material, Gaṅgeśa's attempt (beautifully explained by Mohanty) to find a formulation common to all the proponents of *svataḥprāmāṇya* so that Nyāya arguments against that thesis will apply to all versions of the thesis at once, turns out to be a kind of pointless effort, since if the incommensurability thesis is true the Nyāya arguments miss the opposition completely. More generally, one would suppose that the many generations of thinkers as subtle and profound as those responsible for the polemics in question would have been clever enough to recognize that the issue they were expending so much energy on was a verbal one. I think the issue was not a verbal one, that it represented a real and important confrontation of opinions. Furthermore, to see what the issue is cannot help but illuminate wider issues of comparative study, since Indian epistemology features a conception of knowledge which is nonequivocally shared by all its schools but nevertheless contrasts with the currently favored conception of knowledge in Western philosophical analysis. Since all is not well with the current conception of knowledge in Western philosophical analysis, it would seem that any epistemologist should be interested in exploring the matter.

Specifically, Mohanty takes as a "phenomenological description" of knowledge the account of it, widely held in contemporary analytic philosophy, as justified true belief.[9] My argument in this paper is that Mohanty's conclusion (reported above) is conditioned by his acceptance of the justified true belief account of knowledge, but that such an account is foreign to Indian thought, so that Mohanty's conclusion distorts the situation and leads to the unwelcome claim of incommensurability. Having argued for these points I shall go on to speculate whether the Indian conception of knowledge can be analyzed at all, if so, how, and whether any Western notions are illuminated by such analysis.

Mohanty chooses to translate the Sanskrit term "jñāna" as "knowledge", following others. He does this despite his own admission that such a translation is "definitely misleading"[10] and in fact incorrect. Having admitted that, he then "proposes" to use the English word "knowledge" in the way the Nyāya uses "jñāna".[11] He notes, however, that the word "pramā" translates as "knowledge",[12] and he himself uses "knowledge" regularly to render "pramā". Thus he has the same English word rendering two distinct Sanskrit expressions, expressions which on his own showing connote distinct senses. Since this evidently invites confusion, I prefer to provide my own exposition of the two notions, leaving the Sanskrit terms untranslated until I have argued the case for the proper translations.

A *jñāna* is, in the relevant sense for us,[13] an act[14] of awareness. It does not name a disposition (say, to respond in a certain way when meeting a certain sort of thing). A *jñāna* is something which happens at a time, an occurrent. If it involves belief, it does so only in the sense of a believing as a fleeting act of awareness. A *jñāna* is not a belief in the dispositional sense. And not all *jñānas* are beliefs even in the occurrent sense – believing is, or may be, only one sort of *jñāna*. Any act of awareness which has intentionality constitutes a *jñāna*. Entertaining a doubt, vaguely sensing the presence of something or other, drawing a reductio ad absurdum inference, and understanding someone's meaning are all *jñāna*. None of them are believings. And since they are not beliefs (in any sense) none of them are true beliefs, and none of them are justified true beliefs. Rather, a *jñāna* is, as indicated, *an* awareness. It is not knowledge, or even *a* knowledge *per se*, though it remains open to further scrutiny whether all, some or no acts of awareness constitute instances of knowledge in some sense other than justified true belief.

A *pramā* is an awareness which has a certain essential property, called *prāmāṇya*. Mohanty renders "prāmāṇya" as "truth" and argues that there are "different types of concepts of truth to be met with in the different versions of the *svataḥ* theory."[15] But I do not find that he demonstrates this claim. He has not shown that the several versions of the *svataḥ* theory represent different meanings of "prāmāṇya". They may be different theories about how we become aware that something answers to a single concept. Indeed, Gaṅgeśa clearly assumes the latter to be the case. Otherwise he would hardly have proposed his account of what the several versions of the *svataḥ* theory have in common with his own, i.e., what *prāmāṇya* is.

Gaṅgeśa's approach is to set forth a univocal account of what the opposition's thesis is to collect the best arguments for that thesis, to refute those arguments, and then to offer arguments in favor of the opposite thesis his own. Gaṅgeśa appears to believe that he and his opponents are debating a thesis whose formulation is in terms of concepts they both understand and share. Before we settle for the incommensurability solution proposed by Mohanty, I suggest we should examine the notion of *prāmāṇya* to see if we cannot, using Gaṅgeśa's suggestions as a guide, find a meaning for the term which will make the debate a real rather than a sham confrontation.

First, some formal features of a *pramā*. As we have seen, a *pramā* is an awareness. Thus, it is an occurrent, not a disposition. So, if we do choose to translate "pramā" as "knowledge" we must immediately recognize that it is not knowledge in the sense of justified true belief, where "belief" means the disposition to respond in appropriate ways when stimulated.

Nevertheless, if we consider the notion of an occurrent believing I think there is reason to think that a *pramā* can be considered to be such. There is Sanskrit terminology to the point. A *pramā* is a type of awareness which has the property of being an ascertaining (*niścaya*), as opposed to another type of awareness, doubting (*saṃśaya*). *Pramā* is not the only such type of awareness: a *viparyaya*, erroneous or false awareness (*mithyājñāna*), is also a *niścaya*. In the case of both *pramā* and *viparyaya* one has an awareness that is not accompanied by a feeling of doubt or puzzlement, one is not vacillating among more than one alternative hypothesis, but "declaring" for one thesis among alternatives, although he may not express it verbally and is not necessarily conscious of his nonvacillation. So perhaps a *pramā* is a belief after all, though in the occurrent rather than the dispositional sense. And if it should turn out that it must be true as well, then it may be thought that *pramā* is not so far removed from justified true belief after all. Unfortunately, as we shall see, it is not at all clear that a *pramā* must be true in the sense that the justified true belief account of knowledge wants it to be.

Every *pramā* is intentional. It has a content (*viṣaya*), as every awareness has. To decide whether truth is a necessary condition for an awareness to be a *pramā* one must carefully assess the relation which a *pramā* must bear to its content. We want a relation, R, which holds between any *pramā* and its content, a relation which can be admitted by every Indian philosopher to hold between a *pramā* and its content regardless of the particular theory he or any other Indian philosopher proposes about the nature of or proper analysis of R. That is, we want an account of R, and thus an account of the meaning of "prāmāṇya", which will accommodate what Gaṅgeśa says his opponents propound as well as what he, Gaṅgeśa, propounds. Hopefully, to go a little farther, it will accommodate what all Indian systems which have been involved in the controversy over *svataḥ* vs. *parataḥ prāmāṇya* can agree on as a meaning for "prāmāṇya". Thus the account of R must not beg issues between, e.g., "idealist" systems like Buddhism or (perhaps) Advaita and "realist" ones such as Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. The incommensurability thesis contends such an account cannot be found. Let us see if we can't find one.

My suggestion about what R is, is this: where "J" stands for a *jñāna*, and "C" stands for its content,

> R_J iff J apprehends (lit. "measures out") C in accordance with the purpose that motivated J.

This suggestion arises from a combination of considerations. The verb complex *pra* + *mā* literally means to measure something out, by which I take it is meant to cognize something in a certain way, a way that involves at least a minimal structure. Another consideration is that when one seeks to find a Sanskrit term by which R is glossed one regularly finds "yathārtha". This compound has regularly been translated as "as the object is" or something to that effect, a translation that seems to bolster the interpretation of *pramā* as requiring correspondence of J's structure with the structure of some object already there independently of the cognizer. But it needn't be understood that way. The compound can quite as easily mean "as the purpose is", for "artha" frequently has the sense of "purpose", as in the phrase "puruṣārtha", meaning human aims or purposes.

My suggestion, then, is that with R, so defined, as the relation between a *pramā* and its content, we can make sense of Gaṅgeśa's chaim that the analysis he proposed provides a univocal meaning for "prāmāṇya", thus providing a ground for a confrontation between *svataḥprāmāṇya* and *parataḥprāmāṇya*. Next, I want to examine whether this suggestion can be supported from the literature.

Gaṅgeśa's analysis runs as follows:

> "*Prāmāṇya* is either (a) being an awareness whose chief qualifier, x, is in what possesses x, or (b) being an awareness of a relatedness of x to what possesses x."[16]

This is to say that a *pramā* is an awareness (a) whose predicate term (as we might put it) belongs to its subject term, or (b) which attributes some property, x, to its content which has x. Gaṅgeśa argues, in favor of his analysis, that only when (a) or (b) is satisfied does one undertake action predicated on the awareness in question. In addition, he argues, this is the most economical account of what *prāmāṇya* is.[17]

It is important to emphasize that Gaṅgeśa puts forth this analysis as a conception which is common to all of the theories about *prāmāṇya*. As Mohanty explains, Gaṅgeśa's idea is that, however each different *svataḥ* theorist thinks the *prāmāṇya* of an awareness J_1 is made known to us, in any case *what* is made known is a combination of two things, (1) that the qualificandum (i.e., the subject term) of J_1 possesses a certain property, and

(2) that that property is the chief qualifier (predicate term) of J_1. The claim is that the joint satisfaction of (1) and (2) is a requirement common to all those who hold to *svataḥprāmāṇya*, and that it is likewise a necessary condition (though possibly not a sufficient one) even according to *prataḥprāmāṇya* that (1) and (2) be satisfied whenever *prāmāṇya* is present.

Among those philosophers who have become caught up in the *svataḥ/parataḥprāmāṇya* debate we may count some Buddhists, several kinds of Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas and not a few Advaita Vedāntins. My discussion will be content with these, though there may be others as well. What I am about to argue, then, is that, for each of half a dozen distinct formulations by Indian philosophers of what "prāmāṇya" means, each of them satisfies (1) and (2) and also provides an instantiation of what I have proposed to be the relation R. If that is correct, it suggests that Gaṅgeśa's thesis about *prāmāṇya* being a univocal notion holds good, at least provided the relation R is understood my way. Then I shall show that, understood the way Mohanty understands R, the *svataḥ* theory indeed becomes trivialized. But, as I see it, that is a reason to prefer my understanding of R, not his.

Let me start with Buddhism (although Mohanty's discussion leaves the Buddhists aside, no doubt because Gaṅgeśa's discussion does not involve them). In Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* we find the following passage explicating the notion of "right awareness" (*samyagjñāna*, which I take to be his term for *pramā*),

> "Right awareness is awareness that is not contrary to what it is right to attribute (to something) (*avisaṃvādaka*). In ordinary usage it is said that what is right to attribute (to something) (*saṃvādaka*) is that which causes us to attain a purpose (or a thing, *artha*) which has been previously identified. . . . 'Attaining the purpose' here means just causing our activity to have to do with the purpose (or thing, *artha*) identified, and nothing else. Now, awareness does not produce the purpose, but it does cause us to attain it. In causing a person to initiate activity toward a purpose, it causes him to attain it. This initiating of activity is merely the identification of a content of activity. . . ."[18]

As I read this passage, Dharmottara's idea is that the function of a right awareness is to direct the attention of the person having it toward the content of that awareness as being relevant to a previously identified purpose or purposive object. That sort of awareness which does this regularly deserves to be called a *pramāṇa*. What sort of awareness does this regularly? According to Buddhism of Dharmottara's school it is perceptual awareness, defined as direct awareness, i.e., awareness which does not involve conceptual construction (*kalpanāpoḍha*).[19] What we might call sensation constitutes such perception, since it is a moment of sensory awareness prior to association with language or memory. Sensation is right awareness par excellence for the Buddhist, since its entire function consists in calling its content to our attention as something which is a possible object of successful purposive activity.

For Dharmottara, then, the relation R (between right awareness and its content) requires that the awareness apprehends the content as an objective suitable for successful purposive activity. This is an instance of my relation R. And if (as Gaṅgeśa himself will not admit) sensation can be supposed to ascribe a property x to something, then a right awareness ascribes to its content the property of being an objective of successful activity, which property that content (which Buddhism calls the *svalakṣaṇa*) indeed possesses.

Next let us consider those schools which are treated by Gaṅgeśa himself. First we may consider the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka. Mohanty succinctly expresses the Prābhākara notion of *prāmāṇya* when he points out that according to the Prābhākara "there is no cognitive error"; rather, he writes,

> "when we say a knowledge" (i.e., an awareness – my interpolation) "is false we really mean – the Prābhākara seems to be saying – that it leads to unsuccessful behaviour."[20]

A few lines later, Mohanty indicates that a rather late Prābhākara, Rāmānujācārya, distinguishes between three relations, viz., *yāthārthya, prāmāṇya* and *saṃyaktva*.

> "*Yāthārthya* belongs to all awareness (including memory and what ordinarily passes for erroneous apprehension), *prāmāṇya* to all awareness excepting memory (but including even the so-called erroneous apprehension) and *saṃyaktva* only to such knowledge other than memory which leads to successful practice."[21]

"Saṃyak" is the same term we translated as "right" in the Buddhist context of "right awareness". The Prābhākara view thus approximates to that of the Buddhist, with some added distinctions which do not affect my point. That point is, once again, that both my analysis of R and Gaṅgeśa's characterisation of *prāmāṇya* are satisfied on the Prābhākara account. As in Buddhism, the function of a *pramā* is to present to us a content which may be an objective of successful activity – the Prābhākara adds that it must do so for the first time, that it not be a remembrance, but that does not materially affect the point being argued.

Turning next to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, followers of Kumārila, and once again considering Mohanty's excellent review of their views,[22] we find a divergence of explanations but essential agreement that either *prāmāṇya* involves the relation that we have seen Buddhists and Prābhākaras to emphasize, viz., the picking out of a content as an objective of successful activity, or else (for some Bhāṭṭas) it involves a relation they term "viṣayatathātva", which might be rendred as "(J's) being as its content is". I submit that this relation can well be taken as equivalent to my R, e.g. as a pragmatic verification relation, and that it also nicely satisfies Gaṅgeśa's analysis of *prāmāṇya*.

A third type of Mīmāṃsā is that known as the Miśra school, a system whose literature is largely lost to us but which appears in an important role in Gaṅgeśa's discussions. The Miśra account of *prāmāṇya* is rather more complex than those of the other Mīmāṃsakas. The Miśra analysis is that *prāmāṇya* is "tadvadviśeṣyakatve sati tatprakārakatva",[23] that is to say, a *pramā* must satisfy two tests, (1) that the J in question must present a qualificand, C, which has a chief qualifier, Q, and (2) that it must present C as qualified by Q. When we compare this with Gaṅgesa's analysis we find that (1) and (2) are precisely (1) and (2) of Gaṅgesa's analysis. And since the *pramā* J apprehends C as qualified by Q in accordance with the purpose which informs J (whatever purpose that may be) the Miśra analysis also fits the requirements of my R.

Next, consider the Vivaraṇa Advaita Vedānta school's analysis of *prāmāṇya* as "arthaparicchedasāmarthya",[24] i.e., as the property of being an awareness which is capable of picking out (that content which accords with) its purpose.[25] It should be clear that this conception once again satisfies both my account of R and Gaṅgeśa's analysis of *prāmāṇya*.

Finally, we must consider the Nyāya analysis itself, which is just that which Gaṅgeśa himself proposed, viz., the simultaneous satisfaction of (1) and (2), "tadvati tatprakārakatva".[26] *A fortiori*, this satisfies (since it is identical with) Gaṅgeśa's analysis of *prāmāṇya*. Does it fit my analysis of R? Yes, certainly if the purpose motivating the awareness is to apprehend its content in such a way as to correspond with some assumed external object with a fixed, independent structure, which is what scholars have usually supposed Nyāya thinks the purpose of *pramā* to be.

Mohanty is puzzled by the fact that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, a famous Advaita Vedāntin, also adopts the very same terminology in his analysis of *prāmāṇya* as does Gaṅgeśa.[27] The reason he is puzzled is that Nyāya and Advaita differs so widely in epistemology, the former carefully distinguishing what is externally and independently real from what is internal, mental and perhaps unreal, the latter blithely uninterested in such a contrast. Madhusūdana views *tadvati tatprakārakatva* as "belonging to all apprehensions, not excluding error,"[28] writes Mohanty, whereas Nyāya thinks it picks true apprehensions out from false ones. But all of this underlines what I am driving at, which is that "prāmāṇya" does not translate as "truth" (i.e., correspondence with reality), despite standard translation practice, but rather connotes a more pragmatic criterion of being capable of producing or helping to produce satisfaction in action.

So, *prāmāṇya* is not belief (at least as disposition), and for Indian philosophy in general it isn't truth (as correspondence with a fixed antecedent nature of an independently real object). But the justified true belief account of knowledge assumes that knowledge is just belief which corresponds to reality. For that reason, if "knowledge" suggests, as I think it tends to, justified true belief to English readers it should be eschewed as a translation of "pramā".

To put it another way, on the analysis which Gaṅgeśa offers of *prāmāṇya*, understood in the terms suggested by my analysis of relation R, a *pramā* may not correspond with the nature of things (it is "compatible with error", as Mohanty expresses it). Whether or not *prāmāṇya* is confined in its application to awarenesses which attribute to their content properties which an object corresponding to that content actually has is not a matter of the definition of "prāmāṇya" (as it *is* taken to be a matter of the definition of "truth" in Western contemporary thought), but constitutes rather further theory about *which* awarenesses satisfy the purposes motivating them. Naiyāyikas think that further theory which requires correspondence is the correct one; other systems, such as Buddhism and Advaita, do not.

Mohanty finds that the *svataḥ* and *parataḥ* theorists do not confront each other because they have different meanings of *prāmāṇya* in mind. The issue between the two views is presented in the literature to be as follows, according to Mohanty. The *svataḥ* theorist holds that whatever awareness first makes us aware of some awareness J_1 (whether that be J_1 itself, some inference, or a subsequent "aftercognition"), that awareness makes us aware that J_1 has *prāmāṇya*. The *parataḥ* theory denies this claim. Now Mohanty, interpreting "prāmāṇya" as "truth" and "jñāna" as "knowledge", argues that "the (*svataḥ*) theory becomes an analytic consequence of its conception of knowledge".[29] Since the *svataḥ* theory is therefore true (necessarily, though trivially, so) Mohanty reasonably enough concludes that the *paratah* denial of it can only be saved from absurdity if we suppose that the *paratah* theorists mean something else by "jñāna".

But, as we have seen, "jñāna" doesn't mean "knowledge" at all, but awareness. So one might conclude that Mohanty has been led astray by a mistranslation. However, it's not that simple. For even when we agree to translate "jñāna" as "awareness", while retaining "truth" for "prāmāṇya", the *svatah* theory still appears to be either trivial or else so absurd that we must conclude that we haven't understood it at all. For consider: the *svatah* theory is the theory that, for any awareness J_1, whatever awareness first makes us aware of J_1 makes us aware that J_1 is true. But if "truth" means correspondence with reality then either all awarenesses are true (and there can be no error at all) or else we aren't talking about becoming aware that J_1 *is* true, but merely about coming to *think* that J_1 is true. But that is absurd – if I entertain a false awareness J_1 and (then) come to an awareness of J_1, then on that reading of the *svatah* position I could not thereby think that J_1 is false; indeed, I could not at that time even doubt whether J_1 might be false. But we do have such doubts. So either the *svatah* theory is a trivial one (since all awarenesses are ipso facto true), or it is so absurd as to constitute its own refutation. Seeing this, one can understand why Mohanty finds an equivocation on "truth" to be the only way to explain how an issue of any consequence was imagined by anyone to have been raised.

Now I am arguing there is a nontrivialized and far from absurd issue which the *svatah/paratah* debate is about. What is that issue? I take it it is this. The *svatah* theorist holds that, whatever causes us to be aware of J_1 causes us to be aware that J_1 can satisfy its purpose, i.e., can lead to successful activity of the relevant sort. The *paratah* theorist denies this, holding that in order to become aware that J_1 can satisfy its purpose we need a further awareness, presumably inferential, which is over and beyond the awareness which causes us to be aware of J_1 itself. The point comes out most dramatically when we contrast the Miśra theory with the Naiyāyika's. On both theories we first have an awareness, J_1, which is not self-aware but for the awareness of which we require an "aftercognition" J_2. The Miśra theory holds that J_2 not only makes us aware of J_1 but also of J_1's *prāmāṇya*, i.e., J_1's capacity to evoke successful activity. The Nyāya theory denies that J_2 makes us aware of J_1's *prāmāṇya*. It holds that only an inference, e.g., one based on successful action or reasons to think that such activity would be successful, can attest to J_1's *prāmāṇya*.[30]

Notice that it doesn't matter to the *prāmāṇya* debate so posed whether J_1 is true or false, or thought to be true or false. Whether a theorist holds that all awarenesses are true, or all are false, or that some are and some not, the *prāmāṇya* issue remains a real one. Nor does it matter whether a theorist thinks that only true awarenesses can lead to successful activity or, alternatively, thinks that some awarenesses capable of leading to successful activity can be false. The issue concerns whether, when one becomes aware that J_1 is a potential purpose-satisfier, he does so through the same awareness by which he became aware of J_1's occurrence, or through some *other* awareness.

Gaṅgeśa's main argument against the *svataḥ* theorist is that if the *svataḥ* theory were correct it would make it impossible for one to doubt J_1's *prāmāṇya* immediately after J_1's occurrence. That is, since the *svataḥ* theory says that the awareness by which we first become aware that J_1 occurred always involves an awareness that J_1 can satisfy its purpose, has *prāmāṇya*, this blocks our doubting at that moment that it has *prāmāṇya* – but we *do* in fact sometimes doubt the worth of a J as soon as we become aware that it has occurred. Now Gaṅgeśa, no doubt, as a Naiyāyika believes that only true Js can satisfy their purposes, so *his* point can be stated as Mohanty renders it, in terms of 'truth" instead of satisfaction of purpose. But the argument is supposed to tell against an opponent who does not share Gaṅgeśa's belief on that score; the argument's force is a general one not dependent on any particular account of the circumstances that make J a *pramā*.

How then can we translated "prāmāṇya", given that "truth" is misleading as such a translation? We are by now reminded of the writings of the pragmatists, notably William James in his jousts with the notion of truth, which I suspect led him to a position closely resembling that of Indian epistemology. James conceived of truth as "what works", though he was sometimes (not always) cagy about what "working" amounted to and failed to appreciate the difference between his account of truth and the correspondence account with which his view was at odds. We might borrow his term and translate "prāmāṇya" as "workability". A workable awareness (*pramā*), then, is one that is related to its content by R, i.e., apprehends its content in a manner leading to the satisfaction of the purpose motivating it.[31] Then, the argument to this point might be summed up in the following way: all the parties in the *svataḥ/parataḥ* debate agree that the debate is about workable awarenesses.

It is irrelevant to this debate whether an awareness is held to be workable if and only if it is true. Some (the Nyāya) say so, others (Advaitins, Buddhists) deny it. The opposite of "workable" is not "false" but "not workable" (*apramā*), which term is intended to characterize all kinds of awarenesses which cannot lead to the satisfaction of a motivating purpose. The term *apramā* ranges, as we saw, over doubtings, errors and reductio ad absurdum arguments. When one is in doubt, he is not satisfying a purpose (doubting is not a purpose). Errors (i.e., perceptual errors, like the mirage) frustrate our purposes by misleading us. Finally, in a reductio argument the purpose is to prove one's own position (so we're told) but what the reductio (*tarka*) does is merely to convict the opponent of a fault, which does not (at least by itself) effect any proof (unlike a proper inference, where the conclusion does indeed prove just what was intended to be proved).

It is suggestive, furthermore, that proving what is already accepted (*siddhasādhanatā*) is counted as a fallacy (and so as *apramā*, nonworkable) even though what it says is true.

The standard Western reply to the kind of position that emerges from this analysis of Indian epistemology will surely echo the usual response to a reading of James on truth: that the pragmatist or "workability" conception conflates truth with what has value. Recent philosophical analysis has adopted, with a severity bordering on the obsessive, noncognitivism or nonnaturalism in value theory. What used to be known as the "fact-value gap" is nowadays such a chasm that it is hard to convince anyone that there is one. It should be no surprise that classical Indian thought takes the naturalistic position on values; after all. so did Western thought in classical times and until a couple of centuries ago. Justified true belief, as an analysis of knowledge, is understood strictly along noncognitivist lines. A belief, in the sense understood there, must be something capable of being evidenced, and the evidence must be empirical, perhaps mathematical, but clearly not ethically or aesthetically normative. (Of course, one can have justified true belief *about* what norms are in force; for that one can produce nonnormative evidence. What one can't have is a justified true belief that *x* should be done, thought, etc.) The "true" in "justified true belief" is descriptive truth, possibly fudged to encompass "descriptions" of mathematical or logical "facts" (though these are actually linguistic facts, if facts at all, and normative otherwise).

I cannot undertake at this point in this paper to investigate the sources of the noncognitivist obsession. But insofar as the motivation for maintaining it may be supposed to mutually support any attractiveness which the justified true belief account of knowledge might be supposed to have, I shall conclude with some observations which seem to me to suggest that all is not well with the JTB account (as I shall call it henceforward).

It is sometimes suggested that the JTB account is embedded in ordinary language (ordinary English, that is). "There is a certain absurdity", writes Mohanty,

> "in saying both 'I know that S is p' and 'S is p is false'. One cannot know and yet be in error with regard to what he knows. If something is known, it follows necessarily that it is true."[32]

But, as Austin has argued, that may be because of what it is to *say* "I know", involving conversational implicatures or performatives. We should not draw a conclusion about the nature of something from the circumstances involved in certain special kinds of locutions involving terms for it. And furthermore, Austin argues,

> "We are often right to say we *know* even in cases where we turn out subsequently to have been mistaken – and indeed we seem always, or practically always, liable to be mistaken."[33]

The JTB account is far more rigorous than the subtle possibilities of ordinary language can support.

Again, a growing number of contemporary philosophers have seriously questioned whether in ordinary usage knowledge entails belief, as the JTB theory entails it must. Zeno Vendler has argued that "I believe that p", far from being required by "I know that p", is incompatible with it, since in the relevant contexts to say that one believes is precisely to indicate that one *doesn't* know.[34]

These worries address the question of whether "knowledge" actually does in ordinary parlance answer to the JTB account. I suspect many contemporary analytic philosophers cling to the JTB account, unmoved by ordinary language reasons of the sort cited, and that their allegiance to JTB will withstand practically all evidence of the sort derived from usage. They would appear to believe that the question of the proper analysis of the meaning of a philosophical term is not to be decided, or at any rate not merely to be decided, on the basis of common usage. By what is it then to be decided? The question is an interesting one, since having passed over the evidence of usage one wonders what other evidence could be relevant, unless it were "evidence" of a normative nature to the effect that purposes of some sort are served better by say, the JTB account, than any other. Then the question what knowledge is becomes a normative one ("what *should* we mean by 'knowledge'?") and the result is that the JTB theorist cannot, on JTB assumptions, know that "knowledge" means JTB!

If we allow ourselves to ask "what should 'knowledge' mean?", admitting the question's normative character whatever that may imply, we raise the question of what purposes the JTB theory is supposed to help satisfy, and whether or not it does so successfully. I have darkly suggested once or twice that all is not well with the JTB account. The term "foundationism" has been proposed for those epistemologies which are committed to the tenet that empirical knowledge has, and must have, a "foundation",

> "the claim that certain empirical beliefs possess a degree of epistemic justification or warrant which does not depend, inferentially or otherwise, on the justification of other empirical beliefs, but is instead somehow immediate or intrinsic."[35]

If, as seems likely on the basis of recent discussion,[36] foundationist theories generically must fail, and if (for ultimately similar reasons) coherence theories also must prove unsatisfactory, what is left? James' own version of "the pragmatist theory of truth" is hardly satisfactory either, for James reads out the theory in detail as a foundationist view couched in even more mysterious terms than current analytic accounts.

The general problem that foundationist theories face is that of answering the challenge laid down, e.g., by C. I. Lewis when he points out that "if anything is to be probable, something must be certain."[37] Basic beliefs fail as epistemic warrants taken singly for the simple reason that *any* belief by itself requires justification if it is to have any claim to providing a warrant for other beliefs. But pure sense-reports, though possibly incorrigible, are so only if they are construed in such a way as to provide no warrant for anything. "I seem to see green", by itself, provides no evidence that what I see *is* green, nor would one hundred people saying "I seem to see green" do so either, unless we are already supposed to be in possession of some knowledge making it likely that in this case or cases seeming to see green, or saying "I seem to see green", makes "it is green" more probable. But what could be the basis for *that* knowledge? Lewis suggests it might be a "pragmatic *a priori*" born of common human concerns and encoded in meanings, "criteria in mind", with which we face and make sense of the battery of sense-stimuli. While it seems to me Lewis was looking in the right direction when he looks to common human concerns, his own efforts to explore value theory (in *The Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*) suffer because he is unable to find a way of formulating those human concerns in a way which keeps in touch with actual valuings and still retains the *a priori* character which they must have in order for his account to work. Whatever the merits of Lewis' attempts, and it seems to me they have a good deal of merit, they have not found fashion among epistemologists in recent years.

What is the trend nowadays? Once one has decided to abandon empiricism with a foundationist or coherence base, one direction to go is with Nelson Goodman to a kind of high-level relativism. Since "truth . . . pertains solely to what is said",[38] and what is said determines versions or worlds but not The World, Goodman's conclusion is that worlds are made as much as found, and that there may not be any such thing as The World – or if there is, The World turns out to be self-inconsistent when any attempt to characterize it is made. In either case, his conclusion seems to be that if there is such a thing as The World, Reality, we are unable to speak of it.

Goodman's remarkable review of the current epistemological situation contains the following passage, which is pertinent to the state to which the discussion of this paper has brought us. He writes:

> "The thesis that true statements are those that enable us to predict or manage or defeat nature has no little appeal; but some conspicuous discrepancies between utility and truth have to be explained away. That utility unlike truth is a matter of degree can perhaps be dealt with by taking utility as measuring nearness to truth rather than as a critarion of truth itself. That utility unlike truth is relative to purpose might seem less serious when truth is recognized, as in the preceding pages, to be relative rather than absolute. But relativity to purpose does not align in any obvious way with relativity to world or version; for among alternative true versions or statements, some may be highly useful for many purposes, others for almost none and indeed much less useful than some falsehoods . . ."[39]

The suggestion in this paper is that Indian thought adopts a utility reading of "truth" and thus what "knowledge" consists in features this very relativity to purpose. What, then, distinguishes the resulting view from skepticism or a relativism with the "discrepancies" that Goodman points to?

Goodman's discussion, like Mohanty's, operates under the presupposition that "knowledge" is true belief and that "truth" has a fixed antecedent sense which allows us, e.g., to ask with Goodman whether truth need serve any purposes. That last question, notice, makes sense only if we suppose that "truth" means something to us other than "serving some purpose". But if, as I have just attempted to suggest, truth in Indian philosophy *is* the serving of purposes Goodman's discrepancies cannot be expressed there.

There is a hidden reason why Goodman's relativism will, as the jacket to *Ways of Worldmaking* suggests, "incur the wrath of the rationalist, the enmity of the empiricist, and the malice of the modalist, as well as the antipathy of the absolutist". That hidden reason is that in the Western versions of all four of those views – rationalism, empiricism, modalism and absolutism – there is a shared admission, which is that any hierarchy of values is even more questionable than the realistic hypothesis of a single reality, The World. To trade in faith in the given, or consistency, or relativity, or an absolute synthesis of theses and antitheses in favor of a fixed hierarchy of values is beyond the bounds of reason for modern Western philosophy. Why? Because all these lines of thinking tacitly agree on what I have called "noncognitivism" in value-theory. And it is an unavoidable consequence of noncognitivism in value-theory that no fixed relations of supremacy or subordination between values can be demonstrated, for the simple reason that according to noncognitivism no conclusions about values can be demonstrated at all.

But the situation in Indian philosophy is entirely different. Though disagreements among views about whether there is One World, many worlds or no worlds abound there, what is agreed on among all the systems is that the supreme human purpose is liberation, and that there is a fixed, though context-sensitive, value system which coheres with that highest purpose. There is little or no disagreement among Jains, Buddhists and the various Hindu philosophical *darśanas* about values. What is a virtue for one is so for another. The evaluation of stages of progress toward liberation, it is agreed by all, involves overcoming ignorance and attachment. No doubt different philosophers develop their special terminology and emphases, but, as Western students puzzled over what is at issue between, say, the path-philosophies of Advaita, Buddhism and Yoga well know, the agreements far outweigh the differences as long as we confine ourselves to the evaluation of activities designed to lead to ultimate value. Where differences in value theory appear to arise it is customary for the Indians themselves to explain that this appearance only reflects the context-dependent differences in advice which a sensitive guru will give to pupils at different stages along the way.

By contrast, in Western contemporary thought not only is there lack of agreement as to ultimate purpose and the subsidiary goals leading to it, there is even general admission that we can't even address the question rationally, it being a matter of taste and "de gustibus non est disputandum". This is a radical divergence between the contemporary Western situation in philosophy and classical Indian thought; for that matter, there is the same divergence between modern and classical Western philosophy. The JTB account of knowledge is perhaps doomed as a futile attempt to provide a foundation in the absence of normative convictions which would constitute the proper, but now abandoned, core meaning of "knowing". Modern epistemology, getting the wrong message from Plato, perhaps, hoped that that core normativeness could be found in the necessities of formal (mathematical, logical) "truth", that is in consistency or coherence. We are now discovering that that is a forlorn hope, that inquiry is adrift without a recognition at least of the worth of what the inquiry is *for*.

The lost, core meaning of "I know" relates to my awareness that my actions are proceeding satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily toward an intended outcome. "I know what I am trying to do", "I know what I want" are expressions which provide examples of this core meaning. Notice that *what* I know, in these locutions, is an action or volition. As soon as we try to *describe* what it is that I want or am trying to do, doubts may set in. "Are you really trying to do *that*?" is a fair question, suggestion one may not be clear about what his purposes are or ought to be. Knowing that *p* is likewise subject to doubt in the same way, and so no knowledge – *that* can possibly provide the certainty which will ground probability and answer Lewis' challenge. My knowing *what* I am trying to do, on the other hand, is like knowing some thing "by acquaintance" – I have a certainty about what I want which is unlike my certainty that 2 + 2 = 4 but is akin to the alleged certainty about sense-data postulated by phenomenalists. The difference between sense-datum reports and reports of wants and actions is that, whereas sense-datum reports, though perhaps indubitable, cannot ultimately provide the certainty to ground empirical claims, since they are themselves not claims, reports about what one intends or wants are both claims (*pace* the noncognitivist) and indubitable. One might grant this and still find such value-reports irrelevant to the problem of justifying what are allegedly value-free claims of scientific knowledge. This is noncognitivism resurfacing at a deeper level. I cannot here hope to set the noncognitivist challenge to rest, nor is it the purpose of this paper to do so. What this paper is arguing is that Indian philosophy, not being wedded to a noncognitivist approach, thinks it can talk of knowledge (or rather, of *pramā*), but in a sense of "knowledge" different from the current notions predicated on noncognitivism.

The incommensurability thesis is incorrect, then, as an interpretation of Indian theories of knowledge, because there is agreement there about ultimate values, so that construing "prāmāṇya" as workableness does not produce a stultifying relativism or skepticism. To the extent that such agreement is absent from Western philosophical thinking, to turn the coin over, it is to that extent inevitable that there can be no meeting of minds between East and West. One lesson to be learned is that, in analyzing the views of other cultures one must be careful not to import theses held by one's own culture but not by theirs. A deeper message is this: that there may be no middle ground between commitment to absolute values on the one hand and epistemological skepticism on the other. Mathematics does not provide that middle ground. Can holistic conceptions, unguided by fixed normative concerns arising from human purposes to be served hope to justify knowledge claims?

Contemporary Western thought is going through a phase of practicality; there is a call for relevance. Relevance to what? Surely, to concerns viewed as so widespread and pressing as to far outweigh the doubts of the epistemological skeptic. These concerns, and the widespread recognition of them, suggest that there is more thoughtful agreement on a hierarchy of values than the noncognitive assumptions of positivist value theory can make sense of. If so, and if the ultimate concerns of human beings do indeed, when carefully studied and compared, transcend the apparent idiosyncracies of cultures, then the incommensurability of thinking between East and West may turn out to be a goblin of our own making, the shortcoming of a phase in Western thought which, whatever its positive contribution has been, is proving too rigorous for our good in its conceptions of knowledge, truth, and what makes life worth living, or dying, or ultimately leaving for good.

University of Washington

NOTES

* The three papers that follow, by Karl H. Potter, Jiterdranath Mohanty, and Kisor Kumar Chakraborty, were presented in a panel at the meetings of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy in San Francisco, March 1983.

[1] Jitendranath Mohanty, *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth* (Visvabharati, Santiniketan: Centre of Advance Study in Philosophy, 1966), hereafter GTT.

[2] GTT, p. 78.

[3] GTT, p. 76.

[4] GTT, p. 78.

[5] GTT, p. 75.

[6] GTT, p. 79.

[7] Karl H. Potter, 'Toward a Conceptual Scheme for Indian Epistemologies', in J. N. Mohanty and S. P. Banerjee (ed.), *Self, Knowledge and Freedom, Essays for Kalidas Bhattacharyya* (Calcutta: World Press, 1978), pp. 17–30.

[8] GTT, p. 79.

[9] GTT, p. 21.

[10] GTT, p. 27.

[11] GTT, p. 28.

[12] GTT, p. 27.

[13] Sometimes "jñāna" is used to mean "(pure) consciousness". This is a different use of the term from the one studied here.

[14] Mohanty (GTT, p. 25) argues that a "jñāna is not an activity, but a product" (citing Jayanta Bhaṭṭa) "to call it an activity would, firstly, amount to an unusual extension of the ordinary notion of act, involving the notion of movement (*spandana*); but secondly, it is not admitted by the definitions underlying the Nyāya ontology". But when I call a *jñāna* an act I do not mean that it is a motion, nor I suppose do (e.g.) all those Indian philosophers who classify acts (*karman, kriyā*) into three kinds of which one is "mental act" think that the mind moves. And while Jayanta is correct that a *jñāna* is not a member of the third Vaiśeṣika category (of *kriyā*) and is a result (*phala*), I don't see that this makes calling a *jñāna* an act an unusual extension of the English term "act" or "activity", since surely we do speak of, say, calculation as a kind of mental activity.

[15] GTT, p. 77.

[16] My translation of the passage appearing on p. 111 of GTT: "Tathāpi tadvati tatprakārakajñānatvaṃ tadvati tadvaiśiṣṭyajñānatvaṃ vā prāmāṇyam".

[17] Continuation of the preceding passage: "tanniścayād eva niṣkampavyavahārāt lāghavāt". Ibid.

[18] "Avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānaṃ saṃyagjñānam. Loke ca pūrvam upadarśitam artham prāpayan saṃvādaka ucyate. . . . Pradarśite cārthe pravārtakatvameva prāpakatvam. Nānyāt. Tathā hi na jñānaṃ janayadartham prāpayati. Api tvarthe puruṣaṃ pravārtayat prāpayatyartham. Pravārtakatvamapi pravṛttiviṣayapradarśakatvameva." *The Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara Āchārya to which is added the Nyāyabindu* (ed. P. Peterson) (Re-issue, Calcutta 1929), p. 3. My translation.

[19] E.g., Digṇāga and Dharmakīrti use this term in defining perception. See ibid., p. 103, third sentence of the text.

[20] GTT, p. 6.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] GTT, pp. 8–11, where the specific opinions of several individual Bhāṭṭa writers are discriminated.

[23] GTT, p. 12.

[24] GTT, p. 14, note 34.

[25] Mohanty renders the expression "arthaparicchedasāmarthya" differently than I do, taking "artha" as meaning "object" here and elsewhere.

[26] GTT, p. 42 et passim.

[27] GTT, p. 15.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] GTT, p. 76.

[30] In the Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa versions of the *svataḥ* theory we do not become aware of the *prāmāṇya* of J_1 through an aftercognition, but rather, in the case of Prābhākara, J_1 itself vouchsafes its own *prāmāṇya*, and for the Bhāṭṭa, we draw an inference from the knownness (*jñātatā*) which characterizes the content as a result of our cognizing it.

[31] I choose "workable" rather than, say, "working" for reasons familiar both from James' writings and from Dharmakīrti's recognition that so as not to exclude nonspeakers from cognition conceptual construction must be defined in terms of "capability of coalescing with a verbal designation" (*abhilāpasaṃsārgayogyapratibhāsāpratītiḥ kalpanā* . . .), Peterson edition of Dharmakīrti, op. cit., p. 103, fourth sentence of text, and Th. Stcherbatsky's translation of it in *Buddhist* Logic, Vol. II (Dover: New York, 1962), p. 19.

[32] GTT, p. 21.

[33] J. L. Austin, "Other minds" in *Philosophical Papers* (2d edition: Oxford University Press; Oxford, 1970), p. 98.

[34] Zeno Vendler, *Res Cogitans* (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N.Y., 1972).

[35] See Laurence Bonjour, "Can empirical knowledge have a foundation?", American Philosophical Quarterly 15, 1978, 1–13.

[36] See, e.g., Bonjour's paper, ibid.

[37] C. I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (Open Court: Lasalle, Ill, 1946), p. 186.

[38] Cf. Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Hackett: Indianapolis, 1978), p. 18.

[39] Bidi., p. 123.

J. N. MOHANTY

PRĀMĀṆYA AND WORKABILITY – RESPONSE TO POTTER

Professor Potter's very thoughtful paper – the sort of constructive commentary that is needed to make oriental thought alive for us – undertakes to do three things all at once. First, he attacks the incommensurability thesis I advanced in GTT.[1] In doing so, he traces my defense of that thesis to my ascription of the so-called JTB theory of knowledge to the Indian philosophers. So much for the negative part of his paper. Happily, the rest is a bold positive construction. The second thing he does is to show a way out of the impasse created by the incommensurability thesis by suggesting a new interpretation of the concepts of '*pramā*' and '*prāmāṇya*' in Indian philosophy in general, not in any one system or other. Finally, he ascribes the faulted JTB theory to a more fundamental error, an absolute distinction between fact and value, which is then traced to a still deeper mistake, a non-cognitivist theory of value, to which much of western thought is committed but from which the main tradition of Indian thought is free. This general philosophical thesis lends philosophical support to the interpretation of prāmāṇya as 'workability' (rathen than as 'truth'); this latter interpretation – to traverse the path regressively – destroys the JTB-theoretical assumptions on which my interpretation of the *svataḥ-parataḥ* controversy allegedly rests. My commentary shall touch on these issues in the order in which they have just been outlined.

THE INCOMMENSURABILITY THESIS

I find myself in the curious position of being expected to defend what I wrote just about twenty years ago. The incommensurability thesis was very much in the air – not in writings on Indian philosophy, but in philosophy in general amongst linguistically oriented philosophers. The J.T.B. theory of knowledge had not yet been cast into suspicion by the notorious Gettier paradoxes, nor had anti-foundationalism gained that wide acceptance as it has today. But to say this is not to shirk responsibility. The fact is that GTT did defend an incommensurability thesis. Whether it also accepted the JTB

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 329–338. 0022–1791/84/0124–0329 $01.00.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

theory is not at all clear. I will come back to this a little later. For the present, let me stay with the incommensurability thesis.

Potter's main complaint against this thesis is that it trivialises a long and rich tradition of epistemological discussion in Indian philosophy, in which thinkers of the rank of Vācaspati and Udayana, Kumārila and Prabhākara and Dharmakīrti participated. This is indeed a very persuasive, if not logically binding, argument. I respect it. Let us see what thesis I defended in GTT, and what are its consequences.

I wrote: ". . . it is very much plausible that the views of the rival schools are not really mutually incompatible as they at first sight certainly appear to be. They may even be regarded in the long run as supplementing each other. The apparent incompatibility between these views then may *partly* be due to the fact that though it would seem they were giving different answers to the same question, they were *not always* unanimous in their formulation of the problems, so that *they were really* answering very different questions." (GTT, pp. 1–2).

The words 'partly' and 'not always' which I have italicised for this commentary would show that I did not want to maintain that the dispute had no real, substantive, issues at all. In fact, as I will presently argue, even when they were answering different questions while purporting to be concerned with the same problem, the differences in the *specific* questions they answered are traceable to underlying, substantive, differences in their views about common problems. If at one level, the dispute is trivialised (as in my thesis), at another level substantive issues emerge as decisive. You cannot have it both ways.

Consider the following strategies which seem to render the *svataḥ* theory analytically true: (1) defining *prāmāṇya* as *jñānatva*, so that error and other forms of *a-pramā* are not even species of *jñāna*. This answers, by implication, the Naiyāyika argument that if *prāmāṇya* were *svataḥ* (by origin) then the generating conditions of knowledge, being also the generating conditions of *a-pramā* (since *a-pramā* is a species of *jñāna*), *a-pramā* would be *pramā*. However, although in this way victory is won, the Advaitin who proposes the strategy, falls back on the thesis that error is not *jñāna*, for a *jñāna* is opposed to *ajñāna*, while error is not, also because a *jñāna* reveals its object as having had unknown existence prior to being known while error does not. Now all this puts the Advaitin under obligation, unless he has already done so, to defend the implied theory of error, which itself cannot then be definitely defended. (ii) The Prābhākara strategy is to preserve the same identification of *prāmāṇya* and *jñānatva*, not by excluding all *a-pramā* from the scope of '*jñāna*', but by including them all in a manner which does not render *a-pramā* a species of *jñāna* (which is what Nyāya does) but rather in a manner whose consequence is that there is, in reality, no *a-pramā*. We know the familiar Prābhākara theory of *a-khyāti*, which now needs to be defended.

Thus a philosopher who chooses to defend his theory on definitional grounds – unless he is a conventionalist, and no Indian philosopher was one – has to defend a substantive thesis on substantival grounds at some other point. The so-called 'incommensurability thesis' therefore does not render the Indian discussion of epistemology pointless, the thesis shows how, within a system, they hang together. The defect of the exposition in GTT was that it did *not* bring out this trade off which a philosopher makes when he so formulates his terms as to make his position analytically true. If the question, then, which he was asking was different, and the victory was won too easily, that is because at another level, a more substantive and serious encounter with the opponent either had already been or was about to be made. The issue "Is *prāmāṇya svataḥ* or *parataḥ*?" may be sought to be decided by appropriately defining '*prāmāṇya*', but then the question 'Is *prāmāṇya* this or that?' has to be dealt with substantively.

THE J.T.B. THEORY

But the above way of making incommensurability only a surface phenomenon of deeper incompatibilities, would have the consequence of making the *svataḥ* and the *parataḥ* theories to be in the long run incompatibles. But didn't I write in the GTT, as Potter quotes me, "both the theories are in their own ways correct"? And didn't I do that by saying that the *svataḥ* theory understands by '*prāmāṇya*' a predicate of knowledge (when that word is used in standard English sense) and the *parataḥ* theory understands by it a predicate of beliefs (again in the standard English sense of 'belief')? Yes, I did in fact suggest such a 'reconciliation', and, again, the GTT did not make the following point explicit, although it was implicitly being made all along: namely, that

(a) If '*prāmāṇya*' is defined as *jñānatva* (i.e. if it is reasonable to exclude *a-pramā* from the extension of '*jñāna*'), then the *svataḥ* theory holds good; and

(b) if '*prāmāṇya*' is defined as the property of only a species of *jñāna*, then of *jñāna* so understood (i.e. understood as having two species, *pramā* and *a-pramā*). the *parataḥ* theory holds good.

One may have both (a) and (b), but one may decide – not on sweet will, but on good grounds – to regard the antecedents of anyone of them to be acceptable and so be committed to accepting the appropriate consequent. But one may still not want to deny that *if* the other antecedent were true, its consequent would follow.

Didn't the GTT uphold the JTB analysis of knowledge? It certainly did give that impression. Strangely enough, I could not have held both that *all* Indian philosophers held a JTB analysis and that the Vedanta-Mimāmsā concept of *prāmāṇya* concerned knowledge and not belief. Let me then first get down to what I said on pages 20–21 of GTT. I referred to the account of knowledge in terms of truth plus right to be sure *only* with a view to show how the Vedantin's definition of *pramātva* in terms of *jñānatva* and vice versa can be explained in terms of that account. Then on page 77, where I sum up my assessment of the two parties to the *svataḥ-parataḥ* controversy, I maintain that the *svataḥ* theory takes 'knowledge' in a strong sense according to which to know is to know the truth, adding that this is not a mere liguistic stipulation. As contrasted with this, the *parataḥ* theory uses 'knowledge' in a weak sense, as a generic concept which comprehends two species: true and false cognitions. Then I add: "The belief – in spite of all the philosophical difficulties associated with it – perhaps better expresses this generic knowledge in the weak sense." On the next page, I go on to write: "As predicated of beliefs, the predicate 'true' has a significant opposite i.e., 'false' inasmuch as there are true beliefs and false beliefs. But as predicated of knowledge, the predicate 'true' has no significant opposite inasmuch as 'false' is not a predicate of knowledge in the same way as 'true' is." (p. 78).

Now if this *gave the impression* that I subscribed to a JTB theory, or that I ascribed such a theory to the Indian epistemologists, I plead guilty. Potter is quite right in his claim that such a theory cannot give an analysis of '*pramā*'. But what are the reasons he gives in support of this claim? Although at first sight he appears to be holding that the JTB theory cannot give an analysis of *pramā*, in fact his claim is much stronger than that: he insists that the JTB theory *is not acceptable at all*, even as an analysis of 'knowledge' in the western tradition (or in the English langauge.) I will briefly remark on these two claims.

The first claim is that *pramā* cannot be explicated as justified true belief. In this I concur. It is well pointed out by Potter that the word 'belief' has no equivalent in the Sanskrit epistemological literature. Even if we leave out belief as a disposition, belief as an occurrent comes close to that variety of *jñāna* which is a *niścaya*, a certainty. What is wrong, then, in taking a *niścayajñāna* as an occurrent belief? Even an occurrent belief is either a feeling or an attitude which is attached to a proposition, it is a belief that, the proposition being external to the attitude. In the Indian epistemologies, a *pramā* is a *niścaya* but not tagged onto a proposition, but has itself a propositional structure, (so that doubts 'about the same' would have a different structure). But this by itself may not be a very important point. A theory of belief is possible in which belief-that-p is one unanalysed structure. Let us not put too much weight on whether *niścayajñāna* is or is not the same as belief. Supposing it were, can we say that *pramā* is justified true *niścayajñāna*?

Pramā, of course, is true *niścayajñāna* – howsoever one may want to explicate 'true'. It is *yathārthajñāna*. What then is the need for 'justified'? It is well known that in the western discussions on the nature of knowledge, 'justified' was inserted in order to exclude cases of someone guessing or accidentally asserting a proposition that *happens* to be true. Now within the Indian epistemologies, these and such counter-examples do not arise, for the *pramā* is not only a *niścayajñāna* but must have been *caused by* any of the acceptable *pramāṇas*. *Pramā* is *jñāna* that is a *niscaya*, that is not a memory, that is 'true' to its object, and that is brought about by any of the recognised *pramāṇas*. Since the last conjunct was assumed, one need not add "justified". The concept of 'justification', as it occurs in "justified true knowledge" has been explicated in various ways, but one explication of it, namely, the one in terms of causation, perhaps most fits in with the Indian epistemologies. The *pramāṇas* are causes of *pramā*. To be justified means to be brought about by a *pramāṇa*. Whether the resulting theory of knowledge is a JTB theory or not, makes little difference.

Why is a JTB theory, in any form, not acceptable to Potter? Not because of the Gettier sort of paradoxes. Not because it is almost impossible, within the framework of the western epistemologies, to come up with a good account of "justified", or also of "belief". He gives, as far as I can see, several general arguments: first, the JTB is committed to a correspondence theory of truth.

Secondly, a JTB theory, if Potter is right, is committed to a non-cognitivist theory of value, according to which the only sorts of evidence appropriate for the truth of a belief are “empirical, perhaps mathematical” ones, but not ethically or aesthetically normative ones. The “true” in “justified true belief” is descriptive truth. Thus the JTB theory presupposes an absolute fact-value distinction. Third, the JTB analysis entails that knowledge and belief are compatibles, whereas much of our *ordinary usage* of ‘knowing” and ‘believing’ implies that they are incompatible (curiously enough, Potter introduces this argument from Vendler immediately after taking me to task for drawing conclusions about things from facts about linguistic usage.) Fourth, JTB theories presuppose a foundationalist epistemology which has recently fallen into bad repute.

Brief comments on each of these four arguments may be in order. I do not think JTB analysis is committed to any particular theory of truth. In fact, as I understand it, it is neutral as against the competing theories. It analyses ‘knowledge’; but in the *analysiens*, the term ‘true’ occurs as unanalysed. Hence when Potter insists that “it is not at all clear that a *pramā* must be true in the sense that the justified true belief account of knowledge wants it to be”, I am left wondering as to what is that sense. If that is the case, the second argument, namely, that JTB theory presupposes a noncognitivist theory of value is also besides the point, for even ‘true’ in the sense of the pragmatist, as far as I can see, can be taken up into the analysiens. The third argument I concede. The fourth does not impress me a great deal, for foundationalism in general does not bother me a great deal. And the Nyāya itself presents a variety of correspondence theory which is not foundationalistic, as I have argued elsewhere.[2]

PRĀMĀṆYA AS WORKABILITY

Potter's positive thesis, and the most provocative of his thoughts in the paper, is that *prāmāṇya* should be rendered not as truth but as *workability*. Potter makes several claims on behalf of this thesis: (a) that it is a correct exegesis of ‘*yāthārthya*’ in context; (b) that it is a thesis that would be acceptable in common to all schools of Indian philosophy: (c) that it is theory-neutral; and (d) that it helps us avoid the incommensurability thesis (which on its part threatened to render much of Indian epistemology trivial): I will comment on each of these in that order.

(a) The Sanskrit word *'artha'* of course has many meanings. The *Śabda-kalpa-druma* lists the following: *viṣayaḥ*, *yāchñā, dhanam, kāraṇam, śabda-pratipādya, nivṛtti* and *prayojanam*. The three philosophically relevant are: object, meaning of word, and purpose. The question whether, and to what extent these three extensionally coincide was certainly in the minds of generations of Indian thinkers. If *artha* in the sense of object was etymologised as "*arthyate anena*," i.e., as what satisfies (or frustrates) a purpose, a source of anxiety was the case of such objects as gave rise neither to a positive nor to a negative response, in other words, of objects towards which one was simply indifferent. In the epistemological literature, *artha* as *viṣaya* is also defined as that which "floats" in apprehension (*bhāsate*), or as that which is "manifested" in apprehension ("*paricchidyate*"). If Potter wants to bring all such meanings under one common meaning, that is not totally unwarranted, if we are simply concerned with the key word "*artha*". Thus his interpretation is, to say the least, a *plausible* one. Let him consider this key sentence from Vātsyāyana's opening statement: "*pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyāt arthavat pramāṇam*." Are these two occurrences of *'artha'* in the same sense? or is the first = object, the second = purpose? or both = object? Whether it is also viable depends upon how sound are his other claims.

(b) Is "*prāmāṇya* = workability" acceptable to all the systems of Indian philosophy? or, at least, to the main participants in the *svataḥ-parataḥ* controversy? The best support, and I presume the original suggestion for Potters' idea, is to be found in the Buddhist writings. Since the Buddhist was committed to the thesis that none of the conventional *pramāṇas* yield ontological truth, he could make room for conventional truth claims only in terms of pragmatic workability. It is in this sense that Dharmottara's statement in the *Nyāyabinduṭikā* has to be understood: "*Jñānam api pradarśitam artham prāpayat samvādakam ucyate*." Here *'artha'* may be quite plausibly construed as purpose or goal. But the same notion of *samvāda* is understood by Pārthasārathi in Nyāyaratnamālā as "*tadviṣayam jñānātaram*", which amounts to saying that *samvāda* is cognitive coherence rather than pragmatic satisfaction. Gaṅgeśa, in his chapter on the definition of *pramā*, explains *'samvāda'* as *jñānāntareṇa tathā ullikhyamānatvam* (= "being mentioned similarly in another knowledge"). Gaṅgeśa in fact proceeds to assert that *pramā* cannot be defined in terms of successful practice on the ground that such a definition would not apply to cases of true knowledge where due to some reason or other no practical response follows. These latter are the so-called cases of *upekṣā pramā*. It hardly needs to be labored that many major authors did in fact regard *pramā* as 'true' (in the sense of correspondence). Consider *Vidyāraṇya* in *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha*: "*jñānasya arthaparichheda-sāmarthyam*", where '*artha*' cannot be "goal", if '*pariccheda*' = "*manifestation*". If *Vivaraṇa's* definition were read, favoring Potter's suggestion, as "picking out the purpose", we would want to know: does a cognition show, pick out what its goal is, or does it "pick out" the goal in the sense of "satisfying it"? Only in the latter case, would *prāmāṇya* = workability; only in the former case, could *prāmāṇya* be *svataḥ*, as *Vivaraṇa* must be able to hold.

What about Gaṅgeśa's "*tadvati tatprakārakatvam*"? Potter would want to understand by "*tadvati*," I presume: "in the object which satisfies the purpose which motivates the awareness under consideration." But the "*tat*" in "*tadvati*" and the "*tat*" in "*tatprakārakam*" have to be the same. If the latter means a property such as "being a silver", the former must also mean the same property. "*Tadvān*" can then mean "that which possesses that property."

The fact that Madhusūdana takes "*tadvati tatprakārakatva*" as belonging to all apprehensions, not excluding error while Gaṅgeśa takes it as picking only true ones from the false ones, is to be explained – as Madhusûdana himself does in *Advaitaratnarakṣaṇam* – by the fact that for him *tadvati tatprakārakam* = *tadvadviśeṣyakatve sati tatprakārakam*, where 'viśeṣyatā' is a purely epistemological notion, so that even in a false cognition, its object, the qualificandum, is known as possessing *tat*. The Nyāya understanding of the same definition makes it equivalent to *tadvadviśeṣyakatvāvacchinnatatprakāraka*, which rules out that purely epistemological requirement.

(c) Now the philosophical value of Potter's thesis extends far beyond its viability as an exegesis of Sanskrit texts. He is rightly responding to a philosophical situation posed by the incommensurability thesis. In order to set aside that thesis with all its undesired consequences we have to start by assuming that all the different philosophers concerned with *prāmāṇya* were trying to explicate, or philosophically reconstruct, some one pre-philosophical notion. Let us call *that* notion *prāmāṇya*. This notion, so goes Potter's story, is that of workability. *Prāmāṇya* as workability is the pre-philosophical *explicandum*; the various definitions in the various systems are various explications of this notion, they cannot therefore replace it. By this, Potter is able to preserve the univocity of "*prāmāṇya*" and free the concept of any ontological committment i.e. render it "neutral" as between realism and idealism.

This indeed, if right, is no small achievement, especially when Potter is not introducing into Indian philosophical discourse any concept that is clearly foreign to it. On the contrary, almost every Indian philosopher – according to the standard interpretations – looks upon "successful practice" as a mark or criterion of "*prāmāṇya*", only the Buddhist is regarded as taking it as the nature of "*prāmāṇya*." It is therefore right that extensionally the class of awarenesses leading to successful response and the class of awareness that are, on the standard interpretation, "true" appear to coincide. Whether they coincide in intension is the issue.

First of all, I wish to place on record that I have full sympathy with Potter's project. In other words, I share his general philosophical hunch that there must be some *pre-philosophical* and *theory-neutral* concept which the different systems define, explicate, reconstruct, or what have you, depending upon what they happen to regard as the nature of theoretical enterprise in philosophy. [Consider, e.g., the concept of moral goodness of which hedonism, utilitarianism, Kantian rationalism provide some definitions. What is that pre-philosophical, theory-neutral concept which they seek to define?] If anything deserves to be called "phenomenological", then identifying such a conept must be phenomenological. In this sense, Potters' project is phenomenological.

What is disconcerting about Potter's thesis is that one of the theories of truth is assigned a special access to that pre-philosophical, theory-neutral concept. This is the pragmatic theory. The concept of workability, successful practice, however down-to-earth it may appear to be, when generalised over the entire domain of cognitive enterprise, betrays a *theoretical* committment of *the same sort* as the other rival concepts, such as correspondence or coherence. It involves a metaphysical theory of the primacy of will, and an anthropological theory of man as a willing, projecting being. Which is all fine, but which cannot claim that theory-neutral status which is being accorded to it.

Let me propose, drawing upon certain resources of contemporary phenomenology, the conceptual structure "intention-fulfillment-frustration" to do that job, where 'intention' is detached from the concept of goal or purpose ('fulfillment' and 'frustration' likewise from their ties with the practical responsive situation) and signifies a general structure of all conscious life, cognitive or non-cognitive. Within the limits of this paper I do not propose to debate and defend this suggestion, but would like Professor Potter to take this possibility, as a general philosophical position.

(d) Does '*prāmāṇya* = workability' help us avoid the incommensurability thesis?

If the thesis is right, i.e., if there was a common univocal sense of *prāmāṇya*, then of course the issues such as '*svataḥ-parataḥ*' in so far as they were concerned with this univocal sense, would gain in substance. But this would equally be the case if we are right in ascribing *any* such common univocal sense to all the participants.

But does 'workability' in fact succeed in helping us out? I give here only one problem for Potter:

On his account, according to the *svatah* theory to know an awareness is to know it as a *potential* purpose-satisfier, whereas on the *parataḥ* theory, an awareness can be called a purpose-satisfier only after actual satisfaction. So at a new point, i.e., with regard to the problem of *prāmāṇyagraha*, we have an incommensurability. They do not mean the same by 'apprehension of *prāmāṇya*'. In fact, the standard Nyāya inference: *idam jñānam pramā saphalapravṛttijanakatvāt* renders on his thesis to: *idam jñānam saphalapravṛttijanakam saphalapravṛttijanakatvāt* – another, example of analytical triviality.

I will presently desist from reflecting upon Professor Potters' large conceptual framework for comparing Indian and Western philosophies and shall console myself by recalling Udayana's remark on a similar occassion, "kim ādrakavaṇijo vahitracintayā?"

Dept. of Philosophy
The University of Oklahoma

NOTES

[1] J. N. Mohanty, *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth*, (GTT) Santiniketan, 1966.

[2] cp. J. N. Mohanty, "Indian Theories of Truth: Thoughts on Their Common Framework," *Philosophy East and West*, 30, 1980, pp. 439–451.

KISOR KUMAR CHAKRABARTI

SOME REMARKS ON INDIAN THEORIES OF TRUTH

Whether truth (*prāmāṇya*) is *svataḥ* or *parataḥ* is one of the perennial problems of Indian philosophy. The controversy has raged unabated from pre-Christian times down to the present with hundreds of philosophers belonging to different schools developing and subscribing to a bewildering variety of view points on the subject. It is both an honour and a privilege to have this opportunity to say a few words on this age old controversy alongside two highly eminent panelists.

Professor Karl H. Potter has pointed out that it is possible to find a common explicandum to which all major parties in the *svataḥ-parataḥ* controversy could address themselves. This common explicandum is the notion of satisfaction of need or workability. The notion of satisfaction of need may be derived from the concept of *yāthārthya* by taking the word *artha* to mean need or purpose. There can be no doubt that this sense of *yāthārthya* has crept into the discussion of truth-related issues by all parties. This is one notion where philosophers of such diverse pursuits as a Buddhist idealist and a realist Naiyāyika have taken a common stand. Thus we find that both Uddyotakara and Dharmottara have explained the meaning of *artha* in virtually the same language, viz., *arthyate iti artha*. Vātsyāyana, though an uncompromising realist, still held that *artha* means *sukha* (pleasure), *sukhahetu* (source of pleasure), *duḥkha* (suffering) and *duḥkhahetu* (source of suffering). Another meaning of *yāthārthya*, viz., as is the object or correspondence, cannot provide a common explicandum for both the Buddhist and the Naiyāyika, for some Buddhists hold that there is no external reality to which knowledge could correspond. However, that truth satisfies our need is accepted by the Naiyāyika as well. He too, holds that *tattvajñāna* is a means to the realisation of the supreme end of life, viz., liberation. Similarly, all major schools of Indian philosophy have allowed *tattvajñāna* to play some role in the attainment of liberation. Though Indian philosophers do regard philosophy as the pursuit of ultimate truths, they have never held a very high opinion, it may be asserted at the risk of misunderstanding, of what Aristotle has eulogised as 'knowledge for the sake of knowledge'.

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 339–355. 0022–1791/84/0124–0339 $01.70.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

In spite of the above one must not lose sight of the fact that the second sense of *yāthārthya*, viz., correspondence, though not acceptable to some Buddhists, has played a pervasive role in the study of truth related issues. In another place Professor Potter has argued with great skill and persuasion that "the correspondence assumption should not be imposed on the meanings of the *pramāṇa*-terminology".[1] But it has to be remembered that apart from some Buddhists, the major participants in the *svataḥ-parataḥ* controversy are all realists. In the later stages of development in particular, when the Buddhist philosophy was already in a state of decline, the main contenders are on the one hand the Naiyāyikas upholding the *parataḥ* thesis and on the other hand the different schools of Mīmāṃsā upholding the *svataḥ* thesis. At this stage the major participants moved within the framework of a realistic terminology.

Both of the above senses of *yāthārthya*, however, continued to play an important role. The Naiyāyikas held on to the view that successful activity is a ground (*hetu*) for inferring that the awareness producing it is true in the sense of depicting an object as it actually is: thus *yāthārthya* in the first sense almost turns out to be a ground for *yāthārthya* in the second sense. But this cannot be interpreted to mean, as Professor Potter would like to have it, that an awareness leads to successful activity because it corrseponds to reality, so that *prāmāṇya* for all the parties could mean the capacity of an awareness to lead to successful activity. This amounts to chaining all the Indian theories down to a narrow pragmatism which is clearly out of place. So far as the Naiyāyikas are concerned, successful activity is only a ground for inferring truth; in other words they maintain that successful activity can be caused *only* by a true awareness, not that every true awareness leads, or might lead, to successful activity. First, there is the case of *upekṣā-jñāna* – an awareness which produces indifference and does not lead to any activity. Second, there are truths which are *adṛṣṭārthaka* (non-empirical) where the test of successful activity cannot be applied. For both of such cases as well as the cases of familiar (*abhyāsadaśāpanna*) awareness the test of turth that is recommended is *tajjātīyatva.*[2]

The fact that the Naiyayikas have recommended a different test of truth in some cases is significant and should be a warning to an overly pragmatic reading of their theory. It is clear that successful activity is not the only test of truth. Just as an awareness which leads to successful activity is true, so also an awareness which is *tajjātīya* is true.

What then is *tajjātīyatva*? It is a complex notion and cannot be explained in a short space. I shall only mention one thing which has been said by Raghunātha in this connection. An awareness is *tajjātīya* if it has something possessing the pervaded (*vyāpya*) as the qualificandum (*viśesya*) and the pervader (*vyāpaka*) as the qualifier (*prakāra*).[3] For example, (since it is true that whatever has smell is made of earth), smell is pervaded by the property of 'being made of earth'. Under the circumstances truth of the awareness that 'this which has smell, is made of earth' may be inferred on the ground of *tajjātīyatva*. Here 'this having smell' is the qualificandum and 'being made of earth', the qualifier. Since something having the pervaded, viz., smell, is the qualificandum and the pervader is the qualifier, and since something possessing the pervaded cannot fail to possess the pervader, the awareness is true. Again (since nothing which possesses hands and feet is a tree), possession of hand and feet is pervaded by 'not being a tree'. Hence the awareness 'this which has hands and feet, is not a tree' may be ascertained to be true on the same ground. It must of course be known in every such case that the characteristic possessed by the qualificandum is pervaded by the qualifier: the mere fact of pervasion is not enough. Hence this criterion is applicable only in familiar cases and not in unfamiliar cases. If, however, it is known that the characteristic possessed by the qualificandum is pervaded by the qualifier, then according to Raghunātha, "the truth is ascertained by the mind alone".[4] No appeal to successful activity arises in such a case. The Naiyāyika's conception of truth, then, is much broader than what can be accomodated within the pragmatic notion of workability.

Regarding the translation of *jñāna* I think that the translation of *jñāna* as 'awareness' is certainly an improvement on the translation as 'knowledge'. However, I would like to add that the notion of knowledge in the sense of justified true belief is not entirely out of place in the context of Indian theories of truth. Although in actual practice *jñāna* is often said to be true, strictly speaking, truth (*prāmāṇya*) is not predicated of *jñāna*, but of a species of *jñāna*, viz., *niścaya* (certainty). This is clear from the fact that truth is never predicated of another species of *jñāna*, viz., *saṁśaya* (doubt). A *niścaya* carries a sense of conviction; in this respect it is similar to a belief. But for the Naiyayika a *niścaya*, like some other qualities of the soul, endures only for two moments. It is not a dispositional state like a belief in the Western sense. But then, the Naiyāyika too accepts disposition (*saṁskāra*) as a quality (*guṇa*) of the soul and emphasises the need of producing a firm disposition (*dṛḍa-saṃskāra*) through constant meditation as a means to liberation. Further some other schools such as the Sāṃkhya, do not conceive of *niścaya* as a fleeting occurrent as the Naiyāyika does. According to the Sāṃkhya, an awareness, eventually passes into a latent state and remains so until it is revived again in a patent form. A dispositional analysis of knowledge fits into such a scheme without too many problems.

Now a *niścaya* may be *yathārtha* or *ayathārtha*; truth may be predicated of it only if it is *yathārtha*. For the Naiyāyika a *niścaya* is *yathārtha* if and only if it corresponds to what there is. Further that it is *yathārtha* has to be ascertained through evidence. While care should be taken not to gloss over the differences that there are, all this is reasonably close to the notion of knowledge as justified true belief. I shall deliberately pass over the issue of novelty (*anadhigatatva*) as also that of *guṇajanyatva* in this connection.

I fully agree with Professor Potter's remark that the contributions of Professor Jitendranath Mohanty to the study of Indian theories of truth are truly outstanding and ground breaking. While I have learnt a great deal from his works, I would like to mention a few points which require further clarification.

Professor Mohanty has pointed out that the Indian question about the originating causes of truth is difficult to grasp unless one places oneself in the peculiarly ontological-causal attitude prevailing in most Indian schools. He holds further that the *svataḥ* theorist should have said that truth has no origin at all or that the very question about the origin of truth is nonsensical.[5] I find the latter hard to understand, for given the 'peculiarly ontological-causal attitude' an enquiry into the conditions of truth is inevitable. As long as it is held that truth is a characteristic (*dharma*) which belongs to some cases of awareness and does not belong to other cases of awareness, one is bound to answer the question as to what are the determining conditions under which an awareness comes to acquire this characteristic. Indeed, for the *svataḥ* theorist the enquiry may simply boil down to an enquiry into the defective conditions the absence of which would ensure that there is truth.

Moreover, an enquiry into the originating causes of truth or falsity seems to have deeper philosophical roots. Western thinkers too who do not presumably subscribe to such 'peculiarly ontological-causal attitude', have been interested in the physical, biological and psychological conditions responsible for variability of sense data and perceptual error. Western logicians have studied the fallacies that vitiate an inferential process corresponding to the

Indian enquiry into the defects of an inferential mark. Further a causal account of knowing has been advanced by some contemporary epistimologists, such as Alvin Goldman. While I do not wish to suggest that the differences between the Indian and the Western approaches are merely terminological, one can certainly discern a community of purpose behind them. It would be an interesting philosophical exercise to sift the central from the perepheral issues in this regard.

Professor Mohanty has remarked elsewhere that something like a proposition is not admitted by the Indian philosopher.[6] While there is an element of truth in this, the situation is truly complex, for the Indian philosopher has been completely at home in some of the issues which have led some Western philosophers to admit propositions. Thus the Indian philosopher commonly distinguishes between a sentence and its meaning: the former is the *bodhaka* (that which makes understood) and the latter is the *bodhya* (that which is to be understood). It is admitted that sentences belonging to different languages could have the same meaning (*artha*), as also that sentences containing synonymous expressions within the same language could have the same meaning. Some have held that sentences belonging to different languages but having the same meaning, are not different sentences. Truth (*prāmāṇya, yāthārthya*) or falsity is usually attributed to either *niścaya* (certainty), a kind of awareness, or to a sentence. Indian philosophers with a few exceptions have stayed away from meanings as subsistent entities – a view sometimes popular in Western thought. But it is held that what is apprehended through a sentence is not something simple, but something qualified (*viśiṣṭa*). Indian philosophers have debated the question as to whether the qualified is an additional ontic real over and above its simpler constituents. Whatever may be the verdict on that, it is held by many that the qualified which is apprehended through a true sentence or awareness is existent (*prasiddha*), while the qualified that is apprehended through a false sentence or awareness is non-existent (*aprasiddha*). This has some resemblance to the view of some Western philosophers that corresponding to a true proposition/statement/judgement/sentence, there is a fact (some indeed have held that true propositions *are* facts), while there is no fact corresponding to a false proposition etc. Again in Navya-Nyaya there is the important concept of content-ness (*viṣayatā*). It is commonly held that a *bādha-niścaya* (a certainty about the negation of something) possesses the *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka-viṣayatā* (literally: the content-ness which is the limitor of opposed-ness) of what is negated. It is also commonly held that a corresponding doubt (*saṁśaya*) too, though having a more complex content, nevertheless possesses the *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka-visayatā* as a part of its content. In other words the content-ness which is the limitor of opposed-ness of what is negated is possessed by both a certainty regarding the negation and the corresponding doubt. Thus the Indian philosopher has employed various concepts such as meaning, the qualified, content-ness etc. which fulfil purposes similar to those sought to be fulfilled by propositions.

Professor Mohanty also says. "... the entire distinction between analytic truth and synthetic truth, ... does not appear in the Indian philosophies".[7] Once again I would like to add that though no Indian philosopher, to my knowledge, has spoken of the analytic synthetic distinction in exactly the same way some Western philosophers have done, somewhat similar notions are found in Indian Philosophy. The view of Raghunātha referred to earlier, viz., "Sometimes, when there is an awareness to the effect that the qualificandum possesses something pervaded by the qualifier, truth can be ascertained by the mind (*manas*) alone.", is a case in point. What Raghunātha says about awareness may be extended to sentences as well. His point is that the truth of the sentence/awareness 'this which has smoke, has fire' cannot be ascertained by the mind alone. But the truth of the sentence/awareness 'this, which has smoke pervaded by fire, has fire' can be ascertained by the mind alone. No appeal to any external circumstances is needed in such cases. By saying that the truth of such an awareness can be ascertained by the mind alone, Raghunātha has drawn our attention to a special feature of the awareness. This special feature lies, in the language of Nyāya, in the content-ness (*viṣayatā*). The content-ness is such that falsity is ruled out; that this is so can be determined by reflection on the content-ness: this is why the truth can be ascertained by the mind alone. Similarly, the falsity of the awareness 'what lacks fire, has fire' (which is a specimen of *āhārya-jñāna*) can be ascertained by reflection on the content-ness alone. The notion of 'truth/falsity by virtue of content-ness' is an Indian analogue of the Western concept of analyticity. Needless to say, careful and patient research is needed for a thorough comparative study of the two approaches.

Professor Mohanty has added that according to Indian logicians, "The logical laws are also the laws in accordance with which men must think ... it is psychologically impossible to violate a logical law".[8] This, it seems to me, amounts to reading too much of psychology into Indian logic. True, the

Indian logicians do hold that logical laws are the laws in accordance with which men must think, but only in a normative sense. It cannot be construed as a psychological claim about how all men – past, present and further – actually think. That this is so is clearly proved by the acceptance of *āhārya-jñāna*; it is commonly admitted that such an awareness may take place even if the person concerned is aware of the sense of the relevant terms provided the person has the requisite desire. Thus the 'rationality assumption' can be attributed to Indian logic only in a normative sense, but not as a psychological thesis.

In the rest of this paper I shall explain an aspect of the Nyaya theory of truth, mainly developed by Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana, to which not much attention has been paid in recent discussions of Indian theories of truth.

Before proceeding any further it is useful to state what exactly is meant by the Naiyāyika when he holds that truth (*prāmāṇya*) is *parataḥ* (ascertained through the other). First of all, the thesis obviously has a negative implication: it amounts to a rejection of the thesis that truth is *svataḥ* (ascertained through itself). The latter thesis, however, has several forms which should be distinguished. There is first the view of the Prābhākaras that the truth of an awareness is apprehended through the awareness itself. Then there is the view of Miśra that the truth of an awareness is apprehended through the introspection of which the awareness has become the object. Finally, there is the view of Kumārila that the truth of an awareness is apprehended through the same inference through which the awareness is apprehended. Thus the *svataḥ* theory has two main varieties: either it is held that the truth of an awareness is apprehended through the self-same awareness, or it is held that the truth is apprehended through the awareness of which the original awareness becomes an object.

In holding that truth is *parataḥ*, the Naiyāyika rejects all of these views. What, however, is the *para* (the other) through which truth is ascertained? This 'other' factor may take a variety of forms. First the truth of an awareness may be apprehended through another awareness of the same object. This is known as *sajātīyasāṁvāda*, i.e., congruence through what is of the same kind. This may happen in various ways. A perception may be confirmed by another perception of the same object whether through the same sense organ or through a differenct sense organ. To quote Udayana: "Another perceptual awareness itself of fire after the perception of fire. That again is of two kinds: it may be originated through the same sense organ, or it may be through a different sense organ."[9] Similarly, an inference may be confirmed by another inference whether through the same probans or through a different probans, e.g., an inference of fire from smoke may be confirmed by another inference of fire from smoke or by another inference of fire from light. To quote Udayana again: "Similarly in the case of inference; an inference followed by another inference from the same probans or from a different probans."[10] The same is found to be true, as Udayana has pointed out, in the case of cognition through *sábda* (authoritative statement). When something has been cognised through an authoritative statement, the same thing may be cognised through another statement of the same authority or through another statement of a different authority. These are all cases of 'congruence through what is of the same kind', because what has become the object of the original awareness is confirmed through one or more cognitions of the same thing from the same source or a different source; the congruent awareness is said to be *sajātīya* (of the same kind) in the sense that its object is the same as that of the original awareness.

In the first kind of cases, therefore, the other (*para*) factor bestowing confirmation on the original awareness is another awareness of the object of the original awareness. Though the object of the confirmatory awareness is the same as that of the original awareness, the former is described as 'other', because it is neither the same as the original awareness, nor the awareness of that awareness. Hence the difference from the position of the *svataḥ* theory is not obliterated, for from the point of view of the latter the truth of an awareness is apprehended either through the original awareness itself or through the awareness of that awareness.

There is a second kind of cases where the 'other' factor is an awareness of something quite different from the object of the original awareness. This is known as *vijātīyaśamvāda* or congruence through what is of a different kind. Thus the awareness of fire may be followed by the the awareness of something else which, though not an effect of the former, is still pervaded (*vyāpya*) by the former.[11] This too will confirm the truth of the original awareness. In other words an awareness of the presence of what is pervaded confirms the truth of the awareness of the presence of the pervader (*vyāpaka*). The congruent awareness is described as *vijātīya* (of a different kind) in the sense that its object is different from the object of the original awareness.

Thus according to the *parataḥ* theorist, truth of a previous awareness is confirmed by *sajātīya-saṁvāda* or *vijātīya-saṁvāda*, i.e., by a subsequent congruent awareness which has either the same object as that of the previous awareness or has something else as the object which is either an effect of or otherwise invariably connected with the object of the previous awareness.

It may be objected that since the previous awareness is not an object of the subsequent congruent awareness, the truth of the former cannot be apprehended through the latter: can a characteristic (*dharma*) be apprehended without apprehending the characterised (*dharmin*)?

But it may be said in reply that although the subsequent awareness does not have the previous awareness as its object, the former is still an awareness of the same thing as that of the latter or of something else which is inseparably connected. Hence Udayana says that it is ascertained through the subsequent awareness 'that the object is actually so' (*arthatathātva*) and thus it is determined that the previous awareness is true.

A more serious objection is that the *paratah̤* theory leads to a vicious infinite regress. For how can the truth of the subsequent congruent awareness be confirmed? Granted the premises of the *paratah̤* theory it can be confirmed, not through itself, but only through another awareness and so on *adinfinitum*. To avoid the infinite regress it may be said either that the truth of the confirmatory awareness does not need confirmation or it may be said that the truth of the confirmatory awareness is *svatah̤* But then, the objection is, as Vacaspati has put it, "How can all these, the truth of which has not been determined, come to the rescue of the initiating awareness? On the other hand if the truth of it (confirmatory awareness) is regarded as *svatah̤*, what is wrong with the initiating awareness, so that it too should not be regarded so?"[12]

To meet this objection the Naiyāyikas from Vātsyāyana onwards have resorted to the argument that the truth of the initiating awareness may be inferred from the fact that it has produced successful activity. This is the famous 'inferential proof of truth' (*prāmāṇyānumiti*) which runs as follows: the initial awareness is *arthavat* (true to the nature of things) because it has produced successful action; if it were not *arthavat*, it would not have produced successful action, such as is the case for a false awareness.[13] The argument has been put in the *vyatirekin* form in order to avoid the charge of begging the question. If the argument were put in the *anvayin* form, the requisite general premise would be: whatever produces successful action is true. The truth of this premise would be questioned by the sceptic who is not willing to concede that any awareness is true. Such a sceptic would object that there is no undisputed corroborative example (*dṛṣṭānta*) which could be adduced in support of this generalisation. But even such a sceptic could not deny that there are clear instances which show that a false awareness has produced unsuccessful action. On the strength of such undisputed corroborative examples and in the absence of any undisputed counter-example it is permissible to generalise that whatever (awareness) is not true does not produce successful action. Then it may be inferred, in accordance with the rules of inference of the *vyatireki* form, that a certain awareness is true, because it has produced successful action.

The two propositions 'whatever produces successful action is true' and 'whatever is not true does not produce successful action' are, of course, logically equivalent. One may wonder if there is any real purchase in allowing the latter to be used as a premise in preference to the former. But it should be pointed out that Naiyayikas like Vācaspati were well aware of the logical relationship between these two propositions. Still Vacaspati chose to interpret the 'inferential proof of truth', first explicitly stated by Vātsyāyana, as a *vyatirekī* argument for the methodological consideration stated above. To explain further: a sceptic who holds that no awareness is true, cannot afford to deny consistently with his own position that there are particular cases of cognitions which are not true and which also do not produce successful action. Such cases are also acceptable to the Naiyāyika. Hence there are corroborative examples, undisputed by both the Naiyāyika and the sceptic, for the generalisation in the *vyatirekin* form. But there are no undisputed counter-examples. A counter-example would be an awareness which is not true and produces successful action. Even if the sceptic manages to find some such examples, the Naiyāyika can afford to insist consistently with his position that in such cases the awareness is either true or has not produced successful action. Thus the possibility of there being any 'undisputed' counter-example is ruled out. Under the circumstances the above generalisation is permissible in accordance with the rules of generalisation.

The nerve of the above argument is that a true awareness produces successful action and a false awareness does not. It is not, however, the view of the Naiyāyika that every true awareness producess successful action or that every false awareness produces unsuccessful action. What the Naiyāyika does hold is that successful action can be produced *only* by a true awareness. In other words 'being the producer of a successful action' is a reliable mark from which the truth of the awareness may be inferred. Thus it appears that the

Nyāya advocated a pragmatic test of truth. The distinction between the nature of truth and the test of truth has nowhere been, to my knowledge, explicitly drawn by the Nyāya philosophers. But the distinction is clearly implied in their discussions. When for example Udayana says that "Truth (*prāmāṇya*) indeed is inferred from being the producer of successful effort",[14] such a distinction is inevitably implied.

What then is the nature of truth which is inferred from such a mark? Vācaspati initially says that by truth is meant "non-deviation from the thing" (*arthāvyabhicāritā*). Every awareness is an awareness of something. When what is known about the thing does not deviate from what the thing is, the awareness is true. In the words of Vācaspati: "Non-deviation from the thing means . . . lack of disagreement between the nature of the thing and the mode of presentation."[15] Thus it appears that the Nyāya subscribes to a correspondence theory regarding the nature of truth. A sharper analysis of the notion of correspondence was later given by Gaṅgeśa as it has been so admirably explained by Prof. Mohanty.

Why does the Naiyāyika hold that successful effort can be produced *only* by true awareness? Is it not possible that a false awareness too may sometimes produce successful effort? For example, a thirsty man looking for water may happen to find water in a place where he thought there was no water. Should we not say that his effort is successful although his awareness is false? To understand the point it has to be explained in what sense an effort is said to be successful (*saphala*). It should be remembered first of all that the Naiyāyika in this context is speaking only about conscious purposive action for acquiring or getting rid of something. Such an action, according to the Naiyāyika, can be 'produced only by the awareness of the desired thing' (*iṣṭajñānajanya*) or by the awareness of the undesired thing (*aniṣṭajñānajanya*). For example what the Naiyāyika has in mind is such an effort as that of acquiring what is in front, or of getting rid of the thing in front. Such effort takes place only if there is the awareness that the thing in front has some desirable feature or that it has some harmful feature. Thus the thing in front may be perceived as silver. The Naiyāyika describes the situation as that there is a perception of 'this' as having silver-ness which is a desirable feature. According to the language of Nyāya, in this perceptual awareness 'this' is the qualificandum (*viśeṣya*) and silver-ness, the qualifier (*prakāra*), i.e., 'this' is known as qualified by silver-ness. The awareness that the thing in front is something desirable, viz., silver, leads to the desire and effort to acquire it.

The Naiyāyika describes the effort too, as an effort having the 'this' as the qualificandum and silver-ness as the qualifier i.e., it is an effort for 'this' as qualified by silver-ness. Thus an awareness having silver-ness as the qualifier leads to an effort having the same qualifier. Such an effort is said to be successful only if it terminates in the acquisition of silver, i.e., a thing actually possessing silver-ness. The effort is not successful otherwise, i.e., if it terminates in the acquisition of something else, however desirable that thing may be. In other words the acquisitive effort is successful only when there is acquisition of a thing possessing that characteristic which is the qualifier of the effort. The effort in its turn has been caused by an awareness having the same qualifier. Hence the Naiyāyika claims that the success of the effort proves that the initial awareness is true.

The Naiyāyika has resorted to such inference of truth to justify the truth of an awareness in dispute. But what about the truth of the inference itself? Since the said inference is itself an awareness and since the truth of an awareness is *parataḥ*, is not the door of infinite regress opened once again?

Vācaspati has sought to avoid the charge of infinite regress by holding that the truth of the above kind of inference is *savataḥ*. He says quite explicitly that truths arising from perception and authoritative statement cannot be regarded as *svataḥ*, because that such an awareness does not deviate from the fact cannot be determined from the awareness itself. But an exception has to be made for the above kind of inference as well as any other inference arising from "a probans which is non-deviant and where all apprehension of deviation has been set aside."[16] Vacaspati is not making the absurd claim that the truth of all inferences is *svataḥ*. An inference may of course be erroneous and the veracity of a given inference may be questioned. In particular an inference contains a general proposition to the effect that the probans is pervaded by the probandum. It is very common to have apprehension about whether the probans is actually pervaded by the probandum. Suitable steps will have to be taken to allay such apprehension if and where possible. But once "such apprehension has been set aside" and the inference proceeds from a probans which is known not to deviate from the probandum, the truth of the inference becomes *svataḥ*, i.e., needs no further confirmation. Since "the probans cannot be without the probandum", i.e., since the pervaded cannot belong to something without the pervader, too, belonging to it, the inference that the probandum belongs to that thing is "accounted for as unwavering through itself", i.e., without additional verification.[17]

Udayana holds, and says that this is the view of Vācaspati as well, that such *svataḥ* status has to be conferred also on those cases of *upamiti* where the truth of the instructional sentence (*atideśavākya*) and the awareness of similarity are certainly true.

Udayana also agrees with Vācaspati that while the *svataḥ* status can be conferred on truths of inference and truths of *upamiti*, it cannot be so conferred on truths of perception and truths derived from authority.

Another kind of awareness the truth of which is *svataḥ*, says Udayana while attributing the view to Vācaspati also, is the introspection of an awareness (*anuvyavasāya*). Udayana does not hold that the truth of all internal perceptions is *svataḥ*. He says explicitly that their truth like that of external perceptions, is *arataḥ*. But he holds that an exception should be made for introspection. "No body has the introspection that 'I have an awareness' without having any awareness. Nor should it ever happen that there will be the awareness that 'I know silver' when there is the awareness of shell."[18] The awareness of silver may very well be false, for I may have mistaken a shell for silver. But the introspection that I have an awareness of silver is infallible. When such an awareness arises, says Udayana, "there is always cancellation of the nature being otherwise". Thus an awareness of pain is not infallible, but the (introspective) awareness of awareness of pain is infallible.

Yet another kind of awareness the truth of which is held by Udayana to be *svataḥ* is perception of only the characterised (*dharmin*). The truth of such perceptions, whether external or internal, is *svataḥ*, because, says Udayana, even an error must be an error about something. All determinate perceptions (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*) have the twin contents of the characterised, also called the qualificandum (viśeṣya), and the character (*dharma*), also called the qualifier (*prakāra*). In all such cases something, viz., the characterised, is perceived as qualified by some character. For example, in the perception 'this is silver' what is in front is perceived *as* silver, i.e., as qualified by silver-ness. The perception may be erroneous, but that something has been perceived as silver is beyond doubt. The very fact that the perception has taken place is a sufficient guarantee that something exists to which the perceived quality, viz., silver-ness, has been attributed. In other words perception is restricted to only what exists. Something past or future may be an object of inference or another kind of knowledge, but not of perception. The room for error in a perception is restricted to the extent that the existent thing which has become the object of perception may be perceived as having some character which does not belong to it. Hence the perception of the characterised *as* having some character may be erroneous, but the perception of the characterised cannot be erroneous. Its truth is *svataḥ* and needs no additional verification.

Thus it is clear that in Udayana's view the truth of perceptions in general is not *svataḥ*, and not ascertained through themselves, but is *parataḥ* and requires additional evidence. But he has made an exception for two kinds of perceptions, viz., introspection and perception of the characterised. Somewhat similar views have been held by some contemporary philosophers. According to Chisholm, it cannot be said that what we know by means of perception, e.g., I see that Mr. Smith is here, is something that is directly evident. Still such propositions as 'I know that I see a man standing before me' can be said to be absolutely certain and are directly evident.[19] In spite of important differences between the stand-points of Chisholm and Udayana, the latter would have agreed with the former on the point that what is generally known through perceptions is not directly evident. Further since Udayana regards introspections as infallible, he would accept such an awareness as that 'I know that I see' as certain and directly evident. Again it has been held by some sense data philosophers of this century that such a perception as that of a tomato may be false, but that there is a red and round sense datum in such a case is indubitable. Some of them have held also that in such a case that 'I seem to see something' is indubitable. Udayana's view can not be assimilated to that of a sense data philosopher. Still he would agree with them on their claim regarding 'seeming'. He also holds that the perception of the characterised cannot be erroneous. This does not amount to the acceptance of sense data. But it does imply that there is always a 'given' in perception and the apprehension of the given is infallible. Udayana, however, holds that the given in perception is without fail an ontic real and this is where he would part company with most sense data philosophers.

It is clear from the above discussion that according to the view of Udayana as set out in the *Tātparya-Pariśuddhi* there are four kinds of awareness the truth of which is *svataḥ*, viz., (1) inferences arising from cognitions which are already known to be certainly true, (2) *upamiti* arising from cognitions which are already known to be certainly true, (3) introspection and (4) perception of the characterised. The distinctive feature of all of these cases is that none of those 'can be subject to the apprehension of faisity' (*aprāmāṇya-āśaṁkā-anāspada*). For example, taken by itself, as already explained, the truth of the inference that the probandum belongs to the subject may very well be questioned. But it can no longer be questioned when it is already known that the probans belongs to the subject and that the probans is pervaded by the probandum; for the inference follows of necessity from them. A similar kind of necessity is found in the case of *upamiti*; indeed, many Indian philosophers including even a few Naiyāyikas, have regarded *upamiti* as a kind of inference. The possibility of error is ruled out, albeit for different reasons as above explained, in the two remaining cases as well. The possibility of error cannot be ruled out *ab initio* in the case of other kinds of awareness. Hence their truth is *parataḥ* and must be ascertained, not through themselves, but through other factors.

The basic reason, it seems, why Udayana regards the truth of certain kinds of awareness as *svataḥ*, is that there can be no apprehension of error in those cases. This is quite different from the sense in which the *svataḥ* theorists themselves hold the truth of an awareness to be *svataḥ*. Further this sense of *svataḥ* is not incompatible with the truth of such kinds of awareness being also *parataḥ*. In fact Udayana says explicitly that even in the *svataḥ* cases the truth may be ascertained *parataḥ* through various considerations. Indeed Udayana holds that in such cases also the truth can only be ascertained *parataḥ* with reference to a recalcitrant person. According to Udayana then, there is no awareness the truth of which cannot be ascertained *parataḥ*; thus Udayana remains a true advocate of the *parataḥ* theory. He holds nevertheless, without involving any inconsistency, that the truth of certain kinds of awareness is *svataḥ* because the possibility of error is ruled out in those cases. Earlier we have made a reference to Chisholm's view regarding the directly evident. According to Chisholm, when something, say *a* is *F*, is directly evident, the only possible answer regarding what justifies me in thinking I know that *a* is *F* is simply the fact that a is F.[20] It appears that Udayana does not hold any such view regarding the truths which he regards as *svataḥ*. As he himself has said, when he regards certain truths as *svataḥ*, he does not mean to rule out that their truth may be *parataḥ*, but does mean to rule out that no truth can ever be *svataḥ*. His view is that there are certain truths which require no additional justification. Still additional justification may, and will have to be, supplied in those cases if and when demanded. He realises that his view gives the sceptic the opportunity to demand justification for anything and everything that may be thrown at him and that this will reopen the door of an infinite regress. So he concludes that an infinite regress is inevitable "if it is held that truth will necessarily have to be demonstrated."[21] But apparently he is not unduly perturbed by it for, in the first place, he does not think that leading to an infinite regress is necessarily the downfall of a philosophical theory and secondly, he himself has no reservation in holding that certain truths are *svataḥ*. He seems to suggest that there will be no infinite regress, for it is not true that truth will have to be demonstrated in every case.[22]

Philosophy Department,
Calcutta Univeristy

NOTES

[1] Karl H. Potter, this volume of J.I.Ph.

[2] J. N. Mohanty, *Gangesa's Throty of Truth*, (Visva-Bharati, 1966), p. 53.

[3] *Tajjātīyam vyāpyavati vyāpakajñānam: Dīdhiti* on Udayana's *Atmatattvaviveka*, ed. by Dvivedi and Dravida, Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1939, p. 705.

[4] *Kvacic ca prakāravyāpyavadviśesyatvena upasthite jñāne manasaiva prāmāṇyam paricchidyate: ibid*, p. 700.

[5] J. N. Mohanty, *op cit*, p. 79.

[6] J. N. Mohanty, 'Indian Theories of Truth: Thoughts on Their Common Framework', *Philosophy East and West* 30, Oct. 1980, p. 441.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 441.

[8] *Ibid*, p. 441.

[9] *Prātyakṣike ca vahnijñāne prātyakṣikam eva vahnijñānāntaram iti yāvat. Tac ca dvividham, samānendriyajam indriyāntarajam ca; Tātparyapariśuddhi* of Udayana in *Nyāyadarśanam* ed. by A. Thakur, Vol. 1, Mithila Institute Series No. 20, 1967, p. 80

[10] *Evam anumānepi anumanajñānāntaram talliṅgajam liṅgāntarajam ca: Ibid*, p. 80.

[11] *Ibid*, p. 80.

[12] *Ibid*, p. 24.

[13] *Ibid*, p. 24.

[14] *Prāmāṇyam hi samarthapṛavṛttijanakatvānumeyam*: Udayana *Ibid*, p. 82.

[15] *Iyam eva ca arthāvyabhicāritā pramāṇasya yat . . . avisaṁvādah arthasvarūpaprakārayoh: Ibid*, p. 24.

[16] *Anumānasya tu pravṛttisāmarthyaliṅgajanmanah anyasya vā nirastasamastavyabhicāraśamkasya svataḥ eva prāmāṇyam anumeyāvyabhicāriliṅgasamutthatvāt: Ibid*, p. 29.

[17] *Na hi liṅgākāraṁ jñānam liṅgam vinā, na ca liṅgaṁ liṅginam vineti svata eva gṛhītāvyabhicāraliṅgasamuttham niśkampam upapadyate jñānam: Ibid*, p. 29.

[18] *Na hi ajānannapi kaścit jānāmīti anuvyavasyati. Na ca śuktikākāre jñāne rajatam jānāmīti syād: Ibid*, p. 99.

[19] R. M. Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, 2nd. ed., Prentice-Hall of India, 1977, p. 21.

[20] *Ibid*, p. 26.

[21] *Phaladvārikā tu syād api, yadi prāmāṇyam avaśyaniśceyam abhyupeyate*, Udayana, *Ātmatattvaviveka, op cit*, p. 697.

[22] I have touched upon only a few salient features of Udayana's theory of truth. There are many other important points which I have been obliged to leave out. But then it would have taken a whole book to discuss Udayana's theory thoroughtly.

TOM J. F. TILLEMANS

TWO TIBETAN TEXTS ON THE "NEITHER ONE NOR MANY" ARGUMENT FOR *ŚŪNYATĀ*

INTRODUCTION

The present article is my third in a series on the Buddhist argument that entities are void (*stoṅ pa; śūnya*) of own-nature (*raṅ bźin; svabhāva*) because they are neither individuals (i.e. "ones") nor many different things.[1] The reason (*gtan tshigs; hetu*; or equivalently, *rtags; liṅga*) on which this argument depends, that is to say, "being neither one nor many", or more literally, "being free from one(ness) and many(ness)", comes to be known in Indian and Tibetan literature as the "neither one nor many reason" (*gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs; ekānekaviyogahetu*).

Now undeniably the basic theme of this style of argumentation was used in its broad outlines by diverse branches of Buddhist philosophy, and for a variety of purposes: Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti, and Prajñākaragupta, to take a few of the many possible examples, used it to show the impossibility of such notions as universals and partless atoms; Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti used it to analyse the relationship between the self (*bdag; ātman*) and the aggregates (*phuṅ po; skandha*) and, in general, to reduce to absurdity the part-whole relationship.[2] But, although Mādhyamika and non-Mādhyamika alike used this argument in one form or another,[3] it finds an especially sophisticated development in the Mādhyamika-Svātantrika philosopher, Śāntarakṣita, who employed it as the central idea around which he structured his influential text, the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*.

In Tibet, a considerable indigenous literature grew up around Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*. Some works, such as the *dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bśad* of the rÑiṅ ma pa scholar, Mi pham rgya mtsho (1846–1912), and the *dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byaṅ* of rGyal tshab rje (1364–1432), commented directly on Śāntarakṣita's text,but others, in particular the dGe lugs pa monastic textbooks (*yig cha*), combined Śāntarakṣita's exposition of the "neither one nor many" argument with their commentary on the homage (*mchod brjod*) of Maitreyanātha's *Abhisamayālaṃkāra.*[4] As an Indian precedent for situating the "neither one nor many" argument in the context of the

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 357–388. 0022–1791/84/0124–0357 $03.20.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

Abhisamayālaṃkāra's homage, these textbooks would cite certain passages from Haribhardra's commentary, *Sphuṭārthā*.[5]

In my first two articles, I compared certain aspects in the Indian and Tibetan treatments of the argument, and I introduced the important themes present in the texts translated below. I had originally thought to include, in the second article, a translation of these Tibetan texts, which together give a representative sample of the dGe lugs pa discussion of the argument. But this proved to be impossible, and a third article was thus necessary.

Of the texts in question, the first, a chapter from Se ra rje btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's (1469–1546) commentary on the first chapter of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, serves to explain the basic line of argumentation. The second, an except from Tsoṅ kha pa's (1357–1419) *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, deals with the logical fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhahetu* ("a reason whose locus is not established"; *gźi ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs*), a technical problem often associated with the "neither one nor many" argument. The difficulty arises as soon as one seeks to use the argument to prove that pseudo-entities such as the Self (*ātman*), the Primordial Nature (*prakṛti*), *Īśvara*, etc. – in short, the various speculative fictions of the non-Buddhist schools – are in fact non-existent. How is one to avoid that all successful non-existence proofs become self-refuting, if one agrees that the loci, or subjects (*chos can; dharmin*) of valid proofs must in some sense exist? It is a question which has elicited much discussion from Western scholars, and perhaps Tsoṅ kha pa's text will be useful here as it concisely presents certain important ideas of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, as well as Kamalaśīla's basic approach to the problem in his work, the *Madhyamakāloka*.[6]

Finally, a word on the editions which I have used. The chapter from the *sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don* forms a small part of the voluminous collection of textbooks composed by Se ra Chos kyi rgyal mtshan which have recently (197?) been reprinted at Se ra byes monastery in Bylakuppe, Mysore, India. This reprint is completely identical with the text included in the United States Library of Congress Collection of Tibetan Literature in Microfiche. (Microfiche R–1021 in *Tibetan Religious Works: PL 480 SFC Collections*, published by the Institute for the Advanced Studies of World Religions, Stony Brook, New York.) According to the information given by E. Gene Smith on the microfiche itself, it would seem that the blocks were made in Buksa (*sBag sa*), Bengal during the 1960's. At any rate, for our purposes, we shall simply speak of the "New Se ra" edition. We have also consulted the

"Old Se ra" edition, which is probably a late nineteenth century or early twentieth century reprint of Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's works (*Tokyo University Catalogue* No. 21; *Tohoku Catalogue*, 6815 A).

The excerpt from *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* is based on a comparison between the text found in the supplement to the Peking edition of the Tibetan canon (*bstan 'gyur* Vol. 153), an edition of unknown origin published by the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath, Varanasi, India, and finally the bKra śis lhun po ("Tashilhunpo") edition of Tsoṅ kha pa's *Collected Works*, kept in kLu 'khyil monastery's library (Ladakh) and recently reprinted in Delhi by Ṅag dbaṅ dge legs bde mo.[7] As well, *lCaṅ skya grub mtha'*, the extensive work on philosophical systems (*grub mtha'; siddhānta*) composed by the Mongolian, lCaṅ skya rol pa'i rdo rje (1717–1786), reproduces verbatim approximately two thirds of the excerpt in question; this has also proved to be very useful, in spite of the fact that it was not possible to determine the source of the edition used by lCaṅ skya himself.

Here then are the abbreviations to be used: N = the New Se ra edition; O = the Old Se ra edition; P = the Peking *bstan 'gyur* and supplement; T = the Tashilhunpo edition of Tsoṅ kha pa's *Collected Works* (reprinted in Delhi); S = the Sarnath text; lCaṅ = *lCaṅ skya grub mtha'*.

THE CHAPTER ON THE "NEITHER ONE NOR MANY" ARGUMENT IN THE *SKABS DAṄ PO'I SPYI DON* OF SE RA CHOS KYI RGYAL MTSHAN

[N. 24a6] Our own position: I. Recognizing the property to be refuted (*dgag bya'i chos; pratiṣedhyadharma*) by the reason which the teacher [Haribhadra] propounds:[8] II. Explanation, involving other loci, of the reasonings which refute this [property].

I. [24a7] "Something established by virtue of its particular mode of being, [and] not brought about because of appearing to mind (*blo; mati*)" – this is the property to be refuted by the reasons which analyse the ultimate. For, if the person and the aggregates were to exist in such a way, then they would have to withstand logical reasonings which analyse the ultimate [status of entities], and they would have to be perceived during the meditative equipoise (*mñam bźag; samāhita*) of the *Ārya*s ("Noble Ones").[9]

[24b1] An analogy: Take the case of a magician making pebbles and

pieces of wood appear to be horses and elephants. Now suppose that when the pebbles, pieces of wood, etc. appeared in this way, these same [appearances] were not brought about by a deceived mind, but were so established from the side (*ṅos nas*) of the pebbles, pieces of wood, etc. Then, as these [appearances] would be the result (*lag rjes*) of the antecedent like-moments (*rigs 'dra sṅa ma*) making up the [pebbles, etc., it would follow absurdly that] people whose eyes were not affected [by the magician's spells] should also see [these "horses" and "elephants"].[10]

[24b2] Furthermore, in this vein, the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* states:

> Since [conventional truth's] nature is [simply] just as it appears, one does not subject it to analysis. If the yogi [however] does analyse it, then he will commit [the fault of speaking about a] different matter (*don gźan; arthāntara*), and will hence be refuted.[11]

[24b3] Moreover, it [i.e. the property to be refuted] is as stated above, because "an existence brought about because of appearing to the mind" is the meaning of "conventional existence". For, states the *Madhyamakāloka*:

> So therefore all [those] natures which are deceptive entitites [existing] because one thinks of them, [these natures] exist only conventionally.[12]

And the commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* [Tsoṅkha pa's *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal*,] states:

> In the *Madhyamakāloka*, the opposite of what is termed the conventional mode of existence, is known as that which exists ultimately, or as truly established.[13]

And [finally], as states the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*:

> What is only as it appears, this is conventional [existence]. What is other [than such a characterization] is the opposite [i.e. ultimate existence].[14]

[24b5] Thus there is nothing which is truly established, ultimately established, in reality established, etc. But there are [phenomena] which are [conventionally] established by their own defining characteristics (*raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*), from their own side (*raṅ ṅos nas grub pa*), by

their own-natures (*ran bźin gyis grub pa*), and which are [conventionally] established as being substances (*rdzas su grub pa*).[15]

II. [24b6] In general, there are many reasonings proving selflessness (*bdag med; anātman*): (1) the "neither one nor many" reason (*gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs; ekānekaviyogahetu*), which analyses the nature of phenomena; (2) the "diamond-splinters" reason (*rdo rje gzegs ma'i gtan tshigs; vajrakaṇahetu*), which analyses the cause; (3) the reason refuting production of existence or non-existence (*yod med skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs; sadasadutpādapratiṣedhahetu**), which analyses the effect; (4) the reason which refutes production according to the four points (*mu bźi skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs; catuṣkoṭyutpādapratiṣedhahetu*), which analyses both [the cause and the effect]; (5) the "king of reasonings" (*rigs pa'i rgyal po*), the reason from dependent arising (*rten 'brel gyi gtan tshigs; pratītyasamutpādahetu*).[16]

(1) [25a1] The first is explained below. (2) The second is as follows: "The sprout is not ultimately produced, because ultimately it is not produced from itself, nor from others, nor from both [self and others], nor from no cause." As it is said in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*:

> It is not [produced] from self, other, both, or no cause. Never, nowhere, is any entity whatsoever produced.[17]

(3) [25a2] The third [reason]: "The sprout is not ultimately produced, because either it exists at the time of its cause, and is thus not produced, or it does not exist at the time of its cause, and is not ultimately produced." States the *Madhyamakāloka*:

> An existent is not produced,
> A non-existent is like the lotus in the sky.[18]

(4) [25a4] The fourth [reason]: "The sprout is not ultimately produced, because many causes do not ultimately produce just one effect; nor do many causes ultimately produce only many effects; nor does one cause ultimately produce only many effects; and nor does one cause ultimately produce just one effect." The *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* states:

> Many do not create one entity,
> Nor do many create many.
> One does not create many entities,
> Nor does one create one.[19]

(5) [25a6] The fifth [reason]: "The sprout is not truly existent, because it is a dependent arising – like, for example, a reflection."

(1) [25a6] Amongst these [reasons] we shall now explain the first. Here, there are two points: A. The presentation of the reason; B. The establishment of its [three] characteristics (*tshul; rūpa*).

A. [25a7] The bases (*gźi; vastu*), paths (*lam; mārga*), and aspects (*rnam pa; ākāra*) are not truly established, because they are not established as being either truly one or many – just like, for example, a reflection.[20] As the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* states:

> Entities as asserted by ourselves and others are in reality (*yaṅ dag tu; tattvatas*) without the nature of oneness of manyness. Thus they are not truly existent – like a reflection.[21]

B. [25b1] [Establishing the three characteristics]: (a) the *pakṣadharmatva* ("the fact that the reason qualifies the subject"; *phyogs chos*); (b) the entailment (*khyab pa; vyāpti*).[22] Under point (a) there are two: (i) establishing that the [bases, etc.] are not truly ones; (ii) establishing that they are not truly many.

(i) [25b2] The bases, paths, and aspects are not truly ones, because they have parts (*cha bcas; sāvayava*). They have parts because (a′) they exist; (b′) it is impossible that a knowable thing (*śes bya; jñeya*) be without parts; (c′) "having parts" is directly contradictory (*dṅos 'gal*) with "being partless".

[25b3] What is the *pramāṇa* ("valid means of knowledge") which refutes the possibility of partless knowable things? Suppose that we are using the reason "because it has parts" to prove that the bases, paths, and aspects are not truly ones. To ascertain this by means of an inferential (*rjes dpag; anumāna*) *pramāṇa*, there are three [other] *pramāṇas* which must precede [the inference]: the *pramāṇa* which ascertains [the meaning of] "having parts", the reason in question; the *pramāṇa* which ascertains that "not being truly one" is directly contradictory with "being truly one"; the *pramāṇa* which refutes [the possibility of] a common element (*gźi mthun*) qualified by "having parts" and being truly one".[23] Amongst these [three], it is the third which is the most difficult to understand: so let me explain this [point].

[25b5] Let us hypothesize that there are common elements [such as vases etc.] which are qualified by "having parts" and "being truly one". Now, it would follow that a vase [,for example,] would appear, to the conceptual

cognition (*rtog pa; kalpanā*) which grasped it, as being essentially different (*ṅo bo tha dad; bhinnarūpa*) from its parts, but would [however] be [conventionally] established as essentially identical (*ṅo bo gcig; ekarūpa*) with its parts. For, although [the vase] might appear to such a cognition as being essentially different from its parts, it is [,in fact,] essentially one with them.[24] If it were not so [that the vase and its parts were essentially one from the point of view of conventional truth], it would follow absurdly (*thal lo*) that the vase would have to be partless.[25]

[25b7] But suppose that one agreed to the root proposition [that to a conceptual cognition a vase appears as being essentially different from its parts, although it is in fact essentially one with them]. It would then follow absurdly that the vase would be a deceptive phenomenon (*brdzun pa; mṛṣa*). The entailment is as follows: Given a deceptive mode of being, there would be no contradiction in the fact that from the standpoint of appearance [things such as vases and their parts] might appear as being essentially different, even though in terms of the way they exist (*sdod lugs*) they are essentially one. But there is a contradiction when [we mean] things which have a true mode of being.[26]

[26a1] A further reason [why what has parts cannot be truly one]: it would follow absurdly that the whole and its many parts would not be different (*tha dad*), because if they were, they would have to be seen as different during an *Ārya*'s meditative equipoise, and such is not the case.[27] The first part [of the reason] would follow, because if they were different, they would have to be truly different, and if they were [truly different], they [*Ārya*s] would have to see them as such. Here, the first part [i.e. the fact that if they were different, they would have to be truly different] follows, because [the parts and the whole] are [hypothesized as being] things which, on the one hand, seem to be essentially different from the standpoint of appearance, but are in their mode of being essentially identical, and, on the other hand, are also truly established.[28]

[26a3] The second part [of the above reason] is established [i.e. if the parts and the whole were truly different, the *Ārya*s would have to see them as such], because if they were [truly different], then [this difference] would have to be established absolutely (*de kho na ñid du*).[29]

[26a3] Now suppose that one agreed to the root proposition [that parts and wholes are not different]. Then it would follow [absurdly] that the many parts would be one [i.e. identical], because they would be established,

and they would not be different from the whole. Here, one could not agree [that the many parts are one], because the [parts'] being one would be countered by the *pramāṇa* which knows them to be many. [Similarly] it would follow absurdly that the whole would be many, because it would be established, and it would not be different from [its] many parts. Here [again], one could not agree, because the [whole's] being many would be countered by the *pramāṇa* which knows it to be one.[30]

[26a5] [Thus] by means of this line of reasoning, one denies that there is a common element qualified by "having parts" and "being truly one". For, according to this approach, one denies that if wholes and parts are different, they have to be seen as different during the *Ārya*s' meditative equipoise. By denying this, one denies that they are truly different. And by this, one denies that there is a common element qualified by "having parts" and "being truly one".[31]

[26a6] To resume the sense: The bases, paths, and aspects are not truly ones, because they have parts. The entailment holds because if anything were to be truly one, it would have to be one [thing] which does not depend on anything [else] whatsoever, and in such a case, it could not have parts. [However,] they [i.e. the bases, etc.] do have parts, because (a′) they are established bases (*gźi grub*);[32] (b′) it is impossible that a knowable thing be partless; (c′) "having parts" is directly contradictory with "being partless".

(ii) [26b1] [Establishing that the bases, etc. are not truly many:] They are not truly many [different things], because they do not exist as true ones [i.e. as individuals]. The entailment holds, because manyness must be posited in dependence on oneness.[33]

(b) [26b1] Establishing entailment [between "being neither truly one nor many" and "not being truly existent".]

[26b1] If one is to ascertain with a *pramāṇa* that the bases, paths, and aspects are not truly existent, using the reason "neither truly one nor many", then there are three [other] preliminary *pramāṇa*s needed; the *pramāṇa* which ascertains [what it means to be] neither [truly one nor many]; the *pramāṇa* which ascertains that "not truly existent" is directly contradictory with "being truly established"; the *pramāṇa* which refutes [the possibility of] a common element qualified by "being neither [truly one nor many]" and "truly established".

[26b3] As the latter is [again] the most difficult to understand, let me explain this [point]. Suppose that with regard to a reflection one ascertains,

with a *pramāṇa*, that oneness and manyness are mutually exclusive (*phan tshun spaṅs 'gal; parasparaparihāraviruddha*)[34a] and directly contradictory. Now, in dependence on this *pramāṇa*, one can refute [the possibility of] a common element qualified by "being neither truly one nor many" and "truly established".[34b] For, by the action of this *pramāṇa*, and without having to depend on any other mediate *pramāṇa*, one can understand that such a common element is impossible.[35]

[26b5] [Conclusions] : Therefore, the intelligent disciple, for whom the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* is destined, has a [particular] way of developing faith in the nature of the Mother [*prajñāpāramitā*] : he develops this faith by establishing, with a *pramāṇa*, the existence of the Mother three omnisciences (*mkhyen pa gsum; tisraḥ sarvajñatāḥ*).[36] He also has a [particular] way to develop faith in the power of the Mother [*prajñāpāramitā*] : this faith he develops by establishing, with a *pramāṇa*, that the [Mother] three omnisciences are capable of effectuating the perfection which is the professed purpose of their *Ārya* [*bodhisattva*] sons.

AN EXCERPT FROM TSOṄ KHA PA'S *DBU MA RGYAN GYI ZIN BRIS*

[P. Ṅa 77b3] [Objection:] But suppose that one takes this proof [i.e. that entities are neither truly one nor many] as a *svatantra* [*hetu*] ("autonomous reason"; *raṅ rgyud*). Then since subjects (*chos can; dharmin*) such as the *ātman* ("Self"), *Īśvara* ("God"), etc., asserted by non-Buddhists, and [the notions of] suffering and partless consciousness, asserted by our co-religionists, are not established, it would follow that the *pakṣadharmatva* would not be established. Hence, [using a *svatantrahetu*] would be incoherent.[37]

[77b4] [Reply:] Now in the *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* it is said that one can prove only *prasaṅgas* ("consequences") in the case of unacknowledged entities imputed by non-Buddhists, but with regard to acknowledged entities [which possess] their own natures, both [*prasaṅgas* and *svatantrahetus*] are without fault.[38] [Moreover,] Phya pa chos kyi seṅ ge and other Tibetan scholars also said that a *svatantra* was inappropriate in the case of a [non-existent] subject imputed by non-Buddhists.[39]

[77b6] [However,] the *Madhyamakāloka* explains that even if one takes a subject of the sort previously described, so long as the reason (*rtags; liṅga*), and property [to be proved] (*chos; dharma*) are mere negations, a *svatantra* is most definitely appropriate; this is stated many times.[40] If reasons and

properties [to be proved] only applied to established [i.e. existent] bases (*gżi grub*), then *svatantra*s, [or in other words,] proofs which are not *prasaṅga*s, would be inappropriate for these types of subjects. But if there is nothing contradictory for a reason or a property which is a non-implying negation (*med par dgag pa; prasajyapratiṣedha*) to also [qualify] an unestablished basis, then for such [non-existent] subjects too, the *svatantra* will be thoroughly proper. This is the teacher and scholar Kamalaśīla's position.

[77b8] [Objection and reply:] But then what was previously explained in the *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* does not correspond to the *Madhyamakāloka*. As Dharmamitra, however, held that the *Pañjikā* was by Kamalaśīla, it should be investigated if [Kamalaśīla] might not have composed this text [i.e. the *Pañjikā*] specifically at a time when his thought was [still] immature.[41]

[78a1] Well then, what is our own position with regard to these types of [non-existent] subjects? In this context, the *Mahātman* Dignāga states:

> By means of objects of direct perception, inference, belief, and convention [and] pertaining to its actual basis (*raṅ rten la'o*).[42]

Thus, in explaining that the basis [i.e. the subject] and the property [in a proper thesis (*pratijñā* or *pakṣa*)] are not refuted, he did not merely say [the words] "with regard to the subject" (*chos can la'o*), but rather, "its actual subject" (*raṅ gi chos can; svadharmin*).[43] And Śri Dharmakīrti explained the thought behind saying these words as follows: Although the proposition (*tshogs don*) composed of the [merely] nominal subject (*chos can 'ba' źig pa; kevaladharmin*) and the property to be proved might be negated, there is no fault, as this property [to be proved] does not negate the subject which is the actual basis of the property to be proved.[44] Thus, he [Dignāga] says "basis" in order to show that the fault occurs when one negates the subject which is the actual basis of the property to be proved, and [hence negates] the [proposition] composed of the two [i.e. of the actual basis and the property].

[78a5] How is there [thought to be] a fault in refuting the nominal subject? This is extensively explained in passages of the *Pramāṇavārttika* such as, "For example, space, etc. by others . . .", and in connection with the Vaiśeṣika position.[45]

[78a6] The so-called "nominal subject" means one which is stated as the subject, but which is not [in fact] the basis of the property to be proved in

question; it is, thus, an unrelated (*yan gar bar*) subject.[46] [Objection:] "If it is so that when [presenting] a *svatantra*, the *pakṣadharma* has to qualify whatever might happen to be the locus of debate (*rtsod gźi*),[47] then there will be no sense in making a difference between the nominal subject and the subject which is the actual basis. Hence, when one takes *ātman, pradhāna* ("the Principle"),[48] etc. as the loci of debate, then the *svatantraliṅga* (*raṅ rgyud kyi rtags*)[49] will [still] be inappropriate." [Reply:]. But such [a position stems from] not differentiating the viewpoint of the two lords of logic [i.e. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti] from that of the infidels. Having in this way cited the texts of the *sūtra* [i.e. Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*[50]] and the *Pramāṇavārttika*, [the matter] will be more extensively explained in accordance with the *Madhyamakāloka*.

[78b1] In the *Madhyamakāloka* it is said that, on the one hand, it is not sufficient to refute *ātman, pradhāna* etc. by just *prasaṅga*s, but [these pseudo-entities] should also be refuted by *svatantraliṅga*s. And furthermore, the refutations should pertain to the [objects'] own double negatives (*raṅ ldog nas*).[51] On account of these two requirements, it is necessary that [*ātman*, etc.] be taken as loci of debate for *svatantra* proofs. And in this case, although the reason which proves that they [i.e. *ātman*, etc.] are not real entities (*dṅos med; abhāva*)[52] ends up refuting the subject, [the irreality of *ātman*, etc.] is proven according to both ways [i.e. *prasaṅga*s and *svatantra*s] without fault.

[78b3] The *Pramāṇavārttika*, the sense of Dignāga's utterances, states the following:

> The existence of the conventions of what is to be inferred (*dpag bya; anumeya*) and what infers (*dpog par byed pa; anumāna*) is imputed in dependence on a difference which is established for a [conceptual] consciousness.[53]

Following this [line of thought], in cases where the locus must be a real entity, such as [when one is] proving that sound is impermanent because it is a product, or that there is fire on the smokey hill, the directly [intended] basis (*dṅos rten*) for these proofs and refutations is just the object which is the conceptual image [lit. "appearance" (*snaṅ ba*)] of *sound* or *hill* as not-not-sound or not-not-hill.[54] *Sound* and *hill*, themselves, are not the directly [intended] bases, because they do not directly appear to the conceptual cognition (*rtog pa*) which effectuates the proofs and refutations; and if one phenomenon [,such as *sound*, etc.,] is established, then at the same time all its properties [,such as impermanence, etc.,] are also established [,but in logical reasoning, this does not occur].[55]

[78b6] However, [in these examples] the image's locus (*snaṅ gźi*), which appears in this way [i.e. as not-not-sound or not-not-hill], is *sound* or *hill*.[56] Thus, the locus must be a real entity. But [take] cases where the locus, i.e. the subject, need not be a real entity – when [,for example,] *pradhāna*, *Īśvara*, etc. are taken as the loci of debate. The conceptual image as not-not-*pradhāna* or not-not-*Īśvara*, however, does exist, and it is just this that one apprehends when proving that [*pradhāna*, etc.] are not real entities. Therefore, this locus [i.e. the image] does not have the defect that it is not the opponent's object of inquiry, or that it is not what the proponent wishes to infer. Moreover, suppose that one is refuting that the image's locus [i.e. *pradhāna*, etc.] is a real entity, because it is devoid of ability to perform a function, or that one refutes the true existence of the image's locus by [proving that] it is neither truly one nor many. Now, these two reasons will qualify the simple images as not-not-*pradhāna* and not-not-*Īśvara*. And [thus] this very image is the subject which takes as its property the property to be proved, and is designated the *pakṣa*, of which is predicated the *dharma* in *pakṣadharma*.[57] So even though the nominal subject is refuted, this does not lead to the fault that the *pakṣadharma* [*tva*] is not established.

[79a2] If one is using [the reason] ["because it is] a product" to prove sound's impermanence, then as the double negative image (*snaṅ ldog*)[58], which is the appearance as not-not-sound, is not a real entity, the reason, *product*, does not qualify it. Rather, *product* must qualify the image's locus, *sound*. This is due to the fact that the reason and property to be proved are real entities.

[79a4] If [however] "devoid of ability to perform a function" or "neither truly one nor many" are taken as reasons, then both the image's locus [*pradhāna*, etc.] and the double negative image [i.e. the conceptual image as not-not-*pradhāna*, etc.] would be qualified by the reasons. And granted that the image's locus is qualified by the reason, then although this [i.e. the image's locus] might be refuted, the double negative image would [still] be established as the subject on which depends the property to be proved and the *dharma* of the *pakṣadharma*.[59]

[79a5] This has been a summary of the essentials. For a more extensive [explanation] one should consult the *Madhyamakāloka*.

University of Lausanne, Switzerland

NOTES

[1] The first article was a paper presented in 1981 at the Csoma de Körös symposium in Velm, Austria, and is expected to appear in 1984 in the *Proceedings of the Csoma de Körös Symposium*, in the series *Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde*. (Hereafter to be known as Tillemans (forthcoming).) The second article, i.e. Tillemans (1982), appeared in *Études de Lettres* of the University of Lausanne.

[2] For Vasubandhu's refutation of partless atoms see the *Viṃśatikā*, in particular, *kārikā* 12. For the arguments against the Nyāya universal (*sāmānya*), which is held to be a unity inherent in many particulars, cf. *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya ad Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 12 (pp. 478–482 *Sāmānyanirāsaḥ* in Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1953)). Cf. also the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Manorathanandin p. 367: . . . *yathā sāmānyasya paropagatānekavṛttitvād anekatvam āpādyate* (". . . just as it would follow that a universal is a multitude, because the other accepts that it is present in a multitude [of particulars]"). A good example of the Prāsaṅgika's use of this type of argumentation is the "sevenfold reasoning" (*rnam bdun gyi rigs pa*) found in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI, verses 150–161. This argument, which analyses the relationship between a cart and its parts, is an elaboration on Nāgārjuna's fivefold argument (*rnam lṅa'i rigs pa*) found in the *Madhyamakakārikā*s.

[3] In Tillemans (forthcoming), I distinguished monadic and dyadic forms of the argument. For example, ". . . is one", or ". . . is many", are monadic predicates, whereas ". . . is one with . . .", or ". . . is different from . . .", express dyadic relations. Among the examples cited in note 2, those from Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin represent monadic uses of the argument, while Candrakīrti and Nāgārjuna are using a dyadic form. Śāntarakṣita's presentation of the argument is phrased in the monadic form, but he and Kamalaśīla frequently alternate between the two different forms.

[4] The background problem which the Tibetans are seeking to resolve is how to rationally justify believing in the existence of the three omnisciences (*thams cad mkjyen pa gsum; tisraḥ sarvajñatāḥ*) spoken about in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*'s homage. These three aspects of the *prajñāpāramitā* ("perfection of wisdom") have, as their respective objects, the bases (*gźi; vastu*) (i.e. entities, but particularly, persons), the *śrāvaka*, *pratyeka*, and *bodhisattva* paths (*lam; mārga*), and all phenomena or all aspects (*rnam pa; ākāra*). Thus they are termed the "knowledge of the bases" (*gźi śes; vastujñāna*), the "knowledge of the paths" (*lam śes; mārgajñāna*), and the "knowledge of all aspects" (*rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa; sarvākārajñatā*). Cf. Se ra chos kyi rgyal mtshan's *Don bdun cu* pp. 16–17 in the edition of S. Onoda.

Now the Tibetans' answer to this problem is to say that by using the "neither one nor many" argument one arrives at the conclusion that the objects of these omnisciences are all void of true existence (*bden par yod pa*) and true production (*bden par skye ba*). At that point, when one is rationally convinced of this voidness, one is justified to believe that consciousnesses which directly realize this voidness are possible. Cf. Tsoṅ kha pa's *Legs bśad gser phreṅ* T. vol. *tsa* pp. 49–50, rGyal tshab rje's *rNam bśad sñiṅ po rgyan* pp. 11b–12a, and the *sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don* pp. 20b–21b. Note in passing that the latter work follows very closely *rNam bśad sñiṅ po rgyan*.

[5] *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti*, Biblio. Indo-Tibetica p. 4, P.90 ja 94a 2–4: *chos kyi rjes su 'braṅ ba rnams kyaṅ gcig daṅ du ma'i ṅo bo ñid daṅ bral ba'i phyir źes bya ba la sogs pa'i tshad mas gźi daṅ lam daṅ rnam pa skye ba med par yoṅs su śes pa tshigs su bcad pa'i don gyi mtshan ñid kyi yum la gnod pa ma mthoṅ nas śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa*

thams cad mkhyen pa ñid gsum gyi bdag ñid tshul gsum pa can / saṅs rgyas la sogs pa bskrun par mdzad pa ni gdon mi za bar srid pa ñid do źes ṅes par gzuṅ ste / de la rab tu daṅ ba bskyed par byed pa ñid do /. ("Moreover, followers of the *Dharma*, by means of *pramāṇa*s such as [those based on the reason] "because of being neither of the nature of oneness nor manyness", perceive no [possible] refutation of the Mother [*prajñāpāramitā*] characterized by the *kārikā* [i.e. the homage], that is to say, the realization that the bases, paths, and aspects are not produced. Thereupon, they arrive at the certainty that the *prajñāpāramitā*, which has the threefold nature of the omnisciences, is most definitely able to lead to buddhahood etc. And thus, they are greatly inspired by this [*prajñāpāramitā*].") Tsoṅ kha pa, rGyal tshab rje, and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan cite this passage.

[6] Cf. Tillemans (1982) for an explanation of these various ideas.

[7] I might also mention an edition of Tsoṅ kha pa's *Collected Works* which was recently published in Delhi by Lama Gurudeva. However, this edition, like that of the Peking *bstan 'gyur* supplement, was printed at dGa' ldan phun tshogs gliṅ (Lha sa źol press) and states on its title page "reproduced from the 1897 Lha sa old źol (dGa' ldan phun tshogs gliṅ) blocks".

[8] According to Tibetan *grub mtha'* texts, Haribhadra was a member of the same school as Śāntarakṣita: *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma raṅ rgyud pa* (*Yogācāra-Mādhyamika-Svātantrika*). In texts such as Tsoṅ kha pa's *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal* (pp. 129–136) and lCaṅ skya rol pa'i rdo rje's *Grub mtha'* (pp. 371–377), the Svātantrika's understanding of what constitutes "true existence", or the "property to be refuted" (*dgag bya'i chos*), is explained in considerable detail, and is contrasted with the Prāsaṅgika counterpart. We see in these works that the "property to be refuted" as specified on 24a7 of the *sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don* is common to all Svātantrikas, be they of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika or Yogācāra-Mādhyamika tradition.

[9] The *Ārya bodhisattva*s, when meditating on *śūnyatā* – that is, the simple lack of any truty existent entities – are directly perceiving the ultimate truth, or the absolute (*de kho na ñid; tattva*, i.e. "reality"). Therefore, if anything existed ultimately, the *Ārya*s would have to perceive it at this time, and conversely, anything perceived at this time must be ultimate.

[10] The analogy is that the appearances represent conventional truth, but that the tendancy to grasp them as being independent of the mind is like "grasping at true existence" (*bden 'dzin*). Cf. *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal* p. 132 *et passim*.

[11] *Kārikā* 21. Here the text differs from that found in the sDe dge edition of the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* and *vṛtti*:

> *ji ltar raṅ bźin* ṅo bo'i phyir //*
> *'di la dpyad pa mi 'jug go //*
> *rnam par dpyod pa byed na don //*
> *gźan du soṅ bas gnod par 'gyur //* (sa 2b4)

*The *vṛtti* makes it clear that we should read *snaṅ bźin*. The reading found in the *sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don* also occurs in earlier texts such as the *dBus pa blo gsal grub mtha'*. Cf. Mimaki (1982b) pp. 170–171 and n. 462. Cf. also *ibid*. n. 463 for the logical fault of *arthāntara*, one of the points of defeat (*tshar gcad pa'i gnas; nigrahasthāna*). This interpretation of *arthāntara* is borne out by the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā* sa 39a3: *don rnal ma las don gźan źes bya ba ni / ma 'brel ba'i don te / de tshar gcad pa'i gnas su rnam par gźag pa ni rigs pa* dan ldan pa yin no /*. (" 'A matter different from the principal

matter' means one which is unrelated. This is properly considered a point of defeat.")
*The text has *rig pa.*

[12] *Madhyamakāloka* P. 101, sa 254a6.

[13] *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal* p. 130.

[14] *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* k. 3, sa lb3.

[15] Cf. Tillemans (1982). *Grub mtha'* texts stress that as Svātantrikas are Mādhyamikas, own-nature etc. are *only* accepted conventionally.

[16] The 'diamond-splinters" reason is so called because it is said to "vanquish the rock of those who assert real entities". (*dBus pa blo gsal grub mtha'*, p. 216 in Mimaki (1982b): *'di ni dṅos por smra ba'i brag // 'joms byed rdo rje gzegs ma yin //*)

Important in the formulation of all these reasonings is the use of the qualifier "ultimately" (*don dam par; paramārthataḥ*), or what performs the same function, the word "truly" (*bden par*). The famous controversy, in the *Prasannapadā*, between the Svātantrika Bhāvaviveka and the Prāsaṅgika Candrakīrti centers largely on the question as to whether this qualifier should be present in Mādhyamika style reasonings or not. The fact that it is there in our text is a sign that these reasonings are being given from the Svātantrika point of view.

Finally, it is interesting to note that Chos kyi rgyal mtshan is presenting five reasons, rather than the four which we see in certain Indian and Tibetan texts. Bhāvaviveka, in the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* k. 6 (P. 96, dza 381a2), speaks of "four reasons such as the refutation of production according to the four points, etc." (*mu bźi skye 'gog la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs bźi*). Cf. Lindtner (1981) p. 200 n. 14. Moreover, Atiśa, in the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* (P. 103 ki 322a7–324a1; Lindtner pp. 205–211), explains, by name, the *catuṣkoṭyutpādapratiṣedhahetu*, the *vajrakaṇahetu*, the *ekānekaviyogahetu*, and the *pratītyasamutpādahetu*. Cf. also Mimaki (1982b) pp. 213–227 for dBus pa blo gsal's presentation of these four. However, Atiśa's explanation of the first reason, i.e. the *catuṣkoṭy°*, is in terms of the four points "existence", "non-existence", "both", and "neither". But in our text the four points of the *catuṣkoṭyutpādapratiṣedhahetu* are quite different, and deal with "many producing one", "many producing many", "one producing many" and "one producing one". What Atiśa termed the *catuṣkoṭy°* is now being termed by Chos kyi rgyal mtshan the *sadasadutpādapratiṣedhahetu** (*yod med skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs*), a reasoning which involves only the two lemmas of "existence" and "non-existence".

As for the reasoning which our author terms the *catuṣkoṭy°*, it was the principal argument used by Jñānagarbha to prove voidness, and was also extensively used by Kamalaśīla in the *Madhyamakāloka* and *Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* (cf. P. 101 sa 322a *et passim*); however, the term *catuṣkoṭi* is probably not used in these texts in this context; the closest thing which I have been able to find – and this is not very close – is the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā* (sa 28b6–7) speaking about *rnam par rtog pa bźi.*

This fivefold presentation of the reasons for voidness is not without some basis in the Indian texts, and was certainly not just a simple invention on Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's part. lCaṅ skya (*grub mtha'* p. 378) traces it back to the *Madhyamakāloka*:

> *slob dpon chen po* Ka ma la śī la'i dBu ma snaṅ ba *las ni sems tsam pas dbu ma pa la rgol ba'i tshul maṅ po źig gsuṅs nas de dag gi lan 'chad par lugs rigs maṅ du mdzad pa'i rigs pa'i skabs su* [1] *rdo rje gzegs ma daṅ* / [2] *yod med skye 'gog daṅ* / [3] *mu bźi'i skye 'gog daṅ* / [4] *gcig du bral daṅ* / [5] *rten 'brel gyi gtan tshigs rnams kyaṅ rgyal par gsuṅs so* /

And in fact Kamalaśīla does present these five, not by name, but at least in roughly the order in which lCaṅ skya specifies them: (1) = *Madhyamakāloka* P. 101 sa 147a6–7; (2) = sa 148a8; (3) = sa 148b7–8; (4) = sa 149b4–5; (5) = sa 149a7–8.

It seems, therefore, that we have two differing classificational schemata for the Mādhyamika-reasonings, both to some degree attested to in Indian texts, and both being taken up by Tibetan authors.

[17] *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* I, k. 1:

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ /
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana //

[18] So far, unfindable in the *Madhyamakāloka.*

[19] *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* k. 14, sa 2a5.

[20] Cf. n. 4 and 5.

[21] *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* k. 1. Chos kyi rgyal mtshan has substituted *bden par med* ("not truly existent") for *raṅ bźin med* ("without own-nature"; *niḥsvabhāva*). The Tibetan translation of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (P. 101 sa 48b) has . . . *raṅ bźin med de gzugs brñan bźin*. The Sanskrit text found in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* 173, 17–18 is:

niḥsvabhāvā amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ /
ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat //

Tsoṅ kha pa, in *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* and *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal*, formulates Śāntarakṣita's argument as proving *don dam par raṅ bźin med pa* ("ultimately being without own-nature"), but rGyal tshab rje, in *rNam bśad sñiṅ po rgyan* p. 13a, speaks of *bden par med pa*, and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan then goes so far as to incorporate this notion into *kārikā* 1. It might be that rGyal tshab and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan wished to avoid any possible confusion concerning the view *tha sñad du raṅ bźin yod pa* ("conventionally there is own-nature") – a position which the dGe lugs pa attribute to the Svātantrikas. Thus, they chose a completely different term, *bden par med*, instead of *raṅ bźin med* or *don dam par raṅ bźin med pa.*

[22] For the three characteristics of a valid reason, see n. 37. Note that in this context the *anvayavyāpti* ("positive entailment") and the *vyatirekavyāpti* ("contraposition") are not treated individually by Chos kyi rgyal mtshan. Rather, he simply speaks of the entailment (*khyab pa; vyāpti*) between the reason and the property to be proved (*bsgrub bya'i chos; sādhyadharma*). What this comes down to is proving that for all *x*: if *x* is neither truly one nor many, then *x* is not truly existent.

[23] I have been unable to find a clear Indian source for these three *pramāṇas*. rGyal tshab rje speaks about them extensively, in *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* vol. 1 p. 37, in the context of k. 15 of *Pramāṇavārttika*'s *Svārthānumānapariccheda*, a *kārikā* in which Dharmakīrti is arguing for the inclusion of the word "certainty" (*ṅes pa; niścaya*) in the definitions of the three characteristics. But, nonetheless, these *pramāṇas* seem to be fairly peripheral to Dharmakīrti's own meaning, and thus may possibly be a later, Tibetan, elaboration and development. Cf. also Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's *rNam 'grel spyi don* p. 53a.

[24] "Conventionally essentially one" means basically indistinguishability to the direct perception (*mṅon sum; pratyakṣa*) of ordinary, or non-*Ārya*, sentient beings. The idea is that when one *thinks* or *speaks* of parts and wholes, subjects and predicates, actions and agents, etc., one considers them separately, but that this is only a conceptually created

difference: such differences can not be remarked by direct perception. Cf. Tillemans (forthcoming) for a more detailed explanation.

[25] Tsoṅ kha pa, in *Draṅ ṅes legs bśad sñiṅ po* p. 137, stresses that "from the point of view of conventional truth, it is certainly not contradictory for one phenomenon to be of the nature of many parts" (. . . *chos gcig cha du ma'i bdag ñid du yod pa tha sñad pa'i don la mi 'gal mod* . . .). In other words, *conventionally* parts and wholes must be essentially one if there is to be a part-whole relationship at all. It is from the perspective of ultimate truth that this relationship becomes incoherent.

[26] Tsoṅ kha pa, in *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal* pp. 135–136, maintains that this argument is an "abbreviated, easily understood" (*mdor bsdus go sla bar*) way to understand the Svātantrikas' position. Moreover, on p. 136, he says – with far from obvious textual justification – that it is what Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla held (*źi ba 'tsho yab sras kyi bźed pa*). There are, it seems to me, three key steps in Tsoṅ kha pa's presentation of this argument:

(a) Parts and wholes appear as being essentially different to the conceptual cognition which thinks of them (*rtog pa la ṅo bo tha dad du snaṅ ba*), although they are conventionally essentially identical.

(b) Therefore, the way in which parts and wholes appear (*snaṅ tshul*), and the way they conventionally are (*gnas tshul*), are not in accord (*mi mthun pa*). Thus, they are like an illusion and are deceptive phenomena (*brdzun pa*).

(c) Whatever is truly established (*bden par grub pa*) can not be deceptive *in any way* (*rnam par thams cad du brdzun pa spaṅs*).

If we accept (a), (b), and (c), the conclusion that parts and wholes are not truly established phenomena would seem to follow.

[27] dGe lugs pa maintain the (at first sight) rather confusing position that parts and wholes are different (*tha dad*), but not essentially different (*ṅo bo tha dad*)! They differ in that they have differing names, and can be the subjects of different beliefs and attitudes. Cf. Phur bu lcog byams pa tshul khrims rgya mtsho's *bsDus grwa chuṅ* p. 12b. In modern terminology, we could say that they differ in that they are not intersubstitutable *salva veritate* in epistemic contexts such as ". . . knows that . . ." or ". . . believes that . . .". The terminology used in *bsDus grwa* and *lCaṅ skya grub mtha'* is that they have "differing double negatives" (*ldog pa tha dad*). Cf. n. 51 below. This notion of *ṅo bo gcig ldog pa tha dad* ("essentially one but having different double negatives") crops up frequently in dGe lugs pa philosophy, and is used to explain the relation between such things as the two truths, and subjects and their qualities.

[28] My translation here is not literal. Where the Tibetan speaks of "common elements" (*gźi mthun*), I use the construction "on the one hand . . .", "on the other hand . . .".

[29] Cf. n. 9.

[30] This is the usual Indian form of the "neither one nor many" argument. To take an example from Śāntarakṣita, in *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* k. 22 we find him arguing against a Sautrāntika Sākāravādin school who believed that the manifold aspects and the single consciousness were non-dual (*sna tshogs gñis med pa*). In the *vṛtti* he states:

> *rnam pa de dag sna tshogs pa 'di ni rigs pa ma yin te / rnam par śes pa gcig daṅ tha dad ma yin pa'i phyir śes pa de'i raṅ gyi ṅo bo bźin no /* (sa 57b8). *rnam par śes pa de rnam pa du ma daṅ tha dad pa ma yin pa'i lus yin na ni / rnam pa de dag gi bye brag bźin du du mar 'gyur ro /* (sa 58a3).

("The manifold aspects are incoherent. As they are not different from the one consciousness, they will be similar to it in nature [and will also all become one].")
("If consciousness were a body (*lus*) indistinct from its many aspects, then it [too] would be many, just as are the various aspects.")

[31] An argument by contraposition. If x has parts and is truly one, then x is truly existent. Hence, the whole and parts of x would be truly different, and this difference would have to be perceived during the *Āryas*' meditations. Since it is not so perceived, it follows by a number of applications of *modus tollens* that x is not something which both has parts and is truly one.

[32] "Established basis" (*gźi grub*) is equivalent to "existent" (*yod pa*) and "knowable thing" (*śes bya*). Cf. n. 52. below and *bsDus grwa chuṅ* chapter 2 (*gźi grub kyi rnam bźag*).

[33] This argument is found in *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* k. 61–62.

[34a] Cf. *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti ad* k. 1 (sa 52b6): *raṅ bźin źig yod par gyur na ni gcig pa'am cig śos pas mi 'da'o // de dag ni phan tshun spaṅs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid yin pas phuṅ po gźan sel bar byed do /* ("If an own-nature did exist, then it could not be anything but one [i.e. individual] or the opposite [i.e. many]. These [i.e. oneness and manyness] are mutually exclusive characteristics, and thus they admit no other alternative.") Cf. *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* sa 89a6 for a fuller explanation. The locutions *phuṅ po gźan sel bar byed pa* or *phuṅ po gźan med pa* (*Pañjikā*), or sometimes, *phuṅ gsum srid pa'i sgro 'dogs chod pa* (*lCaṅ skya grub mtha'* p. 393) seem to correspond to the *tertium non datur* in the Law of Excluded Middle.

[34b] The length of the Tibetan sentence necessitated a somewhat non-literal rendering. I chose to split it into two, and repeat the word *pramāṇa* (*tshad ma*).

[35] The idea seems to be that one first knows that a reflection is neither one thing nor many different things, and is therefore non-existent. On the basis of this understanding, one generalizes, and then comes to understand that oneness and manyness are "mutually exclusive" and "directly contradictory", that is, there is no third alternative between oneness and manyness for existent things. (Cf. n. 34). In other words, one understands the principle, for all x: if x is not one thing and x is not many different things, then x does not exist. If one understands this much, then one can *immediately* understand that for all x: if x is not *truly* one thing and x is not truly many different things, then x is not truly existent. It suffices to add the word "truly" to the previous principle.

[36] Cf. n. 4 and 5. The Tibetans frequently abbreviate *thams cad mkhyen pa gsum* by simply *mkhyen pa gsum*; in Tillemans (forthcoming) I translated this as "three wisdoms".

[37] Generally, Mādhyamikas understand by *svatantrahetu*, or *svatantrānumāna*, a proof along the lines of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti model, where the reason (*gtan tshigs; hetu*) possesses the three characteristics (*tshul; rūpa*) necessary for validity: (a) the *pakṣadharmatva*, the fact that the reason does qualify the subject; (b) the *anvayavyāpti*, the fact that the reason entails the property to be proved; (c) the *vyatirekavyāpti*, the fact that the negation of the property to be proved entails the negation of the reason. Note however that the dGe lugs pa view of what constitutes a *svatantrahetu* demands certain additional conditions, which I can not go into here, but which are explained in Tillemans (1982).

At any rate, since Dignāga, Buddhist logicians have recognized that the subject's being non-existent is one among a number of sufficient conditions for saying that the *pakṣadharmatva* of the *svatantrahetu* does not hold. Cf. *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III k. 10, P. 130 ce 7a3:

gñi ga la grub chos kyi ni //*
tha sñad bya phyir gñi ga daṅ //
gcig la ldog daṅ the tshom daṅ //
gźi ma grub la mi 'dod do //

*The *vṛtti* (trans. Kanakavarman and Dad pa śes rab) ce 127b6–7 reads *kyis.* ("One should apply the term [*pakṣa*] *dharma* to what is established for both [the debaters]. Thus, if one or both negates [the reason], or if it is in doubt, or if its locus is not established, it is not admitted [as the *pakṣadharma*].")

Finally, note that Tibetan authors frequently cite a line from the *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti ad* k. 1 as the basic source for situating the problem of *āśrayāsiddha* in the context of the "neither one nor many" argument. Sa 52b7–8: *gtan tshigs 'di ma grub po sñam du ma sems śig /.* ("Do not think that this reason is unestablished.") An "unestablished reason" (*ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs; asiddhahetu*) is one where the *pakṣadharmatva* does not hold.

[38] A *prasaṅga* is only a proposition implied by the opponent's position, and need not be accepted by its proponent.

[39] For more on Phya pa chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169), an influential figure in the development of the Tibetan *pramāṇa* tradition, see van der Kuijp (1978) and (1983).

[40] Cf. *Madhyamakāloka* sa 188a3–6 cited in *lCaṅ skya grub mtha'* p. 379: *gaṅ la dṅos po'i chos yod pa'i ṅo bor sgrub par mi 'dod kyi / 'on kyaṅ sgro btags pa'i chos rnam par bcad pa sgrub pa tsam źig brjod par 'dod pa de la ni ma grub pa ñid la sogs pa'i / ñes pa brjod pa tha sñad du yaṅ dṅos por gyur pa'i chos can mi dgos te / de ni de'i chos ma yin pa'i phyir ro // de la bltos nas kyaṅ de'i chos can ñid du mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // de ma grub tu zin kyaṅ bsgrub par bya ba med na mi 'byuṅ ba'i gtan tshigs mṅon par 'dod pa'i don grub pa la gegs byed pa med pa'i phyir ro /.* ("When one does not wish to prove that a [certain] property of a real entity does in fact occur, but wishes to merely prove a negation of a projected property, then if it is said that there are faults such as *asiddha* etc., [we reply] that it is not necessary that the subject be a real entity, even conventionally. For, it [i.e. the property to be proved] is not [in fact] the property of that [non-existent subject]. Moreover, it [i.e. the non-existent subject] is not properly the subject of that [property] which would depend on it. And although it [i.e. the subject] is granted to be unestablished, this does not constitute an obstacle to the establishment of the object intended as the reason which is necessarily linked to the [property] to be proved.")

[41] For the problem of the authorship of the *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā*, and the lost commentary by Dharmamitra on the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, see Mimaki (1982a) p. 371, n. 39.

[42] *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* ce 43a6 (trans. Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ rgyal), as well as the sDe dge and Co ne *bstan 'gyur* versions of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III k. 2 (The sDe dge/Co ne version of this *kārikā* has *brtan la'o* rather than *rten* or *brten la'o*.) This verse, which is freguently cited by such dGe lugs pa authors as rGyal tshab rje (cf. *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* Vol. 2, p. 316) and lCaṅ skya rol pa'i rdo rje (cf. *lCaṅ skya grub mtha'* p. 121), only figures in one of the translations of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*; it is not in the Peking version of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, nor is it commented upon in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* or Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*. The following verse, however, is found in the Peking version of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, and is commented on in both translations of the *vṛtti* as well as in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (cf. ce 294a):

raṅ gi ṅo bo kho na bstan //
bdag 'dod raṅ gi chos can la //
mṅon sum don daṅ rjes dpag daṅ //
yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba'o //

("It [i.e. the thesis (*phyogs; pakṣa*)] presents only its own nature, is accepted by oneself [i.e. the proponent], and concerning its own [i.e. actual] subject, it is not negated by means of objects of direct perception, inference, belief, or convention.")
Here, Dignāga is giving his well-known definition of a thesis. Cf. in this context, *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 28 and Manorathanandin's *vṛtti* (p. 373, 7), where the latter summarizes Dignāga's definition as follows: *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣaḥ*).

Now Tsoṅ kha pa has obviously followed the sDe dge/Co ne version of k. 2 and Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ rgyal's translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, where *raṅ rten la'o* is substituted for *ma bsal ba'o* (=*anirākṛtaḥ*), which makes for a difficult reading. It seems probable that Tsoṅ kha pa understood *raṅ rten la'o* as meaning the same thing as *raṅ gi chos can la*, and then introduced the term *raṅ rten chos can*. And even though the verse from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is most likely a corruption of the text, it did have quite an importance for the dGe lugs pa. Post-Tsoṅ kha pa writers frequently cite this verse, and use the terminology *raṅ rten* and *raṅ rten chos can*; rGyal tshab rje, to take an example, in *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* vol. 2, interprets quite a number of *kārikās* in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV in the "light" of this questionable verse.

[43] I have translated *raṅ gi chos can* ("its own subject") by "its actual subject", and *raṅ rten* by "its actual basis", to better bring out the contrast with "nominal subjects" (*chos can 'ba' źig pa*).

[44] Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 136–148. Note that Kamalaśīla in the *Madhyamakāloka* sa 188b–189a quotes quite a number of these particular *kārikās* from *Pramāṇavārttika* IV. Cf. also n. 40.

[45] *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 141 and 142.

yathā parair anutpādyāpūrvarūpaṃ na khādikam /*
sakṛc chabdādyahetutvād ity ukte prāha dūṣakaḥ //
tadvad vastusvabhāvo 'san dharmī vyomādir ity api /
naivam iṣṭasya sādhyasya bādhā kācana vidyate //

*Miyasaka (1972) and Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1953) p. 550 have the reading *anutpādyā pūrvarūpan*, but I have preferred to follow Manorathanandin (*vṛtti* p. 407, 5), Cf. the Tibetan of 141ab: *dper na mkha' sogs gźan dag gis / sṅon med raṅ bźin skyed med min /*. ("For example, when one states that space, etc. are not novel natures unproduced by other [conditions], because they are not causes for [producing their qualities such as] sound etc. all at once, the [Vaiśeṣika] adversary might say that in that case the subject, space, etc., would not have the nature of a real entity. But, like that, [i.e. when the subject is the Vaiśeṣika's notion of space] there is no refutation whatsoever of the desired proposition to be proved.")

[46] Cf. *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* vol. 2, p. 317: *bsgrub bya'i chos daṅ 'brel med kyi chos can 'ba' źig pa* . . . ("the nominal subject, which is unrelated to the property to be proved . . .").

[47] In other words, whatever is simply being spoken about, be it existent or non-existent.

[48] In the Sāṃkhya system, *pradhāna* is equivalent to *prakṛti*, the primordial matter or

nature. Cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya ad* k. 3: *mūlaprakṛtiḥ pradhānam* /. In Tibetan translations of the Sāṃkhya terminology, *gtso bo* equals *spyi gtso bo*.

[49] *svatantraliṅga* (*raṅ rgyud kyi rtags*) = *svatantrahetu* (*raṅ rgyud kyi gtan tshigs*).

[50] *Sūtra* (*mdo*) probably refers to *tshad ma'i mdo*, i.e. the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

[51] This is a complicated way of saying that it is *pradhāna*, etc. *themselves* which should be refuted. In the dGe lugs pa texts on *pramāṇa*, the *raṅ ldog* of *x*, means simply *x* itself, or more exactly, the exclusion of everything which is *in anyway different* (*tha dad*) from *x*. There are a series of these important terms using *ldog pa: raṅ ldog; gźi ldog* ("the double negative which is the basis [for applying a term]"); *don ldog* ("the double negative which is the meaning [for applying a term]") etc. I can not pretend to delve into this subject here, but see the *ldog pa ṅos 'dzin* chapter ("recognizing the double negative") of *bsDus grwa chuṅ* pp. 10b–11a.

[52] I have used "real entity" rather that just "entity" or "existent" to avoid confusion between *dṅos po* and *yod pa*, concepts which are quite distinct in the Tibetan *pramāṇa* philosophy. This school's ontology can be represented schematically as follows:

Existent (*yod pa*) = knowable (*śes bya*) = established basis (*gźi grub*)

real entity (*dṅos po*)
= impermanent (*mi rtag pa*)
= product (*byas pa*)
= that which is able to perform a function (*don byed nus pa*)

permanent (*rtag pa*)
= uncomposed phenomenon (*'dus ma byas kyi chos*)
= unproduced phenomenon (*ma byas pa'i chos*)

As for the term "not a real entity" (*dṅos med; abhāva*), it covers both what is permanent and what is completely non-existent (*med pa*). A more extensive exposition of this ontology is to be found in the Sautrāntika chapters of *grub mtha'* texts, Cf. also *bsDus grwa chuṅ* chapter 2, *gźi grub kyi rnam bźag*.

[53] *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 183:

> *anumānānumeyārthavyavahārasthitis tv iyam* /
> *bhedaṃ pratyayasaṃsiddham avalambya prakalpyate**//

*Cf. PV *Bhāṣya*. Miyasaka: *ca kalpyate*. Tib. *rnam par brtags pa yin*.

[54] Literally, "The very objects which are *sound* and *hill* appearing, to conceptual cognition, as what is excluded from not-those two". I have, however, simply translated *ma yin pa las log pa* by "not-not-", as the Tibetans themselves make no distinction between *ma yin pa las log pa* and *ma yin pa ma yin pa*. An important point to be noted is that conceptual images – also often known as "object-universals" (*don spyi*) – are not real entities (*dṅos med*). But they are, however, said to be permanent, and are thus not completely non-existent (*med pa*) (Cf. n. 52). Furthermore, to every item, existent or non-existent, their corresponds such an image, and though the item (e.g. *pradhāna*) may be non-existent, its image is not.

[55] Tsoṅ kha pa's point in introducing *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 183 was that it shows the often-discussed theme that the difference between subjects and their properties is only conceptually created (cf. rGyal tshab *op. cit*. Vol. 1, p. 97). In other words, when one

says or thinks that sound is impermanent, even though there is in fact no difference between the *svalakṣaṇa* (i.e. the real entity) sound and its impermanence, there seems to be such a difference to thought. The consequence is that although the *svalakṣaṇa* sound is indirectly denoted (*brda'i źen yul*) by the word "sound", what directly appears to the mind, the "directly [intended] basis" (*dṅos rten*) when one says "sound", can not be the *svalakṣaṇa* sound: if it were, then sound's impermanence, and all the other properties which are in fact not different from sound, should also appear, and an inference of sound's impermanence would become superfluous, as this could be established by simply hearing the word "sound". Thus *svalakṣaṇa* can only be (indirectly) referred to via the medium of their conceptually created counterparts; it is these images which are ultimately reponsible for the separation between subject and predicate, and which are the direct objects of discursive thought. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* I (*Svārthānumāna*) for Dharmakīrti's presentation of these reasonings.

[56] The image's locus is, as it were, the "original" of the copy. Thus, for example, *sound* is the locus of the conceptual image as not-not-sound, and *pradhāna* is the locus of the image as not-not-*pradhāna*.

[57] Usually, the term *pakṣa* means the thesis, composed of the subject and the property to be proved. But in the term *pakṣadharma, pakṣa* refers only to the subject. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti ad* k. 1 (*Svārthānumāna*): *pakṣo dharmī / avayave samudāyopacārāt /*. ("The *pakṣa* is the subject. For [here] the part is metaphorically designated as the whole.") Note that the term *dharma* in *pakṣadharma* refers to the reason, whence the meaning of *pakṣadharmatva*: "the fact that the reason is a quality of the subject".

[58] In other words, the image itself.

[59] Cf. Tillemans (1982) pp. 116–118. It should be remembered that as the conceptual image as not-not-*pradhāna* is permanent, it is, in this system, not a real entity, and is devoid of ability to perform a function. Cf. n. 52.

TIBETAN TEXT OF THE SELECTION FROM THE *SKABS DAṄ PO'I SPYI DON*

[N. 24a6; 0.21a] / raṅ lugs la / slob dpon gyis bźed pa'i rtags gyi dgag bya'i chos ṅos gzuṅ ba daṅ / de gźi gźan gyi steṅ du 'gog byed [24a7] kyi rigs pa bśad pa'o //

daṅ po ni / blo la snaṅ ba'i dbaṅ gis bźag pa ma yin par raṅ gi thun moṅ ma yin pa'i sdod lugs kyi ṅos nas grub pa de / don dam dpyod byed kyi rtags kyi dgag bya'i chos yin te / gaṅ zag daṅ phun po de ltar grub [24b1] na / don[1] dam dpyod[2] byed kyi rigs pas dpyad bzod[3] ciṅ 'phags pa'i mñam gźag gis gzigs dgos pa'i phyir te /

dper na sgyu ma mkhan gyis[4] rde'u śiṅ rta glaṅ du sprul pa'i tshe / rde'u śiṅ bu sogs rta glaṅ du snaṅ ba na de ñid blo 'khrul ba'i [24b2] dbaṅ gis bźag pa ma yin par / rde'u śiṅ bu sogs kyi raṅ ṅos nas grub pa yin na / de dag gi rigs 'dra sṅa ma'i lag rjes su 'gyur bas mig ma bslad pa rnams kyis kyaṅ mthoṅ dgos pa bźin no //

de ltar yaṅ / *dBen gñis las* /

> ji ltar [24b3] snaṅ bźin ṅo bo'i phyir //
> 'di la dpyad pa mi 'jug go //
> rnal 'byor dpyod par byed na don //
> gźan du soṅ bas gnod par 'gyur //

źes gsuṅs /

gźan yaṅ / de de yin pa'i phyir te / blo la snaṅ ba'i dbaṅ gis bźag pa'i yod pa de kun rdzob tu [24b4] yod pa'i don yin pa'i phyir te / *dBu ma snaṅ ba* las

> de'i phyir de dag gi bsam pa'i dbaṅ gis dṅos po brdzun pa'i ṅo bo thams cad ni kun rdzob tu yod pa kho na'o //

źes daṅ / *'Jug ṭīkā* las /

> *dBu ma snaṅ ba*r kun rdzob[5] tu yod tshul [24b5] gsuṅs pa'i ldog phyogs kyi yod pa ni don dam par bden grub tu yod par śes pas /

źes daṅ / *bDen gñis* las /

> ji ltar snaṅ ba de kho na //
> kun rdzob gźan ni cig śos so //

źes gsuṅs pa'i phyir /

des na bden par grub pa / don dam par [24b6] grub pa / yaṅ dag par grub pa sogs med kyaṅ / raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa / raṅ ṅos nas grub pa / raṅ bźin gyis grub pa / rdzas su grub pa sogs yod do /

gñis pa la / spyir bdag med gtan la 'bebs pa'i rigs pa la du ma yod de / chos [24b7] rnams kyi ṅo bo la dpyod pa gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs / rgyu la dpyod pa rdo rje gzegs ma'i gtan tshigs / 'bras bu la dpyod pa yod med skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs / rgyu 'bras gñis ka la dpyod pa mu bźi skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs / rigs pa'i [25a1] rgyal po rten 'brel gyi gtan tshigs rnams su yod pa'i phyir /

daṅ po de 'og tu chad / gñis pa ni / myu gu chos can / [0.21b] don[6] dam par mi skye ste / don dam par bdag daṅ / gźan daṅ / gñis ka daṅ / rgyu med gaṅ ruṅ las [25a2] mi skye ba'i phyir te / *rTsa ba śes rab* las /

> bdag las ma yin gźan las min //
> gñis las ma yin rgyu med min //

dṅos po gaṅ dag gaṅ na yaṅ //
skye ba nam yaṅ yod ma yin //

źes gsuṅs pa'i phyir /

gsum pa ni myu gu chos can / [25a3] don dam par mi skye ste / raṅ gi rgyu'i dus su yod par yaṅ mi skye / raṅ gi rgyu'i dus su med par yaṅ don dam par mi skye ba'i phyir te / *dBu ma snaṅ ba* las /

yod pa rnam par mi skye ste //
med pa nam mkha'i pad mo bźin //

źes gsuṅs pa'i phyir /

[25a4] bźi pa ni / myu gu chos can / don dam par mi skye ste / rgyu du mas 'bras bu gcig kho na don dam par skyed pa yaṅ ma yin / rgyu du mas 'bras bu du ma kho na don dam par skyed pa yaṅ ma yin / rgyu gcig gis 'bras bu du ma kho na don dam par skyed pa yaṅ ma [25a5] yin / rgyu gcig gis 'bras bu gcig kho na don dam par skyed pa yaṅ ma yin pa'i phyir te / *bDen gñis* las /

du mas gcig gi dṅos mi byed //
du mas du ma byed pa'aṅ min //
gcig gis du ma'i dṅos mi byed //
gcig gis gcig byed pa yaṅ min // [25a6]

źes gsuṅs pa'i phyir /

lṅa pa ni / myu gu chos can / bden par med de / rten 'brel yin pa'i phyir / dper na / gzugs brñan bźin źes pa lta bu'o //

de rnams kyi naṅ nas / gtan tshigs daṅ po de 'chad pa la / rtags 'god pa daṅ / tshul[7] sgrub [25a7] pa gñis las /

daṅ po ni / gźi lam rnam gsum chos can / bden par ma grub ste / bden grub kyi gcig daṅ bden grub kyi du ma gaṅ ruṅ du ma grub pa'i phyir / dper na gzugs brñan bźin / źes pa lta bu yin te / *dBu ma rgyan* las // [25b1]

bdag daṅ gźan smra'i dṅos 'di dag //
yaṅ dag par ni gcig pa daṅ //
du ma'i raṅ bźin bral ba'i phyir //
bden par med de gzugs brñan bźin //

źes gsuṅs pa'i phyir //

gñis pa la phyogs chos sgrub pa daṅ / khyab pa sgrub pa [25b2] gñis las /

daṅ po la / bden pa’i gcig bral du sgrub pa daṅ / bden pa’i du bral du sgrub pa gñis las /

daṅ po ni / gźi lam rnam gsum chos can / bden par grub pa’i gcig tu med te / cha bcas yin pa’i phyir / de chos can / cha bcas [25b3] yin te / yod pa gaṅ źig / cha med śes bya la mi srid / cha bcas cha med daṅ dṅos ‘gal yin pa’i phyir /

cha med śes bya la srid pa ‘gog pa’i tshad ma de gaṅ źe na / cha bcas kyi rtags kyis gźi lam rnam gsum bden grub kyi gcig [25b4] min par grub pa’i rjes dpag tshad[8] mas ṅes pa la tshad[9] ma gsum sṅon du ‘gro dgos te / de la rtags kyi mtshan gźi cha bcas ṅes [0.22a] pa’i tshad ma daṅ / bden grub kyi gcig min pa bden grub kyi gcig daṅ dṅos ‘gal du ṅes pa’i tshad [25b5] ma / cha bcas daṅ bden grub kyi gcig gi gźi mthun ‘gog byed kyi tshad ma gsum sṅon du ‘gro dgos pa’i phyir / de rnams kyi naṅ nas tshad ma gsum pa ‘di rtogs dka’ bas / de bśad na /

cha bcas daṅ bden grub kyi gcig gi gźi [25b6] mthun yod na / bum pa chos can / raṅ ‘dzin rtog pa la raṅ gi cha śas rnams daṅ ṅo bo tha dad du snaṅ ba daṅ / raṅ gi cha śas rnams daṅ ṅo bo gcig tu grub par thal / raṅ ‘dzin rtog pa la raṅ gi cha śas rnams daṅ ṅo bo tha dad du snaṅ ba gaṅ źig / raṅ gi cha [25b7] śas rnams daṅ ṅo bo gcig yin pa’i phyir / ma grub na / bum pa cha bcas ma yin par thal lo //

rtsa bar ‘dod na / bum pa chos can / brdzun par grub par thal lo // khyab ste / snaṅ lugs la ṅo bo tha dad du snaṅ yaṅ sdod lugs la ṅo bo gcig tu grub pa [26a1] / brdzun par grub pa’i sdod lugs la mi ‘gal yaṅ bden par grub pa’i sdod lugs la ‘gal ba’i phyir //

de’i rgyu mtshan yaṅ cha can daṅ cha du ma chos can / tha dad du med par thal / tha dad du yod na / tha dad du ‘phags [26a2] pa’i mñam gźag gis gzigs dgos pa las / des tha dad du ma gzigs pa’i phyir / daṅ po grub ste / tha dad du yod na bden par grub pa’i tha dad yin dgos / de yin na de’i gzigs ṅor tha dad yin dgos pa’i phyir / daṅ po der thal / snaṅ [26a3] lugs la ṅo bo tha dad du snaṅ yaṅ sdod lugs la ṅo bo gcig tu grub pa daṅ / bden par grub pa’i gźi mthun yin pa’i phyir /

gñis pa grub ste / de yin na de kho na ñid du grub dgos pa’i phyir //

rtsa bar ‘dod na / cha du ma chos can / gcig tu thal / grub [26a4] ciṅ cha can daṅ tha dad du med pa’i phyir / ‘dod mi nus te / khyod gcig yin pa la khyod du mar ‘jal ba’i tshad mas gnod pa’i phyir / cha can chos can / du mar thal / grub ciṅ cha du ma daṅ tha dad du med[10] pa’i phyir / ‘dod mi nus te / khyod du ma yin pa la khyod [26a5] gcig tu ‘jal ba’i tshad mas gnod pa’i phyir //

rigs pa 'di la brten nas cha bcas daṅ bden grub kyi gcig gi gźi mthun khegs te / de la brten nas cha can daṅ cha du ma tha dad du yod na tha dad du 'phags pa'i mñam gźag gis gzigs dgos [26a6] pa de khegs / de khegs pas de gñis bden grub kyi tha dad yin pa de khegs / de khegs pas cha bcas daṅ bden grub kyi gcig gi gźi mthun khegs pa'i phyir //

don bsdu na / gźi lam rnam gsum chos can / bden grub kyi gcig tu med de / cha [26a7] bcas yin pa'i phyir / khyab ste / bden grub kyi gcig yin na gaṅ [0.22b] la'aṅ bltos med kyi gcig yin dgos / de yin na cha bcas ma yin dgos pa'i phyir / de chos can / cha bcas yin te / gźi grub pa gaṅ źig / cha med śes bya la mi srid / cha bcas [26b1] cha med daṅ dṅos 'gal yin pa'i phyir //

gñis pa la / de chos can / bden grub kyi du mar med de / bden grub kyi gcig tu med pa'i phyir / khyab ste / du ma gcig la bltos nas bźag dgos pa'i phyir //

gñis pa khyab pa sgrub pa ni /

bden grub kyi [26b2] gcig daṅ bden grub kyi du ma gaṅ ruṅ daṅ bral ba'i rtags kyis / gźi lam rnam gsum bden med du tshad mas ṅes pa la tshad ma gsum sṅon du 'gro dgos te / de la de gaṅ ruṅ daṅ bral ba ṅes byed kyi tshad ma / bden med bden grub daṅ dṅos [26b3] 'gal du ṅes pa'i tshad ma / de gaṅ ruṅ daṅ bral ba daṅ bden grub kyi gźi mthun 'gog byed kyi tshad ma gsum sṅon du 'gro dgos pa'i phyir /

tshad ma phyi ma 'di rtogs dka' bas bśad na gźi gzugs brñan gyi steṅ du gcig daṅ du ma [26b4] gñis phan tshun spaṅs 'gal gyi dṅos 'gal du ṅes pa'i tshad ma la brten nas bden grub kyi gcig daṅ bden grub kyi du ma gaṅ ruṅ daṅ bral ba daṅ bden grub kyi gźi mthun 'gog nus te / tshad ma de'i byed pa la brten nas bar du [26b5] tshad ma gźan brgyud pa la bltos mi dgos par / de 'dra ba'i gźi mthun mi srid par rtogs nus pa'i phyir //

des na rgyan gyi ched du bya ba'i gdul bya dbaṅ rnon chos can / yum gyi ṅo bo la dad pa skye tshul yod de / yum mkhyen gsum yod par [26b6] tshad mas grub pa'i sgo nas yum la dad pa skye ba'i phyir / yum gyi nus pa la dad pa skye tshul yod de / mkhyen gsum de raṅ sras 'phags pa'i bźed don phun tshogs sgrub nus su tshad mas grub pa'i sgo nas yum la dad pa skye ba'i phyir //

---

(1) O. *den* (2) O. *dpyad* (3) O. *bzad* (4) N.O. *gyi. rNam bśad sñiṅ po rgyan* p. 12b4 has *gyis*. (As I mentioned in Tillemans (1982). The *sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don* is an elaboration of rGyal tshab rje's *rNam bśad sñiṅ po rgyan*, and quotes many passages almost verbatim.) (5) N. *rdzobs*. (6) O. *dan*. (7) O. *chul*.

(8) O. *chad*. (9) O. *chad*. (10) N.O. *yod*. Cf. *rNam bśad sñiṅ po rgyan* p. 13b2: *med*. I have not noted my occasional transformations of single *śad* (/) into double *śad* (//).

TIBETAN TEXT OF THE EXCERPT FROM *DBU MA RGYAN GYI ZIN BRIS*

[P.Ṅa 77b3; T. 427; S. 41] gal te sbyor ba 'di raṅ rgyud du byed na / gźan gyis smras pa'i bdag daṅ / dbaṅ phyug la sogs pa daṅ / raṅ sdes smras pa'i[1] sdug bsṅal daṅ / śes [77b4] pa cha med kyi chos can ma grub pas / phyogs chos ma grub par 'gyur bas / mi 'thad do że na /

'di *dKa' 'grel* las gźan sdes btags [T. 428] pa'i ma grags pa la ni / thal bar sgrub pa kho na yin la [77b5] grags pa'i raṅ gi ṅo bo rnams la ni / gñis ka ltar na yaṅ ñes pa med ces 'chad ciṅ / cha pa la sogs pa bod kyi mkhas pa rnams kyis kyaṅ / gźan gyis btags pa'i chos can la raṅ rgyud mi ruṅ [77b6] bar 'chad do //

dBu ma snaṅ ba las ni sṅar bśad pa lta bu'i chos can du bzuṅ ba la yaṅ / rtags chos rnam bcad tsam yin na raṅ rgyud śin tu yaṅ ruṅ bar lan maṅ du bśad [S. 42] de / rtags daṅ chos [77b7] gźi grub kho no la 'jug pa yin na ni / chos can[2] de 'dra ba la thal 'gyur min pa raṅ rgyud mi ruṅ la / rtags chos med dgag gźi ma grub pa la'aṅ mi 'gal ba yin na ni / chos can de 'dra ba la'aṅ raṅ rgyud [77b8] ruṅ ba legs par bsgrub pa ni / slob dpon mkhas pa *Ka ma la śī la*'i lugs so //

des na *dKa' 'grel* las sṅar ltar bśad pa 'di *dBu ma snaṅ ba* daṅ mi mthun no // *dKa' 'grel* 'di *Ka ma la śī* [78a1] *la*'i yin par *Chos kyi bśes gñen* yaṅ bźed pas / 'di ni slob dpon thugs ma rdzogs pa'i skabs su gcig tu mdzad dam brtag go //

'o na chos can de 'dra ba la raṅ [78a2] lugs ji ltar yin że na / 'di la bdag ñid chen po *Phyogs kyi glaṅ pos* /

> mṅon sum don daṅ rjes dpag daṅ yid ches grag pas raṅ rten
> la'o[3] /

żes rten te chos la ma bsal ba 'chad [78a3] pa na / chos can la'o żes pa tsam ma smos par raṅ gi chos can [S. 43] żes pa'i [T. 429] tshig smos pa'i dgoṅs pa dpal ldan *Chos grags* kyis bśad pa'i tshe / chos can 'ba' źig pa daṅ / bsgrub bya'i chos gñis [78a4] tshogs pa'i tshogs don bsal[4] yaṅ chos des[5] bsgrub bya'i chos raṅ gi rten chos can ma bsal pas[6] skyon min no // des na bsgrub bya'i chos raṅ gi rten gyi chos can daṅ de gñis tshogs pa bsal na / skyon yin pa [78a5] bstan pa'i don du rten źes gsuṅs pa bśad do //

chos can 'ba' źig pa bkag pa la skyon ji lta bu yin pa ni /

dper na mkha'[7] sogs gźan dag gis /

źes sogs *rNam 'grel* las rgyas par [78a6] bśad de / *Bye brag pa*'i 'dod pa la 'byuṅ ṅo //

chos can 'ba' źig pa źes pa ni / chos can du smras kyaṅ skabs de'i bsgrub bya'i chos kyi rten min pas / chos can yan gar bar[8] soṅ ba'i don no // [78a7] raṅ rgyud kyi skabs su rtsod gźir gaṅ[9] byuṅ de ñid la phyogs chos 'grub dgos na / chos can 'ba' źig pa daṅ / raṅ rten gyi chos can gñis 'byed pa'i don med pas bdag daṅ gtso bo sogs rtsod gźir [S. 44; 78a8] bzuṅ ba'i tshe / raṅ rgyud kyi rtags mi ruṅ źes pa ni / rigs pa'i dbaṅ phyug gñis kyi raṅ gi lugs daṅ / mu stegs kyi khyad par dbye ba ma phyed pa'o / tshul 'dis *mDo* daṅ *rNam 'grel* gyi gźuṅ [78b1] draṅs nas rgyas par *dBu ma snaṅ ba* las gsuṅs so //

'di yaṅ *dBu ma snaṅ ba* las bdag daṅ gtso bo sogs 'gog pa ni thal 'gyur tsam gyis mi chog gi raṅ rgyud kyi rtags kyis kyaṅ dgag dgos pa [T. 430] daṅ / [78b2] de yaṅ raṅ ldog[10] nas dgag dgos pa gñis kyis raṅ rgyud kyi sbyor ba'i rtsod gźir bzuṅ dgos pa daṅ / de'i tshe de dag dṅos med du bsgrub pa'i rtags kyis chos can bkag kyaṅ / skyon ma yin pa'i [78b3] tshul gñis kyis bsgrubs so //

Phyogs glaṅ gis gsuṅs pa'i don *rNam 'grel* las /

dpag bya dpog[11] par byed pa yi //
don gyi tha sñad gnas pa 'di //
śes pa la grub [S. 45] tha dad la //
brten [78b4] nas rnam par brtags pa yin //

źes gsuṅs pa ltar gźi dṅos po dgos pa byas pas sgra mi rtag pa daṅ / du ba la la[12] me yod du bsgrub pa la yaṅ rtog pa la sgra daṅ la gñis / de gñis ma yin [78b5] pa las log par snaṅ ba'i don ñid dgag sgrub kyi dṅos rten yin gyi sgra daṅ la ñid dṅos kyi rten min te / dgag sgrub byed pa'i rtog pa la dṅos su mi snaṅ ba'i phyir daṅ / chos gcig cig bsgrubs na de'i [78b6] chos thams cad cig car du bsgrubs par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro //

'on kyaṅ de ltar snaṅ ba'i snaṅ gźi ni sgra daṅ la yin pas gźi dṅos por gyur pa dgos / gźi chos can[13] dṅos po yin pa mi dgos pa gtso [78b7] bo daṅ dbaṅ phyug la sogs pa rtsod gźir bzuṅ ba la yaṅ rtog pa la gtso bo daṅ dbaṅ phyug ma yin pa las log par snaṅ ba ni yod la / de ñid la dmigs nas dṅos por med ces bsgrub pas gźi [78b8] de la phyir rgol la śes ‘dod daṅ / [S. 46] sṅa rgol la dpag ‘dod med pa’i skyon med la / snaṅ gźi dṅos [T. 431] por yod pa[14] don byed pa nus[15] stoṅ daṅ / snaṅ gźi bden par yod pa bden pa’i gcig du [79a1] bral gyis[16] bkag pa na / rtags de gñis gtso bo daṅ dbaṅ phyug ma yin pa las log par snaṅ ba de ñid la ‘grub[17] la / de ñid bsgrub bya’i chos gaṅ gi chos su ‘jog pa’i [79a2] chos can daṅ / phyogs kyi chos gaṅ gi chos su bźag pa’i phyogs su btags pa ñid yin pas chos can ‘ba’ źig pa bkag pas kyaṅ phyogs chos mi ‘grub pa’i skyon med do //

byas pas sgra mi [79a3] rtag par bsgrub pa na / rtog pa la sgra ma yin pa las log par snaṅ ba’i snaṅ ldog dṅos por med pas / byas pa rtags de la ‘grub pa min gyi / snaṅ gźi sgra la grub dgos te / dṅos po rtags [79a4] daṅ bsgrub bya’i chos su byed pa’i gnad kyis so //

don byed pas stoṅ pa daṅ gcig[18] du bral rtags su byed pa’i tshe ni[19] / snaṅ gźi daṅ snaṅ ldog [S. 47] gñis ka rtags de yin par grub ciṅ / snaṅ gźi[20] rtags de yin [79a5] par grub na / de bkag kyaṅ snaṅ ldog sgrub chos daṅ / phyogs chos kyi chos gñis brten pa’i chos can du ‘grub bo //

‘di ni sñiṅ po bsdus pa ste / rgyas par *dBu ma snaṅ ba* las śes dgos so //

NOTES

[1] P. *raṅ sṅas smras pa’i*. S. *raṅ sdes pa’i sdug bsṅal*.

[2] The sense of the passage would seem to suggest *chos can*, instead of *chos* as found in P.T.S.

[3] P.T. *raṅ brten la’o*. Cf. *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* ce 43a6: *rten*, and lCaṅ p. 121: *rten*.

[4] P. *gsal*.

[5] S. *das*.

[6] P.T. *chos can pas*. S. *chos can bsal pas*. Tsoṅ kha pa’s thought, as shown in the lines immediately below, must be *chos can ma bsal pas*.

[7] P.T.S. *mkhas*. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 141 (ed. Miyasaka): *mkha’*.

[8] lCaṅ p. 122: *yan ga bar*.

[9] P.T. *gar*.

[10] P. *raṅ sdog*.

[11] P. *dpag*.

[12] P.T.S. *du ba la*. Cf. lCaṅ p. 123: *du ba la la*.

[13] P.T.S. *gźi chen*. Cf. lCaṅ p. 123 *gźi chos can*.

[14] P.T.S. *med pa*. Cf. lCaṅ p. 124: *yod pa*.

[15] P.T.S. *gñis*. Cf. lCaṅ p. 124: *nus pa*.

[16] P.T.S. *gyi*. Cf. lCaṅ p. 124: *gyis*.

[17] S. *grub*.

[18] P.T.S. *daṅ du bral*. Better to read *daṅ gcig du bral*.

[19] S. *na*.

[20] P. *snaṅ gźa*.

REFERENCES

Atiśa. *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā*. P. 103 5344 ki 277b6–339b2.

Bhāvaviveka. *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha*. P. 96 5258 dza 380b6–381a8.

Candrakīrti. *Madhyamakāvatāra*. P. 98 5261 'a 225b7–245a2, and 5262 'a 245a2–264b8.

lCaṅ skya rol pa'i rdo rje (1717–86). *lCaṅ skya grub mtha' = Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bźag pa gsal bar bśad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan*. Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings ("P.E.S.") Press, 1970.

Co ne bstan 'gyur. Stony Brook, New York: Microfiche of The Institute of the Advanced Study of World Religions (IASWR).

sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka, bsTan 'gyur. dBu ma Vol. 1–17, 1977–79. *Sems tsam* Vol. 1–16, 1979–81. *Tshad ma* Vol. 1–9, 1981–1983. Tokyo: Faculty of Letters of Tokyo University.

Dharmakīrti. *Pramāṇavārttika*. Ed. by Y. Miyasaka, *Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Naritasan Shinshoji: *Acta Indologica* 2 1972, pp. 1–206.

Dharmakīrti. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. Ed. by R. Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikaṃ of Dharmakīrti*. Rome: Serie Orientale Roma 23, 1960.

Dharmakīrti. *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. P. 130 5710 ce 250b6–329b1.

Dignāga. *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. P. 130 5700 ce 1–13a5, trans. Kanakavarman and Dad pa śes rab. *sDe dge Tshad ma* 1, 4203 and *Co ne*: ce 1–13a7, trans. Sudhanarakṣita (=Vasudhararakṣita ?) and Seṅ rgyal.

Dignāga. *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. P. 130 5701 ce 13a6–93b4, trans. Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ rgyal, P. 130. 5702 ce 93b4–177a7, trans. Kanakavarman and Dad pa śes rab. *sDe dge* (ce 14b1–85b7) and *Co ne* (ce 14b1–85b5) have only the tranlation by Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ rgyal.

rGyal tshab rje = rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen (1364–1432). *dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byaṅ*. Sarnath: P.E.S. Press, 1976.

rGyal tshab rje. *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed*. 2 volumes, Sarnath: P.E.S. Press, 1975.

rGyal tshab rje. *rNam bśad sñiṅ po rgyan*. Blockprint of dGa' ldan byaṅ rtse monastery, North Kanara, Karnataka State, India, 197?.

Haribhadra. *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti Sphuṭārthā*. Varanasi: Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica 2, 1977, P. 90 ja 93a6–161a7.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa. *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Trans. and edited with Gauḍapāda's *Bhāṣya* by T. G. Mainkar. Poona: Oriental Book Agency, revised edition, 1972.

Jinendrabuddhi. *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (*Viśālāmalavatī*). P. 139 5766 re 1–355a8.

Jñānagarbha. *Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā. sDe dge bsTan 'gyur* (*dBu ma*) 12 3881 sa 1–3b3.

Jñānagarbha. *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti. sDe dge* 12 3882 sa 3b3–15b1.

Kamalaśīla. *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā*. P. 101 5286 sa 84b7–143b2.

Kamalaśīla. *Madhyamakāloka*. P. 101 5287 sa 143b2–275a4.

Kamalaśīla. *Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi*. P.101 5289 sa 312a5–338a5.

van der kuijp, Leonard W. J. (1978). 'Phya-pa Chos-kyi seng-ge's Impact on Tibetan Epistemological Theory', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5: 355–369.

van der Kuijp, Leonard W. J. (1983). *Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology*, From the eleventh to the thirteenth century. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 26, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Lindtner, Chr. (1981). 'Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and its Sources', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9: 161–214.

Manorathanandin. *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*. Ed. by D. Shastri, *Pramāṇavārttika of Āchārya Dharmakīrti*. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati Series 3, 1968.

Mimaki, Katsumi (1982a). "Le Commentaire de Mi pham sur le *Jñānasārasamuccaya*", in L. A. Hercus *et al.* (ed.), *Indological and Buddhist Studies*, Volume in honour of Prof. J. W. de Jong on his sixtieth birthday. Canberra: Faculty of Asian studies of the Australian National University, pp. 353–376.

Mimaki, Katsumi (1982b). *bLo gsal grub mtha'*. Kyoto: Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusyo, University of Kyoto.

Mi pham rgya mtsho = 'Jam mgon 'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho (1846–1912): *dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bśad 'jam dbyaṅs bla ma dgyes pa'i żal luṅ*. *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, Gangtok, 1976.

Nāgārjuna. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Ed. by J. W. de Jong, Adyar: The Adyar Library and Research Center, 1977.

Prajñākaragupta. *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*. Ed. by R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna: Tibetan Sanskrit Works 1, 1953.

Śāntarakṣita. *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*. P. 101 5284 sa 48b7–52b1.

Śāntarakṣita. *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, P. 101 5285 sa 52b1–84b7.

Śāntarakṣita. *Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā* (attributed to Śāntarakṣita). *sDe dge* 12 (*dBu ma*) 3883 sa 15b2–52b7.

Se ra rje bstun chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469–1546). *Don bdun cu = bsTan bcos mṅon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi brjod bya dṅos po brgyad don bdun cu ṅes par 'byed pa'i thabs dam pa*. Ed. by Shunzo Onoda, *Rje btsun pa'i don bdun cu*, An Introduction to the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, Nagoya University: Studia Asiatica no. 6, 1983.

Se ra rje bstun chos kyi rgyal mtshan. *sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don = bsTan bcos mṅon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa daṅ bcas pa'i rnam bśad rnam pa gñis kyi dka' ba'i gnad gsal bar byed pa legs bśad skal bzaṅ klu dbaṅ kyi rol mtsho żes bya ba las skabs daṅ po'i spyi don*. Blockprint, textbook (*yig cha*) of Se ra byes monastery, Byllakuppe, Mysore district, Karnataka, India, 197?. IASWR microfiche R–1021. Old Se ra edition, Tohoku 6815 A.

Se ra rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan. *rNam 'grel spyi don = rGyas pa'i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi don 'grel rgyal tshab dgoṅs pa rab gsal żes bya ba le'u daṅ po'i dka' ba'i gnad la dogs pa gcod pa*. Blockprint, textbook of Se ra byes, 197?.

The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition. Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute, 1957.

Tillemans T. (forthcoming). "The 'Neither One nor Many' Argument for *Śūnyatā*, and its Tibetan Interpretations", to appear in the *Proceedings of the Csoma de Körös Symposium 1981*, published in the series, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde.

Tillemans T. (1982). "The 'Neither One nor Many' Argument for *Śūnyatā*, and its Tibetan Interpretations: Background Information and Source Materials". *Études de Lettres*, University of Lausanne, 3, July–September, pp. 103–128.

Tsoṅ kha pa = Tsoṅ kha pa bLo bzaṅ grags pa (1357–1419). *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*. Sarnath: P.E.S. Press, 1976. *Collected Works*, Vol. *ba* pp. 412–444. P. 153 ṅa 71b7–84b8.

Tsoṅ kha pa. *Draṅ ṅes legs bśad sñiṅ po*. Sarnath: P.E.S. Press, 1973. *Collected Works* Vol. *pha*, pp. 478–714.

Tsoṅ kha pa. *dGoṅ pa rab gsal = bsTan bcos chen po dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bśad dgoṅs pa rab gsal*. Sarnath: P.E.S. Press, 1973. *Collected Works*, Vol. *ma*, pp. 1–575.

Tsoṅ kha pa. *Legs bśad gser phreṅ = Śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ṅag gi bstan bcos mṅon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa daṅ bcas pa'i rgya cher bśad pa'i legs bśad gser phreṅ. Collected Works*, vol. *tsa*, pp. 1–633, *smad cha* Vol. *tsa*, pp. 1–209.

Tsoṅ kha pa. *gSuṅ 'bum = Khams gsum chos kyi rgyal po Tsoṅ kha pa chen po'i gsuṅ 'bum* (*Collected Works of Tsoṅ kha pa*). Delhi: dGe ldan gsuṅ rab mi ñams (mñam ?) rgyun phel series 79–105, published by Ṅag dbaṅ dge legs bde mo, 1975–79.

Vasubandhu, *Viṃśatika*. Ed. S. Lévi, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Paris, 1925.

Yoṅs 'dzin phur bu lcog byams pa tshul khrims rgya mtsho (1825–1901). *bsDus grwa = Tshad ma'i gźuṅ don 'byed pa'i bsdus grwa'i rnam bźag rigs lam 'phrul gyi lde'u mig* (3 books: *chuṅ, 'briṅ, che ba*). Dharamsala and Tashi Jong H. P. India, 197?.

ELI FRANCO

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF PRAMĀṆASAMUCCAYA(VṚTTI) I, 3d*

The main purpose of this paper is to point out that certain Buddhist logicians regarded universals, substances etc. as real entities, and that they based their opinion on *PS*(*V*) I, 3d.

While working on the *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* I came across a surprising Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa* which clearly implied that universals etc., are real entities. My first reaction was to assume that the Buddhist position is misrepresented by Jayarāśi, but my past experience with him taught me that, although he may use sophistical or unfair arguments against his opponents, he usually states their position most faithfully before attacking it. In my search for relevant material I have come so far upon nothing but a single sentence, again as a *pūrvapakṣa*, in the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, which confirms the information of the *TUS*. Moreover, by comparing and contrasting *pūrvapakṣa* with *siddhānta* in the *TS*(*P*) we may gain some insight, though necessarily fragmentary and insecure, into the reasons which led these logicians to give up some of the most basic principles consecrated in Buddhism almost from its very beginning. The main conclusions which I was able to draw from the *TS*(*P*) are: what led these Buddhists to accept universals was their understanding of Dignāga's theory of conceptual construction (*kalpanā*); they defined conceptual construction as a cognition which relates (or is capable of relating) the perceived object with a (real) universal etc.; their interpretation of *PS*(*V*) I, 3d had a considerable weight at that time; Śāntarakṣita und Kamalaśīla were strongly influenced by these commentators, and used some of their ideas in their own interpretation of Dignāga. (In fact, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla can only be understood with reference to these commentators. This is why they seem to have been misunderstood by modern scholars.)

I hope that this paper will substantiate all these claims. As for further philosophical implications which must have been realized as direct consequences of the acceptance of universals etc., I can say nothing at all. Nor do I know anything about the identity of these logicians or about their works. The only thing which seems certain is that they lived after Dharmakīrti (and before Śāntarakṣita, of course).

Journal of Indian Philosophy **12** (1984) 389–400. 0022–1791/84/0124–0389 $01.20.
© 1984 *by D. Reidel Publishing Company.*

Since the whole discussion evolves around *PS*(*V*) I, 3d, it may be quoted here for convenience's sake:

> *atha keyaṃ kalpanā nāma?*
> *nāmajātyādiyojanā//*
> *yadṛcchāśabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate ḍittha iti, jātiśabdeṣu jātyā gaur iti, guṇaśabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti, kriyāśabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka iti, dravyaśabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍī viṣāṇīti.*[1]

Professor Hattori translates this passage as follows: "What then, is this conceptual construction?

k. 3d. The association of a name (*nāman*), genus (*jāti*), etc., [with a thing perceived, which results in verbal designation of the thing].

In the case of arbitrary words (*yadṛcchā-śabda*, proper nouns), a thing (*artha*) distinguished by a name (*nāman*) is expressed by a word [such as] "Ḍittha". In the case of genus-words (*jāti-śabda*, common nouns), a thing distinguished by a genus is expressed by a word [such as] "*go*" (cow). In the case of quality-words (*guṇa-śabda*, adjectives), a thing distinguished by a quality is expressed by a word [such as] "*śukla*" (white). In the case of action-words (*kriyā-śabda*, verbal nouns) a thing distinguished by an action is expressed by a word [such as] "*pācaka*" (a cook, to cook). In the case of substance-words (*dravya-śabda*), a thing distinguished by a substance is expressed by a word [such as] "*daṇḍin*" (a staff-bearer) or "*viṣāṇin*" (horned, a horn-bearer)."[2]

It is well known that Dharmakīrti did not use the above classification of words into five categories in his definition of conceptual construction; instead he simply defined conceptual construction as a cognition characterized by a word (cf. Pramāṇaviniścaya I, 4bc: *rtog pa mṅon par brjod can gyi/ śes pa = abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpanā*[3]). Whether Dharmakīrti's definition is faithful to Dignāga's original intention or not, is a question which lies outside the scope of this paper. It is clear, however, that our logicians saw a discrepancy between them. They claimed that there are two types of conceptual construction, and that Dharmakīrti's definition covers only one of them. Their opinion is introduced by Kamalaśīla in the form of a short objection to Śāntarakṣita's definition of *Kalpanā* (*TSP* p. 451.9–10):[4]

> *nanu ca anye 'pi na kevalam abhilāpinīṃ pratītiṃ kalpanāṃ varṇayanti, kintu jātiguṇakriyādisambandhayogyām api, sā kasmān na gṛhyate?*

"Objection: Others, however, are of the opinion that conceptual construction is not only a cognition characterized by a word, but also [a cognition] which is capable of connecting a universal, a quality, an action etc., [with the perceived object]. Why is this [conceptual construction] not included [in the definition]?"

Unfortunately, Kamalaśīla does not tell us who theses 'others'[5] are. It seems to me, however, that we are dealing here with Buddhist commentators, although the opinion expressed is somewhat 'un-Buddhist'. Furthermore, since the context, in which the above definition of conceptual construction was originally proposed, is lost to us, we have to rely on Kamalaśīla for our interpretation. Now, it is clear from the discussion which follows the definition, that this second definition of conceptual construction is modelled on Dignāga's words, in *PS*(*V*) I, 3d, for after it has been rejected, the opponent asks: "If this is not a correct definition, how come it was used by Dignāga?" (*TSP* p. 451. 17–18)

The supposition that we deal here with Buddhist commentators is further corroborated by the first of the reasons which Śāntarakṣita gives for rejecting their opinion. It is that universals are not allowed (*apāsta*) (in Buddhist metaphysics presumably). This is a simple argument from authority, and it would have been useless if it were directed at somebody who stood outside the Buddhist camp.[6] Our supposition is also corroborated by the Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa* in the *TUS* according to which conceptual construction is a cognition produced *by* qualifications, such as quality, action, universal etc.[7] Thus, it seems quite certain that certain Buddhists did allow universals as real entities, and on top of that, justified their position by appealing to the authority of Dignāga himself.

Moreover, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla take some pains to refute this opinion, from which fact we may conclude that this interpretation of Dignāga carried considerable weight at that time.

The only reason why one would hesitate to regard these commentators as Buddhists is that their opinion does not fit within the general framework of the Buddhist system; and it is true that most Buddhist logicians did not allow universals. This argument, however, is rather weak, for there is no such thing as the Buddhist system, and there never was. We may use the term, of course, as a convenient historical fiction, but we should not forget that it is no more than that. Īśvarasena, for instance, with his three means of valid cognition and his four or perhaps even six characteristics of a valid inferential sign,[8] is at least as 'un-Buddhist' as our commentators here.

Nor can we consider theses commentators as "metaphysical dissidents". On the contrary, Kamalaśīla presents them as sincere, if misguided, followers of Dignāga, and not as independent philosophers.

In order to understand and appreciate the full impact of their interpretation of Dignāga, I shall have to present in some detail Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's counter-interpretations. Although it is highly unlikely that they are faithful interpretations of Dignāga, they are nevertheless of interest by themselves, not only as a testimony of Dignāga's 'Rezeption', but also as a nice illustration of certain formal aspects of Indian philosophical literature, for they contain quite a number of tricks used by commentators to interpret away problems. In fact, the whole discussion may serve as a marvelous example of what a commentator can do to a text when he does not like it, does not understand it, or both.

The refutation of the opinion according to which the universal is a real entity is not much of a problem for Śāntarakṣita. He repeats a well known argument against the universal, namely, that neigher the universal nor its connection with the individual are ever seen.[9] His real trouble starts when he tries to show that the opinion he has just rejected is not Dignāga's. In order to do that, he proposes several alternative explanations, all of them most incredible.

I. According to the first explanation, the compound *nāmajātyādiyojanā* is to be divided into two parts (*varga*): *nāmayojanā* and *jātyādiyojanā* (i.e. *nāmajātyadi*° is not a *bahuvrīhi*, but a *dvandva* the second member of which is of course a *bahuvrīhi* again). The first of these parts expresses Dignāga's own thought whereas the second expresses the thought of an opponent. Otherwise Dignāga would have simply said *nāmādiyojanā* or *jātyādiyojanā*.[10]

With regard to this explanation an objection is raised: conceptual construction is a property of a cognition, not a property of a thing, and the purpose of the passage is to show that it is the perception which is free from conceptual construction and not the perceived thing. But the relation described by Dignāga obtains between name, universal etc., on the one hand, and things which 'have' them (*tadvat*, i.e. which are their substrata) on the other. Thus what Dignāga says is irrelevant (*aprastuta*).[11] In order to meet this objection, I.1. Śāntarakṣita explains that the word "relation" (*yojanā*) denotes the cause of the relation. The cause of the relation is of course no other than the cognition in which a word appears (*āviṣṭābhilāpā pratītiḥ*), in as much as the cognition arises in the form of a relation between two things (although in reality nothing is related to anything, since all *dharmas* are devoid of activity).[12] Kamalaśīla provides two alternative ways to obtain this meaning:

I.1a. The compound *nāmajātyādiyojanā* is a *bahuvrīhi* with an ablative relation which qualifies the word *pratīti* (cognition), although the word *pratīti* doesn't even occur in the text. Even though it is not stated explicitly the division into *svamata* and *paramata* is still to be borne in mind, and thus we could translate the compound as "[the cognition] because of which there is a relation of a word[13] [according to me] and [a relation] of an universal etc., [according to my opponent] [with the thing perceived]."

I.1b. Alternatively, the explanation of "relation" as "the cause of the relation" can be obtained by a metonomy of the word for the effect on the cause (*kāraṇe kāryopacārāt*). Since the use of a metonymy without a purpose is not legitimate, Kamalaśīla explains that the purpose is to point out the nature of that cause which is distinguished from all the other causes.[14] The translation in the light of this interpretation would differ slightly in form, but not in meaning from the one in I.1a.

I.2. Śāntarakṣita proceeds to interpret Dignāga in yet a different manner. The compound is explained again as a *bahuvrīhi*, but this time it does not qualify the word *pratīti*, but the word *kalpanā* (conceptual construction), and it involves an instrumental relation.[15] The division into *sva-* and *paramata* is probably to be retained, and thus one could translate: "[Conceptual construction is] that by which (or perhaps: with which) a word [according to me] and an universal etc., [according to my opponent] are related [to the thing perceived]."

I think we can go back now to our starting point and try to understand what the 'others' were actually claiming. In doing so, several things should be borne in mind:

(1) Their statement refers to *PS*(*V*) I, 3d, and in fact it is an interpretation of it.

(2) The first part of the definition was formulated under the influence of Dharmakīrti (PV in quoted above).

(3) In the second part of the definition (*jātiguṇakriyādisambandhayogyām*) the word *nāman* does not appear, and it is not to be included under *ādi*.

(4) Śāntarakṣita's counter-interpretations, especially the division into *sva*- and *paramata*.

Putting all this together, the most plausible solution seems to me that the 'others' did what was done again and again in the history of Buddhist logic: they misunderstood Dignāga, because to some extent, at least, they were too strongly under Dharmakīrti's spell. To be more precise: they read the first sentence of the Vṛtti (*yadṛcchāśabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate ḍittha iti*) as identical with Dharmakīrti's definition of *kalpanā*. (The reason for this is not hard to guess, for under the theory of *anyāpoha* all words can be considered as arbitrary words.[16]) Then they were left with the rest of the Vṛtti which they could not fit in anymore, and consequently concluded that Dignāga was talking about two types of *kalpanā*: the one expressed in the first sentence, the other in the rest. Śāntarakṣita accepted this division, but claimed that the second part should be considered as a *pūrvapakṣa*. Unless we assume that Śāntarakṣita already had before him a division of the Vṛtti (and correspondingly of the *kārikā*) in two parts, his analysis of the *kārikā* as containing both Dignāga's thought and the thought of an opponent is, I think, hot intelligible.

Now, if this interpretation is accepted, a further question immediately arises: why couldn't Śāntarakṣita and the 'others' take the Vṛtti as one homogenous sentence? The answer was stated explicitly at the beginning of the discussion: because the universal does not exist. That is, both Śāntarakṣita and the 'others' considered that the second part of the Vṛtti implied the existence of the universal. The difference between them is that Śāntarakṣita was reluctant to attribute to Dignāga the opinion according to which the universal exists and claimed that this part of the text expresses the thought of an opponent; the 'others', on the other hand, simply accepted it as Dignāga's opinion. Indeed, if we say that "a thing distinguished by a genus is expressed by a word (such as) '*go*' (cow)", are we not presupposing that the thing exists, the genus exists, and that there is some sort of relation between them? Does the fact that a thing distinguished by a genus is expressed by some word diminish somehow the reality of the genus? If we say that a thing qualified by a quality such as white is expressed by the word "white", do we imply that the quality white does not exist? Certainly not! It is clear, therefore, that this unorthodox interpretation of Dignāga is not, linguistically speaking, impossible.

It is obvious from the above that, although Śāntarakṣita provides several interpretations which bear directly on the *kārikā*, it is not the *kārikā* which is problematic, but the Vṛtti (for the *kārikā* is laconic enough to be interpreted in every possible manner). In fact, it is only when one understands how Śāntarakṣita understood the Vṛtti that one understands why he is so troubled by the *kārikā*. In oder to find out the exact manner in which Śāntarakṣita understood the Vṛtti, we shall have to consider yet another interpretation of the compound *nāmajātyādiyojanā*, which is based on a different interpretation of the Vṛtti.

II. Śāntarakṣita probably felt that the division of the compound into two parts, the one containing Dignāga's thought, the other the thought of the opponent, was a bit far-fetched, and he gives another alternative explanation according to which the compound expresses only the position of Dignāga. According to this interpretation, the word *nāman* is to be understood as a genetive, and the word *jātyādi* as an instrumental.[17] Thus one may translate: "[Conceptual construction consists in] relating a word [with the thing perceived] by means of a universal etc."

(Hattori interprets this passage the other way around, i.e., as relating the universal with the thing perceived by means of a word, but his interpretation seems linguistically impossible.)[18]

Śāntarakṣita's last analysis of the compound is based on a different interpretation of the Vṛtti. As long as the compound was divided into *svamata* and *paramata*, the Vṛtti had to be read accordingly, viz. the first sentence (up to *ḍittha iti*) would express the theory of Dignāga, and the rest the theory of an opponent. If, however, the compound expresses only Dignāga's position, then, says Śāntarakṣita, the words "*nāmnā yukto 'rtha ucyate*" are to be connected with all the examples enumerated by Dignāga;[19] and Kamalaśīla explains: "Just as in the case of arbitrary words a thing distinguished by a word is expressed, in the same manner in the case of universal-words etc., [such as] 'cow' etc., a thing distinguished by a word is expressed."[20]

But what about the words *jāti, guṇa, kriyā* and *dravya* which equally appear in the instrumental case? These are instruments (*karaṇabhūta*). Thus the Vṛtti should be understood as follows: in the case of universal-words, a thing distinguished by a word is expressed by means of an universal, for instance 'cow'; in the same manner in the case of quality-words a thing distinguished by a word is expressed by means of a quality, for instance 'white'. The same is true for action-words and substance-words.[21]

The advantage of this interpretation is that it brings Dignāga's words close to Dharmakīrti's and Śāntarakṣita's definitions of *kalpanā* without dividing them into two parts, for every conceptual construction is now understood as relating the object with a word. Its disadvantage is that it implies that Dignāga accepted the universal and the rest as real entities. For if one says that the universal is an instrument for conceptual construction, one is bound to assume that the universal exists. This conclusion is quite surprising, for Śāntarakṣita started the whole discussion by claiming that the interpretation of *kalpanā* quoted at the beginning of this paper is not correct because the universal etc., do not exist. Does Śāntarakṣita, after going through all these painful and elaborate interpretations, finally admit that Dignāga accepted the existence of the universal? And if so, why take all this trouble?

I think Śāntarakṣita straddled the fence; on the one hand he probably suspected that Dignāga's words did imply the existence of universals, on the other hand he knew that Dignāga couldn't possibly allow universals. To solve this conflict he piled up as many interpretations as possible, probably not aiming to explain Dignāga's words, but rather to make them more obscure. The underlying message would be: we don't really know what Dignāga meant in this passage, but we know that he did not accept universals. Even if the last interpretation does imply the existence of universals, then the whole passage can be explained away as considering things from the point of view of empirical reality.[22]

However, we, to whom all these commentators' tricks are cruelly denied, cannot be satisfied with such explanations. Do we have to conclude then that Dignāga accepted the existence of universals? This is obviously absurd!

Do we have to conclude instead that Dignāga did not really mean what he said, or, as Satkari Mookerjee puts it, that "Dignāga, therefore, lays himself open to the charge of looseness of expression or confusion of thought or perhaps both by resorting to this tortuous formulation"[23]?

The whole trouble seems to be due to a simple confusion between attribute and predicate. It is clear from Śāntarakṣita's interpretation of the Vṛtti that he takes the word *viśiṣṭa* as an attribute of *artha*. Now, if we follow him, it follows that conceptual construction expresses a state of affairs which exists independently of it. If, on the other hand, we take the word *viśiṣṭa* as a predicate, the problem disappears. I am aware, of course, that this solution sounds alarmingly simple, but we should not forget that the ancient Buddhist philosophers were human like us, and as such were liable to mistakes, even simple ones. Thus I suggest the following translation of the Vṛtti:

"In the case of arbitrary words, a thing is expressed as distinguished by a name, [for instance] '*Ḍittha*'. In the case of genus-words, [a thing is expressed as distinguished] by a genus, [for instance] 'cow'. In the case of quality-words, [a thing is expressed as distinguished] by a quality, [for instance] 'white'. In the case of action-words, [a thing is expressed as distinguished] by an action, [for instance] 'a cook'. In the case of substance-words, [a thing is expressed as distinguished] by a substance, [for instance] 'a staff bearer', 'a horn bearer'."

Two more things might be added in this connection. According to Hattori, Dignāga's classification of words into five categories "seems to have been adopted from the Vaiyākaraṇas."[24] He may be right in general, but "Dignāga's identifying *viṣāṇin* as a *dravya*"[25] does not show that he bases his explanation on the *Mahābhāṣya* p. 1.6, as he claims.

After stating his own theory of conceptual construction, Dignāga says: *anye tv arthaśūnyaiḥ śabdair eva viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate*. ("On the other hand, others hold that what is expressed [in all these cases] is a thing qualified only by words which denote no real entity."[25]) Again, Hattori may be right in considering that "Although the text begins with "*anye tu*", it is evident that Dignāga introduced this sentence here with the intention of making his own point clear."[27] The real *pūrvapakṣa*, however, seems to be *Yogasūtra* 1.9[28]: *śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ*. "Conceptual construction does not denote a real entity in as much as it follows the cognition of a word."

Department of Philosophy,
Tel-Aviv University

NOTES

* I am indebted to Ms. K. Preisendanz who read the first draft of this paper and made most useful and stimulating suggestions.

[1] Sanskrit fragment quoted in M. Hattori, *Dignaga, On Perception* (Harvard Oriental Series 47, 1968), p. 83 nn. 1.26–27; cf. also p. 237b.16–20.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[3] Cf. T. Vetter, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam*, Wien 1966, p. 40.6–7 and n. 1.

[4] *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary '*Pañjikā*' of Shrī Kamalashīla, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Bauddha Bharati Series 1, Varanasi 1968.

[5] I will use the plural form throughout this paper to comply with '*anye*'. It is well known, however, that such plurals as *anye, eke, kecit* etc., may refer to a single person.

[6] Cf. *TS*. 1218:

> *jātyādiyojanāyogyām apy anye kalpanāṃ viduḥ /*
> *sā jātyāder apāstatvād adṛṣṭeś ca na saṅgatā //*

The possibility that the objection was raised by an opponent from outside the Buddhist camp, as an ironical teasing ("Even you Buddhists must accept that by conceptual construction one apprehends a real universal, since your master Dignāga himself said so") does not seem very probable either, for (again, relying on the way things are presented by Kamalaśīla) in that case one would expect something like *bhavatāpy abhyupagantavyam.*

[7] Cf. the *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa (ed. by S. Sanghavi and R. Parikh, G.O.S. 87, Baroda 1940), p. 32.14f.

[8] Cf. E. Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam*, Wien 1979, p. 123 n. 75.

[9] Cf. *TS* 1219:

> *jātyādīnām adṛṣṭatvāt tadyogāpratibhāsanāt /*
> *kṣīrodakādivac cārthe ghaṭanā ghaṭate katham //*

[10] Cf. *TS* 1220 and *TSP* ad loc.:

> *heyopādeyaviṣayakathanāya dvayoktitaḥ /*
> *parāparaprasiddheyaṃ kalpanā dvividhoditā //*

yadi tarhi jātyādiyojanā kalpanā na yuktaiva, tat kathaṃ lakṣaṇakāreṇoktaṃ: "nāmajātyādiyojanā kalpanā" iti? āha: heyetyādi. tatra heyā jātyādiyojanā paraprasiddhā kalpanā, upādeyā svaprasiddhā nāmayojanā kalpanā iti darśanāya dviprakārāpi kalpanā nirdiṣṭā. katham avagamyate? ity āha: dvayoktitaḥ. yasmān nāma ca jātyādayaś ca nāmajātyādayas teṣāṃ yojanā ity evaṃ vargadvayam uktaṃ; anyathā nāmādiyojanā, yadi vā jātyādiyojanā ity evaṃ vācyaṃ syāt. na cedaṃ parigaṇanam. ādiśabdavaiphalyaprasaṅgāt.

[11] Cf: *TSP* p. 451.24–26: *nanu ca kalpanā jñānadharmaḥ, tadvirahapratipādanam eva prakṛtaṃ pratyakṣādhikārāt, nārthadharmavirahapratipādanam, nāmajātyādīnāṃ ca yā yojanā tadvadbhiḥ, sārthagato dharmaḥ, na jñānasya; tataś cāprastutābhidhāyitvaṃ lakṣaṇakārasya.*

[12] Cf. *TS* 1221:

> *nāmādiyojanā ceyaṃ svanimittam anantaram /*
> *ākṣipya vartate yena tena nāprastutābhidhā //*

TSP p. 452.7–10: *anantaram=avyavahitaṃ nimittaṃ yat tasyāḥ kāraṇam. tat punar āviṣṭābhilāpā pratītiḥ. sā ca vastudvayānusandhānākārotpattitas tathā yojaneti vyapadiśyate. naiva tu kaścit kiṃcid yojayati, nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇām.*

[13] It is clear that by *nāman* Dignāga means a proper name (such as Ḍittha). Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, however, interpret *nāman* as a word in general (*śabda* or *abhilāpa*).

[14] Cf. *TSP* p. 452.10–13: *tasyākṣepo dvābhyāṃ prakārābhyāṃ: nāmādīnāṃ yojanā yato bhavati, sā tathoktā. gamakatvād vaiyadhikaraṇye 'pi ca bahuvrīhiḥ. kāraṇe kāryopacārād vā. upacārasya prayojanaṃ: tadanyakāraṇebhyo viśiṣṭakāryakāriṇaḥ svabhāvakhyāpanam.*

[15] Cf. *TS* 1222 and *TSP* ad loc.:

> *nāmajātyādayaḥ sarve yojyante vānayeti sā /*
> *tathoktā kalpanā proktā pratītir abhilāpinī //*

athavā yojyate 'nayeti yojanā, nāmajātyādīnāṃ yojaneti samāsaṃ kṛtvābhilāpiny eva kalpanā nirdiṣṭety adoṣa iti darśayati: nāmajātyādaya ityādi.

I am not quite sure how the word *sarve* is to be understood. Does Śāntarakṣita mean that an universal, a quality, an action and a substance are all, each single one, connected with a word in the same cognition? In this case the distinction between *sva-* and *paramata* is dropped. Then, however, one would have to reinterpret v. 1223 and 1224: v. 1223 does not introduce a new alternative, v. 1224 would apply the solution of 1222 to the Vṛtti, *yadvā* in 1223 would become problematic and would have to be left unclear (say, 'however'), *yady evam* in *TSP* 452.17 would refer to 1222, and not to 1223 ab (read *parihārāntaram* instead of *parihārāntam*). In this way all the structural difficulties emanating from this interpretation of *sarve* are perhaps solved, but unless Śāntarakṣita was trying to mislead his readers, 1223 must introduce a new alternative. I therefore think that the division into *sva-* and *paramata* is to be retained. It seems to me that by the word *sarve* Śāntarakṣita tried to emphasize that conceptual construction must be a cognition. In other words, when Dignāga presents his opponent's opinion, i.e., conceptual construction as a relation between an object and a universal etc., he does not talk about something like *samavāya*; just like in the case of his own theory of conceptual construction for his opponent as well the relation must be brought about by a cognition. Conceptual construction cannot be a property of the object, precisely because this does not hold good in the case of the word. Since relations between words and objects belong to the realm of cognitions, Śāntarakṣita can conclude that what is meant by Dignāga is nothing but a cognition characterized by a word. Amazing though it may seem, somebody probably managed to interpret Dignāga's *kalpanā* (or according to Śāntarakṣita: Dignāga's opponent's *kalpanā*) as a property of the object (cf. *TSP* p. 451.24–26, quoted in n. 12). This may also be the reason why Kamalaśīla is more satisfied with the explanation in 1222 than the one in 1221, for the cause of a relation between word and object, which appears in the cognition, does not have to be the cognition itself (it could be any cause, for instance *vṛddhavyavahāra*). Both attempts of Kamalaśīla to explain why by the cause of the relation all the other causes except the cognition are excluded – by stating that the compound qualifies the word cognition which does not even appear in the text, and by stating that one talks metonymically about the cause while using the word for the effect – are quite awkward. The solution in 1222 is more elegant, for by explaining *kalpanā* as 'that by which a word is related to an object', i.e., *kalpanā* as a sort of glue between word and object, it follows that *kalpanā* must be a verbal cognition.

[16] Cf. *TS* 1226:

> *nanv anyāpohavācyatvāj jātiśabdas tu kevalaḥ /*
> *vivakṣāparatantratvād yadṛcchāśabda eva vā //*

[17] Cf. *TS* 1224cd:

> *nāmno jātyādibhiḥ seyam ity artho 'dhyavatiṣṭhate //*

TSP p. 453.9–11: *nāmno jātyādibhir iti, yojaneti śeṣaḥ. seyam ity anena samāsārthalabhyāṃ kalpanām eva nirdiśati. jātyādibhir yojanā jātyādiyojanā, nāmno jātyādiyojanā seyaṃ nāmajātyādiyojanety ayaṃ samāsārtho 'dhyavatiṣṭhata iti yāvat.*

[18] Cf. Hattori, *op. cit.* p. 85: "Or, even if *jāti* etc. were admitted provisionally as entities, it must be noted that these are related to a thing only through the medium of *nāman*". Hattori's interpretation is based, I suppose, on *TSP* p. 453.5–6: *jātyā karaṇabhūtayā nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate gaur iti, tathā guṇādibhir iti*. But *karaṇabhūtayā* is a feminine adjective which must, therefore, qualify the feminine *jātyā* and not the neuter *nāmnā*.

[19] Cf. *TS* 1223:

> *yadvā svamatasiddhaiva kevalā kalpanoditā /*
> *sarvatra nāmnā yukto 'rtha ucyata iti yojanāt //*

(The change from *viśiṣṭa* to *yukta* is for pure metrical reasons.)

[20] Cf. *TSP* p. 452.22–25: *yathā yadṛcchāśabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyata, evaṃ jātyādiśabdeṣu gaur ityādiṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyata ity etat sarvatra granthe yojanīyam iti.*

[21] Cf. *TSP* p. 453.5–6, quoted in n. 18.

[22] Cf. *TSP* p. 454.24–455.12: *na śābaleyādivyaktivyatiriktā jātyādayaḥ paramārthikāḥ santi, sāṃvṛtās ta iti.*

[23] Cf. S. Mookerjee, *Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* (reprint Delhi 1975), p. 284.

[24] Cf. Hattori, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 237b and p. 25.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

[28] Cf. also *Nyāyasiddhi* of Jaipure Nārāyaṇa (ed. A. Subrahmanya Śāstri, Benares Hindu University Darśana Series 4, Benares 1961) p. 63.23–26: *vikalpaśabdena śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyaḥ pratyayaviśeṣa ucyate. tad uktaṃ*

> *śabdajñānānupātī yo 'tas tu śūnyaḥ sa ucyate /*
> *vikalpa iti tattvajñaiḥ kharaśṛṅgakhapuṣpavat // iti.*

tathā diṅnāgenāpi *sūtritam, śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpa iti.*

110160

BOOK REVIEW

Logical and Ethical Issues of Religious Belief, Bimal Krishna Matilal, University of Calcutta, 1982, pp. 186+.

This book by the Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at Oxford, is an extended version of his Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectures on Comparative Religion delivered in Calcutta in 1980. Professor Matilal takes up and considers with the clarity and learning we have come to associate with his work, various topics mainly in what may be called the philosophy of religion. The topics range from the distinctive characteristics present in Hindu philosophy of religion, through 'the problem of evil' and 'Ineffability', to the concept of necessity in Indian logic.

Here we have an example of the comparative philosophy of religion and indeed of comparative philosophy of a very high standard. In the last chapter Professor Matilal takes the trouble to discuss and justify the enterprise he has undertaken in the rest of the book. In brief, in this chapter his thesis is that if certain safeguards be followed, e.g. making and following the distinction between a religious faith-commitment and the dispassionate survey of one's own (and others') religious philosophy, divesting oneself of, or at least alerting oneself to, the prejudices that distort and cramp such an investigation, viz. that 'religious truth' is the monopoly of one's own religious tradition alone, then 'comparative religion' including comparative philosophy of religion (understood in the non-pejorative, literal senses of these expressions), can be a useful and viable exercise. I agree with this conclusion, though the discussion would have been helped by reference to the relevant ideas in such works as W. C. Smith's *The Meaning and End of Religion* and Tillich's *The Dynamics of Faith*. One such concerns the place of critical evaluation in the comparative endeavour. I am not happy with Professor Matilal's "tolerance principle" (my phrase) as a sound basis for this endeavour, viz. the a priori assumption, in contrast to the "intolerance principle" of the religious bigot, that all significant (religious) truths are necessarily multi-faceted in an egalitarian way, for example, that your way of looking at the Transcendent as essentially impersonal is on a par with my perception of the Transcendent as fundamentally personal. I do not deny that we may well have to say that many important (inter-) religious truths are thus faceted, but I also want to allow methodologically for the possibility that there is but incohate truth

Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 401.

11060

or even plain falsity in one facet in contrast to the greater truth-adequacy of another, in the light of certain truth-criteria, e.g., internal coherence, correspondence with experience, human ennoblement – which doubtless need to be discussed. In other words, in the many-faceted jewel of truth some facets may well be more flawed than others. This issue has not been taken up by Professor Matilal. I with to make a plea for "dispassionate passion" in the quest for truth, religious truth no less, a passion not necessarily inimical to humility, tolerance, sensitivity and receptivity in our dealings with those with whom we seem not to agree.

On the whole I found the comparative treatments insightful, informative, useful, and balanced (the chapters 'Problem of Evil' and 'Necessity and Indian Logic' being outstanding in this respect). Thus in the chapter on 'Ineffability' the section on 'The Buddhist Tetralemma', by eschewing simplistic logical explanations evinces a mature sensitivity to the purposes of religious language which both illuminates and stimulates further discussion. Occasionally I found grounds for complaint too. I have already given one example. Another would be unclarity, as I see it, in earlier sections of the chapter on ineffability. Here we are not told *how* mystical experience may be communicable through metaphor per se, and how it may be communicable through metaphor in contrast to paradox, or *whether* the intention of metaphor in this context is to convey *something* positive about the Ineffable in spite of over-riding apophatism in the fact of the latter, in contrast to the intention of paradox to affirm ineffability simpliciter.

As to the book's presentation one would do well to follow the table of corrections after p. 186. I have detected a number of others, some of the more noteworthy of which are: p. 6, li. 26, read: "the rich must go through the eye of a needle" etc.; p. 7, li. 2, for "more" read "mere"; p. 37, last sentence of middle para. read "Just as from the concept of freedom " etc. "it does not also necessarily follow that he would act rightly always"; p. 45, li. 16–17, read "gymnosophists"; p. 139, first line, remove "that"; p. 141, li. 12, insert "to" after "to"; p. 146, li. 8 put ":" after "form"; p. 161, li. 21, and p. 166, li. 16, read "alternatively" for "alternately". All these errors cannot swamp, however, what is a first-class work in the comparative philosophy of religion, though it is a pity that the book's considerable light in this area has been hid under the bushel of a comparatively inaccessible publication.

Cambridge University J. LIPNER

3/1 187

Compiled
1999-2000